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## IN THIS ISSUE

After many years in research in various major fields of sociology Robert E. Park is now engaged in setting forth the basic framework of his sociological system. One phase of this was published in an earlier article, "Reflections on Communication and Culture."<sup>1</sup> In the present article, "Symbiosis and Socialization," he is dealing with the field of human ecology in its relation to social organization and collective behavior. Dr. Park is professor emeritus of sociology at the University of Chicago and visiting professor of sociology at Fisk University.

The May issue of the *Journal* was devoted to a symposium on "The Relation between the Individual and the Group" from the standpoints of psychiatry, psychology, sociology, and cultural anthropology. The remaining papers in this number are further contributions to the same theme.

In the paper, "Field Theory and Experiment in Social Psychology: Autocratic and Democratic Group Atmospheres," Ronald Lippitt develops the experimental approach derived from field theory in social psychology in a study of authoritarian versus democratic leadership methods. Mr. Lippitt is a research assistant of Dr. Kurt Lewin, Iowa Child Welfare Research Station.

John Dollard in his article, "Culture, Society, Impulse, and Socialization," defines and differentiates these concepts which he proposes as basic in the field of social psychology. Dr. Dollard is a member of the staff of the Yale Institute for Human Relations, author of *The Criteria for a Life History, Southern Town*, and co-author of *Frustration and Aggression*.

In his paper "Emile Durkheim and Sociological Psychology" Harry Alpert reviews the contribution of Durkheim and warns against certain dangers involved in its use in sociological research. Harry Alpert, instructor at the College of the City of New York, received his doctorate degree in June of this year at Columbia University with a dissertation on "Emile Durkheim's Sociology."

"A Note on George H. Mead's *The Philosophy of the Act*" by Samuel M. Strong attempts to give an interpretation from the standpoint of social psychology of Mead's last posthumous volume. Mr. Strong is a graduate student at

<sup>1</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIV (1938), 187-205.

34,864 cases of mental disorder admitted to state hospitals and private sanitariums during a 13-year period constitute the basic data for this ecological study which shows certain distinct relationships between types of mental disorders and types of local communities in a large city.

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the University of Chicago and has interested himself in the problem of the application of social psychological concepts to appropriate research projects.

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## **In the September Issue<sup>1</sup>**

### **Status and Power**

Herbert Goldhamer and Edward A. Shils

**Social Role and Ego Security in Mormon  
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<sup>1</sup> Subject to revision.

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# THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

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## SYMBIOSIS AND SOCIALIZATION: A FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIETY

ROBERT E. PARK

### ABSTRACT

There are two fundamental types of interaction, namely, competition and communication, which are everywhere active in bringing into existence and maintaining the types of social order and organization characteristic of society. While these two principles operate everywhere in human society, they are by no means wholly or always absent in forms of association characteristic of the lower organisms. So-called plant and animal communities exist everywhere in which the different species live together in forms of association that may be described as symbiotic rather than social. Animals, and particularly insects, exhibit forms of association that are fundamentally familial, and based less upon competition than upon instinct and communication. In human society competition is progressively limited, as social relations become stabilized, by tradition and custom and by a moral order. In so far as the customary and moral order prevails over temporary impulses and interests of its individual members, society will be capable not only of concerted but consistent collective action. Social institutions are, in the first instance, effects of the efforts of societies to act collectively. The so-called "group mind" is merely a body of traditions, understandings, sentiments, and ideologies accumulated through conversation and communication, which make for any social group, social intercourse, understanding, and collective action possible. Socialization is the process by which the individual finds, at its various levels of social organization—ecological, economic, political, and moral or cultural—his place and function in society. The process by which the immigrant is incorporated in any social and cultural order is the reverse of that by which an individual born into a society finds his place in it.

### I. HUMAN SOCIETY AND HUMAN ECOLOGY

Human society everywhere presents itself to the disinterested observer in many, but particularly in two, divergent aspects. Society is obviously a collection of individuals living together, like plants and animals within the limits of a common habitat, and it is, of course, something more. It is, though perhaps not always, a col-

lection of individuals capable of some sort of concerted and consistent action.

Viewed abstractly, as it appears, perhaps, to the geographer or to the demographer, who scrutinizes it with reference to numbers, density, and distribution of the individual units of which it is made up, any society may seem no more than an agglomeration of discrete individuals, no one of which is visibly related to, or dependent upon, any other.

Closer observation of this seemingly unco-ordinated aggregate is likely to disclose a more or less typical order and pattern in the territorial distribution of its component units. Furthermore, as numbers increase this pattern is likely to exhibit a typical succession of changes. Such a settled and territorially organized society is ordinarily described as a community.

A more searching inquiry is likely to reveal the fact that this particular society, and others of the same type, so far from being, as the demographer might be disposed to conceive them, mere aggregates of statistical entities, are better described as constellations of interacting individuals, each individual unit strategically located with reference to its dependence upon every other, as well as upon the common habitat. One further item: the whole constellation will be in a state of more or less unstable equilibrium.

This condition of unstable equilibrium permits a community to preserve at once its functional unity and continuity—i.e., its identity in time and space—by the constant redistribution of its population with relatively minor readjustments of the functional relations of its individual units. In such a community the existing territorial order, as well as the functional relations of the individuals and of the groups of which the population is composed, will be measurably controlled by competition or, to use a more inclusive term, by what Darwin described as the "struggle for existence."

This, in brief and in substance, is the conception of human society as it appears from the point of view of human ecology. The main point is that the community so conceived is at once a territorial and a functional unit.

Described in this fashion, abstractly, and without reference to its other and more concrete characteristics, the human is not essentially

different from the plant community. I should like to add, if the comment were not wholly irrelevant, that it is a comfort in these days of turmoil and strife to realize that society and human beings, when in repose, do retain and exhibit some of the dignity and serenity of plants.

There is another point of view from which one may look at society—a point of view from which it does not appear as a community, not at least as a mere agglomeration of relatively fixed and settled units, but as an association of individuals participating in a collective act. The most obvious illustration of such a unit, the family, preserves its identity and integrity not merely when it is settled but when it migrates. Communities can hardly be said to migrate. Other examples of collective entities that act are mobs, gangs, political parties, pressure groups, classes, castes, nationalities, and nations. Anything that migrates in mass—a swarm of bees, a pack of wolves, or a herd of cattle—is likely to exhibit some or all of the characteristics of such societies as are capable of collective action.

It seems that every possible form of association is or should be capable, under certain circumstances, of collective action. But there are types of communities, the individual members of which live in a condition of interdependence that is sometimes described as social, which are, nevertheless, quite incapable of collective action. With the extension of commercial intercourse to every natural region of the earth one may perhaps say that the whole world is living in a kind of symbiosis; but the world community is at present, at least, quite incapable of collective action.

Symbiosis is ordinarily defined as the living together of distinct and dissimilar species, especially when the relationship is mutually beneficial.<sup>1</sup> But Wheeler, in his notable volume on the social insects, says that social life—all social life—“may, indeed, be regarded merely as a special form of symbiosis.”<sup>2</sup> Other writers would, perhaps, be disposed to regard every form of symbiotic relationship as

<sup>1</sup> See *An Ecological Glossary* (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1938), p. 268.

<sup>2</sup> William Morton Wheeler, *Social Life among the Insects* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1923), p. 195.

in some sense and to some degree social. At any rate there are many forms of human association in which there is co-operation sufficient to maintain a common economy, but no communication and no consensus sufficient to insure anything like effective collective action.<sup>3</sup> Any association in which widely scattered individuals unconsciously compete and co-operate, or by exchange of goods and services constitute themselves an economic unit, may be described as an entity that is symbiotic rather than social; that is, in the restricted sense in which the term is used when we think of the family as the prototype of every other species of social group.

But there are forms of association in which human beings live upon society as predators or parasites upon a host; or they live together in a relation in which they perform, directly or indirectly, some obscure function of mutual benefit but of which neither they nor their symbionts are conscious. All these varied forms of association may be described as examples of symbiosis, but they are forms of association that are not social in the sense in which that term is ordinarily applied to human relations, particularly such relations as are recognized by the custom and enforced by the expectation of the "customers."

One remembers the so-called "silent trade," of which we have some infrequent accounts in the history of European contacts with primitive peoples. Here there is contact—some sort of understanding but no custom. Was this form of association symbiotic or social? This is clearly a marginal case.<sup>4</sup> And then there are in India the "criminal tribes" and pariah peoples who live in a kind of symbiotic relation with other peoples of that country. And there are finally the occupational castes, where individuals and groups of individuals live and work together under the terms of some general understanding but do not eat together or marry. Castes are not species and they do, in spite of regulations forbidding it, interbreed. However caste relations may be regarded in some sense as symbiotic, since they bring peoples together in economic and industrial relations while they prohibit the intimacies and understandings which seem

<sup>3</sup> Robert E. Park, "Reflections on Communication and Culture," *American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1938, p. 192.

<sup>4</sup> P. J. Hamilton Grierson, *The Silent Trade* (Edinburgh, 1903).



necessary to participation in single moral order—such an order as one expects to find in a society democratically organized.

It is quite possible for castes to live together, each performing a distinct function in the economy of which it is a part. But it is likely to be difficult, though not impossible, for castes to participate in a collective act, such as is involved in the formation of a national state. The government of India is likely, when and if it achieves its independence of England, to retain its imperial character, since it will continue to be a collection of ethnic and linguistic minorities. Nationalism and imperialism, also, for that matter, invariably assume the existence of a kind of solidarity which is ordinarily created in the process of acting collectively, but which involves active participation of all individual units in the common purpose.

There are, of course, a great many kinds of collective action; the most elementary and the most pervasive is undoubtedly mass migration. Bees swarm, birds migrate, and human beings rush madly hither and yon in search for some new El Dorado or in hope of achieving somewhere a new Utopia. Collective action of every sort requires some form of communication; only in this way is it possible to achieve and maintain a concert and a consistency in the movements of individual units that we ordinarily ascribe to an act, in contrast with the casual and undirected movements in which mere impulse finds expression.<sup>5</sup>

It is apparent that we are concerned here with different types of association brought about and maintained, in the main and on the whole, one by competition and the other by communication, or both. The one is symbiotic and takes the form, ordinarily, of a division of labor among competing organisms or groups of organisms. The other is social in the ordinary and more restricted use of that term and is based on communication and consensus, which implies a kind of solidarity based on participation in a common enterprise and involving the more or less complete subordination of individuals to the intent and purpose of the group as a whole.

The way in which competition and communication function, the

<sup>5</sup> Walter Heape *et al.*, *Emigration, Migration and Nomadism* (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, Ltd., 1931), pp. 137-46; Charles Elton, *Animal Ecology* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1927), pp. 132-33.

one to bring about the further specialization and individuation of the individual and the other to bring about the integration and subordination of individuals to the interests of society, I have indicated in the paper on "Communication," cited above. What remains to be made clear is how these two types of organization, the symbiotic and the social, interact and combine to bring about the specific types of association—ecological, economic, political, or customary and cultural—which distinguish the institutions of society or the types of social organizations which constitute the subject matter of the several social sciences, ecology, economics, politics, and sociology.

Sociology, as ordinarily conceived, is primarily concerned with the nature and natural history of institutions; with the processes by which institutions develop and eventually evolve the specific and stable forms in which we know them. But customary cultural and moral relations are notoriously dependent on, and responsive to, political, economic, and, ultimately, those more elementary associations brought about by the sheer struggle for existence. And besides that, the more intimate and familial types of association grow up within an environment created by the freer, more individualistic, and secular association of a political and economic society.

## II. INSTITUTIONS AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

Institutions have their setting in actual interests and affairs of ordinary life and sometimes arise quite suddenly in response to the pressure of some necessity—a flood, a famine, a war—anything which makes collective action urgent. This is, at any rate, the way in which fascist institutions have arisen in Italy and Germany. Labor organizations, for example, came into existence in order to carry on strikes and to direct the slow-burning revolution which is gradually transforming the capitalist system. Courts of arbitration have arisen in the same way in order to deal with the conflicts of capital and labor in situations where, because of the existence of a constitutional struggle, administrative law could not be effectively applied in dealing with the situation.

Not every social movement terminates in a new institution, but the necessity of carrying on programs initiated in some social

emergency has been responsible for many if not most modern and recent institutions. Nor is it always possible to determine precisely the point at which a social movement merges into an institution. The ladies of the Y.W.C.A. used to say that theirs was not an institution but a movement. This was intended, perhaps, to distinguish it from the Y.M.C.A., which presumably had been a movement but had become an institution. Every social movement may, however, be described as a potential institution. And every institution may in turn be described as a movement that was once active and eruptive, like a volcano, but has since settled down to something like routine activity. It has, to change the metaphor, defined its aims, found its place and function in the social complex, achieved an organization, and, presumably, provided itself with a corps of functionaries to carry on its program. It becomes an institution finally when the community and the public it seeks to serve accept it, know what to expect of it, and adjust to it as a going concern. An institution may be regarded as finally established when the community and the public in which and for which it exists claim as a right the services to which they have become accustomed.

Other institutions arise more slowly and less obviously. Coming into existence under such circumstances, institutions are likely to be more deeply rooted in tradition and in the habits and human nature of the individuals of which the community is composed. In the natural course institutions may thus come to exist less as instruments for the performance of social functions than as interests of their functionaries or of one of the several classes of which the community is composed. In the latter case they are likely to impose themselves as a discipline and as external forms of control upon the generations that grow up under the influence of their tradition.

Much more might be said in regard to the manner in which social movements initiate and are eventually superseded by institutions. Social movements seem, in many instances, to be the source and origin not merely of new institutions but of new societies. But there are other aspects of collective behavior which, for the purposes of this paper, are more interesting and significant.

Sumner distinguishes between institutions which are (1) enacted and (2) institutions which are crevice—that is, institutions which

grow up and take form in the course of the historic process and those which, in so far as they are the product of reflection and rational purpose, have the character of an artifact rather than of an organism. In the long run, however, every institution will tend to have the character of something that is at least indigenous to the situation and the society in which it exists. The distinction Sumner makes is obvious enough. We do set up institutions and expect them to go like machines. Society is always more or less a work of art. On the other hand, institutions are always, finally, the accumulated effects of tradition and custom; they are always in process of becoming what they were predestined to be, human nature being what it is, rather than what they are and were.

There is, as Sumner says, implicit in every institution a concept and a philosophy. In the efforts of men acting together to pursue a consistent course of action in a changing world this concept emerges and the philosophy which was implicit becomes explicit. It may take the form of a rationalization or a justification for the institution's existence—what might be described as the institution's *apologia pro vita sua*. Although there may be implicit in the practices of every institution an idea and a philosophy, it is only in a changing society where it becomes necessary to defend or redefine its functions that this philosophy is likely to achieve a formal and dogmatic statement; and even then the body of sentiment and ideas which support these principles may remain, like an iceberg, more or less completely submerged in the "collective unconscious," whatever that is. It is furthermore only in a political society, in which a public exists that permits discussion, rather than in a society organized on a familial and authoritative basis that rational principles tend to supersede tradition and custom as a basis of organization and control. Besides, mankind has never been as completely rational in either its behavior or its thinking as was once supposed. As Sumner remarks, "property, marriage, and religion are still almost entirely in the mores."<sup>6</sup>

It is, however, in the nature of political society that every class, caste, institution, or other functional unit should have its own dogma and its individual life-program. In a familial society, dogma

<sup>6</sup> William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (New York: Ginn & Co., 1906), p. 54.

and ideology may perhaps be said to exist potentially and in the egg. They are not so likely to be stated formally as a rule or principle of action.

One of the recent extensions of the realm of the social has been the inclusion in the field of sociological investigation of the subject of knowledge itself. "The principle thesis of a sociology of knowledge is," as Mannheim has stated it, "that there are modes of thought which cannot be adequately understood as long as their social origins are obscured."<sup>7</sup>

This means that, from the point of a sociology of collective behavior, the ideology of a society or of a social group is, like its customs and its folkways, an integral part of its social structure and that one can no longer proceed on the assumption that "the single individual thinks: Rather it is more correct to insist that he participates in thinking further what other men have thought before him."<sup>8</sup>

The ideology of a class, caste, or social group seems to perform the same role in the functioning of a collective unit that the individual's conception of himself performs in the function of his personality. As the individual's conception of himself projects his acts into the future and in that fashion serves to control and direct the course of his career, so in the case of a society its ideology may be said to direct, control, and give consistency, in the vicissitudes of a changing world, to its collective acts.

The psychiatrists seem to have been the first to direct attention to the importance of the individual's self-consciousness in the understanding of his behavior. They were, also, among the first to take account of the fact that the individual's conception of himself, as long as he is socially oriented and sane, is always a more or less accurate reflection of his status in one or more social groups.

In somewhat the same fashion sociologists, some of whom got their inspiration and took their point of departure from Karl Marx, have arrived at the conclusion that the ideologies, not merely of economic classes but of cultural groups generally, are a by-product of their col-

<sup>7</sup> Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1936), p. 2.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

lective acts. "It is not," as Mannheim puts it, "men in general who think, or even isolated individuals who do the thinking, but men in certain groups who have developed a particular style of thought in an endless series of responses to certain typical situations characterizing their common position."<sup>9</sup>

This extension of the field of sociological investigation to include the natural history of the ideas, ideologies, intellectual dogmas, and those unconscious understandings which make concert, collective action, and above all conversation and discussion, possible, has brought within the purview of systematic investigation those very elements, in personality and in society, namely, the conceptual and rational, which scholasticism had forever put beyond the sphere of an empirical science and the possibility of a naturalistic explanation.

The theory that the state is a legal construction and in that sense a logical artifact has remained the last stronghold of a sociology that conceives itself as a philosophy rather than as a natural or empirical science. As a matter of fact the sociology of knowledge might well serve as prolegomena to the study of what has sometimes been referred to, although in the language which Mannheim expressly repudiates, as the "group mind."<sup>10</sup> The rather ghostly conceptions, "group thinking," "group mind," including the "general will" have haunted the minds of writers on political science and sociology, whenever and wherever they have tried to conceive the intrinsic nature of the bond which holds men together in such manner as makes collective action possible.

Almost the first attempt to investigate and describe collective behavior was Gustave Le Bon's volume, *The Crowd: A Study of Popular Mind*.<sup>11</sup> The character of the crowd, or of the psychological crowd, as Le Bon described it, was that of a heterogeneous group which, under the influence of some contagious excitement, had achieved a momentary but relatively complete moral solidarity in which every individual was completely submerged and dominated by the mood and purpose of the group as a whole. He said:

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>11</sup> New York, 1900; see also Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924 ed.), p. 869.

The psychological crowd is a provisional being formed of heterogeneous elements, which for a moment are combined, exactly as the cells which constitute a living body form by their reunion a new being which displays characteristics very different from these possessed by each of the cells singly.<sup>12</sup>

But the solidarity by which a heterogeneous and casually assembled collection of individuals is transformed into a "new being" is, naturally, not anything physical. It is, to use Le Bon's term, "psychological." The crowd, when organized, behaves according to the "law of the mental unity of crowds," and it is just the consensus and moral solidarity thus achieved which Le Bon describes as the "mind of the crowd," which gives that *omnium-gatherum* the character of a social entity.

In contrast with the organized or psychological crowd is the crowd in dissolution, i.e., the crowd in a state of panic, a stampede. In such a stampede the excitement may be quite as contagious as it is in the organized crowd but it will not express itself in a collective act. On the contrary the crowd in a state of panic acts as if every individual were for himself and "devil take the hindmost."

Le Bon, more than any other writer, has been able to lend to his conception of the collective mind a sense of reality which is lacking in other descriptions of the same phenomenon. Mary Austin, who writes interestingly but somewhat mystically of the behavior of sheep and shepherds, speaks of the "flock mind." Elsewhere we hear of the "public mind" or the "medieval" or the "modern" mind where, in the context, we are not certain whether those terms refer to an individual type or to a collective unit.

However, none of these is the kind of social unit with which Mannheim is concerned in his studies of the sociology of knowledge. The collective mind which he has sought to investigate is not that of a crowd where there is complete unanimity but rather that of a public where there is diversity of sentiments and of opinion. Nevertheless there is in such a public an underlying and more or less unconscious unanimity of purpose and intent. Consensus, under the circumstances, takes a more complex form which in logic is described as a "universe of discourse." One purpose of Mannheim's studies seems to have been to bring into clear consciousness this

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 889.

underlying unity and identity of intent which exists, or may exist, within the obvious diversity of opinions and attitudes. Characteristic of a public or any group involved in conversation and discussion is what I may describe as the dialectical process. But the dialectical movement of thought, in the course of a discussion, tends to assume the character of a collective act.<sup>13</sup>

The group mind, so called, whatever else the implication attached to the term, is always the product of communication. But this communication takes different forms in the crowd and the public. In the case of the mob or the psychological crowd communication takes place, to be sure, but individual A is not able to distinguish his own attitude from that of B, and vice versa. As Mead puts it, "one form does not know that communication is taking place with the other." Le Bon seeks to express the same idea when he describes as one of the incidents of the formation of a crowd the "disappearance of conscious personality and the turning of feeling and thoughts in a definite direction."<sup>14</sup>

In the public, communication takes the form of a conversation; an interchange of attitudes or, as Mead describes it, a "communication of gestures." In this form of communication individual A becomes aware of his own attitude by taking the role of B. In this way A sees his own act from the point of view of B and each participates, from his own point of view, in the collective act. This, says Mead, "carries the process of cooperative activity farther than it can be carried in the herd as such, or in the insect society."<sup>15</sup>

### III. PLANT COMMUNITIES AND ANIMAL SOCIETIES

In the meantime there has drawn up on the margins, if not quite within the framework of the social sciences, a body of organized knowledge that calls itself sometimes biological but more often sociological, but is, in any case, concerned with relations that are not ordinarily regarded as social; and it is concerned also with organisms, like plants and animals, which live together in forms of association that do not, in the sense that the term social applies to

<sup>13</sup> George H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 7 n.

<sup>14</sup> Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 887.

<sup>15</sup> Mead, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-55.



human beings, constitute them a society. Such, for example, are the plant associations, first observed and described by plant geographers, one of whom was the Danish ecologist, Eugenius Warming.

In 1895 Warming published a volume entitled *Plantesamfund* (Plant Community) in which he described the different plant species living together within the limits of a habitat as "practicing" a kind of natural economy and by so doing maintaining relations which constituted them a natural community. It is this economy and this community which is the special subject matter of the science of ecology.<sup>16</sup> Ecology has been described as "an extension of economics to the whole world of life."<sup>17</sup> But it is at the same time, as Charles Elton put it, not so much a new subject as a new name for an old one. It is a kind of natural history.<sup>18</sup>

A vast literature has come into existence since Warming's first attempt to describe and systematize what was known at that time of the communal life of plants, and this literature has been succeeded in turn by similar studies of plant and animal communities as well as of insect and animal societies. Ecology is concerned with communities rather than societies, though it is not easy to distinguish between them. Plant and animal sociology seems to include both forms of association. A plant community is, however, an association of diverse species. An animal society is more likely to be, like insect societies, an association of familial or genetic origin.

The first ecological studies were, however, geographical, concerned quite as much with the migration and distribution of plants and animals as with their dependence upon their physical habitats. More recently, following a cue suggested by Darwin in his *Origin of Species*, ecological studies have investigated not merely the in-

<sup>16</sup> Ecology is a term first used by Ernest Haeckel, the distinguished German biologist, in 1878, and is derived from the Greek *oikos*, which means house and is the root from which the word economics was coined.

<sup>17</sup> H. G. Wells, Julian S. Huxley, and G. P. Wells, *The Science of Life*, Vol. III (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1931), chap. v, p. 961.

<sup>18</sup> *Animal Ecology* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1927), p. 1; "Species that form a community must either practise the same economy, making approximately the same demands on its environment [as regards nourishment, light, moisture, etc.], or one species present must be dependent for its existence upon another species, sometimes to such an extent that . . . symbiosis seems to prevail between them" (Eugenius Warming, *Oecology of Plants* [Oxford, 1909], p. 12).

teractions and interdependencies of the plants and of plants and animals, including man, living in the same habitat but they have studied the biotic community itself in so far as it seemed to exhibit a unitary or organismic character. This emphasis upon the communal organization of plants and animals has more and more disposed students to describe the social and ecological relations of all living organisms in the language of the social sciences, of economics, of sociology, and even of political science.

Recently, W. C. Allee published a volume<sup>19</sup> which he described as "A Study of General Sociology." It was, in fact, a sort of first book of animal sociology since it dealt with what happens to animals when they come together temporarily in large numbers, like bats in a cave or bees in a swarm. These associations were inevitably, under the circumstances, of the elementary and abstract sort which mere propinquity enforces. Such aggregations are, in fact, mere population units in which there is spatial integration, to be sure, but no indication of social solidarity.

This publication was followed by the translation from the German of an imposing volume by J. Braun-Blanquet,<sup>20</sup> in which the complexities of the interrelations and interactions of the plants and plant species that constitute a plant community—including the physical conditions under which this communal life is maintained—are systematically analyzed and described.

Ecology is, it seems, in the way of becoming a social, without ceasing to be a biological, science. It is still concerned with the physical conditions which make plant and animal life possible, but the life for which these conditions exist, is not that of the different species merely but of some sort of social entity or superorganism of which the species are integral parts.

The effect of this extension of the concept of society and the social to include every form of association short of parasitism in which organisms of the same or different species practice a natural economy seems to extend indefinitely the number and the variety of social relationships and of social entities with which a general sociology is concerned. "The whole field of interrelationships of

<sup>19</sup> *Animal Aggregations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931).

<sup>20</sup> *Plant Sociology* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1932).

organisms," says Allee, "must be taken as the content of a general sociology."<sup>21</sup> This conception of the social indicates a wide field for taxonomic exploration since it suggests that the realm of the social is coterminous with the active interaction of living organisms in what Darwin described as "the web of life." It is in this sense that Darwin's theory of the origin of the species may be regarded, as J. Arthur Thompson says, as an application of a sociological principle to the facts of natural history.

Meanwhile the area within which a world-wide struggle for existence is operative is steadily expanding and, seeing that microbes travel by the same means as men, the dangers of disease and the dangers of war tend to grow *pari passu* with increased use of every form of transportation, including the most recent, the airplane. Thus the web of life which holds within its meshes all living organisms is visibly tightening, and there is in every part of the world obviously a growing interdependence of all living creatures; a vital interdependence that is more extensive and intimate today than at any other period in the course of the long historical process.

In spite of the extraordinary variety of associations which the studies of the plant and animal sociologists have revealed, all or most of the more general types seem to be represented in human society. In fact one thing that makes the study of plant and animal associations interesting is that plant and animal communities so frequently exhibit, in strangely different contexts, forms of associations that are fundamentally like those with which we are familiar in human society. Besides, they exhibit, singly and in isolation, types of association which in human society are overlayed by other later and more elaborate forms. For example, the plant community is an association in which the relations between individual species may be described as purely economic. The plant community, in other words, is not, as is the case of insect and animal societies, a genetic association in which the individual units are held together by natural and instinctive ties of family and the necessities of procreation and the protection of the young.

Plants cast down their seeds on the ground from whence they are borne away on wind, wave, or any other convenience which

<sup>21</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

chance offers. Thus plants once established on the soil and in a habitat are obviously immobile, but the plant species are more easily and widely dispersed than animals. Plants of the same species, because they make the same demands upon the natural resources of the habitat, are likely to be dispersed by competition. For the same reason plants which make different demands upon the natural resources—i.e., light, moisture, and the chemical elements which they take from the soil and air—tend to become associated because, as each species finds its niche in the community, competition is diminished and the total production of the plant community, if one may speak of production in this connection, is increased.

Plant communities do not, of course, act collectively as animals do, but the associations they form, partly by a natural selection of species and partly by adaptation and accommodation of individuals—as in the case of the vine and the fig tree—do, by diminishing competition within and by resisting invasion from without, make more secure the life of the community and of the individuals of which it is composed.

The plant community is perhaps the only form of association in which competition is free and unrestricted, and even there competition is limited to some extent by the mere passive resistance offered by the association and co-ordination of different species of which the community is composed. This limitation of competition is, however, purely external and not the result, as in the case of animals and man, of either instinctive or intelligent inhibition.<sup>22</sup>

The needs of plants as of every other organism are twofold. There is the need to preserve the individual in his struggle to complete his own life-cycle and there is the need of preserving the continued existence of the species. Plants provide these two necessities, however, in ways that differ fundamentally from animals or at least from those animals that maintain a family and a social existence. Braun-Blanquet says:

<sup>22</sup> "Primitive man, just as much as civilized man, has his own strong inward and outward ties and inhibitions beyond which he cannot go (Thurnwald); and the behavior of an animal is determined in exactly the same way by the inner and outer restraints which are imposed upon it. Whosoever believes that sexual inhibitions do not exist for animals is on the wrong road altogether" (Friedrich Alverdes, *Social Life in the Animal World* [New York, 1927], pp. 12-13).

The principles of usefulness, of division of labor, of conscious support, of marshaling all resources for the accomplishment of a common purpose do not exist in the plant world. The struggle for existence rules here undisturbed. It regulates directly or indirectly all the unconscious expressions of the social life of plants. Herein lies the deep and fundamental difference between the vital relations of plant and those of animal communities.<sup>23</sup>

Insect societies, as contrasted with the freedom and anarchy of plant communities, are well-nigh perfect examples of an industrial regimentation and of a communism in which the individual is completely subordinated to the interests of the society. The explanation is that insect societies are merely large families in which the functions, not only of the sexes but of so-called castes, are fixed at birth in their physiological structure.<sup>24</sup>

This does not mean that there is in insect societies nothing that corresponds to the symbiotic forms of association characteristic of plant communities. On the contrary, social insects, notably the social ants, live in symbiotic relation with a number of other insects. In fact, as Wheeler remarks, "ants may be said to have domesticated a greater number of animals than we have and the same statement may prove to be true of their food plants which have been carefully studied."<sup>25</sup>

It is more difficult in the case of the social animals than of the social insects to define the difference between forms of association

<sup>23</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

<sup>24</sup> . . . In striking contrast with men, ants have to be built for their jobs. They do not make tools; they grow them as parts of their bodies. . . . Each species of ant is thus built specially for its own particular kind of life and is quite unadaptable to any other. Even within the single community there is the same kind of specialized physical diversity. Only the males and females have wings; the neuters grow up wingless. The neuters have much bigger brains than the males or the queens; but, as they never have to fly, their eyes are smaller. . . . This physical diversity goes hand in hand with diversity of behaviour. The males do nothing but fertilize the queens when the time comes. The queens lay eggs eternally. The workers have the instinct of tending the young, the soldiers are impelled to bite and snap in defence of the colony. The workers of one kind of ant keep ant-cows, but never look at grain or make raids on other ants. Those of a second are only graminivorous, those of a third live by slave-labour. Thus the division of labour in an ant-community, unlike the division of labour in a human community, is based on marked, inborn individual differences of structure and instinctive behaviour between its members (Wells, Huxley, and Wells, *op. cit.*, IV, 1163-64).

<sup>25</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

that are symbiotic and those which are social. Thus Alverdes<sup>26</sup> distinguishes between what he calls associations (mere collections) and societies. By associations he means those aggregations of animals that otherwise carry on a solitary existence, but do, at some period in their seasonal or life-cycle, come together in response to occasional and external causes. By societies, on the other hand, he means those more permanent groups, including insect societies, in which individuals come together in response to the needs and instinctive urges of the individual organisms. This means that the form which an animal society does take is the one it was predestined to assume by the nature of the inheritance of the individuals of which it was composed. "In short," says Alverdes, "no social instinct, no society."

There are two types of association, aside from those occasional aggregations already referred to, which may have arisen in response to "instincts" rather than to external forces. These are the family and the herd or flock. In both cases the particular form which solidarity takes undoubtedly has an inherited and instinctive basis. What operates to modify this form of association and determine the collective activities of the individuals so associated is, among other things, the character of the communication of which the group is capable. Thus among the anthropoid apes, as among the birds, there seems to exist, as there frequently does between a man and his dog, a responsiveness, an understanding and intimacy not unlike that characteristic of personal relations among human beings.<sup>27</sup>

The extent to which animals of the herd or flock are responsive to the expressive behavior of other animals is most obvious on the occasions where some excitement, whipped up by the milling of the herd or flock, mounts to a point where it issues in a panic or stampede. The milling herd is in so many respects like the organized crowd, as Le Bon has conceived it, that one wonders that it does not, as in the case of a mob, express its excitement in a collective act. The mob is, in fact, the crowd that acts. But a stampede, because in

<sup>26</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 14-16.

<sup>27</sup> Wolfgang Köhler, *The Mentality of Apes* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., 1927); see Appendix, "Some Contributions to the Psychology of Chimpanzees," particularly pp. 282-311; see also Alverdes, *op. cit.*, "Mutual Understanding and Imitation," chap. ix, pp. 164-78.

this case the impulses and actions of the individuals involved are not co-ordinated, does not take the form of a collective act. There is no stampede "mind."

The herd does not act but it does, in the course of its milling about, perform something that might be called a dance. Mary Austin says:

It is doubtful if the herder is anything more to the flock than an incident of the range, except as a giver of salt, for the only cry they make to him is the salt cry. When the natural craving is at the point of urgency they circle about his camp or his cabin, leaving off feeding for that business; and nothing else offering, they will continue this headlong circling about a boulder or any object bulking large in their immediate neighborhood remotely resembling the aperturances of man, as if they had learned nothing since they were free to find licks for themselves, except that salt comes by bestowal and in conjunction with the vaguely indeterminate lumps of matter that associate with man. . . . This one quavering bleat, (the salt cry) unmistakable to the sheepman even at a distance, is the only new note in the sheep's vocabulary, and the only one which passes with intention from himself to man. As for the call of distress which a leader raised by hand may make to his master, it is not new, is not common to flock usage, and is swamped utterly in the obsession of the flock-mind.<sup>28</sup>

Why does this dance of the restless flock not, as Mary Austin's description suggests it might, assume the form of a ceremony? Why, in other words, does this collective excitement not take on the character of ritual or a symbolic act? The mass games described by Groos (*The Play of Animals*) and the sham, and sometimes very real, battles in which birds and other animals engage during the mating season, seem to be fundamentally expressive, merely. Groos calls them orgiastic in character.<sup>29</sup>

Mass behavior of that sort in animals is not unlike the same expressive and orgiastic behavior in human beings, since the crowd that dances rather than acts is at any rate a "psychological" if not an "organized" crowd. The behavior of animals under the influence of collective excitement is to such an extent like that of crowds everywhere that Alverdes, in his effort to indicate the character of the solidarity which is created by the rise in the herd of this contagious excitement, has recourse again to the conception of the "collective mind." This phrase cannot, however, be regarded as an

<sup>28</sup> *The Flock* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1906), pp. 127-29.

<sup>29</sup> Alverdes, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-51.

explanation of the phenomena to which it refers. It may be, like the "instincts" to which Alverdes refers in his description of animal society, inexplicable. In that case "collective mind" is merely the name we give to a phenomenon that needs to be further investigated.

What are these phenomena? Alverdes says:

Among social species, courage and pugnacity grow in proportion to the number of individuals present; this is true of ants, bees, bumble bees, wasps, hornets, and others. In the case of the honey bee, a small and weak community often does not defend itself against enemies which it could easily repulse, whereas a strong community is always ready for attack, and expels every intruder. According to Forel, one and the same ant which is full of courage among its fellows will take to flight before a much weaker adversary as soon as it finds itself alone. State-building insects are overcome by profound depression if their nest disappears.<sup>30</sup>

What distinguishes the collective mind of the lower animals from that of the human crowd is the fact that the contagious excitements which arise in the herd do not, as in the case of the psychological crowd, issue in either collective action or in anything like ceremonial behavior. What is even more significant, these excitements do not finally take the form of institutions. It is the possession of institutions which distinguishes human from animal societies. Institutions, however, seem to be, finally, the product of the type of dialectical or rational communication which is the peculiar characteristic of human beings.

#### IV. SOCIALIZATION

This brief survey of the forms of association, the communal and social, in which individual organisms maintain some sort of collective existence, suggests that it is pertinent to repeat here in regard to socialization—the process by which associations are formed—what was said earlier, in somewhat different language, in regard to two types of association, or two aspects of society. Socialization and social organization seem at any rate to be brought about by the co-operation of two fundamental types of interaction. There is in every society a process or processes of individuation and a process or processes of integration. The effect of competition is to disperse existing aggregations of organisms and by so doing to bring

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 142.



about, as a result of adaptation to new environments, the creation of new races and species. But the existence within a habitat of diverse species and races makes possible a new association and a natural economy, based on genetic diversity rather than genetic identity.

In human societies a division of labor based upon a diversity of occupations and enforced by economic competition performs the function which, in the plant community or other biotic associations, is performed by symbiosis.

There is, however, or there presently emerges in both animal and human societies, the necessity for a more stable form of association than that which either biotic or economic competition and co-operation is sufficient to produce. Such a more stable form of association is likely to occur whenever the interaction of the competing organisms, by adaptation to the habitat or in any other fashion, achieves a relatively stable equilibrium. In such a situation, with the gradual rise in the animal species of a capacity for and means of communication—by which animals as well as human beings have been able to respond to the minds and intentions of other animals—a new and more intimate type of solidarity is made possible; a solidarity which enables societies to co-ordinate and direct the acts of their individual components in accordance with the interests and purposes of the society as a whole.

Thus a society may be said to arise upon the basis of a community. The distinction is that in the community, as in the case of the plant and animal community, the nexus which unites individuals of which the community is composed is some kind of symbiosis or some form of division of labor. A society, on the other hand, is constituted by a more intimate form of association based on communication, consensus, and custom.

The social organism, as Herbert Spencer conceived it, was based on the existence in society of a division of labor. It is in this sense, also, that F. E. Clements and others have described the plant community as an organism.<sup>31</sup> But the social organism thus conceived had, as Spencer points out, no sensorium. There was no central apparatus where the sensations and impulses of the individual units

<sup>31</sup> Braun-Blanquet, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

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of which a society is composed could be sorted out, assimilated, and integrated, so that society could act consistently in response to them. Society and the superorganism have, to be sure, no sensorium, but individuals in society do communicate and somehow they do achieve that sort of consensus that Comte believed was the essential and fundamental trait of any society. This communication and the accumulated body of tradition on which it is based is what is sometimes referred to as the "collective mind."

Society, theoretically at least, begins as Allee pointed out, with a mere aggregation, i.e., a population unit. But even on this level of association there is interaction of some sort. On the economic level, as we know economic relations in human society, competition and the struggle for existence continue, but as social relations multiply this struggle is more and more restricted by understandings, by customs, by formal and contractual relations, and by law. All of these impose restrictions, in the interest of an evolving society and of the manifold social and collective units of which such a society is composed, upon the free competition of individuals in the original aggregate or population unit.

On the political level the freedom and competition of individuals is still further limited by the express recognition of the superior and sovereign interests and rights of the state or of the community as a whole, as against the adverse interests or claims of individuals or groups of individuals, living within or under the protection of the state or other political authority. The existence of such sovereignty as the state exercises, however, is dependent upon the existence of a solidarity within the state or other territorial and political unit, sufficient to maintain that authority and enforce its behests when they come into conflict with the interests and the purposes of individuals.

Eventually this competition of individuals is restricted and restrained on the personal and moral level of association by the claims which intimate associations with, and knowledge of, the needs, the attitudes, and the sentiments of others make upon us, particularly when these are re-enforced by tradition, customs, and the normal expectations of mankind. Every individual who is or will eventually be incorporated into any society, whether it be an alien coming from

some other ethnic or cultural group or one born into the association and society of which he is a member, inevitably passes through such a process of socialization. The process of socialization as it takes place in the formation of any social group today reflects in a way the phylogenic processes by which existing types of association, or societies, and of institutions have come into existence in the course of the historic process.

Looked at in a historical perspective we observe that the progressive socialization of the world, that is, the incorporation of all the peoples of the earth in a world-wide economy, which has laid the foundation for the rising world-wide political and moral order—the great society—is but a repetition of the processes that take place wherever and whenever individuals come together to carry on a common life and to form the institutions—economic, political, or cultural—to make that common life effective.

But below the level of those forms of associations which we call social is the biotic community and the ecological organization in which man finds himself involved in competition and co-operation with all other living organisms. Thus we may represent human society as a kind of cone or triangle, of which the basis is the ecological organization of human beings living together in a territorial unit, region, or natural area. On this level the struggle for existence may go on, will go on, unobserved and relatively unrestricted.

If one is an alien he may live in the new society for a considerable time in a relationship which is essentially symbiotic, that is, a relationship in which he does not feel the pressure of the customs and expectations of the society by which he is surrounded. Or he may, if he is conscious of the social pressure, still experience it as something alien to him and continue to treat the people with whom he comes in contact as part of the flora and fauna, a situation in which their social pressures would impose upon him no moral claims which he felt bound to respect. But eventually the mere presence of an alien who is possessed by such a dispassionate and secular attitude toward the customs, conventions, and ideals of the society of which he has become, by the effect of propinquity and whether he chose to be or not, a constituent element, is certain to bring him, no matter how discrete his behavior, into conflict with those to whom their cus-

toms, if not sacred, are at least to such an extent accepted; that a too great detachment toward them is certain to be offensive if not a little shocking. Such an alien attitude, in any case, inevitably stimulates in the native a pervasive sense of malaise as if in the presence of something not quite understood and hence always a little to be feared.

This is not, of course, the only way so-called "culture conflicts" may arise. It is, perhaps, the most insidious form in which they are likely to appear. Conflict, which is merely conscious competition—that is, competition in a situation in which the competitor knows with whom and with what he is competing—creates, to be sure, a solidarity in the competing groups. Solidarity in the in-group, as Sumner has pointed out, is always more or less an effect of conflict with an out-group,

Conflict is, however, like competition, an individuating factor in society. It affects the individual not merely in his vocation and in his position in the economic order but affects him in his personal relations. It affects his status and very largely determines the conception which he forms of himself. It is in conflict situations that economic competition, the struggle for a livelihood, tends to become a struggle for political and social status.

However, conflict leads to understandings; understandings not merely implicit but explicit and formal. Conflict is the most elementary form of political behavior, and formal understandings, involving controversy and discussion, terminate in accommodations, in the formation of classes, and in formal and contractual relations of various sorts. Political conflict, when it does not lead to the formation of classes, does at least bring about class consciousness, and politics seem to be merely the classic and typical form in which the class struggle is carried on.

More intimate associations in the family and in the neighborhood as well as by occupation and class tend to develop more intimate personal understandings. Particularly is this the case within the limits of what Cooley calls the "primary group," i.e., the family, the neighborhood, and the village.

The process of socialization may be said to terminate in assimilation, which involves the more or less complete incorporation of the

individual into the existing moral order as well as the more or less complete inhibition of competition. Under these circumstances conflict takes the form of rivalry, more or less generous.

The child born into a society may be said to go through the same process of socialization as the stranger who is finally adopted into a new society. The difference is that in the child's case the process begins with assimilation and ends with individuation and emancipation, i.e., emancipation from the traditions and claims of the family and primary group. The process of individuation ordinarily continues with his participation in an ever wider circle of political and economic association. The child's life begins, to be sure, without those human traits that we describe as personal. Most of the child's personality traits seem to be acquired in intimate associations with other human beings. But children are very rapidly and very completely incorporated into the societies in which birth or chance finds them. Only gradually do they achieve the independence and individuality we associate with maturity. One is assimilated into the little world of the family, but he achieves independence and individuality in the larger, freer world of men and affairs.

One begins life as an individual organism involved in a struggle with other organisms for mere existence. It is this elementary form of association that we describe as ecological. One becomes involved later in personal and moral, eventually economic and occupational, and ultimately political, associations; in short, with all the forms of association we call social. In this way society and the person, or, the socialized individual, came into existence as a result of essentially the same social processes and as a result of the same cycle or succession of events.

# FIELD THEORY AND EXPERIMENT IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: AUTOCRATIC AND DEMO- CRATIC GROUP ATMOSPHERES

RONALD LIPPITT

## ABSTRACT

The author illustrates briefly the type of research projects which may be expected to emerge from the field-theoretical formulation of sociological and sociopsychological problems. A "total behavior" technique of observation of group and individual child behavior is briefly described which attempts to record all meaningful social behavior in its proper relationship to other facts of the "total field" of coexisting phenomena influencing behavior. By the experimental manipulation of the social atmospheres of two children's clubs, using the variable of authoritarian versus democratic leadership methods, it is indicated that quantitative and qualitative data were secured which seem to clarify in a preliminary, empirical fashion, such dynamic concepts as *group locomotion*, *group goal*, *degree of group unity*, *group stratification*, *group and member space of free movement*, *social powerfield*, *degree of belongingness*, and *membership status*. A preliminary approach to the problem of analyzing the same material (social-behavior data) from the sociological and psychological points of view, using the same realm of discourse, is attempted.

As Dr. Lewin has pointed out,<sup>1</sup> the social atmosphere is one of the outstanding characteristics of the total psychological field of the individual. An adequate field-theoretical approach to sociopsychological investigation seems to demand a simultaneous study of the major characteristics of this social field (e.g., properties of the social group) and of the adjustment of the particular individual (e.g., a feeling of personal insecurity in the social situation) to the quasi-social facts of his total life-space. Our interest in an experimental clarification of sociopsychological problems and in the concepts for dealing with them brings us face to face, immediately, with several practical problems which need to be examined briefly.

What types of social situations are amenable to truly experimental investigation? What can we learn about the dynamics of authoritarianism, democracy, minority-group reactions, the creation of scapegoats, by intensive observation of experimental clubs of chil-

<sup>1</sup> Kurt Lewin, "Field Theory and Experiment in Social Psychology: Concepts and Methods," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIV, No. 6, May, 1939.

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—Because of the interdependence of this article and of Dr. Lewin's referred to here, it was originally planned to publish both in the May issue. Owing, however, to lack of space in the May issue, it was unfortunately necessary to defer Mr. Lippitt's.]

dren? Clearly it is meaningless to be guided by such questions as: What is "the" prototype of democracy? What is the "true" autocracy? How does the "typical" minority group react to persecution? The investigator should realize from the start that there are many varieties of such social atmospheres, which the experimentalist can only try to attack one at a time. The choice of a particular constellation (e.g., kind of democratic atmosphere) for experimental study should be less guided by the attempt to copy some historically given case than by the attempt to realize those types of group atmospheres which promise the best insight into the underlying dynamics and laws. Only the insight into these laws, and not the search for some prototype, will enable us to answer such a question as: What are the common properties and individual differences of particular authoritarian and democratic groups? To make adequate experimental manipulation possible, rather small social constellations (i.e., clubs rather than "social orders") were created. If, however, the experimenter can really create the constellation he wishes to study, in terms of types of events and the pattern of the social setting, even though on a small scale, he will go a long way toward understanding the laws of this constellation, even though the size of the group and the intensity of the social experience do not duplicate the larger social situations.

To get on a step farther, we must ask: How shall we observe and analyze behavior, group and individual, in an experimental situation? In setting up techniques of observation and analysis one must keep in mind that, field-theoretically, we will (a) regard the group as a whole, existing in a larger social field with many overlapping dynamic relationships (e.g., influence of family and school memberships); (b) regard the group as composed of interdependent parts or members, taking the criterion of interdependence as basic for the definition of a social group; (c) regard each member as existing in a social field in which even the "individuality" problems must be viewed in a framework of group membership; and (d) observe group and individual activities in terms of meaningful psychological units of behavior, as discussed by Barker, Dembo, and Lewin (1),<sup>2</sup> rather than in terms of relatively meaningless and arbitrary physical time

<sup>2</sup> Numbers in parentheses refer to works cited in Bibliography at end of article.

units. Specific items of observation will always be related to their larger setting. We find that data gathered in this fashion can usefully be analyzed with a double frame of reference—the individual psychology of the group member and the collective behavior of the group regarded as a dynamic unity.

To deserve the description “experimental,” the sociological or psychological study must go beyond refined observation techniques to actual manipulation of certain variables, with others controlled. The data which will be quoted below, in attempting to indicate the promise of a field-theoretical, experimental approach to sociopsychological problems, are drawn chiefly from a preliminary study by the present writer. Two experimental mask-making clubs were organized, with one major variable operating to create different social atmospheres, an authoritarian versus a democratic type of leadership. In selecting the club members from a larger number of volunteers, a variety of techniques (e.g., Moreno’s sociometric type of questionnaire, teacher interviews, child interviews, and playground observations) were utilized to equate the clubs on such items as: number, intensity, and nature of interpersonal relationships; group-status stratification in terms of popularity, leadership ability, and intellectual ability; and the variety and type of other group memberships which might influence behavior in the new club situation, such as the freedom or rigidity of the home atmosphere, the type of discipline in the school situation, and the reaction to membership in other organized groups, such as the Boy Scouts. A detailed account of the techniques is given elsewhere (5, 6). Many of the “standard” controlled variables become relatively unimportant in this type of research project (e.g., small differences in intelligence quotient or chronological age), and a number of variables which are usually neglected require careful attention (e.g., friendship connections and the nature of overlapping group memberships). If we are careful to pick out the important items for preliminary equating, the major behavior deviations which appear during the course of our experimental group life can usually be related to the major differentiations of our experimental social atmospheres. The number and variety of experimental manipulations of group life which are possible without in any way creating an “unlifelike” situation for the



group members are multifold, as the reader who has worked with such groups will realize. Group "test situations" may be created, such as the leader's leaving the room for a few minutes or arriving late, or the entrance into the situation of a stranger who, in the role of a janitor, asks friendly questions about the club life and the leader, who is out of the room, or criticizes the work of some of the members to bring out the style and unity of response of the group. The observers, as part of the "furniture" of the situation, are enabled to gain a rich fund of information from such events. The first purpose of the observation techniques must be to record as fully and insightfully as possible the total behavior of the group. This is a distinct break away from the usual procedure of recording only certain behavior symptoms, which are determined in advance. Skilled observers and "total-behavior" techniques made possible, in the present research example, such a wide variety of quantitative and qualitative analyses as these: (a) the total volume of initiated and response social interactions, divided into ascendant, submissive, objective, and ignoring behavior; (b) the volume and type of social interactions between subgroups, as compared to those within subgroups; (c) the specific curves of behavior of each member; (d) the stability and unity of group structure pattern and of specific subgroupings under varied conditions; (e) the influence on unity of pattern and stability of structure of leader-initiated versus spontaneous subgroupings; (f) analysis from stenographic records of the language behavior of the group in terms of such categories as hostility, attention demands, resistant behavior, hostile and objective criticism, expressions of competition and co-operation, amount of dependence on authority, and expressions of *I*-centeredness versus *we*-centeredness; (g) the activity goals of individuals and groups; and (h) shifts of situation, such as the polarization of hostility against a scapegoat, or a drop of work interest after the exit of the leader, etc.

The comprehensiveness of these synchronized strands of data makes possible the imbedding of each single action in the total social situation where it occurred, and makes it possible to follow up, by reanalysis, new clues which arise from time to time as to possible behavioral relationships, which would have been lost forever if check lists of behavior symptoms had been used. The possibility of focus-


ing numerous strands of evidence upon one or two focal points of investigation helps to correct, to an important extent, for the necessity of working with such a number of variables as the social situation presents.

No attempt will be made here to present a systematic framework of concepts for thinking about this group of problems of interest to both the sociologist and the individual psychologist. The preceding article has indicated some beginning steps in this direction. The writer's interest is in indicating how this particular experimental approach seems to make possible a constructive attack upon a few of these problems and the validation of hypotheses about them—hypotheses of sociological, as well as psychological, interest.


To define the group as a "dynamic unity" made up of interdependent subparts or members, and to use such concepts as "group locomotion" and "group goal," may sound to the sociologist like a return to the mysticism of the early concept of "group mind." There is nothing of this sort implied, and the double frame of reference of our experimental analysis seems to make possible some simple, empirical definitions of such terms as "group locomotion." From the observations upon the group structure of our clubs we find that any particular cross-section of the group life gives us a picture of this sort: Two members are working together mixing plaster of Paris; one member is constructing a partition around the mold, and the other two are finishing the clay features of the mask which is about to be cast. If a visitor should ask, "What is the club doing?" the answer of any member would be, "We are making a mask." If the visitor should ask the member working by himself, "What are you doing?" he would probably reply, "I'm fixing this partition so they can pour plaster of Paris in." For any cross-section of group life a series of such questions, ranging from general to specific, indicates a variety of individual activity goals, some of which appear integrated into subgroup goals (e.g., "We're making the clay mold"), which can again be integrated at a higher level into a group goal ("We are making a mask"). If any member begins to loaf or sets up some individual goal which is at cross-purposes to the group goal, the group locomotion through the region of "casting the mask" is immediately impeded, to a greater or lesser degree depending upon the degree of

unity of effort which the task demands and the position of the particular member in the group stratification. As each member performs his individual task, he is helping to make possible the group locomotion through the larger, more inclusive region which is made up of dynamically related subregions or subgroup activities (Fig. 1). Depending upon the type of group (e.g., authoritarian, democratic, or anarchic), the group goal may be one commonly shared by all members or induced by some individual or individuals who have a central position in the group stratification, or may be a combination of induction and mutual sharing. The group goal may be a cognitive fact for each member, may exist in the cognitive structure of only one member of the group, or may be unconscious for all members (see Lewin's definition of "valence" [3, p. 220]). The experimentalist must demand: Why is it that some groups are so highly unified, while others present a picture of disintegration of structure which seems to make group locomotion almost impossible? Why is it that, in some groups, the group goal is on the tip of every member's tongue, while in others one looks in vain for a verbalized collectivity of purpose? Some of the differences cited below between our authoritarian (A) and democratic (D) groups will indicate a first step toward the answering of such questions as these.


As one indirect measurement of the degree of unity of the two clubs we analyzed the unity or division of the group structure pattern as the clubs worked upon identical activities. The pattern of group structure is, of course, partly a function of the particular type of activity; but with this factor equated for the two groups, the differences in co-operative interdependence which appeared could be interpreted as evidence of differences in psychological interdependence. We found that 30 per cent of the group structures (i.e., constellations of functional subgroupings existing at a given moment of group life) in the A-atmosphere were initiated by the leader, as compared to complete spontaneity of subgroupings in the D-situation. The two structures of most highly united group pattern (i.e., all five members engaged in one interdependent activity, or four members together and one working individually) occurred 14 times for a total of 34.5 minutes in the autocratic group, while these high degrees of unity of pattern appeared 41 times for a total of 151



a



b



c

FIG. 1.—(1a) The group members ( $C^1, C^2 \dots C^5$ ), by carrying out individual but interdependent locomotions ( $l^1, l^2 \dots l^5$ ), make possible the group locomotion ( $l^0$ ); through the region of casting the mask. (1b) A momentary cross-section of group activity usually finds subparts of the group locomoting through separate task regions ( $l^{a1}, l^{a2}, l^{a3}$ ) which are subregions of the group-task region (casting mask). (1c) Entrance into a new group-task region (papier mâché) is only possible by the interdependent contribution of every subpart or member to the new group locomotion ( $l^0$ ), and the completion of his locomotion through his particular activity region of the last group-activity region. (Barrier regions are represented as barred regions.)

minutes in the D-atmosphere. The two most divided types of group structure pattern (i.e., everyone working individually, or two members working together and the rest by themselves) appeared 41 times in the A-atmosphere for a total of 109.5 minutes, as compared to 19 times in democracy for a total of 49 minutes. These differences become even more significant when it is noted that the A-leader changed the A-group structure toward higher unity 19 times out of 27 initiated shifts, and that spontaneously the group changed toward greater disintegration of structure 40 times out of 63. As one scans the profile of group-structure changes for any meeting, it is noted that in the autocratic atmosphere the leader was continuously pushing the group toward a more unified pattern, but it was an unstable type of unity which shifted almost immediately toward a more disintegrated pattern when the leader's rigidifying influence was withdrawn. The D-group achieved an autonomous, stable unity of functioning at a much higher level of structure. Differences in interdependence of member function are again indicated if one examines the language behavior of the two groups. The relative frequency of such personal expressions as *I*, *me*, and *mine* versus such collectives as *we*, *us*, and *ours* was taken as one index of personal ego involvement versus group goal involvement. It was found that only 18 per cent of the expressions of the A-group members indicated a feeling of collective unity, while 82 per cent were of an egocentric nature. Over a third (36 per cent) of the D-member's expression were *we*-centered, while 64 per cent were *I*-centered. If social interactions were analyzed as taking place between members of different functional subgroups ("out-group" interactions) or between members of the same functional subgroup ("in-group" interactions) some interesting indexes of group unity and of social distance may be computed. A number of elementary formulas were developed (4) for computing the in-group and out-group interaction possibilities of any particular group structure. It was found, for instance, that even in these closely knit, face-to-face groups of five children and a leader, about twice as many social interactions, per unit of interaction possibility, occurred between in-group members as between out-group members. In- and out-group differences in objectivity and aggressiveness of interpersonal relations indicated that rather important

life of the club, while the child groupings in the D-situation were all spontaneous in nature; (f) during one-fourth of the life of the D-club the leader was an in-group member in terms of activity, while the A-leader was in an out-group directing position in more than nine-tenths of his social actions; and (g) the D-leader was treated as more nearly an equal by the child members than was the A-leader, the former receiving more ascendant, objective, and friendly approaches, while the latter received more than twice as much submission. These and other data indicate that the A-leader held a domineering, central position in the group stratification, and that he allowed little individuality of function to emerge in the activity of the other members (Fig. 2, *a*). On the other hand, the region of centrality of status was accessible to any child member in the D-atmosphere, although the leader was still more central than any of the other members. Each D-member had a unique position in the stratification of the group (Fig. 2, *b*), with results which will be noted below in our consideration of the individual group members. The asymmetrical relationship of the A-leader with each of the members made the most potent subgroup<sup>3</sup> membership of any child in the A-group his submissive, dependent connection with the leader (Fig. 3, *a*), while independence and spontaneity of personal subgroupings existed in the D-atmosphere (Fig. 3, *b*).

The number and type of regions which are accessible or inaccessible to group locomotion (i.e., group space of free movement) in any social field are important factors in the observation and understanding of group dynamics. In our preliminary study it was observed that group freedom of locomotion was limited in three ways in the A-atmosphere: (*a*) by leader induction of strong goals contrary to the goal of the majority of the members, (*b*) the setting-up of barriers by the leader to make certain regions inaccessible (e.g., a rule against going out of the room), (*c*) the limiting of end-goal perspective by leaving the future unstructured (e.g., leader keeps all plans to himself). From the analysis of data we found that the A-leader frustrated spontaneous goals much more often than the D-leader did, and also that his own goals usually became induced group goals; while in the D-situation, the leader usually suggested

<sup>3</sup> See discussion of concept of *potency* in Lewin (3), pp. 34, 93.

two or three possible goals, leaving the final discussion and decision to the group members (Fig. 4, *b*). Most limiting of all, the A-leader retained "possession" of the future. Beyond the immediate, partially induced, goal of the present, the A-group could not see the path to the end-goal of mask-making (Fig. 4, *a*). At any moment the authority might alter their direction. In preliminary discussion periods the D-leader helped his group to structure the cognitively unknown region (*U*) between themselves and the final goal (Fig. 4, *b*). From interviews with the two groups of children it was clear that




FIG. 3.—In the A-situation the potency of the subgroup dependent relationship with the leader (*SuP*) was the strongest behavior determinant; egocentric individual goals (*IP*) had greater potency than belongingness to the group as a whole (*GrP*). In the D-situation subgroup divisions (*SuP*) meant less than total group membership (*GrP*) in determining behavior, and very little egocentrism (*IP*) was evident.

this difference in perspective was an important factor in freedom of group locomotion.

To illustrate the importance of a double frame of reference for our experimental analysis in gaining a fuller understanding of the total social situation, we must turn now from such group-centered, sociological concepts as "degree of group unity," "degree of group stratification," "group space of free movement," and "group locomotion" to such individual-centered, sociopsychological concepts as individual "social powerfield," "degree of belongingness," "release of tension," and "membership status."

The extent to which any member's efforts are involved in a group locomotion toward a group goal seems to be related to the degree of belongingness of his group membership. Such phrases as "strong loyalty," "group-mindedness," and "lack of identification with the group" are expressions of degrees of belongingness. There are several measures of strength of group-belongingness in our data on the A- and D-groups. The significant difference in the use of *we* and *I* terms has already been noted. A vote was taken, at the end of about twelve weeks, on two questions: (a) whether the meetings should




FIG. 4.—In the authoritarian situation the leader maintained "possession" of the cognitive structure of the future; future steps remained an unknown region (*U*) for the members. The leader created an induced force (*if*) as strong or stronger than the own interests (*of*) of the members. The leader indicated only one means ( $m^2$ ) of passing through each work region. A barrier ( $B^m$ ) to other possible means ( $m^1$ ,  $m^3$ ) existed in the strength of the leader's powerfield (indicated by the number of lines of influence passing through a given area). In the democratic situation the leader helped the group to structure the future into definite regions ( $R^1$ ,  $R^2$ ,  $R^3$ ,  $R^4$ ) or steps of work progress, and several possible means ( $m^1$ ,  $m^2$ ,  $m^3$ ) of accomplishing each task were presented. Goal-setting was spontaneous (*of*) rather than leader-induced (*if*).

stop or continue for a longer period, and (b) what should be done with the group property, the masks. All of the A-group voted to stop with that meeting; four of the D-group voted to continue the club meetings. All of the A-group members claimed some mask for their own, to take home (e.g., "Give me mine," "Give us our masks"); all of the D-group members suggested a group disposal of one or more of the masks (e.g., "Give the pirate to Mr. Lippitt," "Give the black one to the teacher"). Another indication of differences in group-belongingness was the extent to which individual goals, not related to collective activity, claimed the attention of the



members. In spite of the greater spontaneity of expression in the D-situation, the data indicated that the A-members were more frequently observed to be in an overlapping situation where an individual goal conflicted with the group goal and resulted in the member leaving the field of club work. An interesting study in shift of belongingness appeared when one member of each club was changed to the other group. Two meetings passed before the member shifted from the D- to the A-club referred to her new group as "we." Until then she had continually made such remarks as, "Ours is better than yours," "You're different in this group, aren't you?" and "I don't like yours." The quantity and quality of conversation and total volume of social interactions of both members showed a rather quick shift toward the "style of living" of the new group (Fig. 5), with certain factors of the old group allegiance disappearing quickly and others persisting over a longer period. The insecurity of the new "social ground" manifested itself in a number of ways: failure to join in the group conversation, failure to respond to social approaches, over-aggressiveness, lack of physical activity, etc.

The actual contribution of a member to group locomotion obviously depended upon other factors than the strength of the psychological forces related to his feeling of belongingness. The office boy and the president of the corporation may have the same feeling of belongingness to the group goal, and still their contributions to any particular group locomotion will be quite different. From our observations we must add that the specific action which corresponds to a given individual force toward the group goal seems to depend upon the position of the member in the group structure, with its different degrees and symmetry or asymmetry of stratification, and the direction of his individual effort in relation to that of collective locomotion.

From a series of ingenious experiments in which he observed the behavior of young children at different distances from strange persons in new and familiar surroundings, Wiehe (10) developed the concept of "social powerfield," or sphere of social influence. Among other findings, Wiehe noted that for very young children the different distances from the strange person seemed to correspond to different degrees of social pressure with quite different behavior symptoms

(e.g., embarrassment and show-off behavior, friendly and free expression, strong tension with physical immobility). In representation the lines denoting a given strength of social influence have been designated as "iso-influentials," and the intensity of the social pressure is shown by the number of "lines of influence" crossing a given area. In every social interaction there is an overlapping of two or more social powerfields. From our present study of overlapping powerfields in the two club situations, three main characteristics of the relationship seemed to be most important in determining the social resultants of the interaction: (a) the meaning (hostile, friendly, etc.) of the other person's powerfield for the individual influenced by it; (b) the relative strength of the overlapping powerfields; and (c) the extension or area of the social field influenced by the particular social powerfield. Taking the amount of successful ascendant directing behavior as one indication of strength of social influence, we note the greater inequality of social power in the leader-member relationship in the A-atmosphere (Fig. 6, *a*), as compared to the D-situation (Fig. 6, *b*). The greater number of regions in which the A-leader directed behavior also revealed a wider extension of the A-leader's social power in the field of club activity. The meaning of the leader's powerfield was quite different in the two clubs. The A-leader was largely ascendant in his social contacts, demanding submissive obedience. That the A-group members wanted to weaken the domination of the leader's powerfield seems indicated by the fact that they ignored a social approach of their leader (i.e., refusal to respond by pretending not to hear or to understand) three times as often as the D-group members. Although the A-group members were less ascendant, in terms of total volume toward their leader, their pattern of ascendance was quite different from that of the D-members. The ascendance of the former consisted largely of aggressive demands for attention and approval, while that of the latter was chiefly friendly and work-minded in nature. More qualitative observations and such interview comments of A-members as "We might have been allowed to plan things more," and "I like to have leaders that aren't very strict," seemed to justify the conclusion that being within the social powerfield of the A-leader was viewed as depleting to one's own social

mands for attention of the leader and the other members to work accomplishment by each A-group member has already been noted. This seems to indicate clearly that sometimes workmanship was viewed as a possible means to more satisfactory social status. The D-group members also made bids for attention, but a study of the interpersonal relationships in the two clubs shows a rather wide difference in the pattern of member recognition. In the D-group the attempt to gain recognition for good work was usually directed to the group as a whole, and spontaneous praise was often given by the other members. Demands for attention were predominantly directed toward the leader in the A-atmosphere, but this means of gaining status did not seem to prove very satisfactory. First of all, the source of social status, the leader, was also the source of social power depletion; and we have noted that there was often a negative valence to member-initiation of social interactions toward him. Also, the demand for recognition from the leader was very often met by an impersonal remark of acceptance or by further directions as to what to do next. We concluded that in this particular authoritarian work atmosphere the leader's domination of the work situation and his function as a restrictor of free social movement seemed clearly to bar a work-minded path to satisfactory social status. In the D-atmosphere work achievement seemed to be, cognitively, the clearest and most desirable path to social status. Several barriers to voluntary recognition by fellow-members as a method of gaining a better position in the group stratification seemed to exist in the A-situation: (a) the leader's domination of all central functions and his retention of all plans for the future made child leadership difficult; (b) the competition for status which existed between the members made each member unwilling to spontaneously recognize superiority in his fellow-members, which would have meant a relative loss in position for himself; (c) a tentative explanation of a third barrier to leadership in such a situation derives from the work on regression and frustration by Barker, Dembo, and Lewin (1), which indicated that the effect of personal-goal frustration is often dedifferentiation or primitivation of the personality structure, resulting in a lower level of behavior. In the present experiment, where there was frustration of locomotion toward more satisfactory social status, we might




FIG. 7.—Components of conversation behavior

hypothesize that the tension resulted in a primitivation of the individual's techniques of social relationship with other individuals. A number of experiments in child psychology (9) seems to indicate




FIG. 8.—Dominating ascendancy

that domination is a more infantile means of gaining social recognition than is leadership, and the work of Piaget (8) suggests a relationship between a more undifferentiated personal structure and a predominance of egocentric behavior. The egocentric point of view is essentially that of the dominator. Leadership demands a recogni-

tion of, and insight into, the particular individuality of the persons being led. In the D-situation we noted that the leader helped to make a central position in the group stratification accessible to all members, and a friendly spirit of work recognition existed between the members (items on co-operation, praise, constructive suggestions, objective criticism, etc., in Fig. 7).

A dominating type of verbal expression (the leader put no restriction upon free speech in either club) appeared, from our observations, to be the only path left open by which members could strive toward status in the A-situation. The autocratic leader was too inaccessible, his social powerfield too strong, to be attacked; but a pattern of hostile attempts at domination developed progressively between the A-members (Figs. 7 and 8). But each member seemed to be weakened by his social dependence upon the leader to about the same extent; and in the close face-to-face relationships of a five-member club each member was almost continually overlapping, in his efforts toward superior status, the social powerfields of all the other members (Fig. 9). This seemed to result in an unsatisfactory mutual weakening of the influence of each member. Twice during the series of club meetings a constellation of forces arose within the A-group which seemed momentarily to upset this equilibrium of forces and provided some release of individual tensions. This was the scapegoat situation, which seemed to represent a major shift in the interpersonal dynamics indicated in Figure 9. Instead of each member weakening each other member, a polarization of dominating attack took place against the powerfield of one member of the group (Figs. 10 and 11). This attack seemed to have the momentary effect of strengthening all the attacking members, because (a) it meant the withdrawal of the domination of the other three members who were attacking the scapegoat, and (b) it advanced each member one step toward his goal of social status by giving him an obvious superiority over one other member of the group. In both cases the meeting-by-meeting curves of dominating and friendly behavior and the stenographic records showed a drop in proportion of hostile relationships and an increase in the percentage of friendly interactions for a short time after the outburst against the scapegoat. Both scapegoats (Tom and Joe) found the situation so unpleasant that they soon




FIG. 9.—The members in the authoritarian group mutually weaken one another by the hostile nature of their overlapping social powerfield relationships, contracting the social influence of each member.




FIG. 10.—Recipients of dominating behavior in the autocratic club

quit the club. Interestingly enough, the scapegoats were the two members who, by teacher-ratings and playground observations, had been rated as having the most social influence (leadership ability) of the five children chosen as A-group members. Perhaps unified




FIG. 11.—A shift in the constellation of forces results in all the hostility being directed against one member ( $C^s$ ). The scapegoat is weakened at the expense of a relative gain in social power by the other four members.

attack upon an individual of somewhat superior status represented the most satisfying means of gaining a more central position in the group stratification in this social situation. Another interesting example of release behavior occurred on the day of the final meeting of the authoritarian group. After the masks had been divided in accordance with the group vote, and the leader had announced that



the meeting would be the last one, a change in atmosphere seemed to exist for the members. To quote briefly from one of the records:

The masks are divided out, as in the voting, and Jack immediately begins to throw his around violently, pretending to jump on it. He throws it down again and again, laughing. Ray wants to know if it won't break, then starts to throw his down too. Later Jack and Harry chase each other around the room wildly with streamers of paper toweling. The leader finally gives them the choice of staying and working for the rest of the period or leaving. They left. The masks, their own work, seemed somehow to represent the unpleasantness of the atmosphere of domination in which they had been constructed. They couldn't fight the leader, but they could the masks.

Only a smattering of the total experimental data has been presented, but it is hoped that this brief survey has indicated the possibility of collecting data, by this "total-field" method of experimental manipulation and observation, that may fruitfully be analyzed in a way that makes possible the integration of sociological thinking about the group and psychological thinking about the individual as a group member. It will probably be of interest to the sociologist to note, in passing, that a comparison of the scope of individual variation of behavior within the club atmospheres with the differences in group behavior between the two "social climates" indicates the predominant strength of the immediate social atmosphere in these particular experimental setups. There is hardly space in this report for the statistical evidence on this comparison.

The results of this preliminary study seemed fruitful enough to warrant further development of the experimental and observation techniques utilized. Four new clubs were organized (7), after a much more thorough study of the problems of preliminary control by selection of club members, collection of sociological data concerning other group memberships, and better psychological measurement of each group member. In an enriched setting the clubs lived through six weeks of "democratic," six weeks of "autocratic," and six weeks of "laissez faire" leadership (5). These social climates followed in different order for the different groups. The four club leaders altered their type of leadership as they each developed the atmosphere in three different clubs. Thus a control of original group differences and the effect of "leader personality" was possible in a more adequate

way. New techniques of experimental group manipulation were investigated. A third study (2) is under way, which is utilizing a revision of the methods briefly indicated above. This is an attempt to study experimentally some of the sociopsychological problems of minority group membership, with groups of girls. A rather wide range of problems which might be fruitfully attacked with a similar approach must come to the mind of the reader with a special interest in this type of problem, which has hitherto usually been chopped up rather ruthlessly by being left to the sociologist or the individual psychologist for study or for speculation.

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# CULTURE, SOCIETY, IMPULSE, AND SOCIALIZATION

JOHN DOLLARD

## ABSTRACT

The question is: "What are the basic concepts in the field of social psychology?" Discussed first are the uses and limits of the terms "culture" and "society." Important is the fact that the society idea points at the individual in associated life and not merely at his abstracted habitual outfit. Some conception of impulse is necessary to an effective social psychology; the movement away from instinctivist views has overlooked this fact. Crucial but much neglected is the socialization conception. No one knows in detail how children grow up in our or any other society. Hypothetical examples and fragmentary observations are not a sufficient basis for a theory of human learning; minute studies will have to be made which are specifically oriented from the societal and impulse standpoints.

## CULTURE

When we use the term "culture," we are adopting a certain point of view on human behavior. It does not describe all that men are or all that they do. The culturalist regards the social inheritance as a thing; he describes the socially transmitted, nonbiological action patterns of groups of men.<sup>1</sup> He aims to distinguish this social "thing" from the relatively unalterable biological inheritance of human beings; animal inheritance is seen as more or less standard from one social group to another, whereas cultural textures vary widely. "Culture" is the name given to these abstracted (from men) inter-correlated customs of a social group. Culturalists place great stress on the definition of daily life-situations by these patterned ways which come down to us from the past or which we borrow from other human groups about us, and they are keen in searching out the history of custom and in showing its pervasive influence.

The abstracted view of human behavior which we call cultural has turned out to be exceedingly useful, mainly in disposing of erroneous presumptions about human nature. It rebuts the presumption that any human group has, at least within any short time span, invented its own way of life; cultural research shows, on the contrary, the over-

<sup>1</sup> Tylor's definition, which follows, stresses the main points directly or by implication: "Culture or civilization, taken in its wider ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society" (E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture* [New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1874], I, 1).

whelming coercion exercised on any given group by its historical ways of action. History indeed does not seem measured by the living and dying of generations of men but rather as the slow floating through time of culture patterns. Cultural research shows also the great frequency of borrowing of culture items and sometimes comes to look on these forms themselves as if they were motile. This accounts for the great role of maps in cultural research, for from them one can see the geographical spread and limits of particular traits and complexes of traits. Through the stressing of the role of history and diffusion of culture elements, one gets a proper perspective on human laziness and uninventiveness of how much easier it is to adapt a cultural solution to a life-dilemma than to invent one.

The culture concept also shows the uselessness of "instinct" theories of human nature. Arguing from the behavior of the industrious ant or the tireless beaver, social philosophers used to allow themselves to speak of human instincts which determined in detail the actions of men in society. Culturalists have disposed of this contention by showing how variable are the social solutions to organic needs which have become conventional in different societies and that in every case these solutions have to be *learned* by the incoming organism, whether infant or adult. It is clear from these researches that each society evolves its own kind of men and not the other way around, so far, at least, as any few generations of human beings are concerned. A special case of instinctivism is racialism, or the doctrine that some one human stock has peculiarly and consistently advanced social problem-solving. Some of the western European stocks are often cited as examples. The culturalists have made such views impossible to the realist by showing the welter of social influences that have made up the cultural heritage of western European peoples of the present day, and how numerous and divergent are the human stocks that at one point or another in historical development have temporarily taken over an actual superiority.

The cultural view also serves to put us in our places and to scale down the egotistical pride with which each surveys the achievements of his own society. Studies of different societies show that each mode of life is adequate in its way, is fondly viewed and firmly held by its participants, and that cultural chauvinism is the rule among socie-

ties. Our own western European group is the only one which has ever manifested, through its anthropologists, a dispassionate interest in the customs of other people, even if that occurred after we had destroyed a great many of the native societies and used their resources to our own ends. It is true, of course, that our society is superior to any other at some points, say in the invention of the assembly line as a technique of production, but it is not at all certain as yet that human welfare is any better served thereby than in the humblest "hoe culture." Cultural studies may be said then to have a deflationary effect on the bigotry with which members of a given society defend their folkways and mores.

Yet there are certain dangers in the cultural approach to human nature that have often been overlooked. One of these is that, in fixing attention on the mat of culture, the culture-bearing group will be neglected. This group is also worth noticing, and it presents some problems which do not emerge on the cultural level of perception.

Another difficulty is that a very peculiar conception of the human animal emerges from the cultural way of viewing behavior.<sup>2</sup> He appears as a bearer of culture, much as factory workers look like "hands" to their employer. What one sees from the cultural angle is a drama of life much like a puppet show in which "culture" is pulling the strings from behind the scenes. Men do not emerge in their full personal reality, but they appear as actors of parts, as role-players, and the attention is never centered on them but only on their outlines of behavior. These dangers are incurred, of course, only when the cultural view is practiced by itself and no supplementary concepts are available to indicate other important aspects of human action.

It is necessary to see the limits as well as the advantages of the culture point of view because the emergence of the American school of anthropology has given the term a peculiar dominance. Sociologists constantly use the term, and it is beginning to salt the discourse of other disciplines as well. The attempt here is not to

<sup>2</sup> This criticism was first vividly suggested by Edward Sapir, "Why Cultural Anthropology Needs the Psychiatrist," *Psychiatry*, I, No. 1 (February 1938), 7-9.

discredit it but to put it in better perspective by discussing it in conjunction with other necessary views.<sup>3</sup>

#### SOCIETY

The societal perspective on human action fixes our attention on some features of social life that are not easily perceived when one is studying abstracted habit patterns. When one puts on his societal spectacles, he sees first of all a group of animals with certain necessary relations to one another.<sup>4</sup> It is not a cultural fact that younger animals born into a social group must be taken care of by older ones, or that ten men together can kill any one man, similarly armed. It is also not a cultural fact that human animals can inhibit antisocial action tendencies under pressure of punishment, or that co-operative attitudes flow toward those who facilitate response tendencies. These are facts of another order which have to do with the animal nature of men as it is exhibited in associative life, and no one can easily arrive at these observations if he sees through the cultural periscope alone. Once these views are arrived at by other means, confused culturalists will often claim loyalty to them, but this loyalty is short-lived; it does not extend to the use of the societal mode of perception in actual data-gathering operations.

In addition to seeing animals, one sees them living on land under natural limitations. Geographical space is essential to the societal idea. "Land" is seen as a congeries of conditions which exert some, though often not determinative, compulsion on the way of life of the group. It makes a difference in the problems posed by a society

<sup>3</sup> This discussion is intended only for our own in-group of social scientists; we must all propagandize the term vigorously to those who do not yet make systematic use of it. The culture perspective cannot be given up since it is one of the few real achievements of social science.

<sup>4</sup> Sumner and Keller, whose standpoint on society is here accepted, write: "If an observer could peer down through the air-ocean and view the human creatures living and moving about upon its floor, . . . these would present themselves as discharging the usual function of organic groups: the maintenance and the reproduction of life. A group of human beings living in a cooperative effort to win subsistence and to perpetuate the species: such is the conception here offered of a human society. . . . Our starting points are located so close to the organic range that we have but to omit the word 'human' from this definition in order to have a definition of any non-human society" (W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller, *The Science of Society* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927], I, 6-7).

whether one hundred men or a million are included in it, whereas it does not seem to make an essential difference from the cultural standpoint whether a hundred men or a million exhibit a culture pattern. Societal life is seen as a collective struggle against limitation, and the group itself is seen as an expedient in the survival of the individual. Food-getting, sex expression, and security in both are the minimal objectives that can be posited for man in society. Group life necessarily imposes limiting conditions on the individual member, but it is on the whole the lesser of available evils. This view is observably different therefore from the conception of men as passive porters of a social tradition; from the societal standpoint the struggling animals come sharply into view.

It is necessary to stress also, as Linton<sup>5</sup> has done, that society consists of a group of animals with mutually adapted habits. And here the culture point comes to the fore. This habit adaptation is not a chance one, nor is it invented on the spot for the occasion; it derives from the formula for habit characteristic of a group, i.e., its culture. Who wants food, shelter, clothes, or children must get them in the traditionally prescribed ways. Any society therefore is sectioned into various subgroups according to age, sex, class, or special function, and these groups develop the habits necessary to permit them to function in the co-operative scheme. It is dangerous, however, to presume that the adaptive character of the members of a society is ever perfect or that it is achieved without a struggle in which the adaptive habits are constantly reinforced at the expense of maladaptive and destructive tendencies.

It is only on the societal level of perception that the problem of the nature of social solidarity comes clearly into view. It is not, intrinsically, a problem that can be seen at all from the cultural standpoint. Solidarity is essentially a problem of "making people

<sup>5</sup> Linton does not, to be sure, stress "animals" in his definition but refers to "mutually adapted individuals"; this somewhat passive term "individual" indicates a difference in systematic approach from that outlined in this paper and shows the marks of a surviving culturalistic mode of conception in Linton's thought. His valuable paper should be read in conjunction with this one since it contains excellences of exposition as to "culture" and "society" not possible for this writer (see Ralph Linton, "Culture, Society, and the Individual," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XXXII [October, 1938], 425-36).

be good," of submitting to habit adaptation. Here enter questions of policing some persons by other persons, of conscious rejection of antisocial lines of conduct, or of repression of countermoral tendencies. To give this question meaning, policing persons must be clear in their actual roles of administering punishments or offering rewards, and the individual must be shown as a battleground between moral and antimoral tendencies. From this standpoint the pillar of the community becomes clear as do the traitor, mobile person, informer, or marginal man, not as mere bearers of divergent patterns but as animals struggling in real dilemmas. On the one hand is the group, the traditional unit of survival with its demanding pressures for renunciation, and, on the other, the animal with his naïve formula of direct action and the shortest route to the goal.

Sumner<sup>6</sup> has already indicated that custom can be viewed from a societal standpoint, quite different from the passive perception of the culturalist. He has distinguished the run of custom into folkways and mores. The term "folkway" implies simply a habitual way of group action; it is probably mildly sanctioned or indicates optional modes of behavior. The mores, on the other hand, are the highly sanctioned customs of the group—those customs which are viewed as essential to group survival and which individuals have no option of accepting or rejecting. This type of distinction is extremely useful to the social psychologist since one would expect the mores to inhibit those aspects of the biological life of the individual whose free expression would be dangerous to group survival. Compared to this powerful conception of the mores the term "culture trait" is quite colorless. It does not distinguish between a taboo on murder and an injunction to hold a fork in the right hand. Sociologically seen, however, the former would be in the mores and the latter would not. With the aid of the mores concept we can locate the individual in society since we find him heavily bound by highly valued customs. The mores point at individuals, at bodies, and at a rich and turbulent biological life. Culture patterns, on the contrary, merely pick out the repetitious aspects of behavior and specifically exclude, by their nature as concepts, the emotional life of man.

A further achievement of Sumner will show the difference between

<sup>6</sup> W. G. Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1906), p. 3.



the societal and cultural standpoints on behavior; it is his treatment of the in-group. Sumner<sup>7</sup> saw clearly that a society is a defensive type of association, that it exists as a unit, and that its existence involves an emotional relationship between its members. It is the introduction of the emotional term that is crucial. The continuance of habitual association in a group is dependent on strong positive ties between its members, based, of course, on the obvious fact of services mutually rendered; accompanying these ties Sumner noticed the corollary existence of hostile sentiments toward outsiders, i.e., those who do not share the sacred mode of life of the in-group. The formation and splitting of in-groups, the tightening and loosening of associational bonds, is a fact continuously noticed by sociologists. America was rapidly whipped into a taut in-group with appropriate out-group resentments toward Germany in the years 1916-18; and it seems indeed to be repeating the process in 1939-40. The white caste in the American South forms an in-group against Negroes, although the latter are prevented by their dependence from externalizing their hostility against whites. The Jews are apparently being pushed into out-group status very widely in the western European culture area at the present time, with resulting solidarity among "good Germans" or Americans. It is the use of the emotional or animal term that is so characteristic of Sumner's viewpoint, and its use puts the problem of group solidarity in a new light. From his standpoint we see society not as a congeries of custom but as a fabrication of personal relationships in which animal love and hate play an important role.

It will be noted from the foregoing that the terms "culture" and "society" do not fit together as neat elements in our theoretical architecture. The reason is that the concepts have different functions, as has been shown, and have gained currency in a certain blind way of their own. Some writers extend the term "culture" to designate the living group of persons as well as the abstracted habits of the group; this is inexpedient since it leads to confusion. For the actual group, conceived of as an association of persons, "society" should always be used.

It is affirmed also for the sake of thoroughness that there is always

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

a society where there is culture. Men seem to be the only animals living in association who have developed it highly. Conversely, an elaborated culture exists only in human society.

"Society" seems to be the broader term since it includes the manifestations of culture *and* impulse. Perhaps to regard a society as culture stopped in bodies, or as a blend of culture and impulse, would not be too bad a way of relating the terms for the present, though it by no means covers all the aspects of societal behavior which need emphasizing. "Impulse" in this case equals the facts of animal life as they are presented to the social group for elaboration.

#### IMPULSE

In rejecting the instinct theory of determination of social behavior, the social scientist seems to have gone one step farther and denied the existence of organic propensities at all, or at least that these propensities could play any part in a social-science theory. That this is a very unsatisfactory state of affairs is immediately clear if one examines any individual human life. What we find then is a set of impulses in some state of organization or disorganization, and indeed we see that the control and expression of these impulses is the major problem of life as felt by the individual. We must therefore add another term to our list of indispensable concepts, namely, "impulse."

In the inevitable chapter on motivation in social psychology textbooks there is usually recited a series of impulse tendencies, such as hunger, thirst, sexual desire, flight, hostility, etc. However, these tendencies are usually passed over rapidly, and it is difficult to visualize them as motors of human action. The student has no opportunity to see these tendencies in operation in the socialized adult nor is anyone able to give him an account of how they are molded and related in the typical life-history in our society. He comes away from such a discussion with a quite vague idea of how dynamic the impulse life may be. Thereafter he has little opportunity to study these impulses in others, and he rightly refuses to generalize from his own case, however acutely he may know that he himself is a being driven strongly from the organic side. In conventional social science the social order is made so clear that this seems to the student to

be the most definable and positive variable; his firsthand contacts, on the other hand, with the animal side of man are usually slighted and often missing altogether. The result is the fictive "man" of social science—a man who is determined totally by the formal social order and who dumbly and unprotestingly accepts its mandates whatever they may be. One must examine the individual life closely to see how biased this conception of man actually is.

Let us then make use of the term "impulse" and say that an impulse is an urge to act that has been or can be conscious.<sup>8</sup> It does not mean the habit which mediates the urge once this habit is established. It is important to exclude the more or less automatic functions of the body from our list of impulses. For example, the tendency to a certain type of balance of chemicals in the blood stream would not be called an impulse because such a "need for balance" does not ordinarily figure in the conscious behavior of the individual, though some derivatives of it may appear as pain. One must further notice that impulse is a term defined on the psychological level of perception, i.e., in reference to the concrete actions in social life which an impulse may generate. Let us suppose that in frustration situations aggressive impulses are mobilized. One could possibly define such aggression mechanistically, that is, in terms of secretions from the adrenal gland entering the blood stream, becoming somehow effective through the nervous system and producing change in nerve endings. These changes in turn would lead to changes in the great muscles of the body. Such an endocrinological or neurological interpretation of an aggressive impulse may sometime be exactly made, but it cannot be made as yet. For that reason such a description is a "lower level" type and is not included in this definition of impulse. What is crucial social-psychologically is that the organism exhibits tendencies to bite, claw, crush, or evade some object or barrier that is placed in its way. The tendency to act in this way when it is or can be conscious is an impulse, in this case an aggressive one. It is tentatively suggested that these impulses are "bottom"

<sup>8</sup> This conception emerged from a conversation with Dr. Hanns Sachs, psychoanalyst, of Boston. He was undoubtedly paraphrasing or clarifying a view of Freud's. It is Freud who has made especially clear and specific the conception of the craving nature of man and the impulsive "demands" which the organism puts on society.

in the conceptual scheme of the social psychologist. Out of them, under social pressure, are elaborated the character structures and systems of action which we see in adult individuals.

It is not easy in cold print to give an adequate sense of the craving nature of man.<sup>9</sup> Perhaps one ought to depict the impulses in terms of their most extreme forms to do this. One would want to call up the image of thirst in terms of the anguish of the "Bounty" sailors who were doled out three wine glasses of water per day during the time of a forty-day sea journey.<sup>10</sup> In the case of hunger, we could remember the agonies of the members of the Donner expedition—sufferings which drove them to cannibalistic practices.<sup>11</sup> Rage can be easily seen in small children, in individuals gone berserk, or in the steady hatred which is often vented on minority groups. The power of sexual desire is especially clear to everyone in our society since it is one of the most severely suppressed of motivational forces and is likely, therefore, to appear to individuals as a constant danger to their security. If we see impulse in these dynamic terms, especially in extreme cases, we can realize the enormous value of social organization in stabilizing these forms of expression and in providing the arts of life which make it unnecessary to arouse an impulse like hunger in extreme form; social organization could then be viewed as a defense against the impulse. We will see further that society offers the mold for impulse expression and that the dynamic impulse trends are packed and rammed into the folkways and mores. From this standpoint society is not a mere formal outline of behavior patterns; it is rather an engine fed by the individual biological life and the impulse trends which compose it.

Our delight in the culture concept is so considerable and well justified that we are likely to try to make it work where it does not fit. There is a tendency in this direction in sociological social psychology

<sup>9</sup> Dr. H. A. Murray has given a detailed and discriminating discussion of this problem. He uses the concept "need" to refer to this projective aspect of the human animal (see his *Explorations in Personality* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1938], pp. 75-85).

<sup>10</sup> Charles Nordhoff and James Norman Hall, *Men against the Sea* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1934), pp. 95-96.

<sup>11</sup> Julian Dana, *Sutter of California* (New York: Press of the Pioneers, Inc., 1934), pp. 249-53.

where perception is so largely directed by our cultural outfit of concepts. The result is the mechanical man of sociology—the man with “attitudes” determined by “culture” but no testes or viscera. This cultural robot comes into being by projecting culture patterns on the shapeless clay offered to society by animal evolution. He does not exist in fact, of course, and one can continue to believe in him only by avoiding any detailed observations of his behavior. Man is there to be studied, not posited or derived from artificial systems. One particular error of this view can be examined—the notion that “culture can do anything,” can make of men whatever it determines. No doubt it can do much, and that most surprising, but not anything; there are limits, and sharp ones, to what it can do. To pass over as too obvious the limiting conditions imposed by human hunger, thirst, temperature needs, etc., one may take the neurosis. The neurosis seems to be a product of excessive renunciation of animal needs for love and gratification, accompanied by a rigid suppression of the hostility which arises as a result of such deprivation. The animal so deprived stages a private rebellion, a sort of individual sabotage against social co-operation. “No fun, no work” would express what is implied by his behavior. A society must take good care, then, to see that its members have enough fun to make it worth while for them to carry the work and burdens of social life. The possibility and existence of such conditions as those of neurosis must be viewed as a “limit” beyond which culture cannot go.

#### SOCIALIZATION

Socialization is the process of training a human animal from birth on for social participation in his group. He is socialized when he is capable of playing the role destined for him as an adult. Some persons are never completely socialized in that they cannot marry when they are expected to, cannot work as they ought, or cannot trust others sufficiently to be able to co-operate. A unification of scientific approaches is needed to study socialization.<sup>12</sup> One needs from psychology the sense of an animal learning; culture defines the

<sup>12</sup> The “child development” movement is closely allied to the study of socialization. The trouble with this conception is that it implies that development is more or less automatic, granted certain conditions, while the socialization concept pictures development as occurring only under pressure and sometimes heavy pressure.

routines to be learned; and the society concept shows us the group of actual persons who dole out the rewards and punishments in terms of which habits are fixed and undesired traits are eliminated.

The points of view are at hand; what is needed is the situation in which they can actually be put in operation. There seems only one, i.e., the human family, for it is in this situation that the basic learning takes place.<sup>13</sup> Socialization will never be understood until attention is centered on the individual child in the family and painstaking findings are assembled of his day-to-day acquisition of social skills. At the present time some excellent suspicions of what occurs in the socialization of children have been derived from the studies of adults made by Freud, but, as he himself has insisted, they are only the first outlines of the laborious investigations which must be made; to non-Freudians they are far from constituting proof of his contentions. The home, rather than the clinic, is the actual first laboratory in which socialization may be studied.

It seems clear from present data that socialization is a process full of conflict between the child and its trainers. Growing up is not a smooth automatic process of assimilating the folkways and mores; on the contrary, society has to deal with a rebellious animal full of animal lust and anger. The domestication of this animal is without exception a process attended by conflict and strain. The conflict incidental to social growth is most visible in the case of deviant persons; in the case of neurotics it is shown by a resentful non-cooperation for social ends and in the cases of psychotics and criminals open rebellion is perceptible. But normal persons too know the heavy pressure of conventional life and express, at least in dreams and fantasies, some of the antisocial wishes and resentments which they dare not manifest more openly.

The nature of the conflicts involved in socialization can best be seen by the use of the concepts of frustration and aggression.<sup>14</sup> First there are frustrations attending the satisfaction of the *direct* impulses of the child. For example, delays occur in feeding after hunger

<sup>13</sup> I have discussed this problem in an earlier paper (see John Dollard, "A Method for the Sociological Study of Infancy and Preschool Childhood," *Journal of Educational Sociology*, IX [October, 1935], 88-90).

<sup>14</sup> J. Dollard, L. W. Doob, N. E. Miller, O. H. Mowrer, and R. R. Sears, *Frustration and Aggression* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), chaps. i, ii, iii, and iv.

tensions are strongly present; or a change in food habits is forced on the child by weaning in the course of which its sucking tendencies are blocked without possibility of an effective substitute response. These frustrations, the importance of which it is difficult for adults to conceive, bring a proportionate aggressive striving in their train. This aggression in its turn is either not rewarded or is actively punished by the caretakers of the child. Sex and excretory excitations also meet with frustration of a more or less transitory nature and also produce aggression, which again is condemned by social surrogates. On the base of these original impulses a whole set of *derived* impulses or strivings are built up, as those for attention, those leading to social contact, those leading to preferment over others, and those leading to affirmation of social sex type. As the child advances through our social system of age grading, many of these impulses too suffer frustration and must disappear. Growing up may therefore be seen as involving a series of frustrating as well as satisfying experiences; the least that can be said is that conflict in the individual life is inevitable and that socialization is always a frustrating experience. The important question is probably how frustrations are dosed, i.e., how rapidly they are imposed and whether anything like adequate substitute responses for the lost gratifications are available.

But socialization is by no means completely a frustrating experience. The seeming obvious intent of social organization is to maximize gratification, to permit of all possible impulse expression which is consistent with group survival. Since the conditions of life for any society are constantly fluctuating, as by the appearance of rival societies or changes in numbers, the balance between gratifications which may safely be permitted and renunciations which must be demanded is changing also. Human beings cannot be frustrated beyond a certain point, though no one knows now how to measure it, without defeating the societal end of co-operative activity; persons too much frustrated will not and cannot co-operate. If, therefore, the balance shifts so that societal suppression becomes too severe, neurotic apathy and sabotage appear and become destructive factors. As the eye of God has seen the rise and fall of societies in

the past; this apathy must sometime, somewhere, have been a crucial factor; it might be described as a form of societal suicide.

The point to press at this time seems to be that no one of the four concepts we have discussed is self-contained; each implies to some degree the others; none can be seen clearly in its uses and limits unless the others are taken into account. If only one of these modes of social perception is used, the user thereof will be found to be a scientific cultist of some kind, either a rabid culturalist, a sociologist, an instinctivist, or a student of the imaginary isolated individual. Least well worked out at the present time are the impulse and socialization concepts; their better molding with the others will constitute a long step toward the unified social science which seems desirable.

INSTITUTE OF HUMAN RELATIONS  
YALE UNIVERSITY



## EMILE DURKHEIM AND SOCIOLOGISMIC PSYCHOLOGY

HARRY ALPERT

### ABSTRACT

Emile Durkheim and his co-workers on the *Année sociologique* have vigorously urged that, since man is a social and cultural product and since society provides the necessary conditions of personality development and expression, psychology must be made a sociologically conscious discipline. Society creates in the individual the self-control, attention, and effort necessary for sustained action and hence expression. It also provides man with his values, ideals, standards, and sympathies. Therefore, a comprehensive human psychology must include a sociology of values, of thought and knowledge, of mental states, of emotions, of language, etc. These studies, termed "sociologismic," involve three dangers: (1) the tendency to ignore the biological basis of human nature and to reduce the individual to an automaton impassively receiving and conforming to a social heritage; (2) the tendency to invent psychological principles *ad hoc* or to adopt implicitly some outmoded psychological system; and (3) the tendency to hypostatize society and social forces. The Durkheimians have not altogether avoided these pitfalls, but Durkheim himself must be counted among the most cautious of them. He and his disciples have given affirmative evidence of the fruitfulness of studying what Professor Delacroix has aptly termed the "social dimension" of psychical data.

Professor Steuart H. Britt has recently raised the question: "Social psychologists or psychological sociologists—which?"<sup>1</sup> The problem he thus evokes has been focal in the thinking and writings of the social psychologists, philosophers, and sociologists for about two generations now. The spearhead of the movement to establish a psychological sociology by sociologizing psychology was the group of thinkers who rallied around Emile Durkheim and the *Année sociologique*. The following is a discussion of Durkheim's position on the necessity of making psychology a socially conscious discipline.

The psychological consequence of social nomia or regulation is individual frustration. Biologically rooted impulses are bound to be inhibited when men live in an ordered society. Since rules generally exist where there is a tendency to act contrary to their commandments, the price of social regulation is individual constraint. It is one-sided, however, to think of society solely as a control mechanism. If society is restraint, it is also expression; if it is restriction, it is also liberation. We must view both sides of the medal. Society is for its members not only regulation but also a source of life and

<sup>1</sup> *American Sociological Review*, II (1937), 898-902.

expression. Durkheim expressed this succinctly when he stated that society is not only a system of organs and functions maintaining itself against external forces but also *le foyer* of an internal moral life leading the individual ever beyond himself.<sup>2</sup> Society is the source, the creator, of ideas, ideals, and values. It has, to pursue a Durkheimian metaphor, not only a body but also a soul; and this soul is the totality of social ideals. Social phenomena are essentially systems of values and ideals. A comprehensive sociology must therefore view society as giving direction to human life and as developing personality.

It is a commonplace of sociology that it is "our social heritage," to use Graham Wallas' phrase, that keeps man from sinking to the level of mere bestiality and animality. It is the totality of our socially acquired and socially transmitted techniques, knowledge, beliefs, institutions, traditions, values, and ideals that makes all the difference between man the civilized being and man the pitiful, biologically underequipped animal. Durkheim is hardly alone in asserting that "man is human only because he is civilized."<sup>3</sup> Take away from the human being his language, his conceptual apparatus, his categories of thought, his ethics, religion, art, science, and philosophy, and what remains? An animal dominated completely by his sensible appetites, a prey to his instincts, impulses, whims, and fancies, whose life, as Hobbes foresaw, would be "poor, solitary, nasty, brutish, and short." Graham Wallas has vividly pictured in a well-known passage what would happen "if the earth were struck by one of Mr. Wells' comets, and if, in consequence, every human being now alive were to lose all the knowledge and habits which he had acquired from preceding generations (though retaining unchanged all his powers of invention, memory and habituation)." And the growing literature on feral cases adds empirical and experimental support to the suppositions of these political writers.

Man, then, is a double inheritor. From his biological parents he receives his original nature: his organs and their capacities, functions, impulses, and tendencies. From society, on the other hand,

<sup>2</sup> *Sociologie et philosophie* (Paris: Alcan, 1924), pp. 132-33 ff.

<sup>3</sup> "Le Dualisme de la nature humaine et ses conditions sociales," *Scientia*, XV (1914), 206.

he acquires, through the social processes of education and habituation, his social nature: his culture, his values—in short, his civilization. Culture, however, is not a biological part of man. It is “a post-natal imposition upon his biological organism—that is the real meaning of its being socially inherited.”<sup>4</sup> His double inheritance, therefore, makes man a dual creature; it is the source of his never ceasing, inextricable unrest. Human nature, as the resultant of original and social nature, can be only an imperfect harmonization of its two component but in many respects divergent elements. The exigencies of social life are not always compatible with the immediate urges and pleasures of the organism. There is necessarily an ascetic, and hence a frustrational, element in orderly social living. Human nature, being dual, is inexorably subject to unceasing tensions. “Far from being simple, our inner life has a sort of double center of gravity. There is, on the one hand, our individuality, and more especially, our body which is its foundation; on the other, all which, in us, expresses something other than ourselves.”<sup>5</sup>

Tensions may be a severe price to pay for social living, but it is a necessary price if we are to live at all as human personalities. For it is from society, and not from original nature, that we obtain the necessary conditions of personality development. It is society that teaches us discipline and self-control, the reins without which our personality would run wild.<sup>6</sup> Durkheim has well described the consequences of anomia, that is, the condition in which the social pressures making for self-discipline are rendered impotent.

Imagine a being liberated from all external restraint, a despot more absolute than the ones history tells about, a despot whom no external power can control and rule. By definition, the desires of such a being are irresistible. Shall we say, therefore, that he is omnipotent? Certainly not, for he himself cannot resist them. They are masters over him as over all other things. He is subject to them; he does not dominate them. In a word, when our desires are freed from all moderating influence, when nothing limits them, they become themselves tyrannical and their first slave is the very subject who experiences them. Moreover, you know the sad spectacle he presents. The most contrary impulses, the

<sup>4</sup> H. S. Mekeel, “A Psychoanalytic Approach to Culture,” *Journal of Social Philosophy*, II (1937), 234.

<sup>5</sup> E. Durkheim, “Le Dualisme de la nature humaine et ses conditions sociales,” *Scientia*, XV (1914), 209.

<sup>6</sup> E. Durkheim, *L'Education morale* (Paris: Alcan, 1925), pp. 19-62.

most antithetical caprices follow one upon another, leading this self-entitled absolute sovereign in the most divergent directions, so that this apparent omnipotence resolves itself, in the end, into a veritable impotence. A despot is like a child; he has the latter's weaknesses, and for the same reason: he is not master of himself. Self-mastery, then, is the first condition of all true power, of all liberty worthy of the name.<sup>7</sup>

Anomia, moreover, is conducive to suicide, for human life can hardly be happy or even possible, unless one's wants approximate one's means. Normally the moderating influence of society serves to check one's wants, to keep them within bounds. Under anomic conditions, however, the social brake gets out of order and individuals' wants soar rapidly. A "the sky's-the-limit" psychology develops. The suicide statistics record the rest of the story.

Thus, in imposing self-discipline on individuals, society is creating the condition for personality expression. Expression means systematic action; and this, in turn, implies sustained attention and effort—habits that are developed only under the pressure of social requirements. Society, however, exercises an even more positive action.

As mentioned above, and as Cooley taught, we acquire from our experience in groups our sense of values, our ideals, our standards, our sympathies, loves, hates, and fears. Moreover, it is society that has created the dignity of man and the glory of his past and future. It is for these reasons that a psychology of human nature must be largely sociologismic. Since much of our human nature has a social origin, a comprehensive human psychology must comprise: a sociology of values which traces the social origins and settings of ideals and which analyzes the social factors in ethics, religion, law, economics, life, and art; a sociology of thought and knowledge; a sociology of mental states; a sociology of emotions; and a sociology of language.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51. Cf. E. Durkheim, *De la division du travail social*, Book III, chap. ii, and *Le Suicide*, Book II, chap. v.

<sup>8</sup> In addition to the works of Durkheim, see the following: C. Bouglé, *Leçons de sociologie sur l'évolution des valeurs* (2d ed.; Paris: Colin, 1929); M. Granet, *Danses et légendes de la Chine ancienne* (Paris: Alcan, 1926) and *La Pensée chinoise* (Paris: Renaissance du livre, 1934); G. Davy, *La Foi jurée* (Paris: Alcan, 1922); F. Simiand, *Le Salaire, l'évolution sociale, et la monnaie* (Paris: Alcan, 1932); M. Halbwachs, *La Classe ouvrière et les niveaux de vie* (Paris: Alcan, 1912), and by the same author, *L'Évolution des besoins dans les classes ouvrières* (Paris: Alcan, 1933) and *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (Paris: Alcan, 1925); also the works of Lévy-Bruhl; Ch. Blondel, *Introduction à la psychologie collective* (Paris: Colin, 1928), and the same author's "Les Volitions,"

It can scarcely be denied that the developments toward a sociological psychology of human nature which are mentioned in the footnote to the previous sentence and for which Durkheim supplied the impetus and inspiration have borne ample and significant fruit. Of course, in studies of the sociologistic kind, one must guard against ignoring the biological basis of human nature and against reducing the individual to a mere automaton impassively receiving and conforming to his social heritage. Merton is unquestionably right in contending that when French writers "treat the collective representations as hypostatized entities ready to fasten onto individuals who come within their realm they turn to sterile, meaningless psittacism."<sup>9</sup> It can be positively asserted however, that such a criticism is in no way applicable to Durkheim. The latter was keenly aware of the recalcitrant nature of human beings, of the give-and-take element in the process of acculturation, and of the fundamental tendency of individuals to be refractory to social disciplines. It is erroneous to attribute to Durkheim, as Malinowski apparently does,<sup>10</sup> the theory of unswerving, automatic, "slavish, fascinated, passive," obedience to social codes. The former was even quite saddened by the inherent antagonism between social demands and individual inclinations. If society were merely the natural and spontaneous development of our organic nature, he wrote, there would be no resistances and no conflicts between our biological and our social selves. These two parts of our nature would harmonize and adjust to each other without friction. Society, however, has exigencies altogether different from the ones implied in our strictly biological nature. Our social and organic natures, while always effecting an adjustment to each other, are nevertheless made up of somewhat

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in G. Dumas's *Traité de psychologie* (Paris: Alcan, 1924), Vol. II, Book I, chap. v, pp. 333-425; the late Professor Meillet's "Comment les mots changent de sens," *Année sociologique*, IX (1906), 1-38, and his *Les Langues dans l'Europe nouvelle* (Paris: Payot, 1918).

See Bouglé's *Bilan de la sociologie française contemporaine* (Paris: Alcan, 1935), esp. chap. i, for a résumé of most of these contributions.

On the sociology of thought, see the critical essay by D. Essertier, *Les Formes inférieures de l'explication* (Paris: Alcan, 1927), esp. pp. 258-78.

<sup>9</sup> R. K. Merton, "Recent French Sociology," *Social Forces*, XII (1934), 542.

<sup>10</sup> B. Malinowski, *Crime and Custom in Savage Society* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1932), p. 4.

different elements and tend to orient us in divergent directions.<sup>11</sup> Such thoughts could hardly be expressed by one who ignored the organic rootings of human life or who saw in the individual only a passive, psittaceous product of his social milieu.

It is likewise doubtful whether the charge of "cultural determinism" is validly applicable to the Durkheimian brand of social psychologists.<sup>12</sup> If cultural determinism ignores individual differences, if it "views the individual as a passive recipient of the cultural patterns of his group," and if it "pays little attention to original nature, sees no problem in social development, and belittles the possibilities of human beings having unique lines of experience,"<sup>13</sup> then it is a distortion to attribute this position, as Blumer does, to writers like Blondel and Halbwachs, or even to Lévy-Bruhl. These French social psychologists have concerned themselves with the social aspects of psychological phenomena, it is true; but in doing so they have not denied that these phenomena possess other aspects. Blondel in particular has insisted on the importance of a psychology of individual differences in which psychophysiological as well as sociopsychological factors are considered.<sup>14</sup>

A second danger inherent in the sociologistic approach is the tendency to invent one's own psychological principles or to adopt implicitly some outmoded system of psychology. It is well-nigh impossible to study phenomena like primitive mentality or magical behavior, even in their strictly sociological aspects, without adopting some kind of psychological view of the nature of mental processes, of the association of ideas, or of human motivation. It is imperative, therefore, that sociologists keep in constant touch with the developments in psychological science, just as it is incumbent upon psychologists not to ignore what the late Professor Delacroix has termed

<sup>11</sup> E. Durkheim, *Scientia*, 1914, pp. 219-20.

<sup>12</sup> The charge is made by H. Blumer (see Blumer, "Social Psychology," in *Man and Society*, ed. E. P. Schmidt [New York: Prentice-Hall, 1937], pp. 154-57).

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 157.

<sup>14</sup> Ch. Blondel, *Introduction à la psychologie collective*, p. 187. Cf. Halbwachs, *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, p. xi, n. 1, and L. Lévy-Bruhl, *La Mentalité primitive* (Herbert Spencer Lecture) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931), pp. 10-11. Blumer, we feel, exaggerates the unity and "schoolishness" of these writers. See, e.g., Blondel's review in *Revue philosophique*, CI (1926), 290-98. Blondel's conclusion contains a warning against "sociological imperialism" and "pan-sociologism" (*ibid.* p. 298).

the "social dimension" of psychic data.<sup>15</sup> Since their tasks involve some degree of psychologizing, sociologists must become more conscious of their implicit psychological assumptions.<sup>16</sup> One of the most serious defects in Durkheim is precisely this tendency to adopt or invent psychological principles *ad hoc*.

A third risk contained in sociologistic investigations is the hypostatizing of society and social forces. The Durkheimians undoubtedly do not have a clean slate on this score. But if, with Essertier, we may distinguish "pure sociologism," with its literal, unqualified, and substantialist acceptance of concepts like "collective consciousness" and "collective entity," from "neo- or moderate sociologism" which, as it is professed by Marcel Mauss<sup>17</sup> and seems to be adopted by Paul Fauconnet,<sup>18</sup> treats "collective consciousness" and "collective representations" merely as heuristic modes of expressing the reality of associational life, then we do not hesitate to qualify Durkheim's position as neo- rather than purely sociologistic.<sup>19</sup> If the expression is not too odd, we may say that Durkheim was a moderate Durkheimian.

In conclusion, then, it may be urged that sociologistic studies, provided that they give due consideration to the biological basis of human nature, make explicit their psychological presuppositions, and avoid the tendency toward social hypostatizing,<sup>20</sup> can well serve to present a penetrating and revealing picture of the personality aspects of social living.

COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

<sup>15</sup> H. Delacroix, *Le Langage et la pensée* (Paris: Alcan, 1924), p. 55.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. D. Essertier, *Psychologie et sociologie* (Paris: Alcan, 1927), pp. 30-31.

<sup>17</sup> "Rapports réels et pratiques de la psychologie et de la sociologie," *Journal de psychologie*, XXI (1924), 892-922.

<sup>18</sup> *Congrès des Sociétés philosophiques américaine, anglaises, belge, italienne et française*, 1921: Communications et discussions (Paris: Colin), pp. 471-72.

<sup>19</sup> The expressions "neo-sociologism" and "moderate sociologism" (*sociologisme nuancé*) appear in Essertier, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-94. Essertier seems to regard Davy as representative of the extreme position (see D. Essertier, *La Sociologie* [Paris: Alcan, 1930], p. 179, n. 3).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. M. Mauss, "Fragment d'un plan de sociologie générale descriptive," *Annales sociologiques*, Ser. A, fasc. 1 (1934), pp. 1-56.

A NOTE ON GEORGE H. MEAD'S *THE PHILOSOPHY  
OF THE ACT*<sup>1</sup>

SAMUEL M. STRONG

The striking feature of Mead's system of thought is its unitary nature, which can be traced from his early writings to the manuscripts published posthumously in this volume. The elaboration of his concepts presents a progressive continuity, and the central problem of his works underwent a similar evolutionary process. In the *Definition of the Psychical*<sup>2</sup> Mead formulated a thesis which is fundamental to his theory of the genesis of the self that he later developed in *Mind, Self, and Society*.<sup>3</sup> He rejected the various conceptions of the psychical which considered an antecedent mind or denied its existence altogether and established the notion that the psychical is a cognitive act. Mead was aware of the vexing problem that psychology confronted when it attempted to account for the manifestations of social process and for those phases of mind and self that are social in nature. He observed, then, that biological considerations forced psychology through associationism, parallelism, functionalism, and behaviorism. The criticism that he leveled at his predecessors was that they failed to show how mind and self arise within conduct. He then set out to show how mind and self are not biologically given but are social emergents, how language serves as a mechanism for the appearance of mind and self in the social act, and how the ongoing social process generates the mind and self, thus freeing conduct from a mentalistic and subjective interpretation.<sup>4</sup> He demonstrates further how the individual act may be viewed within the social act; how to bridge the gap between impulse and rationality; how the organism acquires the capacity of self-consciousness, reflective thinking, abstract reasoning, and purposive behavior; and how man as a rational being arose. These constitute some of the major problems in Mead's social psychology and are essential points of departure for an evaluation of the present volume.

*The Philosophy of the Act* is a synthesis of Mead's basic concepts as well

<sup>1</sup> Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938.

<sup>2</sup> ("University of Chicago Decennial Publications" [Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1903)], pp. 77-112.

<sup>3</sup> Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.

<sup>4</sup> This is Mead's major criticism of Cooley. See his article, "Cooley's Contribution to American Social Thought," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXV (1930), 693-706.



as an elaboration and explanation of the critical points in his system of thought. Realizing the need of introducing scientific method into a field that had always been refractory to its application, he refined old concepts and introduced new ones in explaining the pattern of the act. Mead's pragmatic philosophy of science is based on his theory of the logical structure of meaning—defined as the triadic relation between gesture, adjustive response, and resultant of the social act which the gesture initiates.<sup>5</sup>

Through his analysis of the act Mead provides his singular contribution in relating the pragmatic philosophy of science to social psychology. The stages of the act—stimulus, attitude, perception, manipulation, and consummation—are involved in a process which implies that although an act may be reflective or nonreflective, the blocked impulse requires the reflective process to set up hypotheses in order to guide action. Action in turn is tested through action, thus bringing about consummation. It is important to see in this connection how perception has in it all the elements of an act: "The stimulation, the response represented by the attitude, and the ultimate experience which follows upon the reaction represented by the imagery arising out of past reactions."<sup>6</sup> Mead points out: (1) the relation between scientific objects and perceptual objects; (2) the mechanism by which the reference relation as found in the response to perceptual objects may be considered; (3) the relation between perception and consummation; and (4) the manner in which the consummatory nature of the object is the referent of the complete response.

The central problem is the relationship of the organism with the world of experience of this organism. It is in fact the problem of subject-object relation. Mead conceives that scientific objects are constructs of perception and that both elements—the scientific and perceptual objects—are common in social experience. Such an interpretation raises the question of the process of emergence which implies the problem of what sort of a physical, biological, or cosmological environment arises with the emergence of mind and society. Contrary to Whitehead's position, Mead assigns to thinking the potentiality of causing changes in the order of natural events. This does not contradict his assumption that the organ-

<sup>5</sup> Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, pp. 75-82.

<sup>6</sup> Mead, *The Philosophy of the Act*, p. 3. See also Mead's analysis of Bergson's theory of perception, especially with reference to Mead's discussion of the social act, in "The Genesis of the Self, and Social Consciousness," *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXV (1925), 251-77.

ism and its environment emerge simultaneously. To explain this point Mead introduces the concept of the organization of perspectives.

Mind emerges in the process of the social act. The significance of mind and its capacities must be viewed in terms of social action and reflective thinking, while the development of the self consists of the organization of perspectives. The basic problem is to account for the process of emergence and to explain the perspectives which are associated with a given emergent. Mead's concept of the "generalized other" as a common perspective is a means which serves in verifying hypotheses in the pattern of the act. By seeking to account for emergence through a process in which the past and the future combine in the present, he transcends the limitations set by Minkowsky's position of no emergence and no process and Whitehead's "eternal objects" and the static implication of his theory. Creative intelligence determines new orders of events by proposing new plans of action. The organization of perspectives can be viewed as the uniting of past and future.

The problem of emergence is of crucial significance in Mead's system of thought since it represents the vital source for his unique contribution to social psychology without having resorted to metaphysical explanations. He accounts for this basic problem through the principle of sociality.<sup>7</sup> This principle involves: (1) the social nature of consciousness in the process of the social act, (2) the reflective process in the mechanism of social conduct whereby the organism responds to its own responses, and (3) mind as the scene where the passing from one perspective to another takes place. The principle of sociality as Mead conceives it involves also his assumption that "there are in Nature aspects which answer the minded organisms."<sup>8</sup> In this manner the interaction of the environment and the organism constitutes an ongoing process which must be viewed in terms of the social act. Mead's dynamic social approach considers the actual process by which we pass from one perspective to another and the control of oncoming events over that process. Through reflective think-

<sup>7</sup> In *The Philosophy of the Present* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932), Mead presents the concepts of dynamics, process, emergence, and the social character of nature within the frame of sociality. In *The Philosophy of the Act* he demonstrates how these concepts supplement one another and how sociality itself is one of the phases of the processes of nature.

<sup>8</sup> *The Philosophy of the Act*, p. 609. Further in this context Mead states: "What is essential to such a mind is that it should be characterized by sociality in both its dimensions, for not only must it be determined by the different elements that go to make it up in the system in which it belongs but it must in passage be able to occupy successive systems so that it realizes itself in each as a member of the other or others."

ing, memory, anticipation, inference, and prediction data found in one reference system can indicate data found in another. Sociality is the basis for prevision of the consequence of an act; it enables a man to be several perceivers at the same time; and, consequently, reconstruction through hypothetical inferences is possible in the process of analysis. Mead points out the mechanism of control in the pattern of the act. With the aid of reflective thinking man is able to hold on to a distant object as a controlling factor in conduct for the solution of problems. That distant object as a temporary future and the experimental nature of the act relegate to the oncoming event the capacity of control, thereby transforming action into a process that has within it past, present, and future.

The process of knowing consists in co-ordinating perspectives. The objects of knowledge, as Mead views them, are universals that have their source in common perspectives which are arrived at through the process of emergence, the theory of reflective thinking, and the principle of sociality. One cannot conceive, then, of an absolute unchanging past or future since the emergent gives meaning to the past that in turn is a past of an emergent. Through the process of reflective thinking and hypothetical testing of action the perspective is not changeless and sociality becomes the principle and form of emergence. The process of selection inherent in the organic process manifests itself through reflective thinking in that the organism not only responds to its own organic states but responds to its own responses. The significant role in adjustment and the means by which the continuity of emergent forms takes place Mead ascribes to reflective thinking. Through the supplementary nature of Mead's concepts he establishes an inseparable relation between his social psychology and cosmological views. The order of events is affected only through emergence. The role-taking activity, the social process, and the common action must be viewed in terms of the organization of perspectives. The blocked act is brought to consummation through hypotheses whereby the future and the past are united in the act. Hypotheses, as means for organizing perspectives made possible through reflective thinking, introduce the reconstruction and the completion of the act. The philosophy of the act points out the interrelationship of these processes that operate in the change and development of the environment.

The social theory of value and the analysis of knowledge, that explain the role of the scientific technique of reflection, formulate the social character of common action in bringing about change. Verification and meaning are not of an individual nature. The social act explains the relationship of the organism and environment whereby universals are not

immanent entities but are subject to the process of emergence. The epistemological and cosmological considerations and the theory of value in *The Philosophy of the Act* are based on the principles of evolution and dynamics within the frame of Mead's social psychology. He demonstrated through his analysis of the pattern of the act that the formulas of science lie within ordinary perceptual experience. The relation of thought and action is treated by Mead in the same manner in which he conceives of scientific formulations as methods of control.

It is hardly possible to touch upon the many significant phases that this comprehensive treatise deals with since the fertile material appeals to divergent interests. Thus the students of philosophy, philosophy of science, logic, or ethics would refer to those elements that are pertinent to their respective fields of knowledge much in the same manner that this writer attempted to single out some salient factors of Mead's social psychology. It is to the latter field that Mead has made the greatest contribution. The task that the social psychologist faces, now that we are in possession of Mead's complete system of thought, is to translate it into operational language. It will be necessary to abstract Mead's system of social psychology from his epistemology, cosmology, and ethics and to formulate his theory of the social act with its inherent theories of language, meaning, mind, self, and the development of society so that his hypotheses should lend themselves to the test of experimental science.<sup>9</sup> The theories just enumerated are fundamental in the explanation of human behavior and are developed in Mead's social psychology with great originality. The importance that he attaches to the "delayed act" as a source for all the concepts dealt with in general psychology should be of primary consideration in any experimental research that would be initiated. Research in this direction should consider Mead's hypothesis that the problem is not in providing an explanation for the individual conduct through a study of the individual act, but that the explanation is to be derived from social conduct that implies the complete social situation. The social psychology Mead developed challenges the existing schools of thought that are presenting conflicting theories to explain individual behavior. The controversial topics of motives and drives that are the substance of much theorizing in psychology and abnormal psychology are handled by Mead in a singular fashion. He maintains that while the goal is implicit in the act, the individual act should be conceived within the context of the larger social act that involves the group. "The ob-

<sup>9</sup> In his chapter on "The Limits of the Problematic" (*ibid.*, pp. 26-44) Mead deals with the question of predictability in experimental psychology.

jective of the act is then found in the life-process of the group, not in those separate individuals alone."<sup>10</sup> The implications of these hypotheses are important enough to merit verification. Mead holds that the "dynamic ongoing social process" composed of social acts lends itself to observation, and the social psychological technique which he provides is from the "outside to the inside." The two aspects of the act—the external and internal—should be considered in their natural social situation. In *The Philosophy of the Act*, Mead provides a line of thinking which further emphasizes the task for the social psychologist to proceed in applying experimental scientific techniques to the problems he raises. There are invaluable suggestions in Mead's social psychology that point also to therapeutic possibilities of behavior disorders and for scientific control of conduct. The concept of the "generalized other" and the process of "role-taking" illustrate potentially fruitful areas of research in this direction. This, however, must first be preceded by the translation of Mead's social psychology into operational language so that his hypotheses may be tested.

CHICAGO

<sup>10</sup> Mead, "The Genesis of the Self . . . , " *Ethics*, p. 264. On pp. xxxv-xxxvi of the Introduction to *The Philosophy of the Act* Charles W. Morris and the associate editors of that volume point out Mead's acknowledgment of the influence of relativity physics on his social psychology and his interpretation of the research procedure of science and also (pp. xlv-lxv) state his position in contrast to those of Minkowsky and Whitehead.

## HIGHER DEGREES IN SOCIOLOGY CONFERRED IN 1938

According to reports received by the *Journal* from institutions offering graduate instruction, 43 doctoral degrees and 125 Masters' degrees in sociology were conferred in the calendar year 1938 by 43 institutions in the United States and Canada. The list includes only those institutions which require a dissertation or thesis. Because of lack of space, degrees, dissertations, and theses in the field of social work are not included.

### DOCTORS' DEGREES

- Frank Dewitt Alexander, B.S., M.A. Peabody College, 1927, 1929. "Tenants and Owners in a Rural Cotton Community: A Cultural Study." *Vanderbilt*.  
Mila Alihan, B.A. University of British Columbia, 1927; M.A. Smith, 1928. "Social Ecology." *Columbia*.  
Isabel Janet Blain, M.A. Glasgow, 1932; Glasgow School of Social Study, 1932-33; Two-Year Cert. Bryn Mawr, 1936. "Some Characteristics of Skilled Performance in the Assembly of Precision Instruments as Shown by a Refined Technique of Motion Study." *Bryn Mawr*.  
Elsie Elizabeth Carlson, B.S. North Dakota, 1931; M.A. Nebraska, 1934. "A Study of the Crimes Committed by 100 Habitual Criminals." *Nebraska*.  
Arthur Shu-Yuan Chen, A.B. St. Johns University (China); A.M. Southern California. "The Sociology of Old Age." *Southern California*.  
Oliver Cromwell Cox, S.B. Northwestern, 1928; M.A. Chicago, 1932. "Factors Affecting the Marital Status of Negroes in the United States." *Chicago*.  
Winston Wallace Ehrmann, B.S. Yale, 1934. "Cultural Determinants of the Status of Woman." *Yale*.  
Kenneth Evans, B.A., M.A. Texas, 1925, 1928. "The Changing Occupational Distribution and the Rise of Professional Services in South." *North Carolina*.  
Harold L. Geisert, B.A., M.A., Illinois, 1929, 1930. "Circulation of Newspapers as an Index of Cultural Change." *North Carolina*.  
Harold Allen Gibbard, A.B. University of British Columbia, 1932; M.A. McGill, 1934. "Residential Succession." *Michigan*.  
Clarence Elmer Glick, A.B. De Pauw, 1927; M.A. Chicago, 1928. "The Chinese Migrant in Hawaii: A Study in Accommodation." *Chicago*.  
Paul Glick, B.A. De Pauw, 1933; M.A. Wisconsin, 1935. "The Effects of the Depression on Wisconsin's Birth Rates." *Wisconsin*.  
Leo Arthur Theodore Hask, A.B. Cornell, 1926; A.M. Iowa, 1928. "Discontinuity in a Population." *Harvard*.

- Philip Morris Hauser, Ph.B., M.A. Chicago, 1929, 1933. "Differential Fertility Mortality and Net Reproduction in Chicago." *Chicago*.
- Reuben Hill, B.A. Utah State, 1935; Ph.M. Wisconsin, 1936. "Success and Failure of Adult Probationers in Wisconsin." *Wisconsin*.
- Joseph Sandy Himes, A.B., A.M. Oberlin, 1931, 1932. "The Negro Delinquent in Columbus, 1935." *Ohio State*.
- William Bay Irvine, A.B. Marietta College, 1917; M.A. Pittsburgh, 1934. "A Study of the Relative Participation of Children of Native, Mixed and Foreign Parentage in Eight Recreational and Religious Agencies of Sharon, Pennsylvania." *Pittsburgh*.
- Edward Jandy. "Life and Theory of Charles Horton Cooley." *Michigan*.
- Arthur Katona, B.A., M.A. Wisconsin, 1930, 1931. "Adult Education and Democracy in America." *Wisconsin*.
- Collerohe Krassovsky (Mrs.), D.A.E. Paris, Sorbonne, 1925; A.B., A.M. Michigan, 1929, 1931. "The Evolution of Structure Function Relationships of a Social Institution." *Michigan*.
- Peter Lejins, Candidate of Philosophy, Candidate of Law, University of Latvia, 1930, 1933. "The Concept of Imitation and Imitation as a Factor in Crime." *Chicago*.
- Mildred R. Mell, B.A. Michigan, 1920; M.A. Georgia, 1925. "Poor Whites." *North Carolina*.
- Gildas Eugene Metour, A.B., M.A. Pittsburgh, 1932, 1933. "An Intensive Case Analysis of Some Social Types of Personality: A Study of Wishes." *Pittsburgh*.
- Elmer Dayton Mitchell, A.B., A.M. Michigan, 1912, 1919. "The Growth of Physical Education in Allied Movements in the State of Michigan: Study of Institutional Acceptance and Integration." *Michigan*.
- Twila Neeley, B.A. Wooster, 1925. "Error in the Interview." *Columbia*.
- Elizabeth Nottingham, B.A., M.A. Cambridge. "The Making of an Evangelist." *Columbia*.
- Jacob Jesse Ogle, A.B., M.A. Cincinnati, 1921, 1922; Rabbi, Hebrew Union College, 1928. "Is the American Protestant Church a Rural Institution? A Study of Its Adaptation to Successive Social Environments." *Nebraska*.
- Thomas Mason Record, B.A. Yale, 1932. "A Sociological Study of Ancient Irish Culture." *Yale*.
- Ruby Jo Reeves, B.S. Texas State College for Women, 1929; M.A. Yale, 1936. "Marriages in New Haven since 1870." *Yale*.
- Percy A. Robert, A.B. Loyola, 1926; A.M. McGill, 1928. "Probationers in Essex County, New Jersey: A Study of the Social Backgrounds and Ecology of the Probationers of Essex County." *New York University*.
- R. Welling Roskelley, B.A., M.A. Utah State, 1932, 1933. "Attitudes and Overt Behavior: Their Relations to Each Other and to Selection Factors." *Wisconsin*.
- Irwin Taylor Sanders, A.B. Washington and Lee, 1929. "The Sociology of a Shopski Bulgarian Village." *Cornell*.

- Clarence Henry Schettler, A.B., M.A. Missouri, 1926. "Problems of Personality Traits with Emphasis upon the Problem of Mutability." *Chicago*.
- Clarence Wesley Schroeder, A.B. Southwestern College, 1913; M.A. Kansas, 1913. "Divorce in a City of 100,000 Population." *Chicago*.
- Ruth E. Shallcross, A.B. Nebraska, 1929; Two-Year Cert. Bryn Mawr, 1937. "Some Problems in the Control of Industrial Homework: An Analysis of Homework Legislation and Administration in New York State." *Bryn Mawr*.
- Emile Benoit Smullyan, A.B., A.M. Harvard, 1932, 1933. "French Sociological Theory and Its Critics." *Harvard*.
- Paul Alfred Francis Walter, Jr., A.B. Stanford, 1921; A.M. University of Mexico, 1933. "A Study of Isolation and Social Change in Three Spanish-speaking Villages of New Mexico." *Stanford*.
- Chester R. Wasson, B.A. Pittsburgh, 1929; M.A. Oberlin, 1931. "Social and Economic Backgrounds of Distressed Rural Groups in the Minnesota Cut-over Region." *Minnesota*.
- John Wesley Mayhew Whiting, Ph.B. Yale, 1931. "Inculcation and Social Control in a New Guinea Society." *Yale*.
- B. O. Williams, B.S. Clemson Agricultural, 1918; M.S. Virginia, 1929. "Occupational Mobility of Farmers with Reference to Certain Socio-economic Factors (Pickens Co., S.C.)." *Minnesota*.
- Edith Webb Williams, A.B., A.M. North Carolina, 1930, 1932. "A Study of Background Factors Associated with Marriage Adjustment in Rural Families." *Cornell*.
- Richard Hays Williams, A.B. Pomona, 1933; A.M. Harvard, 1936. "The Expression of Common Value Attitudes toward Suffering in the Symbolism of Mediaeval Art." *Harvard*.
- Richard L. Woolbert, A.B. Illinois; A.M. Chicago, 1930. "The Logic Used in Sociological Case Studies." *Iowa*.

## MASTERS' DEGREES

- Gustave Amerell, B.A. Wisconsin, 1937. "The Role of the Probation Officer in the Success or Failure of Adult Probationers in Wisconsin." *Wisconsin*.
- Odin Anderson, B.A. Wisconsin, 1937. "The Attitude of the Norwegian Church toward Social and Economic Problems." *Wisconsin*.
- Richard Ashby, A.B. Florida, 1936. "Florida, 1920-1925: A Case of Interstate Migration." *North Carolina*.
- Miner H. Baker, B.A. Washington, 1935. "The Proposed City Light Merger: A Study in Public Opinion." *Washington*.
- Gordon Hitchcock Barker, B.S. Northwestern 1928. "Family Factors in the Ecology of Juvenile Delinquency." *Northwestern*.
- Edward Jackson Baur, A.B. Chicago, 1935. "Delinquency among Mexican Boys in South Chicago." *Chicago*.
- Davis Bin-Nun, A.B. Chapman, 1937. "A Sociological Analysis of the Riots in Palestine: Causes and Cures." *New York University*.



- Alvin Harold Bloom, Ph.B. Chicago, 1927. "The Frequency and Treatment of Social Problems in the Twentieth-Century American Novel." *Northwestern*.
- Clarence Theodore Bluemel, A.B. Indiana Central, 1930. "Functional Structure of Twelve Villages in Stephenson County, Ill." *Michigan*.
- Robert M. Bossinger, A.B. Oberlin, 1924; B.S. in Ed. Kent State University, 1930. "Defense of the Indigent Defendant in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas." *Western Reserve*.
- Mary Chamblee Bower, A.B. State Teachers College of Oklahoma, 1931. "A Study of the Records of Students Who Did Not Graduate from Syracuse University." *Syracuse*.
- Marian L. Brockway, A.B. Washburn, 1934. "A Study of the Geographical, Occupational, and Political Characteristics of Congressmen, 1800-1919." *Kansas*.
- Julia Estelle Brown, A.B. North Carolina. "Social Distance between Negroes and Whites." *Southern California*.
- Herman D. Burrell, A.B. Fisk, 1936. "Racial Contacts along the 'Main Street' of the World." *Fisk*.
- John M. Byrd, B.S. Murray State Teachers College. "Educational Policies of the Federal Government toward the Sac and Fox Indians in Iowa: 1920-1937." *Iowa*.
- Sophie T. Cambria, A.B. Barnard, 1937. "Workers' Education in the Trade Union Movement." *Byrn Mawr*.
- David Carpenter, A.B. Washington University, St. Louis, 1937. "Boy Scouts of America . . . Measurable Influence on Its Past and Present Membership." *Washington University*.
- Maurine M. Cason. "The Influence of the Home Background on the Social Adjustment of the Child in School." *Colorado*.
- Helen F. Christiansen, A.B. Minnesota, 1909. "The Relation of School Progress Measured in Terms of the Total Amount of School Attendance or Course Completion to Subsequent Economic Adjustment among High School Students Attending Four St. Paul High Schools in 1926." *Minnesota*.
- James Claibourne Booth, A.B. Scarritt College, 1935. "Educational Backgrounds and Personality Problems of Night School Students." *Vanderbilt*.
- Reed K. Clegg, B.S. Utah, 1931. "A Sociological Survey of the Murray Community." *Utah*.
- Edwin Conrad, B.A., L.L.B. Wisconsin, 1932. "Commentaries on the Wisconsin Law of Probation." *Wisconsin*.
- Severino Fermin Corpus, A.B. Chapman College. "An Analysis of the Racial Adjustment Activities and Problems of the Filipino-American Ch. Fellowship in Los Angeles." *Southern California*.
- Harriet D. Crawford, B.A. Washington, 1936. "Teachers' Information and Attitudes concerning Current Social Problems." *Washington*.
- C. K. Djang, A.B. University of Shanghai, 1931. "A Brief Survey of Chinese Immigrants in American Life." *Louisville*.

- Charles Dollard, B.A. Wisconsin, 1928. "The Interview as a Tool for Research and Counseling." *Wisconsin*.
- Mary S. Drew, B.A. Washington. "Part-Time Employment for Women in Seattle, 1929-1937." *Washington*.
- Zaneta Eager, B.A. Pomona, 1927. "Organization and Leadership Factors Affecting the Development of Rural Drama Programs in Boone County, Iowa." *Iowa State College*.
- Ronald Edgerton, B.A. Wisconsin, 1931. "Leaders and Leadership." *Wisconsin*.
- Eric Ely Estonick, A.B. New York University, 1937. "Social Forces in American Literature since the World War." *New York University*.
- Jeanette Farrington, A.B. Washington University, St. Louis, 1936. "Techniques of Revolution." *Washington University*.
- Fred Fletcher, B.A. North Carolina, 1938. "Curriculum Training for Professional Leadership in Recreation in Institutes of Higher Learning in Southeastern Region." *North Carolina*.
- Karl A. Fox, A.B. Utah, 1937. "A Critique of Mortality Statistics with Special Reference to Utah." *Utah*.
- Edward W. Francel, B.S. Minnesota, 1937. "A Comparative Study of Delinquent and Nondelinquent Boys Who Have Previously Been Studied at a Child Guidance Clinic." *Minnesota*.
- William M. Fuson, A.B. Kansas, 1936. "A Study of Collective Tendencies in the Development of the American Railroad Industry." *Kansas*.
- Alexander Davis Gaither, A.B. Knoxville, 1932. "Negro Women Employed in Domestic Service in Columbus, Ohio." *Ohio State*.
- John Manuel Gandy, A.B. Virginia State College for Negroes, 1937. "Study of Racial Attitudes of Negro College Students." *Ohio State*.
- Merlin E. Garber, A.B. Illinois, 1939. "Culture Adaptations in the Church of the Brethren." *Illinois*.
- Albert I. Gordon, B.A. New York University, 1927. "Some Significant Factors Associated with Unrest among the Laundry and Dry Cleaning Employees in Minneapolis." *Minnesota*.
- John Ralph Graves, A.B., LL.B. Missouri, 1930, 1932. "Juvenile Maladjustments of One Hundred Flint Criminals." *Michigan*.
- Lois M. Greenwood, A.B. Indiana, 1938. "Frontier Banditry." *Indiana*.
- Clementina Griffin, A.B. Vassar. "A Sociological Study of 52 Senior Boys—the Products of Junior-Senior High School." *Southern California*.
- Constance H. Hall, B.S. Massachusetts State, 1936. "A History of the Child Labor Amendment." *Massachusetts State*.
- Ella Zarbock Hames, A.B. Eastern State Teachers, 1934. "Causal Factors in Juvenile Delinquency." *Michigan*.
- Harold E. Hammer, A.B. Kalamazoo, 1934; B.D. Colgate-Rochester Divinity School, 1937. "The Rural Churches of Cortland County, N.Y." *Cornell*.
- Edwin R. Hartz, A.B.-S.E. Missouri State Teachers College, 1933; B.D. Duke, 1937. "Social Problems in a North Carolina Parish." *Duke*.

- Ethel Crew Hawkins, B.A. North Carolina College for Women, 1925. "Family Discipline as a Conditioning Influence on Children from One to Six Years of Age." *North Carolina*.
- Amos Henry Hawley, Jr., A.B. Cincinnati, 1936. "Immobility: An Analytical Study of the Resistances to Human Migration." *Michigan*.
- Laura Heacock, B.A. Omaha. "The Housing Projects in Omaha." *Omaha*.
- Lucile M. Herrick, A.B. George Washington, 1924. "A Study of Lester F. Ward, the Sociologist." *George Washington*.
- Henry Holmes Hill, A.B. Birmingham-Southern, 1937. "A Comparative Study of Negro Suicide in Tennessee." *Vanderbilt*.
- Maurice Osborn Hunt, A.B. Indiana, 1934. "The Program of the Indiana Boys' School." *Indiana*.
- James Alexander Hutchins, Jr., B.A. North Carolina, 1937. "Development of Football in the South." *North Carolina*.
- Ruth Inglis, A.B. Stanford, 1935. "A Socio-psychological Study of the Relationship between Literature and Society in Terms of the Attributes of Women in Popular Fiction and in American Life." *Stanford*.
- Abe J. Jaffe, A.B. Chicago, 1935. "Religious Differentials in the Net Reproduction Rate." *Chicago*.
- Ira O. Jones, B.A. Omaha. "Editorial Influence on Social Problems." *Omaha*.
- Peter Pierre Klassen, A.B. Denison, 1931. "Birth-Rates of Foreign Nationalities in America and Abroad: A Study in Assimilation." *Chicago*.
- Lottie Lavin, A.B. Chicago, 1937. "Jewish Education in Chicago." *Chicago*.
- Kent Watson Leach, A.B. Oberlin, 1937. "The Sociology of the D.A.R.'s." *Oberlin*.
- Bessie Ying Lee, B.S. Oregon, 1935. "Perpetuation of the Primary Group Patterns among the Chinese in Portland, Oregon." *Oregon*.
- William H. Levitt, B.A. North Carolina, 1938. "Occupational Distribution of Jews in North Carolina." *North Carolina*.
- John D. Lillywhite, B.S. Utah, 1934. "Statistics of Crime in Salt Lake City, with Special Reference to Burglary." *Utah*.
- Marvin B. Lind, B.S. Iowa State, 1935. "Analysis of the Education, Income, Mobility, Occupation and Vocational Activities of Farm Youth in the High School Area of Montezuma, Iowa." *Iowa State*.
- Rhea Johnson Loosli, B.S. Utah State, 1930. "A Comparison of Life History and Questionnaire Methods in the Study of Family Relationships." *Cornell*.
- William L. Lyon, B.A. Fresno State, 1935. "Methods and Criteria Used in Oregon in the Selection of Parolees from the State." *Oregon*.
- Lucyle Bivens McAllister, A.B. Louisville Municipal, 1934. "Prominence of Persons with Negro Blood in Brazilian Cultural Life." *Fisk*.
- Raymond McClinton, B.S. Millsaps, 1936. "Social-economic Analysis of Mississippi Delta Plantations." *North Carolina*.
- Edward McDonagh, A.B. Southern California. "Social Distance between China and Japan." *Southern California*.
- Duncan George MacLennan, A.B. Franklin College; B.Th. Western Theological

- Seminary; A.M. Denver. "The Racial Culture Process in Nova Scotia." *Southern California*.
- Edwin Baichly Main, Ph.B. Chicago, 1934. "The Social Adjustment of the Orthopedically Handicapped Individual." *Chicago*.
- Nathan Mandel, B.S. Minnesota, 1934. "A Controlled Analysis of the Relationship of Boy Scout Tenure and Participation to Community Adjustment." *Minnesota*.
- John Frederick Dalman Marquardt, B.S. Pennsylvania. "A Study of the Los Angeles Coordinating Councils." *Southern California*.
- Alva M. Maxey, A.B. Talladego, 1932. "Attitudes among the Negroes of Oberlin." *Oberlin*.
- John A. Mayden, A.B., B.S. Drury, 1927. "The Relationship of Prevailing Behavior Patterns and Crime." *Illinois*.
- Martin H. Miller, A.B. Western Reserve, 1937. "Treatment of Persons Charged with Intoxication in the Municipal Court of Cleveland, O." *Western Reserve*.
- William F. Milner, A.B. Indiana, 1937. "Prison Escapes." *Indiana*, 1939.
- Donald M. Mitchell, B.A. Louisiana State, 1936. "Migration to and from a Connecticut Suburban Town, 1930-1937." *Connecticut State*.
- Shotaro F. Miyamoto, B.A., M.A. Washington, 1936, 1938. "Social Solidarity among the Japanese in Seattle." *Washington*.
- Josephine Moch, A.B. Smith. "A Comparison of the Approaches to the Study of a Problem Case from Points of View of Woodworth, Mowrer, and Freud." *Southern California*.
- John Lambert Molyneaux, B.S. Virginia, 1936. "The Repeal Movement: A Case Study of a Political Movement." *Virginia*.
- Thomas P. Monahan, A.B. Indiana, 1937. "Critique and Analysis of Birth Statistics in Bloomington, Indiana, 1917-1937." *Indiana*.
- Augusta M. Morgan, A.B. Fisk, 1928. "The Moros as a Factor in the Racial Situation of the Philippine Islands." *Fisk*.
- Ernest E. Neal, A.B. Knoxville, 1935. "Mixed Bloods in the Caribbean: A Survey of the Role and Stature of Mixed Bloods in the Caribbean Area." *Fisk*.
- Elizabeth Virginia Newell, A.B. Seton Hill College. "The Padua Hills Theatre as a Community Organization Enterprise." *Southern California*.
- Kathryn Newton, B.S. Lewis Institute, 1930. "The Use of Life History Material for Rating Changes in Certain Personality Characteristics." *Cornell*.
- Jean Duncan Noble, A.B. Smith, 1918. "The Role of Social Attitudes in the Adjustment of an Occupational Group." *Michigan*.
- Esther Nueman, A.B. Cincinnati, 1934. "Ironbound: A Neighborhood below the Tracks." *New York University*.
- Mary Elaine Ogden, A.B. Chicago, 1936. "The Social Orientation of the Society Girl." *Chicago*.
- Mary Bess Owen, A.B. Indiana, 1937. "Study of a Neighborhood in Bloomington, Indiana." *Indiana*.

- J. C. Peterson, A.B. Jackson, 1935. "Mechanization in Cotton Production: Some Social and Economic Effects." *Fisk*.
- Sara Moss Phillips, A.B. Louisville, 1935. "A Social Survey of Oldham County." *Louisville*.
- Lubin Pickwood, A.B. Fisk, 1933. "Nationalism in Puerto Rico." *Fisk*.
- Hans H. Plambeck, B.A. Oregon, 1935. "Social Control as Manifested in the German Labor Service." *Oregon*.
- Harley O. Preston, A.B. Kent State, Ohio, 1938. "Relationship of Eschatological Emphasis to Economic Status of Protestant Churches in Bloomington." *Indiana*, 1939.
- Thomas I. Quarton, A.B. Southern California. "Social Background of Juvenile Predelinquents in San Pedro District." *Southern California*.
- Beatrice C. Raisin, A.B. New Jersey College of Women. "Social Factors in the Adjustments of 100 Girls on Placement from a State Training School for Mental Deficients." *Southern California*.
- Donald E. Rasmussen, A.B. Illinois, 1937. "Attitudes of Joliet-Stateville Prisoners toward Parole." *Illinois*.
- William C. Resnick, A.B. Washington, 1935. "A Quantitative Method for the Appraisal of Cities." *Northwestern*.
- Kyrl Wilson Richards, A.B. Allegheny, 1929. "The Neighborhood Business Men's Associations in Chicago." *Chicago*.
- Towland Vance Rider, A.B. Amherst, 1937. "Socio-economic Survey of the Onondaga Indian Reservation." *Syracuse*.
- Ida Roevland, B.A. Omaha. "Study of Rituals and Ceremonies of Negroes in Omaha." *Omaha*.
- Jane Packard Schirber, A.B. Goucher, 1918. "Tuberculosis Control in Middlesex County, New Jersey." *New York University*.
- Ralph A. Schofield, A.B. Indiana, 1938. "Recidivism of Prisoners Committed for Drunkenness." *Indiana*, 1939.
- Eleanor B. Sheedy, A.B. New Rochelle, 1929; LL.B. Boston University Law School, 1932. "Social Philosophy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr." *Clark*.
- E. H. Shelley, B.A. Omaha. "Relation of Extra-curricular Activities on Grades of High School Boys." *Omaha*.
- Alice Sickels, A.B. Whitman, 1915. "The Upper Levee Neighborhood: A Study of an Isolated Neighborhood of About One Hundred Italian Families in St. Paul, Minnesota, Known as 'The Upper Levee.'" *Minnesota*.
- Yaemitsu Sigimachi, A.B. Washington. "The Social Thought of Ancient Japan." *Southern California*.
- Ralph William Skeels, B.Sc. Ohio State, 1937. "The Adjustment Problems of Foreign Students at Ohio State University." *Ohio State*.
- Walter Slocum, B.A. South Dakota State College, 1933. "Use of Family Data in Village Planning." *Wisconsin*.
- Mary Stewart Soutar, B.A. Girton, Cambridge, 1936. "Comparative Study of Wage Movements and Technological Change." *Bryn Mawr*.

- David G. Steinicke, A.B. Southern Methodist, 1937. "Population Characteristics by Census Tracts of Dallas, Texas." *Southern Methodist*.
- Leah Genevieve Stewart, A.B. Michigan State. "A Study of the Efficiency of the Ingham County Emergency Relief Administration as Measured in Terms of Clients' Attitudes toward Specific Techniques and Procedures." *Michigan State*.
- June Voss Strother, B.A. Washington, 1931; B.S. in L.S. Washington, 1932. "The Development and Adequacy of the Library as an Institution in the State of Washington." *Washington*.
- W. Glenn Syllenger, B.A. Western Kentucky State Teachers College. "Boy Life in Omaha." *Omaha*.
- Angeline Tauchen, B.A. Creighton. "An Ecological Study of Ashland Community." *Omaha*.
- Harold P. Templeton, B.S. Iowa State, 1934. "Extent of Student Employment and Comparison of Scholastic Records of Employed and Non-employed Male Students of Iowa State College, Fall, 1936." *Iowa State*.
- Paul A. Thomas, A.B. Oberlin, 1932. "Vigilantism." *Oberlin*.
- Esther M. Thompson, A.B. Southern California. "Classification and Correlation of Certain Traits of Boys in Clubs of All Nations Boys Club." *Southern California*.
- Bernard C. Weiss, A.B. Michigan, 1934. "The Effect of the Depression upon Immigrant Families Undergoing Cultural Change." *Michigan*.
- Mary Beth White, A.B. Colorado, 1935. "The Problem of Medical Care in the U.S." *Colorado*.
- Blaine T. Williams, A.B. Iowa. "An Analysis of the Personnel of an Iowa School Board: A Study in Social Control." *Iowa*.
- Marion Francis Williamson, A.B. Buffalo, 1937. "Study of the Crowd Behavior of Rural and Urban Depression Crowds." *Nebraska*.
- Elizabeth A. Wilson, A.B. Louisville, 1924. "Recreation in Louisville: An Historical Sketch." *Louisville*.
- Pearl H. Wong, A.B. Ohio Wesleyan. "The Racial Composition of the Chinese." *Southern California*.
- Mildred M. Wood, A.B. Wheaton, 1936. "The Social Structure Tested by the Distribution of Legal Enactments: A Statistical Analysis of Illinois State Laws since 1890." *Illinois*.
- Ruth Zeigler, A.B. Bell State Teachers College, 1936. "The Chicago Civil Liberties Committee, 1929-38." *Chicago*.

## STUDENTS' DISSERTATIONS IN SOCIOLOGY

The following list of doctoral dissertations and Masters' theses in preparation in universities and colleges in the United States and Canada is a compilation of the returns from letters sent by the editors of the *Journal* to departments of sociology. The date given indicates the probable year in which the degree will be conferred. The name of the college or university in italics designates the institution where the research is in progress. The list does not include names which have formerly been printed in the *Journal* except where the research problem has been changed. The number now working for doctoral degrees is 95, and the number working for Masters' degrees is 219.

### DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS

- Harry Alpert, A.B. College of the City of New York, 1932; M.A. Columbia, 1935. "Emile Durkheim's Sociology." 1939. *Columbia*.
- Ernest M. Banzet, A.B. Hamline, 1920; M.A. Minnesota, 1926. "A Half-Century Development of a Rural County-Seat Community as Reflected in Its Newspaper." 1940. *Michigan State*.
- Gordon Barker, B.S., M.A. Northwestern, 1928, 1938. "Home Recreation." 1939. *Northwestern*.
- James Barnett, B.A. Berea, 1928; M.A. Pennsylvania, 1930. "Divorce and the Treatment of Divorce in American Literature since 1890." 1939. *Pennsylvania*.
- Melvin S. Brooks, B.A. Washington State, 1935; M.S. Iowa State, 1937. "The Effects of the Depression upon Fertility and Marriage Rates by Occupational Groups in Wisconsin." 1940. *Wisconsin*.
- Walter Gordon Browder, B.A. Virginia, 1936. "A Case Study Analysis of Southeastern Tenants and Small Owners." 1939. *North Carolina*.
- Robert G. Caldwell, B.S., M.A. Pennsylvania, 1928, 1934. "History of Penology in Delaware." 1939. *Pennsylvania*.
- William Capel, M.A. Columbia, 1933. "Social Stratification in a Georgia Town." 1939. *Columbia*.
- Joseph E. Clark, M.A. Catholic University, date unknown. "The Role of the W.P.A. in the Social Adjustment of Rhode Island Families." *Catholic University*.
- Pearl E. Clark. "Social Adjustment Problems of Junior College Girls." *Southern California*.

- Joseph A. Cook, A.B. Western Ontario; A.M. Catholic University, 1937. "The Corporative Order of Society." 1939. *Catholic University*.
- Howard P. Cottam, B.A. Brigham Young, 1932; Ph.M. Wisconsin, 1938. "Social Values and Family Background in Relation to Standards of Living." 1939. *Wisconsin*.
- Donald Cowgill, A.B. Park College, 1933; A.M. Washington University, 1935. "Trailer Life and Trailer People." 1939. *Pennsylvania*.
- Eugene Cullinane, A.B., M.A. Western Ontario. "The Priest as a Factor in Social Organization." 1930. *Catholic University*.
- Ralph Henry Danhof, A.B. Michigan, 1935. "A Study of the Development of the Social Organization of Two Newly Established Planned Communities: Boulder City, Nevada, and Middenmeer, the Netherlands." *Michigan*.
- Maurice Davies, B.A. Wooster, 1929; M.A. Wisconsin, 1933. "Methods of Studying Statistical Data in Small Geographic Areas." 1940. *Wisconsin*.
- Sam Daykin, A.B. Illinois, 1932. "Applied Parole Prediction." 1939. *Northwestern*.
- Lee Deets, A.B. Northwestern, 1921; M.A. Columbia, 1924. "The Hutterites: A Study of an Isolated Community." 1939. *Columbia*.
- David Dingilian, A.B., A.M. "The Armenians in Los Angeles." *Southern California*.
- Lloyd W. Dought, B.S. Detroit Teachers College, 1926; M.A. Detroit, 1933. "Socialized Medicine in an American Neighborhood in the City of Detroit, Michigan." 1942. *Michigan State*.
- Hugh D. Duncan, A.B. Drake, 1931; A.M. Chicago, 1933. "Chicago as a Literary Center." *Chicago*.
- Irwin Dunskey, A.B. Newark, 1936. "Charles Horton Cooley and the Cultural Approach to Sociology." 1939. *Duke*.
- George N. Eddy, Th. B. Gordon College, 1929; M.A. New Hampshire, 1930; M.Ed. Springfield College, 1934. "A Critique of Schools of Anthropology." 1940. *Duke*.
- Fred O. Erbe, A.B. Drake University, 1933; A.M. Iowa, 1935. "A Study of Life Offenders in Fort Madison Penitentiary." 1939. *Iowa*.
- Thomas Fisher, Ph.B. Chicago, 1921; M.A. Columbia, 1926. "Federal Legislation Affecting Industrial Disputes, 1900-35." 1939. *Columbia*.
- F. Howard Forsyth, A.B. Brigham Young University, 1935; M.S. Iowa State, 1936. "Effect of Depression and Federal Aid on Farm and Village Families in Minnesota." 1939. *Minnesota*.
- John M. Foskett, A.B., M.A. California, 1933, 1935. "Emile Durkheim and the Problem of Order." 1939. *California*.
- Joseph Harold Gaiser. "Social and Economic Study of the Basque Settlement in Jordan Valley, Oregon." *Southern California*.
- Amy Agnes Gessner, B.A., M.A. Wisconsin, 1931, 1933. "Qualitative Migration in a Rural Community of New York State." 1939. *Cornell*.



- Melvin Gillard, A.B. Northwestern, 1915; M.A. Detroit, 1930. "A Study of the Adjustment of Behavior-Problem Boys." 1942. *Michigan State*.
- John B. Griffin. "Culture Factors Affecting Population Growth." *Southern California*.
- Emil H. Grodberg, A.B. Bowdoin, 1932; A. M. Clark, 1933. "History of the Massachusetts Federation of Labor." *Clark*.
- Clara Hardin, A.B., M.A. Colorado, 1928, 1930; Two-Year Cert. Bryn Mawr, 1936. "Negro Accommodation, East and West: A Study of the Techniques of Minority Peoples in Philadelphia and Denver, Using Jews as a Control Group." 1939. *Bryn Mawr*.
- Amos H. Hawley, A.B. Cincinnati, 1936. "A Study of the Relation of Population Numbers to Community Structure." 1939. *Michigan*.
- Friedrich W. Henssler, J.D. Erlangen, Marburg, Germany, 1934. "Changing Functions of Trade Unionism." 1939. *Northwestern*.
- Sister M. Inez Hilger, B.A. Minnesota, 1923; M.A. Catholic University, 1925. "A Social Study of 150 Chippewa Families of the White Earth Reservation of Minnesota." 1939. *Catholic University*.
- Isaac Hoffman, B.A. Michigan, 1929; M.A. Minnesota, 1933. "An Analysis of the Statistical Factors Underlying Certain Techniques for Validating Personal and Social Adjustment Tests." 1939. *Minnesota*.
- Rex De Vern Hopper, A.B. Butler, 1922; M.A. College of Missions, 1925. "Representative Sociological Thought in Latin America." 1940. *Texas*.
- Charles E. Hutchinson. "Acculturation of the Pueblo Indian Villages of the Rio Grande Valley." *Southern California*.
- Sigurd Johansen, B.A. Minnesota, 1932; M.A. Minnesota, 1934. "Social Organization in Doña Ana County, New Mexico." 1940. *Wisconsin*.
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- Geraldine Mott, B.A. Linfield, 1938. "U.S. Chamber of Commerce Views Labor Relations." 1939. *Columbia*.
- Alma Carlson Munson, A.B. Pittsburgh, 1926. "The Field Theory and Criteria for the Life-History." 1939. *Pittsburgh*.
- Barbara K. Nord, B.S. Wisconsin, 1933. "Relationship between Sociology and Anthropology." 1939. *Cincinnati*.
- Edythe Norwick, B.S., M.S. Temple, 1933, 1935; Pennsylvania School of Social Work, 1934-37. "The County Institution District: A Comparative Study of Four Districts in the Philadelphia Area." 1939. *Bryn Mawr*.
- Lawrence O'Connor. "Social Viewpoints of Engineers' Organizations." 1939. *Columbia*.
- Rose M. Oestern. "Family Patterns among the Italians, 'Peon' Mexicans and Slavonians in the Castelar School District in Los Angeles." *Southern California*.
- Helene Ottenheimer, B.A. Utah, 1937. "A Study of Sacred Thought in the Hebrides." 1939. *Wisconsin*.
- W. Frank Pack, A.B. Chattanooga, 1937. "The Sociological Nature of Child Dependency." 1939. *Vanderbilt*.
- Alfred P. Parsell, B.A. Syracuse, 1938. "The Delineation and Analysis of Metropolitan Areas." 1939. *Syracuse*.
- Mildred E. Peacock, B.A. Alabama, "A Critique of F. H. Allport's Theory of Institutions." 1939. *Columbia*.
- Maurice Phillips, B.S. Cornell, 1938. "Some Social Psychological Factors in Differential Fertility." 1939. *Cornell*.
- Paul I. Phillips, Ph.B. Marquette University, 1937. "A Social Analysis of Ten Paired Cases of Delinquency and Non-delinquency." 1939. *Fisk*.
- Sam Phillips, A.B. Western Reserve, 1930. "The Jewish Community of Rochester, New York." 1939. *Western Reserve*.
- Katherin A. Pirie, A.B. Texas, 1937. "How 100 Families Met the Depression." 1939. *Texas*.
- Martha J. Powell, A.B. Monmouth, 1938. "The Nature of a Social Life-Form, with Special Reference to the School." 1939. *Illinois*.

- Dorothy Prothro, B.A. Baylor Women's College, 1931. "Regional-Cultural Factors in the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union." 1939. *Columbia*.
- George R. Ragland, A.B. Langston University, 1938. "Variations in Penal Sentences in the United States." 1939. *Iowa*.
- Pearl Randell, A.B. Smith, 1937. "Comparison of Meads's and Piaget's Theories of Socialization." 1939. *Pennsylvania State*.
- Hoyt Reagan, A.B. Alma, 1937. "Economic Factors in Blindness." 1940. *Michigan State*.
- John P. Regan, B.S. Villanova, 1930. "An Analysis of Sociological Curricula in American Universities." 1939. *Pittsburgh*.
- Grace Reiss, B.A. Iowa, 1932. "An Evaluation of the Adjustment of One Hundred Illegitimate Children, Age Ten Years and Over, Whose Mothers Have Retained Their Custody." 1939. *Minnesota*.
- Jenny Reitsma, "Western Influences on Native Cultures of the Dutch East Indies." 1939. *Wisconsin*.
- Virginia Richardson, A.B. Kentucky, 1938. "The Almshouse in Western Kentucky." 1939. *Kentucky*.
- Duane Robinson, B.A. Washington, 1935. "An Investigation of the Teaching of the Social Sciences in the High Schools of the State of Washington." 1939. *Washington*.
- Bernard Rosenthal, B.S. Minnesota, 1937. "A Preliminary Standardization of a Community of Interest Scale as a Measure of Marital Adjustment." 1939. *Minnesota*.
- Louis Ruchames. "Changing Attitudes of the A.F. of L. to Unemployment Insurance." 1939. *Columbia*.
- Wayne Satchwell, B.A. Linfield, 1937. "The Status of the Blind in the State of Oregon." 1939. *Oregon*.
- Geraldine Seidl. "Employee Attitude to Work and Social Situations in a Department Store." 1939. *Columbia*.
- Thelma K. Shelby, A.B. Dillard, 1936. "The Levantine Jew." 1939. *Fisk*.
- Noboru Shirai, A.B. Kalamazoo. "Present Population Policies of Japan." 1939. *Stanford*.
- Lillian Tobe Simon, A.B. Tennessee, 1932. "Provision for Medical Care of the Indigent." 1939. *Tennessee*.
- Victor Simons, "Treatment of Delinquent Boys in Bergen County, New York: Situation and Prospect." 1939. *Columbia*.
- Rex A. Skidmore, A.B. Utah, 1938. "The 'Mortality Rates' of Boy Scouts in Salt Lake City." 1939. *Utah*.
- Ransford Monroe Smith, A.B. Alabama, 1937. "The Concept of Social Process in American Sociological Thought." 1939. *Ohio State*.
- Sidney Smith, A.B. Manitoba, 1935. "Effects of Union Membership on Relief Reciprocity." 1939. *Columbia*.
- Nellie Solomon, A.B. Pennsylvania State. "A Sociological Study of Carbon-dale, Pa." 1939. *Pennsylvania State*.

- Alfred Stafford, B.S. Carnegie Institute, 1931. "Criteria of Systematic Sociology." 1939. *Pittsburgh*.
- Lewis Standage, A.B. Arizona State Teachers College. "A Sociological Study of the Mexican Community in Downey." *Southern California*.
- Jack Starkweather, A.B. Stanford, 1938. "Blackfoot Mythology." 1939. *Stanford*.
- Donald D. Stewart, B.A. Washington, 1938. "The Civilian Conservation Corps as One Solution to the Vocational Problems of Youth." 1940. *Washington*.
- Clara Strong, A.B. Southern California, 1934. "Mental Hygiene Movement in the United States." *Southern California*.
- A. Phillip Sundal, B.A. Augustana, 1938. "The Forms of Domination and the Rise of the State." 1939. *Wisconsin*.
- Willis Sutton, B.A. North Carolina, 1938. "Social Value of Education." 1939. *North Carolina*.
- A. C. Svenson, B.A. Montana. "Socialization of the Concept of Maladjustment." 1939. *Columbia*.
- Herbert Tacker, A.B. Clark, 1937. "Boys Club Movement in America." 1939. *Pennsylvania State College*.
- Aaron Teitelbaum, Ph.B. Wisconsin, 1938. "The Reliability of Divorce Statistics as Published by the Wisconsin State Board of Health." 1939. *Wisconsin*.
- Tao Teng, A.B. Great China University. "The Concept of Social Progress in American Sociology." *Southern California*.
- Williametta Thompson, B.A. Syracuse. "Some Methodological Implications of the Cultural Configuration Concept." 1939. *Syracuse*.
- Kenneth E. Tiedke, B.A. Wisconsin, 1938. "The Cultural Subareas of Amazonia." 1939. *Wisconsin*.
- Paul Faulkner Tjensvold, A.B. California, 1928. "A Study of the Effect of the Depression on Christian Social Thought." *Southern California*.
- Francis Trimmer, A.B. Roanoke, 1932; D.D. Colgate-Rochester Divinity School, 1935. "Marriage Counselling by Ministers of Religion." 1939. *Cornell*.
- Rosemary Trodden, B.A. California, 1935. "Illegitimacy and the Changing Sex Mores." 1939. *Columbia*.
- Ann T. Ulrich, A.B. Omaha, 1937. "Sociological Study of Twenty-five Housemaids." 1939. *Nebraska*.
- Eva Vilegga, A.B. Montreal, 1937. "Trends in Ceremonial Institutions." 1940. *McGill*.
- Elizabeth Wakefield, A.B. Hiram, 1925. "Child Placement and Adoptions: A Comparative Study." *Southern California*.
- George Walker, A.B. Stanford, 1934. "The Sociology of Growing Old." *Southern California*.
- Gladys R. Walker, A.B. Goucher, 1929. "A Study of Unemployment and Vo-

- cational Maladjustment in the Learned Professions, Particularly in Pittsburgh." 1939. *Pittsburgh*.
- Clifton F. Ward, A.B. Utah, 1937. "Vocational Rehabilitation in the State of Utah." 1939. *Utah*.
- Charles A. Webb, B.Ed. Illinois State Normal, 1932. "Factors and Trends in Low Rental Public Housing." 1939. *Illinois*.
- Lillian Dropkin Weber, B.S. Virginia, 1938. "'General Sociology' as Conceptual Frame of Reference for Specific Sociologies or Specific Concepts Now in Use." 1939. *Virginia*.
- John R. Weinlick, B.S. Moravian College, 1931; B.D. Moravian Theo., 1934. "The Sociology of Religion with Particular Reference to the Sectarian Aspect." 1939. *Wisconsin*.
- Mary Kettler White, A.B. Indiana, 1933. "A Study of the Housing Data of the Indianapolis Real Property Survey, 1934." 1939. *Indiana*.
- Ruth Wick, A.B. Upsala, 1935. "Effectiveness of the American Civil Liberties Union in 'Academic Freedom' Bases." 1939. *Columbia*.
- Georgia P. Wigginston, A.B. Southern California, 1923. "A Study of the Occupational Attitudes of 50 Intermediate School Teachers in Southern California." *Southern California*.
- Vera Wilkeson, A.B. Lawrence College, 1928. "Practices and Principles of Vocational Counselling-Placement: A Field Study of 25 Vocational Placement Agencies in Southern California." *Southern California*.
- Wendell Williams, A.B. Emporia, 1938. "Factors in the Development of Institutional Care of the Socially Handicapped." 1939. *Kansas*.
- Hubert H. Wilson, B.S. International Y.M.C.A. College, 1933. "The Organization of Industrial Insurance Agents." 1939. *Clark*.
- Robert Winch, A.B. Western Reserve, 1935. "The Relation of Neurotic Tendency to Adjustment in Engagement." 1939. *Chicago*.
- Howard W. Wissner, A.B. Pittsburgh, 1938. "The Structures and Functions of the Peace Organizations in Allegheny County." 1939. *Pittsburgh*.
- Robert Wood, A.B. Baker, 1937. "A Critical Study of Desertion Cases in Durham County, N.C., 1928-38." 1940. *Duke*.
- Frederick E. Wright, A.B., Dana, 1933. "A History of the Rise of Modern Industry in Long Branch, New Jersey, and Vicinity and Its Social Aspects." 1939. *New York University*.
- Pek Si Wu, A.B. University of Shanghai, 1937. "Urbanization in China: A Study of Peiping and Shanghai." 1939. *Chicago*.

## NEWS AND NOTES

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### RESEARCH NEWS

*American Negro Study.*—Professor Gunnar Myrdal, Stockholm University, has accepted an invitation of the Carnegie Corporation to direct a study on the American Negro with headquarters in the Chrysler Building, New York City. Associated with Dr. Myrdal on the staff are Ralph J. Bunche, professor of political science, Howard University; Guy B. Johnson, University of North Carolina; Richard Sterner, formerly with the Swedish Royal Social Board; Dorothy Swaine Thomas, formerly director of research in social statistics at Yale University; and Doxey A. Wilkerson, professor of education, Howard University. In addition to the staff a number of experts in the interracial field will contribute to the study. Announcement of the names of these collaborators and of the nature of their contributions will be made at a later date.

*Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce.*—Supplementing its regular work in the field of national income, the Division of Economic Research has released, for the first time, estimates of income payments in the various states. These estimates provide detailed statistics by type of payment and cover the years 1929 through 1937. Preparation of current estimates will be continued as a regular function of the division. Data have been recently compiled on the incomes of dentists and osteopathic physicians for selected years from 1929 through 1937.

A study of the fluctuations in residential building, using multiple correlation techniques, has recently been made by this division for the National Resources Committee. The report evaluates the factors influencing the volume of residential building and in a separate section analyzes the factors determining residential rents. It makes available new estimates of the number of families which may be expected in the United States during each five-year period through 1960 and includes other entirely new series relating to residential building activity and to annual increments in the number of families in the United States since 1900. The annual estimates of long-term debt in the United States have recently been revived, and it is the intention to issue these figures regularly each year in the future.



A recent publication, *Making a City Survey*, develops a basic outline of the technique of initiating a survey in any city or region. The outline is comprehensive and flexible enough to be useful not only in industrial and commercial surveys but also in market analyses, factory-location surveys, real estate appraisals, local purchasing-power analyses, and studies of general business conditions.

*Bureau of Labor Statistics.*—By act of Congress, the Bureau of Labor Statistics is ordered to make periodic studies of social and economic conditions in Hawaii. The last survey was made in 1930, and another is now under way. James H. Shoemaker, of Brown University, is on leave of absence to supervise the study. The report will be available in the fall.

*Bureau of Old Age Insurance.*—A tabulation of data from the 1937 wage records of approximately thirty and a half million employees, who earned taxable wages in jobs covered by Title VIII of the Social Security Act, has been completed. Tables presenting distributions of employees and their wages by state of employment, age, sex, race, and interval of earnings have been prepared and multilithed. Additional tables showing the interstate migratory flow of these employees are now being compiled. Persons interested in obtaining copies of the multilithed tables should write Merrill G. Murray, Bureau of Old Age Insurance, Social Security Board, Washington, D.C. A series of articles interpreting this material is being published currently in the *Social Security Bulletin*.

Plans are being developed for a similar tabulation of 1938 data, which will provide additional information upon the industrial distribution of employees, the continuity of individual employment within the year, and the turnover within each reporting period.

*Bureau of Research and Statistics.*—The second national conference of directors of research and statistics in state public welfare agencies will be held at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., October 23-26. The majority of the meetings will be devoted to group discussions of ways of making statistical data of greater value for administrative use and public information.

Beginning with the March issue of the *Social Security Bulletin*, the statistical series on all public relief in continental United States were revised to include data on employment and earnings of all persons employed on work and construction projects financed in whole or in part from federal funds.

The Division of Public Assistance Research has made preliminary plans for the collection of statistics on the causes of blindness of recipients

of aid to the blind in states with plans approved by the Social Security Board.

Four articles of the series on social characteristics of recipients accepted for public assistance during the fiscal year 1937-38, based on annual reports submitted by state agencies administering public assistance under the Social Security Act, have appeared in recent issues of the *Social Security Bulletin*. The March issue of the *Bulletin* contains data on the physical condition and medical care of old age assistance recipients, and in the near future an article on age, race, and nativity, the last of the series on old age assistance, will be published. A series of articles presenting data on aid to dependent children will next appear in the *Bulletin*.

The Division of Health Studies has completed a number of preliminary estimates of probable volume of disability among the estimated number of gainfully occupied workers in the United States and among those now covered under the provisions of the Social Security Act. These estimates are based on disability experience of various European social-insurance schemes and of certain American sources. A systematic analysis is being conducted at the present time to determine incidence and volume of disability resulting from disabling sickness of specified duration not in excess of one year.

The division is supervising a W.P.A. project at Richmond, Virginia, to analyze family composition in the United States. The project is utilizing the schedules from the national health survey conducted by the United States Public Health Service.

*Community Service Society.*—A committee headed by John D. Rockefeller, III, has been appointed to consider problems of juvenile delinquents. The committee will attempt to add to existing knowledge in the field of crime prevention and to help with the promotion of new methods and treatment. The executive staff will include Leonard V. Harrison, George M. Hallwachs, and Jack M. Stipe.

*Division of Research, Works Progress Administration.*—As a result of the survey to determine and analyze the nature and causes of protracted economic dislocation, the first of several brief descriptive memorandums on the seven cities in the coal-mining area of southern Illinois has been released. In connection with these surveys a number of standard statistical series have been compiled for southern Illinois and for New Bedford, Massachusetts, indicating long-run trends in production, wages, industrial capitalization, size of enterprise, tax levies and collections, savings, liquidation, population mobility, mortality, and public and private relief.

The analysis of the data collected in the survey of youth in forty-five agricultural villages, conducted by this division in co-operation with the American Youth Commission and the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences, is nearing completion. The report will contain sections on the personal characteristics of youth, the mobility of village youth, school attendance and educational attainment, employment of village youth, occupations of village youth, property-ownership and income, and social and recreational activities. An appendix gives the relation of the youth group to the total village population.

Volume III of the *Index of Research Projects* which is in preparation will include digests of research projects undertaken under the auspices of the W.P.A. on which final reports were made available subsequent to June, 1937. It will also include summaries of the reports based upon the Federal Emergency Relief Administration and Works Progress Administration Co-operative Rural Research plan. Volume II, covering research undertaken by public planning organizations, has been released.

*Division of Statistics, Works Progress Administration.*—A new monthly series on total amounts of public relief payments and earnings on federal work and construction projects for the period beginning with January, 1933, has been published in the *Analysis of Relief and Employment on Federal Work and Construction Projects* for January, 1939, and will be continued for subsequent months. These figures do not include earnings of administrative employees and are comparable to the series on the net total number of households and persons aided under the various public relief and employment programs which are also shown in this release.

*United States Employment Service.*—The results of a cross-section analysis of the job-seekers registered with offices of the United States Employment Service in April, 1938, and an account of the operations of the public employment offices during the period in which unemployment compensation benefit payments were started are contained in a recently completed publication, *Survey of Employment Service Information*. The survey presents summary information concerning trends in applications, placements, and active file from September, 1934, through December, 1938, with more complete information concerning the data for the last two years. Comparative reports of operations in benefit- and nonbenefit-paying states are given and employment service data are compared with other series in selected geographic areas. Particular emphasis is paid to the identification of certain groups of recession and nonrecession unemployed.

Following the complete inventory of the active file of April, 1938, a

sample inventory was made in August based upon the records for seven representative states and the District of Columbia. Results of this survey are discussed in the April, 1939, issue of the *Monthly Labor Review*.

*Works Progress Administration.*—The Division of Foreign Housing Studies of the Bibliographies and Indices of Special Subjects project of New York City has recently completed a comparative study of residential construction in various countries which includes a compilation of data translated from various government publications.

#### NOTES

*Eastern Sociological Society.*—The officers elected for the year 1939-40 are president, Willard Waller, Columbia University; vice-president, John Dollard, Yale University; secretary-treasurer, Paul F. Cressey, Wheaton College. The members of the executive committee for the coming year are Maurice Davie, Yale University; C. G. Dittmer, New York University; Joseph K. Folsom, Vassar College; E. Franklin Frazier, Howard University; and Bessie B. Wessel, Connecticut College.

*Ohio Valley Sociological Society.*—In 1938 the Ohio Sociological Society, an organization of sociologists in colleges and universities in Ohio, founded in 1925, was expanded to include the members in the neighboring states of Michigan, Indiana, Kentucky, West Virginia, and western Pennsylvania. At the first annual meeting of this expanded regional society in Columbus, April 28-29, the following officers were elected for 1939-40: president, M. C. Elmer, University of Pittsburgh; vice-president, L. Guy Brown, Oberlin College; secretary-treasurer, S. C. Newman, Ohio State University. F. E. Lumley, Ohio State University, was elected editor of the *Ohio Valley Sociologist*, formerly the *Ohio Sociologist*, founded in 1927. As in previous years the Ohio Student Sociological Association held its meetings simultaneously with the society and elected the following officers for 1939-40: president, John Redman, John Carroll University; vice-president, Robert McIntyre, Akron University; secretary, Irene Osborn, Kent State University; and treasurer, David Rabinowitz, Ohio University.

*American Association for the Advancement of Science.*—At the meeting of the Association in Milwaukee, June 19-24, the program of Section K (on social and economic sciences) consisted of two symposia, two sessions for the presentation of general papers, and a luncheon with the Pi Gamma Mu Society. One symposium was the third conference in the Science and Society series upon "The Economic System in Relation to Scientific Progress," including the following papers of interest to sociologists: "The

Capitalistic System and How It Evolved," by George W. Edwards, College of the City of New York; "The Application of Natural Science Methodology to Economic Studies," and "The Limitations of Natural Science Methodology in Economic Analysis," by Charles F. Roos, Cowles Commission for Research in Economics; "Present Relations of Government to Science," by Charles H. Judd, University of Chicago; and "Should the Government Finance Nongovernmental Research Activities?" by William F. Ogburn, University of Chicago. The second symposium, organized jointly by Section K and the Population Association of America in population problems and planning in the northern lake states area, was devoted to consideration of the questions relating to factors determining the capacity of the northern lake states area to support population, the present composition and distribution of the population, activities of planning organizations in the area, policies and programs of the federal government relative to the area, culture area, and population mobility, including papers by Philip Beck, Farm Security Administration; George W. Hill, University of Wisconsin; C. E. Lively, University of Missouri; A. R. Mangus, Ohio State University; Lowry Nelson, University of Minnesota; C. C. Taylor, Department of Agriculture; Samuel Teper, Wisconsin State Planning Board; J. F. Thaden, Michigan State College; M. W. Torkelson, Wisconsin State Planning Board; Ray E. Wakeley, Iowa State College; George Wehrwein, University of Wisconsin.

*American Country Life Association.*—The twenty-second annual meeting of the Association will be held at State College, Pennsylvania, August 30—September 2, under the presidency of C. L. Christensen, University of Wisconsin College of Agriculture. For further information write the Association, 297 Fourth Avenue, New York City.

*American Foundations.*—Raymond Rich Associates estimate that available information indicates that in 1937 the assets of 243 American foundations amounted to more than \$1,200,000,000 and that the annual total of grants made by these foundations is \$38,500,000. Their report approximates a general allocation of grants for 1937 as follows: medical research, hospitals, public health, etc., \$13,495,898; education, \$9,170,318; social welfare, \$4,695,880; physical and biological sciences, \$2,253,298; government and public administration, \$1,710,598; economics, \$1,353,386. Although an increasing proportion of foundation income is being allotted to research on economic problems, the social sciences other than economics did not share increased interest in economic problems. Sixty foundations, whose grants for 1937, 1934, and 1931 may be compared,

expended \$882,920 on social science in 1937—71 per cent less than in 1934 and 84 per cent less than in 1931.

*American Home Economics Association.*—At the thirty-second annual meeting of the Association in San Antonio, June 20-23, sessions were devoted to consideration of the family and its relationships and to child development and parent education. Joseph K. Folsom, Vassar College, gave an address on "Home Management and Self Management," and John Dollard, Yale University, read a paper on "Frustration and Aggression."

*American Psychiatric Association.*—One session of the ninety-fifth annual meeting held in Chicago, May 8-12, was devoted to social problems with papers on "Historical Aspects of Mass Psychoses," by E. Meslinger and M. K. Amdur, both of the Veterans Administration; "Social Psychiatry—Our Task or a New Profession?" by Samuel W. Hartwell, University of Buffalo; "Psychiatric Needs in Industry," by William A. Sawyer, Eastman Kodak Company; "The Sociological Implications of Neuroses," by Paul Schilder, New York; and "The Psychiatric Findings in the Cases of Five Hundred Traffic Offenders and Accident-prone Drivers," by Lowell S. Selling, Recorder's Court, Detroit. A second session treated extra-mural studies with papers on "The Association of Former Patients in the Mental Hospitals of Illinois; A New Approach in After Care," by Abraham A. Low, Illinois Psychiatric Institute; "The Post-hospital Adaptation of a Group of Selected Cases of Dementia Praecox," by Jay L. Hoffman, Medical Corps, United States Army, and Margaret Hagan, St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington; "An Evaluation of the First Year of a Parole Clinic," by Martin H. Hoffman, Eloise (Michigan) Hospital and Infirmary; and "Hereditary and Environmental Factors in the Causation of Manic-Depressive Psychoses and Dementia Praecox," by Horatio M. Pollock and Benjamin Malzberg, New York State Department of Mental Hygiene. Sociologists participating in a round-table discussion on concepts and treatment of juvenile delinquency were Clifford R. Shaw, Illinois Institute for Juvenile Research, and Walter C. Reckless, Vanderbilt University, while Beatrice B. Berle and E. W. Burgess, University of Chicago, took part in a round table on unsuccessful sex adjustment in marriage.

*American Youth Commission.*—Floyd W. Reeves, University of Chicago, has been chosen to direct the Commission effective June 1, succeeding Homer P. Rainey, who has resigned to become president of the University of Texas.

*Fifth International Congress for the Unity of Science.*—The congress will be held at Harvard University, September 3–9. Among the speakers scheduled are P. W. Bridgman, Karl Bühler, J. Joergensen, R. Carnap, P. Frank, H. Gomperz, L. J. Henderson, W. Jaeger, Sidney Hook, H. M. Kallen, F. Kaufman, Otto Neurath, and George Sarton. Rooms will be available at \$1.25 per day per person. Arrangements can be made through Dr. W. V. Quine, Harvard University. For later notices of the congress write to Professor Charles W. Morris, University of Chicago.

*General Education Board.*—During 1938 the Board appropriated approximately \$7,500,000, of which \$5,500,000 was from its principal. Appropriations included \$1,200,000 for general education, \$3,200,000 for white and \$850,000 for Negro education in the South, \$290,000 to the program for child development, and the remainder for projects under former programs. President Raymond B. Fosdick stated that during the few remaining years of its life the resources of the Board would be devoted to the foregoing fields of activity.

*National Conference on Family Relations.*—Adolf Meyer, Johns Hopkins University, was elected president of the Conference upon the resignation of Paul Sayre, University of Iowa, first president and founder.

The midwest regional meeting was held under the presidency of Arthur J. Todd, Northwestern University, March 31–April 1, in Chicago in joint session with the Chicago Association for Child Study and Parent Education. Papers were given on "The Family and Mental Ill-Health," by L. Guy Brown, Oberlin College; "Trends in Family Relationship the World Over," by Edward A. Ross, University of Wisconsin; "The Work of the National Conference," by Paul Sayre; and "Family and Recreation," by Arthur J. Todd. Reports were made by the chairmen of the following committees: medical care, James A. Britton, chairman; family counseling, Ruth Brickner, Child Study Association of America, chairman; and legislation, Max Rheinstein, University of Chicago, chairman.

The eastern regional meeting held in New York April 28–29 was called by Sidney E. Goldstein, chairman, New York State Conference on Marriage and the Family, which antedates the founding of the National Conference by over two years. Addresses given at the general sessions were "The Conservation of the Family in a Democracy," by Katherine Lenroot; "New Sources of Knowledge," by E. W. Burgess, University of Chicago; "The Marriage Law," by Albert C. Jacobs, Columbia University; "Administration of the Marriage Law," by Paul J. Kern, Civil Service Commission, New York City; and "Mental Tests and the Mar-

riage Law," by Ira S. Wile. The following section meetings were held: "The School and College and Preparation for Marriage and Family Life," "The Church and Education for Marriage and Family Counseling," "The Settlement, Neighborhood House and Community Center as an Agency for Education and Counselling," "Family Welfare Organization and Family Counselling," "Services Rendered by Departments of State Government in the Field of Marriage and Family Life—Possibilities for Integration," and "Eugenics and the American Family."

The Washington State Conference held its organization meeting at Seattle, May 5-6, and elected as its president Norman S. Hayner, University of Washington. It plans to expand its activities into a Pacific Northwest Regional Conference. Other states have formed organizations and will hold conferences in the fall.

*The International Institute of Social Research.*—The Institute, formerly connected with the University of Frankfurt on the Main, Germany, and since 1934 affiliated with Columbia University, has just published its first book in a series of English publications, *Punishment and Social Structure*, by Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer.

*National Conference of Social Work.*—At the sixty-sixth annual meeting in Buffalo, June 18-24, the organization of the program indicates increasing interest in cultural factors as they affect social work as evidenced by sessions on the interplay of cultural and psychological factors, on our present culture and the problems it creates for the adolescent, on the relation of the group worker to the indigenous leader, on the value of the folk-festival to the community, on the situational approach to social work practice in a rural setting, and on nationalities, nations, and communities. The emphasis upon research is indicated by sessions on the factual basis of community planning, on dynamics of interstate migration, and on a research program for a social agency. Among the sociologists taking part in the program of the Conference and associated groups were Harriet M. Bartlett, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston; Neva L. Boyd, Northwestern University; William E. Cole, University of Tennessee; Michael M. Davis, Committee on Research in Medical Economics; Neva R. Deardorff, Welfare Council of New York City; Shelby M. Harrison, Russell Sage Foundation; Mary Van Kleek, Russell Sage Foundation; Philip Klein, New York School of Social Work; Eduard C. Lindeman, New York School of Social Work; Walter W. Pettit, New York School of Social Work; Stuart A. Rice, Central Statistical Board; Josephine Strode, New York City; C. C. Taylor, Department of Agricul-



ture; R. Clyde White, University of Chicago; and Harvey Zorbaugh, New York University.

*Population Association of America.*—The seventh annual meeting consisted of a symposium on economic aspects of population change in conjunction with the National Economic and Social Planning Association held in Washington, May 12-13. Among those participating in the symposium were O. E. Baker, David Cushman Coyle, Louis Dublin, Alfred J. Lotka, Frank Lorimer, Alva Myrdal, J. J. Spengler, P. K. Whelpton, Faith M. Williams, and T. J. Woofter, Jr.

*Society for Social Research.*—The annual summer institute of the Society will be held at the University of Chicago, August 18-19. Programs may be obtained by writing Miss Lolagene Convis, 1126 East Fifty-ninth Street, Chicago.

*White House Conference on the Child in a Democracy.*—The fourth White House children's conference met in Washington April 26 at the call of Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, conference chairman, at the direction of President Roosevelt, honorary chairman. Among the 585 members were economists, sociologists, housing experts, physicians, public health nurses, nutritionists and home economists, other health workers, educators, recreation leaders, editors, industrialists, members of organized labor, members of farm organizations, social workers, clergymen, vocational and employment experts, members of boards of social and health agencies, and members of the American Legion, women's organizations, the National Congress of Parents and Teachers, and many other groups. Addresses were made by President Roosevelt, the Right Reverend Monsignor Keegan, Homer Folks, and Mrs. Roosevelt. Katherine Lenroot, chief of the Children's Bureau, outlined the problems of the conference program. Subjects to be emphasized in the conference report were discussed in four section meetings under the headings: objectives of a democratic society in relation to children; economic foundations of family life and child welfare; development of children and youth in present-day American life; and the child and community services for health, education, and social protection.

The work of the conference will be carried on by committees for eight months under the direction of the report committee, Homer Folks, chairman, and the research director, Philip Klein; and a final session will be held early in 1940. Among the other members of the report committee are C. C. Carstens, Grace L. Coyle, Mrs. Walter Fisher, C. S. Johnson, Jacob Kepecs, J. S. Plant, Homer Rainey, and C.-E. A. Winslow.

*Brigham Young University.*—Fred C. Frey, Louisiana State University, is offering courses on principles of sociology and on race problems during the first term of the summer session.

*University of British Columbia.*—Leah Feder, Washington University, is offering courses in case work methods and child welfare and studies this summer.

*University of California.*—During the summer session Frank H. Hankins, Smith College, will conduct courses in population trends and changing bases of the contemporary social order.

*Catholic University.*—The Reverend John M. Cooper received the Mendel Medal of Villanova College.

*Collège de France.*—A commemorative ceremony was held in Paris in June in celebration of the one-hundredth anniversary of the birth of Th. Ribot. Celebrated also was the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of a chair in experimental psychology, which was first held by Ribot and later by Pierre Janet. The publications of Ribot, including *The Diseases of Personality*, *The Psychology of the Emotions*, and *Essay on the Creative Imagination*, have had an important influence upon the development of social psychology.

*Central Washington College of Education.*—The fourth annual summer educational conference, June 14-16, with William F. Ogburn, University of Chicago, conference leader, was devoted to the theme "Contemporary Social Problems."

*University of Chicago.*—William F. Ogburn has been appointed chairman of the department of sociology effective October 1, succeeding Ellsworth Faris, who will retire at that time after twenty years of service as professor of sociology and fourteen years as chairman of the department.

*University of Colorado.*—Clyde W. Hart, University of Iowa, is offering courses in criminology, population, social control, social progress, and public opinion during the summer, and Ray B. Tozier, Winona State Teachers College, is giving a course in rural sociology.

*Columbia University.*—Teachers College, in co-operation with The Open Road, an educational organization devoted to interregional and international understanding, is conducting a sociological field course on southern conditions in Greenville County, South Carolina, July 3-August 14. Emphasis is being given to the work of the local county council for community development whose social workers and research work-

ers have been investigating economic and social problems of the county and attempting to ameliorate conditions. Following an orientation period in New York and Washington, the class will spend five weeks devoted to field trips in the county; interviews with employers, employees, farm-owners, share croppers, leading citizens, organizational officers; lectures by the staff, by outside experts, by the staff and citizen members of the county council; research by students; attendance at local meetings; and group discussions. The course is directed by W. C. Hallenbeck, Columbia University, and G. W. Blackwell, Furman University.

Samuel McCune Lindsay, professor of social legislation, retired from active service on June 30.

Eduard Beneš, who was voted an honorary degree of Doctor of Laws in 1924, was able this year, for the first time since then, to attend a commencement and receive the degree.

*Cornell University.*—A new department of sociology and anthropology has been established in the College of Arts and Sciences. The staff of the new department will be made up of the following: Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., professor of sociology and chairman; Julian L. Woodward, associate professor of sociology; R. Lauriston Sharp, assistant professor of anthropology; and Philip Weintraub, instructor in sociology.

Simultaneously with the new development the department of rural social organization is changing its name to the department of rural sociology and will continue as a separate department under the chairmanship of Dwight Sanderson. The two departments are integrating their course offerings at both the undergraduate and the graduate levels. Professor Cottrell will be transferred to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences but will retain his position on the staff of the Experiment Station of the State College and will be in charge of certain research projects in the fields of the rural family and the social psychology of rural life.

Courses in general sociology and the family are being offered during the summer session by William O. Brown, Howard University.

John Wiley and Sons, Incorporated, have announced that they will soon publish *Rural Community Organization* by Dwight Sanderson and Robert A. Polson.

*University of Denver.*—Harriet M. Bartlett, educational director and supervisor of the social service department, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, is offering courses in medical social case work and programs of medical care during the first term of the summer session.

*Duke University.*—The Duke University Press announces the establishment of a new series on sociology, the first volume of which is announced for publication in September, *Lester F. Ward: The American Aristotle*, by Samuel Chugerman. Charles A. Ellwood and Howard E. Jensen are editors of this series.

*Harvard University.*—Richard C. Cabot, professor of clinical medicine from 1919 to 1933 and professor of social ethics from 1920 to 1934, died May 8. Dr. Cabot was the author of *Social Service and the Art of Living* (1909), *What Man Lives By* (1914), *Social Work* (1919), *Adventures on the Borderlands of Ethics* (1926), *The Meaning of Right and Wrong* (1933), and *Christianity and Sex* (1937), as well as of medical books. His eminence both in medicine and in the advocacy of social causes earned for him the distinction of being president of the National Conference of Social Work in 1930 and the gold medal of the National Institute of Social Sciences in 1931.

The Committee on Research in the Social Sciences has recently published *An Introduction to the Sociology of Law* by N. S. Timasheff.

*University of Illinois.*—Hans Gerth, who was teaching at the University of Michigan during the past academic year, is giving courses in social evolution and public opinion this summer.

*University of Iowa.*—The Thirteenth Iowa Conference on Child Development and Parent Education will be held June 20–22 under the direction of the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station with the co-operation of the Iowa State Council for Child Study and Parent Education, Iowa State College of Agriculture, and Iowa State Teachers College. The speakers and topics include Howard M. Bell, American Youth Commission, "The Needs of Youth"; Charlotte Carr, Hull-House, "Problem Communities"; Moses Jung, University of Iowa, "Problems of Marriage"; and Caroline B. Zachry, Progressive Education Association, "Understanding Your Child."

During the summer courses in crime and the treatment of criminals and in population and eugenics will be given by John A. Saathoff, James-town College.

*Iowa State College.*—A new publication outlet for manuscripts dealing with science and technology has been provided by the recent organization of the Iowa State College Press, Ames, Iowa. The new press is especially interested in developing publications in scientific and technological fields for which satisfactory publication channels are not elsewhere available.

*University of Kentucky.*—A course on marriage and family life was offered June 12-28 by Ernest R. Groves, University of North Carolina, and Gladys Hoagland Groves.

Harry Elmer Barnes conducted a two-week lecture course on social and economic factors in contemporary civilization.

*Louisiana State University.*—T. Lynn Smith is spending the summer in Central and South America studying the social and economic phases of agriculture. B. O. Williams, Clemson College, is offering courses in sociology during the summer.

The first annual conference on southern life and culture was held April 17-18 on the theme "Sources of the South's Social and Economic Problems." Among the papers presented were "Obstacles to Intellectual Progress in the South," by Gerald W. Johnson, *Baltimore Sun*; "Cultural Elements Differentiating the South from Other Regions," by Howard W. Odum, University of North Carolina; and "Origins of the Disadvantaged Classes in Southern Agriculture," by Will W. Alexander, Farm Security Administration.

*University of Lund.*—Dr. Olaf Åkeson of the department of philosophy and sociology visited Harvard University, Yale University, Columbia University, the University of Chicago, and the University of Minnesota for the purpose of studying the organization of the social sciences with particular reference to sociology.

*McGill University.*—"Agriculture and the Farm Population," the first of a series of Social Research Bulletins published by McGill University, is an analysis devoted to the population of the regions of Ontario and Quebec showing growth of population, rural-urban distribution and composition by age and race, and describing the agricultural working force, showing mode of tenure, the number of hired and family laborers, and the total labor force and labor productivity.

*University of Michigan.*—During the summer session E. B. Reuter, University of Iowa, is giving courses on the sociology of adolescence and race and culture, and Wilbur D. West, Wittenberg College, is offering a course on interactive behavior.

*University of Missouri.*—E. T. Krueger, Vanderbilt University, is giving courses in social pathology and history of social philosophy this summer.

*University of Nebraska.*—Charles R. Hoffer, Michigan State College, is giving courses during the summer in principles of sociology, social institutions, and the community.

*New School for Social Research.*—Emil Lederer, professor of economics and first dean of the graduate faculty of political and social science, died on May 29. Dr. Lederer, who was one of the important contributors to modern German economic theory as a follower of Max Weber and Werner Sombart, and who was the leader of a school of economic thought within the Marxist-revisionist orientation, had held the chairs of economics at the Universities of Heidelberg and Berlin until 1933, when he became an exile.

Professor Lederer was born in Pilsen, August 22, 1882. He was educated at the University of Vienna, which Menger, Böhm-Bawerk, and Wieser were making famous as the center of the marginal utility school of economic theory, and at Berlin specialized in law and economics. He took his doctorate in jurisprudence at Vienna and in political science at Munich. In 1910 he became managing editor, under the supervision of Weber and Sombart, of the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft*, of which he later became editor. He became an associate professor at Heidelberg in 1918 and a full professor in 1922. From 1923 to 1925 he was a visiting professor at the University of Tokyo, where he made a study of the Japanese economy, and in 1931 he became professor of economics in Berlin.

Dr. Lederer's *Die Privatangestellten in der modernen Wirtschaftsentwicklung* ("White Collar Workers in the Modern Economy") was the first study to call attention to the problem of this occupational group. His other studies of this subject were published in the *Archiv* and jointly with Professor Jakob Marschak in the *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, Volume IX, Parts 1 and 2. He is the author of many books and articles aiming at a synthesis of the psychological theory of the Austrian school of Böhm-Bawerk and that of Karl Marx. His chief work was *Grundriss der ökonomischen Theorie* ("Principles of Economic Theory") (1922). In 1938 he published two books, *Japan in Transition*, with Emy Lederer-Seidler, his first wife, and *Technical Progress and Unemployment*. Professor Lederer wrote a number of important articles on social psychology and on revolutionary movements. He also contributed articles to *Social Research*, of which he was an editor and to the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*.

*New York School of Social Work.*—Walter W. Pettit, a member of the staff of the school, has been appointed director to succeed the late Porter R. Lee.

*New York University.*—E. George Payne has been appointed dean of the school of education, effective September 1, succeeding John W.

Withers, who will become dean emeritus. Dr. Payne is editor of the *Journal of Educational Sociology*.

B. W. Aginsky has been added to the department in the field of social anthropology. Margaret Benz, previously in charge of a research project in the field of the family at Columbia University, has been appointed visiting assistant professor. John W. McConnell, assistant professor of economics and sociology, American University, has been appointed assistant professor of sociology. Alfred M. Lee, formerly connected with the University of Kansas and Yale University and chairman of the committee on public relations of the American Sociological Society, has been named assistant professor of marketing.

*Northwestern University*.—Melville J. Herskovits is making a study of the Negroes of the West Indies, the findings of which he will compare with the results of his surveys of African Negroes.

*Oberlin College*.—Newell L. Sims will conduct a European travel seminar leaving New York July 13 and returning August 22. The itinerary includes London, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Helsingfors, Leningrad, Moscow, Kharkov, Kiev, Warsaw, and Paris.

*Pennsylvania State College*.—Claude C. Bowman, Temple University, is conducting courses on social disorganization and on the child and society during the summer session.

*University of Pittsburgh*.—Farrar and Rinehart, Incorporated, has published *General Sociology* by Verne Wright and M. C. Elmer.

*University of Southern California*.—Prentice-Hall, Inc., has published a new text by Pauline V. Young on *Scientific Social Surveys and Research*. Chapters on statistical techniques, graphic presentation, and ecological method were written by Calvin F. Schmid, University of Washington.

Arline Johnson has been appointed dean of the graduate school of social work, succeeding Emory S. Bogardus who has resigned to devote all of his time to the field of sociology, including research work, chairmanship of the department of sociology, and editorship of the *Journal of Sociology and Social Research*.

*Tulane University*.—Robert K. Merton, Harvard University, has been appointed associate professor and acting head of the department of sociology, effective September 1.

*University of Washington.*—With the publication of *Street Index to the Census Tracts of Seattle* by Norman S. Hayner and June V. Strother, Seattle joins the cities with a street coding guide of census tracts.

*Washington State College.*—Paul H. Landis, rural sociologist, has been released from a part of his college duties to accept a part-time consultantship with the National Resources Committee to serve on a panel of technical consultants of the Pacific Northwest Land-Migration-Settlement-Public Works Study.

*Wayne University.*—The University of Chicago Press has announced the publication of *St. Denis: A French Canadian Parish*, by Horace Miner. Courtland Van Vechten is on an exchange instructorship with Dr. Elon Moore, University of Oregon, for the summer session. Clarence Anderson has been appointed assistant-instructor in sociology.

*University of Wisconsin.*—Henry D. Sheldon, Jr., Stanford University, is offering a course in social statistics during the summer session.

T. C. McCormick is spending the summer in Washington working on the subject of the American Negro in the field of agriculture and agricultural policy which is a portion of the study of race relations being done for the Carnegie Corporation by Gunnar Myrdal.

#### PERSONAL

Grace Abbott, professor of public welfare administration, University of Chicago School of Social Service Administration, died June 19. From 1908 to 1917 she was director of the Immigrants Protective League of Chicago; from 1917 to 1919, director of the Child Labor Division of the United States Children's Bureau; and from 1920 to 1921, executive secretary of the Illinois Immigrants Commission. In 1921 Dr. Abbott was appointed chief of the Children's Bureau, resigning in 1934 to accept a professorship at the University of Chicago. She was author of *The Immigrant and the Community* and *The Child and the State*. Miss Abbott was president of the National Conference of Social Work in 1924 and was editor of the *Social Service Review*.

Barnes and Noble, Incorporated, announce the publication of *An Outline of the Principles of Sociology*, edited by Robert E. Park, University of Chicago. The co-authors of the book are Richard C. Fuller, University of Michigan; A. B. Hollingshead, Indiana University; E. B. Reuter, University of Iowa; Herbert Blumer and Everett C. Hughes, University of Chicago.



## BOOK REVIEWS

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*Personality: A Psychological Interpretation.* By GORDON W. ALLPORT.  
New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1937. Pp. xiv+588.

It is characteristic of life and living that it implies the existence in animate as distinguished from inanimate nature of some degree of spontaneity and of some measure of self-direction and self-control. This autonomy, which is ordinarily regarded as an evidence of mind, culminates and finds its most obvious expression in personality, which seems to be the peculiar attribute of man, though the degree of individuality and of idiosyncrasy which some of the higher animals exhibit undoubtedly approaches that which we expect to find in human beings.

Personality, in one or more of its various aspects—physical, mental, or moral—has been an object of observation and reflection ever since Hippocrates and his disciples undertook to distinguish the four temperaments; and after Theophrastus, the pupil and successor of Aristotle, wrote his *Characters*, “character” writing became and has continued to be a recognized if minor form of literary expression. Literature, in fact, has been and perhaps still is the most important source of our knowledge of human nature. However, the wisdom of poets and philosophers is not science, and generalizations based on unsystematic observation and general consensus lack the validity of scientific statements because they have not been, and possibly cannot be, checked in a framework of “causal” explanation.

While personality and human nature have long been the subject of reflective observation, it is only recently that personality, as distinguished from character, has become the subject of systematic investigation and experiment under anything approaching laboratory conditions. Gordon Allport's *Personality*, which was written in view of this new scientific interest, is something more than a textbook in the ordinary sense of that term. It is rather an attempt to redefine, on the basis of a historical and critical review of the widely scattered points of view from which students have approached the subject, that essential unity and identity in all its manifestations which gives personality its substantive character, so that the student has the sense that he is dealing with a thing rather than a mere sum or series of factors. This seems particularly desirable in the case where the factors have been derived by mathematical techniques so

elaborate and artificial that, as the author tactfully puts it, "they risk the accusation that they are primarily mathematical artifacts" (p. 245).

The unity of personality may be conceived, on the one hand, as ultimately physiological, resting upon "the numerous balancing agencies in the body that preserve functional integrity during growth" as well as upon all the other "biological conditions of unity" (p. 346). On the other hand, viewed from the opposite dimensions, from the point of new self-consciousness, it is obvious that the individual's "ego-ideal," i.e., his conception of himself functions likewise as a principle of integration. The self is, in fact, the very "core" of personality and the individual's philosophy of life, in fact, "any *Weltanschauung*, however derived, by engendering intelligibility upon the diversity of experience, serves as an important unifying influence" (p. 346).

Thus the personality in its various manifestations—biological, psychological, and sociological—must be conceived, as Stern described it, as a *unitas multiplex*. But, as this unity is never complete, it is rather a diversity of interacting tendencies in which unity is never wholly achieved but, under the influence of some new necessity, is unceasingly attempted. "Here," says the author, "is a curious fact: the attainment of unity depends more upon knowing what one wants than upon getting it. It is the striving toward a known goal that confers unity, not the successful arrival."

It is in this sense also that psychiatrists tell us that "the normal personality is one that is ever active in the pursuit of goals, whereas abnormality is characterized by apathy, by a deficiency of life interests." Other writers have pointed out that, just as a concrete task tends to call out and focus all the energies available at the moment, so in the long run the individual's life-work, the role that he consciously or unconsciously plays in society, tends through all the changes, mutation, and incidents of an extended career to integrate, stabilize, and give consistency to the individual's personality.

The conceptions which different students have formed of personality are naturally as diverse as their different points of view. From the operational point of view there are, I presume, as many valid conceptions of personality as there are methods which yield a consistent body of facts. Intelligence is what the intelligent quotient measures and personality is what the psychograph, however we conceive that instrument of investigation, describes. The objectivity of these descriptions, which alone gives them the character of science, is insured when the procedure by which the facts were obtained is so clearly set forth that later investigators, repeat-

ing the operation, will be able either to confirm or to challenge the findings of their predecessors.

The difficulty is that there are aspects of personality that all the ingenuity of laboratory psychologists have not been able to bring within the limits of a laboratory experiment. Most of our medical and psychiatric knowledge of human nature, for example, is based on observation, insights, and clinical experience rather than experiment. It is, therefore, of such a nature as does not always permit of quantitative analysis or of description in the form of a mathematical equation. Diagnosis is necessarily based on the interpretation of the individual case, and the validity of every interpretation of such case study—whether it be biography, clinical record, life-history, or psychiatric summary—rests finally on the assumption that the true pattern of personality will emerge from the “systematic relevance” of the recorded facts. In short, the only test to which case study as such can be subjected is that of its internal consistency. Any interpretation one puts upon it is true if it makes sense (p. 360).

The conception which one may properly form of personality seems, therefore, to be somehow involved in the issue as to the nature and merits of the nomothetic and idiographic disciplines: that is, the sciences which seek to arrive at generalizations and the sciences which seek to understand the particular case or event.

The distinction between the two is not, however, as obvious in practice as it appears in theory. One way to study the individual case is to classify it. In fact, it is by the diagnosis of difficult and marginal cases that systems of classification came into existence. Thus clinical knowledge—“acquaintance with,” as James described it—contributes to, and is qualified by, more systematic knowledge (namely, “knowledge about”); and taxonomy, though it no longer seems to have the importance for science that it once did, is still essential to every kind of systematic knowledge.

From the point of view of a holistic or what I might describe as a “totalitarian” conception of personality which seems to be that from which the present volume has been written the case study is the “most complete” as it is the “most synthetic” of all methods of studying personality. “It can include data drawn from tests, experiments, psychographs, depth-analysis, and statistics, it can incorporate explanations derived from the general laws of psychology: genetic, comparative, abnormal.” In short, since it includes both “the scientific (inferential) and intuitive aspects of understanding,” it has at once the value for the student of a work of science and a work of art (p. 395).

From the point of view of the so-called “personalistic psychology” of W. Stern and “the psychology of personality” of the present volume, the

concrete person and no abstraction, stripped of all that in actual life gives it its unique and individual character, is the proper subject of a "psychology of personality." Under these circumstances the case study naturally becomes the most valuable instrument of investigation. But its value is not limited to the understanding of the individual person. By the further analysis and comparison of many such studies it is possible to pass to the formulation and testing of new hypotheses. It is even possible, as the author has attempted to show in his account of the development of personality, to arrive at a general law that "tells how uniqueness comes about" (pp. 101-213).

Most systematic investigations of personality, whether based on questionnaires or on laboratory experiments, are conceived in terms of stimulus and response. The psychological process is, in that case, identified with the changes and mutations in an organism which is conceived as forever in process of adjustment, so that no sooner is a partial equilibrium at any time achieved than the intrusion of some disturbing factor makes a new adjustment. Human behavior is thus operationally conceived as existing in two dimensions rather than in three. It is as if the elements of human nature were eternal like the atoms. But the fact is that every organism is characterized by a definite life-span and has, therefore, some sort of life-history. It is particularly true to human personalities that they exist in this third dimension; that they live in time and have a past and a future of which they are often vividly conscious. It is this aspect of personality in which the individual appears as a conscious and creative agent, seeking to control in his own interest and in that of his fellows not merely his world but himself, to which the psychology of personality as the author conceives it finally directs attention.

"Personalistic psychology" and the "psychology of personality" are both based on the radical conviction that the tradition which assumes that individuality is beyond the limits of scientific investigation is mistaken. In accordance with this new conception of personality it is demanded that psychology "expand its boundaries, reverse its methods and extend its concepts," and in general make room for a more systematic study of personality and of the single, concrete mental life.

ROBERT E. PARK

*University of Chicago*

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*Crime and the Man.* By EARNEST ALBERT HOOTON. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939. Pp. xvi+403. \$3.75.

In this adaptation of a course of Lowell Institute lectures the author undertakes to epitomize the results of a twelve-year survey of the anthro-

pology of the American "criminal" which is to be published in "three ponderous volumes." The forthcoming volumes are to be "really scientific monographs, . . . positively bristling with statistical demonstrations," which will present the "largest body of data on criminal anthropology heretofore collected and analyzed." The present volume is for persons who are willing to accept the author's conclusions on faith.

No criticism of the study itself is possible on the basis of the preview which elaborates the findings and conclusions but gives no pertinent data and reports very inadequately the procedures followed. It contains a great number of nonsense drawings for which the author gives two contradictory apologies: "These are supposed to illustrate the text"; they resulted from a relapse into "adolescent vice." They do not illustrate the text; a psychiatrist would hardly accept the second explanation. The book is also marred by the author's occasional bucolic clowning which is at times so bad as to produce a slight nausea. "Before you can pick fleas off a dog, you must catch your dog." The text is, in the main, an interminable recitation of inferences drawn from tables that are not presented.

The general theoretical position is an extreme biological determinism. The peculiarities of the physical organism are of hereditary origin. These peculiarities determine the mental and emotional qualities of men; they also determine the social behavior and cultural characteristics. Social behavior varies with racial stocks in accordance with their physical and psychological divergences. To give attention to "environment" in explaining human conduct is to act "sympathetically rather than intelligently." "Man makes his own environment." It is possible to improve the culture only by improving the biological organism. Criminal predilection is due to bodily constitution. "Criminals form a social class" determined by hereditary constitution. The author becomes quite emotional at the mere suggestion that incarcerated criminals may be the failures of the profession; he does not believe that clever men commit crimes, and he thinks that anyone who disagrees with his position is "stupid." He is particularly impatient with the "evangelical penologists who have never read the great Italian" (Lombroso).

The concrete investigation, as here described, was designed to study the general relation of physique and crime; . . . [to] examine the physical characteristics of a large group of criminals [persons under sentence in penal institutions] to discover whether they are in any sense physically homogeneous, and, if so, whether they are distinguishable from non-criminals. . . . If prisoners differ biologically and socially from law-abiding citizens of similar status, they ought also to differ among themselves in accordance with the types of crime they commit.

The procedure of the survey involved the examination, by graduate students, of 17,680 persons, about 15,000 prisoners from ten states, and about 2,000 civilians to be used as check lists. Twenty-two anthropometric measurements were taken of each individual and thirteen indices were calculated. Various "sociological" items were recorded. In all, a total of a hundred and seven anthropological and thirteen "sociological" facts were recorded for each individual. The remainder of the study, apparently, was the usual routine procedure. The group was divided by race, nationality, place of residence, etc., and various tabulations run—for physical differences by states, physical differences by offense groups, morphological differences by offense groups, etc.

The result was not only mountains but whole mountain ranges of evidence showing positive differences between criminals and civilians and between the various classes of criminals. Only a few random items can be noted here. Criminals are marked by low and sloping foreheads, small brain cases, various atavistic and degenerative features of the ear, inferior stature, small heads, poor body build, short and broad faces, straight hair, snubbed noses, narrow jaws, small and broad ears, long necks, and so for various other caliper measurements and morphological observations. The average bodily form of criminals varies with the type of offenses they commit. The findings "almost justify the generalizations that short, fat men rape; short, thin men steal; tall, thin men kill and rob; tall, heavy men murder and forge." Bootleggers have broad noses and short faces; rapists have narrow foreheads and long noses; sex offenders have sparse beards; and so on for various other facts. This is, of course, what one would expect once he comes to realize that the "primary cause of crime is biological inferiority" and "organic deterioration." This "fundamental truth" also provides a direct and final explanation of many things previously thought to be of other or complex origin. Insanity, for example, is a manifestation of inferior organization; the higher crime-rate of the second-generation immigrant stock is biological, not social.

The author points out that the differences between criminals and civilians and between criminals convicted of different crimes are statistical averages and insists that, in general, criminals do not bear "any specific stigmata whereby they can be identified at a glance."

The work is apparently not intended as a hoax; Mr. Hooton seems to be deadly in earnest.

The author would forestall criticism by categorizing all critics. "Many will squall," he tells us, "and right loudly. I await these squallings with equanimity." The present reviewer is not disposed to "squall"; he holds no brief for the criminal. And he likes Mr. Hooton's book. In fact, he

considers it the funniest academic performance that has appeared since the invention of movable type. A four-hundred page "blurb" is no mean accomplishment.

It may be true, as claimed, that the forthcoming volumes will establish the validity of the preliminary claims. But the present volume is inadequate on various counts. The raw data were collected a decade before publication and cannot be checked even by sample. There is no reason, in the evidence presented, to assume that the measured criminals were a valid sample; criminologists are in general agreement that there is no such thing. The author is curiously loose and unclear in the use of his basic concepts. He is not clear, or at least not articulate, as to whether he considers race to be a biological reality or a statistical construct. He has nine different white races and talks of "pure Italians." He is impatient with "people who talk about 'types' without having any clear conception as to what they mean when they use the word," but his elaboration leaves one wondering if perhaps the author is scolding himself. There is nothing in the volume to support a belief that the author has any clear understanding of heredity. On the basis of present evidence, it would be naïve to accept the check samples as either unbiased or adequate; one is particularly intrigued by the use of "the fat firemen of Nashville" and the Negro college boys. Mr. Hooton is quite in the modern mode in his child-like attitude toward Arabic numerals and their manipulation, but he gives no adequate explanation of why the statistical correlation of ambiguities should be accepted as serious scholarship. Particularly, one would appreciate an exposition of the logical processes by which one reaches generalizations and conclusions remotely or not at all related to the data presented—how, in other words, one derives social conclusions from biological and physical measurements.

One is impressed by the great industry of Mr. Hooton's assistants but regrets that the energy was not directed into profitable channels. A deep emotional bias, a trained incapacity, and a generous research fund may result in monumental works, but they give no assurance that the procedures will be sound or the results valid. But final judgment is suspended until publication is complete.

E. B. REUTER

*University of Iowa*

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*The Changing Community.* By CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN. New York: Harper & Bros., 1938. Pp. xiii+661. \$3.50.

This volume contains two types of materials—general discussion of the nature of the community and a series of community case histories. In

eight of the twenty-five chapters the author sets forth his definition of the community, discusses its geographic structure, presents his classification of communities into types, criticizes the various theories of community change, and outlines his conclusions concerning future community trends. These chapters, however, are by no means limited to theoretical discussion, for they are based in large part upon concrete studies either made by the author or secured from other sources.

The fourteen case histories, to which more than two-thirds of the space is given, are studies of communities which vary in size from 200 to 10,000 population. That the author is concerned primarily with analyses of villages and small towns appears from the fact that ten of the places studied have a population of less than 2,500 and four have fewer than 500 inhabitants. The records follow a common outline covering the background of the community, its population, industries, property, relief and depressions, family, public life, other social life, and conclusions.

The author states that his method "represents an attempt to integrate the 'ideal-typical' method of Max Weber and the family method of Frederic Le Play and to apply this in an analysis of modern community life." His effort to adapt these earlier patterns to the requirements of modern community studies led to the working-out of a case method which he calls the "empirical-typological." In essence this seems to be a descriptive analysis of a community with emphasis placed on a single factor or aspect such as parasitism, localism, conflict, indifference, etc., which appears to be sufficiently distinctive and characteristic to serve as a key to an understanding of the total community situation. In the words of the author, he has attempted "to determine some outstanding traits of communities, and by emphasizing and enlarging them provide a picture of the social processes involved in the modern community." The application of this method can be seen in the titles of the case histories, as, for example, "Good-natured Littleville," "Lonely's Belligerency," "Indecisive Hamlet," and "Hillville's Haven of Refuge."

The author recognizes that none of his communities falls completely into the category into which it is placed, and that this emphasis upon a single factor tends to force into the background other aspects of the community which may be equally important. In spite of the disadvantages attending the use of the typological method, the author believes that it presents community life as it exists and that it is the most useful approach available. With this conclusion the reviewer does not agree, since this method of analysis fails to take into account the complex web of community forces and the complicated nature of multiple causation.

The author has removed the identification marks from his community



records, thus following the pattern set by case records of families rather than that of social surveys. When the community analysis involves conflict situations in which prominent leaders play an important role or confidential information is secured from informants who must be protected, anonymity may be justifiable; but in the case of the short community records of a more general, descriptive nature such as are found in this volume, the unwillingness to reveal the name and location is hard to understand. The publication in recent years of social surveys of towns and cities as well as of investigations of local, controversial issues has fully demonstrated that it is rarely necessary to resort to the device of camouflage beyond perhaps avoidance of direct mention of names of persons. Complete concealment of the identity of the place studied greatly weakens if it does not destroy the usefulness of the data presented, for one of the first principles in scientific work is that the evidence given should be subject to verification by other students. The reader is denied the possibility of checking the accuracy of the records published in this volume and has no opportunity of supplementing them by further studies or observations of his own. If community case records are to become a useful scientific tool, there must be developed a method of presentation that will not merely depict the situation as the investigator sees it but will make it possible for other students to verify the data and carry the study farther as opportunity offers.

Still another problem connected with the use of the abbreviated community records found in this volume is that the author is compelled because of lack of space to select out of a vast mass of possible data only those facts that seem to be most suitable for his purpose. A community is so complex in its group relationships and is played upon by such a variety of social forces over a period of years that a well-balanced community analysis is difficult to achieve. It becomes necessary, therefore, to rely upon the skill and objectivity of the writer in his analysis of the community and to bear in mind that he possesses a much wider knowledge of the situation than is incorporated in the published record. Since this is the case, it might be better for the community record to be summarized still further and thus spare the reader the necessity of going over a mass of details of interest primarily to one acquainted with the community and directly concerned with the solution of its problems. As a matter of fact, the author follows this plan in his introductory chapters, where his abstract discussion is illuminated by brief references to concrete community situations. This perhaps is the best use to be made under present circumstances of community records—a method which, if followed out completely in this volume, would have reduced its size by at least one-half.

However much the reader of this volume may differ from the author in his method and point of view, it is a book that merits careful study by sociologists. Its value will be best appreciated by advanced students. Much of the theoretical discussion is too technical for the undergraduate or the layman. The case histories, filled as they are with historical and descriptive matter, become monotonous and uninteresting even to the serious student. If more attention had been given to portraying the community in action by describing community crises and the struggle for power among rival groups, the case materials would have been more readable and would have thrown more light upon community processes.

J. F. STEINER

*University of Washington*

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*The Structure of Social Action: A Study in Social Theory with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers.* By TALCOTT PARSONS. New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1937. Pp. xiii+817. \$6.00.

The concept of "action" can be taken in a purely physical or "behavioristic" meaning, that is, it may be held to be sufficiently exemplified by the motion of a billiard ball across the surface of a table. It is held by a number of scientists and philosophers, however, to be impossible to give an adequate account of human behavior—least of all *social* behavior—without using another concept of "action" or "activity" according to which it involves not only the physical movement of the actor, perhaps not primarily that, but his behavior with reference to ends and means as known to him or believed in by him. It is with the theory of social action as conceived in this latter sense that Talcott Parsons is concerned. *The Structure of Social Action*, in form, a searching critical examination of the methodologies employed and the theoretic systems evolved by four great thinkers of the past generation: Alfred Marshall, Vilfredo Pareto, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber, supplemented by briefer examinations of some aspects of the work of Hobbes, Marx, Sombart, Tönnies, and others. The author uses this procedure, however, chiefly as a method of demonstrating the inadequacies of idealism and positivism, respectively, and particularly the utilitarian variety of positivism. He also indicates the main outlines of his own epistemological position, which he terms analytical realism, and of a "voluntaristic" theory of action.

This meaty book is important, both for the contribution it makes to the elucidation of the persistent and difficult problem of the place of values in social behavior and because it contains the best summary and inter-

pretation of the sociological theories of Pareto, Durkheim, and Max Weber that is now available in English. It is unfortunate that it is so long and so abstruse in style; many American students of sociology who would profit by it will be deterred from reading it. There are a moderate extensive bibliography and an index which seem to be adequate.

FLOYD N. HOUSE

*University of Virginia*

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*Explorations in Personality: A Clinical and Experimental Study of Fifteen Men of College Age.* By the WORKERS AT THE HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL CLINIC (HENRY A. MURRAY, ed.). New York: Oxford University Press, 1938. Pp. xiv+761. \$8.50.

*La Pensée préconsciente: essai d'une psychologie dynamiste.* By C. KONZEWSKI. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1938. Pp. 273. Fr. 40.

The first volume describes the results of a corporate research project in which twenty-eight experimenters studied the same group of individuals. The experimenters tried to keep in mind a central set of concepts and they reported and interpreted their findings in assembly. The aim was to avoid the insulating effects of specialization and thus to develop a new science, personology—the study of the whole personality. The result is disappointing. Dr. Murray, who has his name on most of the chapters is given to philosophizing, repetition, and neologisms (e.g., “scientific tion,” “sentimentive,” “harmavoidance”). The most useful chapter is the sixth (206 pages), in which each experimenter describes his procedure and results, giving such excellent sections as “Hypnotic Test,” “Experimental Study of Repression,” and “Violation of Prohibitions.” An interesting chapter is the seventh, in which the group gives a full case study of one subject; significantly, however, this chapter fails to hang together, for the results of each experimenter are not too clearly related to the other.

A basic defect in the volume is the misconception of scientific abstraction. It is fine to study the personality “as a whole.” But the whole personality is the concrete personality, and science never reveals the concrete. The nearest one can come to concrete wholeness by the scientific route is the marshaling of all relevant sciences to describe the individual. The clinic did not do this. It stuck to “psychology,” ignoring both biology and sociology. So naïve is Dr. Murray with respect to the social determinants of personality that he regards social institutions as the product of individual needs, thinks of them as something to which one can belong. He dismisses the sociological approach to personality by saying that the greater part of a person's life is private and subjective, hence could not be

pointing out the vagueness, confusion, and general inadequacy of the philosophical and psychological terms in this field, as these evolved prior to the newer information, the author consistently lets the newer data redefine the old terminology. Even the best-informed individual will find the volume an aid to objective orientation in a difficult field. And it should prove a sobering draft to dreamers, exhibitionists, Freudians, and other weavers of fiction. In the case of a book of such general excellence, it may seem ungracious on our part to point out the few (and not significant) errors of fact: Tumescence in the mammalian male can subside without the orgasm; menstruation in women is not homologous to estrus in mammals below the primates; and the measurements of the intensity of the copulatory urge in women are so uncertain and this intensity seems to vary with so many fortuitous factors that we are probably not warranted in placing its peak at any particular phase of the menstrual cycle.

A. J. CARLSON

*University of Chicago*

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*Relationships between Young Sisters as Revealed in Their Overt Responses.*

By MARGARET B. MCFARLAND. ("Child Development Monographs," No. 23.) New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1938. Pp. xi+230. \$3.50.

In the reviewer's opinion it is difficult to overemphasize the importance of this pioneer exploration, by observational techniques, of children's relationships within the family. Twenty-two sister pairs were studied, the older child in all cases being less than seven years of age. A common-sense methodology was used, adapted to the exigencies of the home situation. Dr. McFarland, in the role of a family friend, observed the behavior of the two children simultaneously, on five occasions, the last two situations being partially controlled by the introduction of experimental toys.

The following quotations indicate the sociological significance of the research:

When Mary (3; 9) and Carlotta (2; 4) were playing in the street, they spent only 15 per cent of their time in social interaction [as against 62 per cent indoors]. Carlotta was spontaneous and merry in the street. She was fondled by all the adults and older children of the neighborhood. . . . Indoors it was not necessary for Mary to witness attentions given to Carlotta when she received none [pp. 181 and 183].

Situations in which the child's own interests were cut across by those of her sister tended to arouse responses against the sister. Situations in which the security of the sister was threatened from without the relationship tended to arouse a response for the sister . . . [p. 192].

A series of graphs facilitate comparison of the sixteen categories used in analyzing the data. Wide individual differences appeared, yet in the behavior of each of the sisters were trends toward certain types of response. Dr. McFarland wisely concludes:

Findings concerning the social behavior of children, based upon observations in specific environments, may be applicable only to behavior in similar environments, and in order to gain a reliable picture of social behavior it may be necessary to observe the children in varied environments [p. 227].

RUTH PEARSON KOSHUK

*University of Utah*

*Children in Foster Homes.* By MARIE SKODAK. ("University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare," Vol. XVI, No. 1.) Iowa City, Iowa: University of Iowa, 1939. Pp. 156.

This is a study of the I.Q.'s of 154 children who had been placed in foster-homes at not later than six months of age and a group of sixty-five who had been placed in foster-homes at between two and five years of age. The first group were tested two or more times at least a year after placement and a year apart. The last test in 87 per cent of the cases was given before eight years of age. The second group were tested at the time of removal from their original homes and again after one to three years in the foster-home. Comparisons are based, for the most part, on averages of different children at different ages, but they give evidence that the I.Q. level is related to the grade of the foster-home. For example, the children of the first group who were placed in better homes scored the same as those in poorer homes at one year of age but scored progressively higher up to four years of age. This illustrates the general trend of the results.

FRANK N. FREEMAN

*University of Chicago*

*The Sociology of Childhood.* By FRANCIS J. BROWN. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939. Pp. xxii+498. \$2.25.

This text is designed for educational sociology. Social interaction is the frame of reference. Some social processes are discussed with frequent references to the child. The picture presented is not the sociology of childhood but a description of the social heritage in which the child lives. When the school is considered, for instance, there is a description of the school in a historical perspective rather than a picture of the dynamic

interactive relationship between the life-organization the child brings to school and the multifarious aspects of the school. Much is said about passive adaptation when the child accepts the only social patterns about him, but a child in interaction is never passive. Co-operation is no more passive than is negativistic conflict. In all cases the past experience of the child is an interactive factor as evidenced by the fact that all children are not influenced in the same way. The life-organization of a conformist is an active element in interaction quite as much as the life-organization of a deviate. Even at birth, before there is human nature, the newborn is not passive. He is a bundle of undefined, dynamic, potential organic activity. An educational sociologist should be the last person to think of learning as a passive matter—a pouring-in process.

Recent sociological research on adolescence by Reuter and others is not mentioned. Many readers will wonder why the four children, briefly described, were considered normal.

L. GUY BROWN

*Oberlin College*

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*Babies Are Human Beings.* By C. ANDERSON ALDRICH and MARY M. ALDRICH. New York: Macmillan Co., 1938. Pp. xii+128. \$1.75.

This book by a busy pediatrician and his wife is disturbing because of its strong points, its inconsistencies, and its dangerous oversimplification of a complex field. More flexible management of the infant's bodily routines is recommended, based on his particular rhythm and stage of growth—fitting the schedule to the baby rather than vice versa, in order to build durable habits of satisfaction. This seems grounded on what science is discovering about the orderly sequence but variable rate of these developmental changes. The authors assume uncritically, however, that all individual differences in tastes and in behavior are inborn, and they would limit the function of social interaction to that of "backing-up" this supposed unfolding from within. Habit formation is ignored, as well as the essential role of culture in shaping human values and attitudes. No familiarity is shown with methods of social control other than rigid domination and restraint, against which the volume is an effective gesture of rebellion.

In the reviewer's opinion this is hardly, as a Chicago columnist has lyrically claimed, "the greatest book since the *Origin of Species*."

RUTH PEARSON KOSHUK

*University of Utah*

*The Man Takes a Wife: A Study of Man's Problems in and through Marriage.* By IRA S. WILE. New York: Greenberg, Publisher, Inc., 1937. Pp. 277. \$2.50.

*The Man Takes a Wife* is not—as the title might lead one to believe—just another addition to the endless stream of literature extolling sexual skill as the open sesame to marital bliss. On the contrary, Dr. Wile sets forth in balanced perspective the multiplicity of elements inherent in the marriage relationship. Moreover, the volume is unique in that its focus of attention is man rather than woman.

Drawing on his experience as a psychiatrist—but emphasizing the normal rather than the pathological—Dr. Wile has written a stimulating account in nontechnical language of the successive stages in the life of the married male in contemporary middle-class England and America.

The author treats of man as suitor, husband (son and son-in-law), and father. The dynamic, ever changing nature of the husband-wife, father-mother, and father-children relations is stressed throughout. The final section of the volume deals with “adventurous middle age,” the so rarely discussed male climacteric, and old age.

Covering so broad a range makes it impossible for the author to dwell at length on any particular aspect of his subject, but his discussion is rich in its suggestiveness, and to the reader with sociological interests it should serve as a reminder of the many unexplored phases of family life which remain to be investigated before an adequate sociology of marriage and the family can be considered achieved.

PAUL WOLINSKY

Chicago

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*Plan for Marriage.* Edited by J. K. FOLSOM. New York: Harper & Bros., 1938. Pp. xii+305. \$3.00.

Eight members of the Vassar staff have collaborated in producing this volume, which consists in large part of materials presented to Vassar students in a series of lectures on marriage. High expectations are aroused by the fact that the editor is known to be both well informed and research minded. The dedication to Dr. Robert Latou Dickinson further leads the reader to expect that he is to encounter the best factual material that modern researches have to offer. Disappointment follows, for with few exceptions the material presented is the familiar homily for the young. Folsom's two chapters are outstanding exceptions. Squier's chapter on the medical basis of sexual practice, although burdened with a birds-and-flowers approach, presents some concrete information. Most of the chap-

ters are so uninformative as to suggest that the authors have probably underestimated the intellectual and emotional maturity of Vassar women. Research findings, even where available in greatest amount, are rarely included in the discussions or conclusions. A lamentable example of this is the chapter by Mrs. Fisher on the married woman and work, which contains no mention of investigational data except in a brief footnote added by the editor.

The book is provided with an annotated bibliography of 163 titles. Among titles included are Thurber's and White's *Is Sex Necessary?* and Selina Fox's *A Chain of Prayer across the Ages*. Among those omitted are the valuable articles by Bernard and by Kirkpatrick, and Hamilton's *Research in Marriage* (though McGowan's inaccurate popularization of Hamilton's work is included).

LEWIS M. Terman

Stanford University

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*Sociologia*. By ROBERTO MACLEAN Y ESTENÒS. Lima, Peru: The Author, 1938. Pp. 534. 10 soles gold.

This is the most pretentious text in sociology to appear in South America since the works of Cornejo and Venturino, the last in 1935. The author is professor of sociology in the University of San Marcos at Lima and is apparently of British-Peruvian descent and should as a consequence be able to read English. However, his treatment of North American and British sociology is quite limited. He gives more attention to Japanese than to North American sociology. Ward and Giddings are the only authors of this country analyzed even briefly. Judging by his content, he has been inspired mainly by the writings and teaching of George Nicolai and Adolfo Posada, whose outlines he follows at certain points. The German and French brands of sociology receive most attention from the author, and even these are of the past generation rather than of the present. The only social psychology he seems to be familiar with is the French of the 1890's and the early 1900's. His chief emphasis is upon biological sociology (with a large treatment of sex), cultural sociology, and the sociology of economic relationships, and especially political sociology and the philosophy of law. In these last three items he follows current European and South American practice. This book runs much less to the doctrinaire emphasis than most of the South American sociologies and gets down in large measure to actual descriptions and evaluations of social processes. Like many Latin writers on the subject, the author displays much erudition, but his work is obviously a compilation and



not very well organized from the standpoint of the sociologists of this country. It would scarcely serve as a text here, although it has many excellent points in its favor for the students for whom it is intended.

L. L. BERNARD

*Washington University*

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*General Anthropology.* By FRANZ BOAS *et al.* Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1938. Pp. xi+718. \$4.00.

This book is presumably intended as a textbook of anthropology to be used by university students. It is not so labeled, Dr. Boas in the Preface calling it "a general book on anthropology," without indicating why any more general books on anthropology than are already available should be necessary. If intended for classroom use, it would seem that something has been lost by the collaboration in it of eight different writers, even though the eight may be said to be roughly the exponents of the same point of view. The main things lost by the symposium method are, of course, continuity and conciseness, since there is inevitably overlapping and repetition. Why separate chapters on "Subsistence" and "Economic Organization," for example, and, if separate chapters are necessary, what is gained by having them written by different people? The division of the later part of the book into such sections as "Social Life," "Government," "Art," "Religion," "Mythology," etc., is also a matter for regret. It is perhaps the habit of anthropologists of dividing their general books thus, more than any other single factor, that makes it difficult for the teacher to demonstrate the unity of culture to students. What is the point of talking endlessly about each culture's having a "pattern" if the same old habit of breaking all cultures up into arbitrary fragments is still followed.

If not intended for classroom use, it is difficult to know for whom the book is intended. Professional anthropologists will not find anything new here either by way of fact or by way of theory, though they will not have to search very hard to find numerous personal opinions of the writers' masquerading as generally accepted propositions. Sociologists may find references to material in obscure publications, of which they might not otherwise be aware, but little else of value to them. The chapter on "Social Life," in particular, will disappoint them, as it contains the greatest number of unsupported dogmatic statements in a book where they are plentiful. The man in the street may find the book interesting, but one doubts whether he would not find a plain summary of fifteen or

twenty tribal cultures without any generalization or arrangement even more interesting and instructive. In fact, whatever audience one thinks of, one cannot help feeling that better books than this one are already available.

C. W. M. HART

*University of Toronto*

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*Racial Origins and Nativity of the Canadian People.* By W. BURTON HURD. ("Census Monograph," No. 4.) Ottawa, Canada: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1938. Pp. xvii+292. \$0.35.

The Canadian census tabulates the population according to racial (really ethnic) origins. This allows for the quantitative analysis of the contacts of diverse peoples, a procedure not possible on the basis of United States census data.

Professor Hurd uses these data in an attempt to "measure the process of assimilation and to discover and evaluate the forces which are working toward that end." This is indeed a rare thing, for, although much has been said about race relations, little attempt has been made to discover the relevant provable facts.

The problems studied range from the purely demographic matters, through problems of social pathology, to segregation, intermarriage, urbanization, and occupational composition. Although the author shows great ingenuity in selecting his problems and in working out methods, he might have done better had he used a smaller number of topics. Nevertheless, great credit must be given him for a serious attempt to subject these matters to verification.

As a whole this volume is stimulating and suggestive. In analyzing specific problems, however, the author has not done as good a job as possible. For example, he finds that about 40 per cent of the variation of birth-rates between the ethnic groups is due to a favorable age composition. This factor, a biological one, should have been removed at the beginning by computing net (or gross) reproduction-rates. The distinctly sociological factors, such as illiteracy, urbanism, length of residence in Canada, would then have stood out in high relief.

Likewise, in dealing with naturalization, he should have held constant length of residence in Canada, which accounts for a great deal of the difference in rates of naturalization of the various groups. Other factors of a more sociological nature, which deter or promote naturalization, would then appear in "true" value.

At other points, similar criticisms might be made. In general, however, no future student can neglect the groundwork here done on an important set of problems.

Chicago

A. JAFFE

*We Americans: A Study of Cleavage in an American City.* By ELIN L. ANDERSON. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937. Pp. xvi+286. \$3.00.

Vermont's chief town is herein given a post-Americanization checkup. The theme of the work is that the melting-pot is cooling off without having finished its work.

Burlington, as here described, is a community of several distinguishable and self-conscious, historic ethnic groups, all speaking some English and likely to speak it, eventually, to the exclusion of other languages; with common business and governmental institutions, in which they are by no means proportionately distributed in positions of authority; and with various degrees of separateness as to churches, schools, fraternal orders, social clubs, charitable organizations, and informal friendly association. All seem to love, without conscious reserve, the symbols of American democracy, but are by no means agreed as to their meaning with reference to current issues. It does not seem likely that these divisions will soon, if ever, disappear.

The presence of a large group of French-Canadians—a culturally resistant people close to their native habitat—the static character of the population, and the preponderance of middle-aged and older people make Burlington a little atypical for the country at large, although not for Vermont and New England. But the author is probably right in thinking that much the same kind of thing is true of other American communities of comparably diverse origins.

The method is that of a survey, based on observation, interviews with leading persons, a household census covering certain basic data, and a series of questionnaires designed to discover the attitudes of the ethnic groups toward one another.

It is of interest that such a study was sponsored by the Eugenics Survey of Vermont—with the excuse that social prejudices must be understood and got out of the way before the desired biological blending of the ethnic groups can be started. And so another set of disillusioned reformers seems to be turning into sociologists.

EVERETT C. HUGHES

University of Chicago

*Three Iron Mining Towns: A Study in Cultural Change.* By PAUL H. LANDIS. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Edwards Bros., Inc., 1938. Pp. viii+148. \$1.75.

A doctoral dissertation, this work is a description in terms of social interaction, of three towns in the Mesabi Range in Minnesota. The author points out that one-industry towns have an easily observable efflorescence, maturity, and decline. Virginia, Hibbing, and Eveleth are much like human beings: one thrifty and sober, the second reckless and spendthrift, and the third hungry for distinction and uncritical of its source. In the most readable part of the book, the author convincingly explains their differences in terms of the relation between municipal government and the mining corporations which are the principal taxpayers.

Though it purports to be sociological, the study lacks theoretical structure and is actually assembled out of history and common sense. There is no systematic collection of materials, the only order being chronological. The summary chapter, "An Analysis of Cultural Change," contains a number of graphs showing "physico-social cycles," "bio-social cycles," "psycho-social cycles," and "culture cycles." The reader is not told what are the units on the axes along which the curves take their course, but learns that certain minor culture cycles represent "life held cheap," "tolerance of vice," or "economy mores in government"—conditions which, by some unrevealed treatment, are reduced to arcs.

HELEN MACGILL HUGHES

Chicago

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*The Peopling of Virginia.* By ROBERT BENNETT BEAN. Boston: Chapman & Grimes, Inc., 1938. Pp. viii+302. \$3.00.

The subject matter of this volume is separated into three parts, the first dealing with the peopling of Virginia; the second concerning itself with the similar phenomena in the one hundred individual counties of the state; and the last giving a short review of physical anthropological data on several thousand members of old Virginia families. Naturally, in the fifty-six pages comprising the first section, it is impossible to sketch with any degree of thoroughness the long history of settlement of the oldest permanent colony in the United States. It is in the second section, making up about two-thirds of the volume, that the sociologist would most likely be interested. Here an enormous amount of work has been done in classifying names of early settlers by individual counties primarily on the basis of six nationalities, as follows: England, Scotland, Germany, Wales, Ireland,

and France. Such a grouping is made in most of the counties for recent citizens, the family names of which are derived from tax rolls and like lists. The aggregate result is a striking substantiation of the claim that Virginia retains in her population today a remarkable similarity of composition, even in percentage representation, to that existing in the earlier days of its history. The third part of the book consists of a short review of four monographic studies previously published in the *Journal of Physical Anthropology*. The plan of the volume is unique in conception and will likely stimulate with advantage similar studies in other states.

WILSON GEE

*University of Virginia*

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*An Experiment in the Registration of Vital Statistics in China.* By C. M. CHIAO, WARREN S. THOMPSON, and D. T. CHEN. Oxford, Ohio: Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Problems, 1938. Pp. 115. \$1.00.

This study of a district of Kiangyin Hsien (province of Kiangsu) which is close to the industrial city of Wusih, is a considerable addition to the volume of statistical evidence concerning the development of Chinese population groups in recent years. Unfortunately, the authors have not tried to compare their results with other registration data. Outstanding among the results of the study is the fairly large volume of migration which is so extensive in the outward direction that emigration from this rural district exceeded the natural increase of the population. Hsiao Chi, with little more than 20,000 inhabitants, actually lost within the four years of registration in population. In addition, the registration yielded an infant mortality rate of more than 260 per thousand, i.e., a rate much higher than generally assumed in China. Thompson's more general comment in Appendix I of the study arrives at very pessimistic and frankly Malthusian conclusions concerning China's population problem, possibly taking insufficient account of such evidence of birth control in Chinese modern cities as exists.

KURT BLOCH

*Long Island, N.Y.*

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*Congrès international de la population (Paris, 1937), Tome VI: Démographie de la France d'Outremer.* Paris: Hermann & Cie, 1938. Pp. 127.

The twelve papers in this volume constitute a survey of population movements in the French colonies and protectorates. Generally speaking, they show a tendency of the native populations to increase rather rapidly.

None of the papers uses any statistical method which requires comment. The purpose is apparently to give information.

In a paper entitled, "The Relative Regression of European Population in Algeria," M. Mesnard proposes an interesting hypothesis. After noting that the expansion of European industrial civilization has often stimulated the growth of affected native populations, he accounts for it by this statement: "The races which we call inferior are profiting at the present moment from the material benefits of our civilization, while we Europeans are already poisoned by its vices (socialism, materialism, etc.)." The point is by no means proved in M. Mesnard's three-page paper, but it suggests a line of work for someone.

EVERETT C. HUGHES

*University of Chicago*

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*Hex Marks the Spot in the Pennsylvania Dutch Country.* By ANN HARK. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1938. Pp. 316. \$2.50.

Within a cover made bright by one of the conventional designs found on "P.D." barns, the reader of this book will find a pleasant introduction to one of America's most lusty cultural islands. While the bait is witchcraft and folk medicine, the author devotes equal or more space to the history and present practices of some of the sects of "plain people," cookery, and to the lore of the Pennsylvania Dutch country.

Although the author does not undertake detailed functional analysis of any of the communities touched upon, the reader will certainly leave the book with the feeling that he has got some insight into what people there get out of life as they live it. The "plain people" eschew those worldly amusements which we, with characteristic ethnocentrism, assume are the only ways of enlivening our existence. But they seem to work, worship, eat, court, and play in a very zestful fashion without them.

One would not expect current conflicts to be dealt with in such a book. And they are not.

EVERETT C. HUGHES

*University of Chicago*

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*The Development of Political Theory.* By OTTO VON GIERKE. Translated by BERNARD FREYD. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1939. Pp. 366. \$4.00.

The publication of an English translation of Gierke's *The Development of Political Theory* is a boon to students of history, jurisprudence, and politics. The book presents a digest of the life and doctrines of Johannes

Althusius, a leading German monarchomach, and places his main ideas in their historical setting. It discovers Althusius' forerunners in the Middle Ages and his successors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Von Gierke summarizes the life of Althusius and then outlines his *Politics* and his *Jurisprudentia*. Thereafter he traces in particular the background and subsequent history of six major elements in Althusius' system. These are: (1) the religious element in the theory of the state; (2) the doctrine of the state contract; (3) the doctrine of popular sovereignty; (4) the principle of representation; (5) the idea of feudalism; and (6) the idea of the legal state. The pages of notes which follow each chapter are extremely valuable to scholars.

Otto von Gierke's attribution of primacy and of excellence to Althusius (see pp. 75, 102, 103, 163, 210, 244, 263, 266) must be read with two things in mind: one is Gierke's avowed purpose to gain "a prominent place in the history of political science" for "an almost forgotten German scholar," and the other is the fact that his was one of a series of jubilee essays in honor of Bluntschli in which "special attention was to be given to the hitherto neglected share of the Germans in this activity of more than five centuries." These two facts may explain the reiterated insistence on Althusius' right to a place of rank alongside the Frenchman Rousseau and others. The book is a masterly piece of scholarship, excellently done into English, and worthy of serious reading by every student in the field of political theory.

HYMAN EZRA COHEN

Wright Junior College

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*The Clandestine Organization and Diffusion of Philosophic Ideas in France from 1700 to 1750.* By IRA O. WADE. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1938. Pp. ix+329. \$3.50.

Anyone who has worked in the manuscript collections of French libraries must have been struck by the number of unpublished writings on political and social problems dating from the early eighteenth century that are to be found there. The reason for that is well known. To avoid the censorship, such manuscripts circulated from hand to hand in one or more copies. If they were regarded by readers as worth the effort, the readers made or had made other copies. The number of copies of such a manuscript is thus a rough index of its significance to contemporaries. Mr. Wade has found one hundred and two treatises "which deal in an unorthodox fashion with religion, natural theology, problems of morality and politics, and which were circulated during the first half of

the eighteenth century" (p. 10). Of one title as many as thirty copies were actually located, though that one was not Meslier's *Testament*, which was probably the most popular. Some of the manuscripts were eventually published—except in a few instances, after 1750, when the censorship began to break down. There is occasional evidence before that time of a systematic effort to give such writings a wide diffusion, for they are occasionally found bound together in a single *recueil* the separate parts of which seem to have come from the same source. There is also evidence of a loose organization among some of the writers, centering around the Comte de Boulainvilliers.

Mr. Wade gives the major part of his book to an effort to identify the authors and an analysis of their ideas. The volume adds abundant confirmation to the theory, held at least since Professor G. Lanson's time, that most of the ideas that became common property on the eve of the French Revolution had already been expressed in smaller circles in earlier decades. Mr. Wade has made a most scholarly contribution both to the history of thought and to the history of the diffusion of thought. It is rather surprising, however, that a book so carefully written and so obviously intended for the scholarly world should have no index.

LOUIS GOTTSCHALK

*University of Chicago*

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*The Defense of Democracy.* By F. ELWYN JONES. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1938. Pp. 352. \$2.50.

*The Crisis of Democracy.* By WILLIAM E. RAPPARD. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938. Pp. xiii+288. \$2.50.

The invention and propagation of verbal symbols for the purpose of eliciting positive or negative organic reactions are of the essence of the democratic political process. With the ideology and practice of democracy in an already advanced stage of decay throughout Europe, those who verbalize in its behalf are typically motivated either by a will to arrest decomposition and restore health to the corpse or by a desire to seek solace through whistling in the cemetery and dreaming of immortality.

Dr. William E. Rappard, director of the Graduate School of International Studies in Geneva, belongs in the latter category of commentators. F. Elwyn Jones, British journalist, belongs in the former. His stimulating and challenging book, which went to press in the summer of 1938, is at once a useful factual survey of the scope, purposes, and techniques of fascist aggression and a call to arms to defend democracy against



its would-be destroyers through collective international action. The fact that even the Chamberlains and the Daladiers reverted belatedly to collective security in the spring of 1939 is a vindication of the correctness of Jones's analysis. It is characteristic of lost causes, however, that their champions invariably perceive reality and bestir themselves to relevant action only after the moment for effective defense has long since passed.

The sources of democratic paralysis and defeatism are well illustrated by Professor Rappard's volume of lectures delivered before the Harris Foundation Institute during August of 1938. Dr. Rappard has scholarly perspective and historical insight. His review of the emergence of liberalism, the impact upon it of the first World War, the rise of the dictatorships, and the prospect of democracy is a thoughtful and thought-provoking performance. But he appears to be hopelessly entangled in the fatal dilemma of the liberal whose fear of proletarian radicalism is so great that he is incapable of resisting fascist totalitarianism. Bolshevism is the enemy, even though it has "refuted itself as a scheme of government. Not so Fascism"—which has "solid achievements" to its credit. It may not endure, but "Stalinism in Soviet Russia would seem far less secure." But democracy will survive through "more economic freedom" and "more executive authority." The enemy, one infers, is on the Left. The enemy is in fact on the Right. But Dr. Rappard prefers to look the other way. At the end he still exemplifies admirably his own opening statement: "The crisis of democracy has indeed taken civilized mankind completely unawares."

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

*Williams College*

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*Essais sur Georges Sorel (vers un idéalisme constructif)*, Vol. I: *De la notion de classe à la doctrine de la violence*. By PIERRE ANGEL. ("Études sur le devenir social," Vol. XXV.) Paris: Marcel Rivière, 1936. Pp. 352. Fr. 15.

In two respects, at least, is the study of Mr. Angel different from the prevailing approach of the Sorel literature. In the first place, he does not try to distil a system out of Sorel's unsystematic work; and, second, he regards him essentially as a "moralist" and social philosopher rather than as an economist or sociologist. But, to make such an approach fruitful, the author himself should have the ability of systematic analysis and the preparation of the sociologist. These the author lacks.

A long series of remarks and reflections, largely apropos of something that Sorel has said, is the book's content. The author's repulsion for

"systems" goes so far as to omit even a presentation of Sorel's views; they are discussed without being "laid on the table." This technique permits the author to be not only unsystematic but also vague and diffuse. Even so, he succeeds in shedding an interesting light on a few of the outstanding problems involved. Mr. Angel points out, for example (pp. 209 ff.), that Sorel has adopted the Marxian concept of class struggle but could not logically maintain its correlate, the theory of historical materialism, owing to the conflict in Sorel's own mind between a "heroic aspiration toward justice" and the scientific fatalism implied in the historical determinism. The result was Sorel's concept of social illusions, degrading Marxism to *poésie sociale*.

But this is not the only self-contradiction or psychological conflict which burdened Sorel's approach. Angel brings out forcefully some of the motives which carried Sorel to an antidemocratic attitude and to a glorification, under the influence of Bergson, of "movement" per se. He shows conclusively that this antidemocratism, derived from a repulsion against the alleged democratic tendency toward intellectual leveling-out of society and from a basically aesthetic bias, was not compatible with the ethical approach of Sorel and compelled him to metaphysical constructions which are supposed to be the subject of a second volume of Angel's study, dealing with Sorel's philosophy.

MELCHIOR PALYI

*University of Chicago*

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*Nazi Germany: Its Women and Family Life.* By CLIFFORD KIRKPATRICK. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1938. Pp. xiii+353. \$3.00.

"What *Middletown* set out to do for a typical small American city," says the publisher's blurb, "this book undertakes to do for one central phase of a whole national development and system, a phase which has hitherto been left largely to *émigrés* and newspaper correspondents." Whether the publisher is doing his author a true service by this description may be open to doubt. The author collected his data during a year in Germany and keenly felt the difficulty of his undertaking: "More than the journalist he [the sociologist] must wrestle with and restrain his prejudice in favor of democracy, liberalism and human reason (*sic*). The writer has no illusions about his capacity for purely objective description . . . in political outlook he is a liberal in the sense that he values reason, toleration and co-operation." He opens with a critique of current interpretations of National Socialism to which he adds one of his own, designated as a "sociological theory of regression to tribal group

intimacy" (National Socialism as a response to a generalized regressive longing for a simple, secure community, relying on force and authority, a response evoked by a period of social stresses and strains). With this assumption, Kirkpatrick investigates the conquest of women by National Socialism, the National Socialist women's organizations, the current theory of family and of the woman's place, the marriage problem, the population policies, and the occupational role of women in the Third Reich. On all these topics valuable information is ably synthesized, although repeatedly factual accounts are marred by the author's insufficient knowledge of much in the German background.

His conclusions are cautious and, on the whole, reflect sound judgment. He believes that the birth-boosting policy has been something of a success, while he is gravely concerned about abuses in the administration of the sterilization program. He questions, in sum, that the Nazi analysis of woman's nature and the resultant halfway policies will "enable Germany to lead the troubled world to a satisfactory solution of the woman's problem" (p. 282). This type of study evokes certain queries: With what standards of measurement does the author approach the Nazi experiment? Since revolutionary changes do not occur in a vacuum, is not a broader historical perspective needed to determine what is specifically Nazi? Thus, the author is often at his best where quantitative evidence is decisive. For even the sociological interpretation of jokes may lose its relevance (p. 258) if the interpreter does not know that they are stale with convention and old age.

WOLFGANG H. KRAUS

*Smith College*

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*The Real Conflict between China and Japan.* By HARLEY FARNSWORTH MACNAIR. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938. Pp. xvi+216. \$2.00.

The aim of this book is explained in the subtitle, "An Analysis of Opposing Ideologies." In a scholarly way Professor MacNair explains the traditional philosophy and outlook of China and Japan and shows how these manifested themselves in their contacts with the West and with each other. "To rear modern, or semimodern, physical superstructures—governmental, military, and commercial in type—is," he tells us in writing of Japan, "less difficult than to eradicate ancient mental foundations and substitute therefor new ways of thought and action" (p. 117). Professor MacNair's lucid and well-documented exposition of this view adds to our understanding of contemporary events in the Far East by

correcting a tendency to seek for an economic explanation of them without giving due weight to the *damnosa hereditas* of the past. By implication at least Professor MacNair is very kind to the *hereditas* of the West, for he speaks of "the generally enlightened, but by no means unselfish policies of the trader-empires, Great Britain and the United States" (p. 90).

HENRY F. ANGUS

*University of British Columbia*

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*The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921.* By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN. New York: Macmillan Co., 1935. 2 vols. Pp. xi+511; 556. \$10.

This work appeared first in 1935. Its merit and value justify the publishers in again bringing it to the attention of the reading public. The author is a well-known newspaper correspondent stationed for many years in Moscow. He early became interested in the task of preparing a comprehensive history of the revolution in Russia. With the assistance of a Guggenheim fellowship, he was able to devote the necessary time for the assembling and digesting of the data for the period chosen, 1917-21. The result is a monumental book, sober, cautious, nonpartisan, detailed, and thoroughly documented. It justly deserves to share with Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution* the distinction of being the outstanding work in the English language on this great historical happening.

HERBERT BLUMER

*University of Chicago*

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*The Abolition of Poverty.* By JAMES and KATHERINE MORROW FORD. New York: Macmillan Co., 1937. Pp. viii+300. \$2.50.

Judging from the style and the handling of the subject matter, the book appears to have been written on an elementary level for general public consumption. Something of the general tone of the work may be gained from a concluding statement:

This essay has not been a plea for reform. Instead it has questioned the good sense of the annual outpouring of billions of dollars for forms of relief which partially alleviate misery but generally fail to reach and curb its sources. It has shown that enough is already known of poverty's causes to make preventive action reasonable. What is not yet known can progressively be ascertained by amply endowed research. The present wastrel practices lack the excuse of necessity; they cannot be justified even on the grounds of expediency. . . . Poverty can be abolished and by measures that are legal, businesslike and consonant with the methods and traditions of our pioneer democracy [p. 290].

Asking, "Is poverty necessary? Can the fortunes now being expended upon the relief be diverted in large part to prevention? Is it possible to abolish poverty? . . . . To what agencies should the responsibility for such a program fall?" (p. 1) the authors conclude that "under wise guidance and skilled social work" millions of persons on relief rolls today are capable of being restored to independence (p. 17).

Thus, the problem of poverty as they see it is predominantly one of adjusting those persons who have slipped below the danger line to a given social order through appropriate clinical measures. The focus of attention is upon the individual and his personal problems of rehabilitation rather than on the adequacy of the social and economic system.

Only lip service is given to those aspects of the problem which involve some questioning of *status quo* arrangements. There is a very sketchy treatment of the maldistribution of wealth and income, further extension of unemployment insurance, and minimum-wage legislation. Conceptions of planned economies are dismissed with mere mention. There seems to be no basic understanding of the psychological pressures of the American standard of living which hit millions of citizens above the subsistence level and which cause them to struggle for status as well as for food and shelter.

A corollary of the authors' preoccupation with matters of individual weakness and incompetence is their unbounded confidence in the efficacy of attacking poverty through perfection of medical and psychiatric techniques, increased knowledge of eugenics, and more efficient administration of social work and public relief.

Admitting that much can be done along the lines of individualization, certainly a truly sociological approach to the problem of poverty should attempt a more realistic analysis of the social organization of which it is a function.

RICHARD C. FULLER

*University of Michigan*

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*Labor Problems and the American Scene.* By LOIS MACDONALD. New York: Harper & Bros., 1938. Pp. 878. \$3.50.

Part I and Part II of this volume deal with the "American Scene," and the "Institutional Setting," which in the language of certain liberal economists is a version of the sociological concept, "The Situation as a Whole." Labor is not an abstraction; it means workers who are people living with other people. Labor problems are the day-to-day problems of

people who live by their earnings. Starting with this conception of the realities, the author discusses workers in steel, in coal, in textiles, in the automobile industry, and in agriculture.

There is included chapters on the history of labor organization, the history of labor legislation, and the introduction of government participation in dealing with labor disputes. The emphasis throughout is on the side of organized labor, with a distinct partiality for the newer labor movement. Perhaps this emphasis has blinded the author to certain of the more conservative segments of the labor movement. Very little attention is paid, for example, to the building industry and the part that the crafts have played in the public relations of organized labor.

There is another defect, which probably applies to most of the recent writings on labor by university people. Very little is said of the public works problem. The reviewer wonders if that problem in its larger dimensions has yet been discovered by the academic observers.

NELS ANDERSON

*Works Progress Administration*

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*Seven Shifts*. Edited by JACK COMMON. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1938. Pp. 271. \$2.50.

If one is searching for the clue to the reaction of workers to trade-unions, political parties, employers, work, wages, and unemployment and relief in terms of their own experiences, *Seven Shifts* is required reading. Seven British workers describe in their own words the world of labor in the midst of which they live. The descriptions are so matter of fact and realistic that the reader can hardly escape the illusion of participating at firsthand in their everyday experiences. He sees the sometimes successful, sometimes futile attempts of humble men to get satisfaction out of humble circumstances. He watches men taking what is possible in their own world and making the best of it. He goes with a plasterer, a steel-worker, a gas-worker, a stall-holder, a furnace-worker, a railway man, and an unemployed man through their daily routine, learns something of the life-history of each, and looks forward with them into the future. He listens while they analyze their problems and tell what they think can be done about them. The stories are not special pleading; they are straightforward, vivid, factual descriptions of what is on the worker's mind—and why.

E. WIGHT BAKKE

*Yale University*

*Men without Work: A Report Made to the Pilgrim Trust.* Cambridge, England: University Press, 1938. Pp. 447. \$3.00.

No more thought-provoking book has been published on the human effects of unemployment. The study is focused upon that most troublesome and challenging part of the unemployment problem, long-term unemployment. From interviews with over a thousand men who had been out of work for long periods in key localities of Great Britain, the authors have built up a picture of the attempts of these men to live as normally as possible, to find substitute satisfactions for those which disappeared with the job, and to make maximum use of their limited resources for self-maintenance. It is as a part of that process that reactions of the unemployed to work, retraining, voluntary agencies, and continued life on the dole are discussed. The resulting analysis of causal relations is destructive of such casual assumptions as "the dole has destroyed the desire to work." But that is an incidental conclusion. The real contribution of this book is the analysis of the interplay of forces in the producing of an end result in human behavior. That contribution has value not only for the student of the specific problems of unemployment, not only for those interested in English problems, but for all students of sociology who wish to find in human adjustment to a particular problem tendencies which have a broader practical and theoretical importance.

E. WIGHT BAKKE

*Yale University*

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*The Aryan Trail in Iran and India: A Naturalistic Study of the Vedic Hymns and the Avesta.* By NAGENDRANATH GHOSE. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1937. Pp. xiii+334.

The author considers the sacred literatures of India and of the Iran and reaches conclusions as to the contributions made by these cultures, two older than Vedic culture. A principal view of the author is that the Indo-European invaders of India were steppe-dwelling nomads and not dwellers on "parklands." The work apparently requires for its evaluation a knowledge of the texts which form its materials.

ROBERT REDFIELD

*University of Chicago*

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*Selected Works of Israel Zangwill.* Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1938. Pp. vii+1526. \$3.50.

This volume reprints a number of the most important writings of Zangwill, who justifiably merits his reputation as a very keen student of traditional Jewish life. His work is already well known to sociological students of the Jewish people, as well as to those interested in the problem of assimilation of ethnic

groups into urban society. So penetrating has been the author's understanding, and so lucid his depiction of Jewish life, that students of both human nature and culture could re-read his writings with great value.

HERBERT BLUMER

*University of Chicago*

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*Deuxième congrès international d'esthétique et de science de l'art.* Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1937. Pp. 896. Fr. 120.

For some time there has been a shift of emphasis from the philosophy of beauty to the sociology and psychology of taste. This tendency has been much more conspicuous in France and Germany than has any other country. These volumes contain the 150 abstracts or complete papers of the participants in an international congress from about a dozen countries, and cover the field of aesthetics as seen by philosophers, psychologists, and sociologists. It is a provocative series, fairly representative of the types of contemporary analysis and research, although many of the papers do not justify their scientific appellation.

JOHN H. MUELLER

*Indiana University*

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*Personal and Social Adjustment.* By WILLIS L. UHL and FRANCIS F. POWERS. New York: Macmillan Co., 1938. Pp. xii+475. \$1.40.

Planned for high-school students, this textbook is divided into five sections: "Successful Living," "Social Life in the Modern World," "Types of Personal Adjustment," "Types of Social Adjustment," and "Development of Social Responsibility." The first section really states the thesis of the book. The text tells the students how to succeed. It is an oversimplified statement of human motives with an undue emphasis upon the ability of each person to control his own life.

RUTH SHONLE CAVAN

*Rockford, Illinois*

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*Character Education.* By HARRY C. MCKOWN. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1935. Pp. xiv+472. \$3.00.

The book opens with a general definition of character as attitudes and conduct integrated toward some worthy goal. The next few chapters are a patchwork of objectives that have been formulated by various groups interested in character education and methods of training that have been tried. The latter half of the book is devoted to a consideration of character education through various school activities. This and other books on character education assume that traits of character such as honesty, industry, and perseverance can be taught as spelling, addition, and grammar are taught, to all children uniformly, through a definite classroom procedure. In view of the early age at which the personality has been found to be "set" and the influence of family, friends, and community patterns in determining the motives and conduct of children, this approach to character education seems almost futile.

RUTH SHONLE CAVAN

*Rockford, Illinois*



*Rural Youth on Relief.* By BRUCE L. MELVIN. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937. Pp. xvii+112.

This work is the eleventh in the series of research monographs published by the Division of Social Research of the Works Progress Administration. It is a clear and concise reference for those interested in the depression effects on rural youth. In addition to data on extent and distribution of youthful dependency, there are breakdowns showing educational, occupational, age, sex, color, and other characteristics of youth on relief. A summary discussion of the youth programs of the federal emergency agencies adds to the value of the report.

LEONARD S. COTTRELL, JR.

Cornell University

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*Child Care and Training.* By MARION L. FAEGRE and JOHN E. ANDERSON. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1937. Pp. vii+327. \$2.50.

This is the fourth edition of a popular book on child-training, designed for parents. A new chapter on "Social Development" has been added to the previous, practical chapters on such subjects as children's diseases, emotional habits, eating habits, play, and books and reading.

RUTH SHONLE CAVAN

Rockford, Illinois

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*The Young Child in the Home.* By the COMMITTEE ON THE INFANT AND PRE-SCHOOL CHILD OF THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILD HEALTH AND PROTECTION. JOHN E. ANDERSON, chairman. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1936. Pp. xxi+415. \$3.00.

The book is based upon elaborate schedules filled out by 820 interviewers for 3,779 white children and 313 Negro children. The material forms a survey of the community and family life, the physical habits and, to a slighter degree, the emotional and social life of a random selection of children.

RUTH SHONLE CAVAN

Rockford, Illinois

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*Our Children in a Changing World.* By ERWIN WEXBERG with HENRY E. FRITSCH. New York: Macmillan Co., 1937. Pp. xii+232. \$2.00.

The subtitle, *An Outline of Practical Guidance*, adequately describes this book. Based on the Adlerian theory that the motives for action are the twin drives toward ego development and social development, the book nevertheless draws widely upon practical clinical experience and to an unusual degree relates attitudes and conduct to the child's social background. The book is very well written in nontechnical language and is illustrated with numerous case excerpts. It may be recommended for the group for which it is intended—parents and teachers faced with practical problems of child-training.

RUTH SHONLE CAVAN

Rockford, Illinois

*The Family, Past and Present.* By BERNHARD J. STERN. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1938. Pp. 461. \$2.75.

The present publication has been sponsored by the Commission on Human Relations of the Progressive Education Association. The book contains a novel selection of illustrative material, particular emphasis being placed on the transitional phases of family life in contemporary America as well as in its primitive and historical setting. One of the best selections of items is contained in the chapter on the primitive family. Photographic illustrations, reproductions, and graphs enhance the educational value of the publication.

The book will well serve its purpose as an aid in high-school and college courses on the family.

ERNEST MANHEIM

*University of Kansas City*

*The Fate of the Family in the Modern World.* By ARTHUR E. HOLT. Chicago: Willett, Clark Co., 1936. Pp. x+192. \$2.00.

Presented originally as part of the radio extension program of the University of Chicago, the chapters of this book group themselves under four general headings: "Types of Families," "The Menace of Individualism," "Improving the Democratic Family," and "The Church and the Family." Aware of the varying purposes for which marriages may be made and of the changing social backgrounds, Dr. Holt nevertheless retains his faith in the family. He believes in a democratic family with its roots in love and affection; danger lies in too much emphasis upon romance and upon individualism; safety lies in recognizing the family as a social group important enough to merit the sacrifice of some individual interests.

RUTH SHONLE CAVAN

*Rockford, Illinois*

*Cities of Sin.* By HENDRIK DE LEEUW. New York: Modern Age Books, 1933. Pp. 188. \$0.35.

In this volume the author has endeavored to present his personal observations of prostitution and the white-slave trade as it appears in oriental cities. He deals with these topics with reference to the cities of Yokohama, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Macao, Port Said, and Singapore. The study parallels strikingly the investigations which have been made by the League of Nations Committee on Traffic in Women and Children and adds nothing new to what is contained in the League of Nations reports.

HERBERT BLUMER

*University of Chicago*

*Vienna: The Image of a Culture in Decline.* By EDWARD CRANKSHAW. New York: Macmillan Co., 1938. Pp. ix+253. \$3.00.

In this work the author has presented a charming and instructive picture of Vienna. His procedure has been to indicate places and edifices of outstanding interest and to use them as a means of depicting the events in the history of Vienna to which they refer. His account well justifies the subtitle of the book—*The Image of a Culture in Decline*. The book was written prior to the Nazi aggression.

HERBERT BLUMER

*University of Chicago*

# ABSTRACTS OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

During the current year the abstracts of periodical literature will cover the period 1937-38. The persons who have aided in the preparation of the material for this issue are: Hugh D. Duncan, H. Warren Dunham, Bess Owen, and Joseph S. Roucek. The numerals and letters appearing after each abstract correspond to the items in the following scheme of classification:

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|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| I. THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY        | e) The State and Political Process   |
| a) Sociological Theory          | f) The School and Education          |
| b) History of Sociology         | g) Economic Institutions             |
| c) Methods of Research          | h) Voluntary Associations            |
| d) The Teaching of Sociology    | IV. POPULATION AND HUMAN ECOLOGY     |
| II. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY           | a) Demography                        |
| a) Human Nature and Personality | b) Ecology                           |
| b) Collective Behavior          | c) The Rural and the Urban Community |
| III. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION        | V. DISORGANIZATION                   |
| a) The Family                   | a) Personal Disorganization          |
| b) Ethnic and Racial Groups     | b) Social Disorganization            |
| c) Social Stratification        |                                      |
| d) The Church and Religion      |                                      |

156. Prevision sociologique et structures ethniques: Judaïsme et nationalisme [Sociological Prevision and Ethnic Structures: Judaism and Nationalism].—What is called "race" must be studied not in isolation but in contact situations. To discover what is really "Jewish," we must study the Jew, not as he exists apart from other people, but as he lives when he insinuates himself into a world which has been hostile to him for so long a time. If by "race" we mean a group of dispositions, attitudes, etc., which have been transmitted through successive generations, then we may speak of a Jewish race. It is not so much single factors—for these factors are soon found elsewhere—but certain clusters of characters which although found in part elsewhere are found as a whole only among the Jews. Ethnic characteristics such as anti-Semitic writers dwell upon must be related to the specific social situation in which they operate. Such factors as Zionism and anti-Semitism are often reciprocal in their influence upon one another. Sombart has described Jewish characteristics such as intellectualization, speculativeness, urbanization, rationalism, etc. Wirth deals with the various Jewish types within the ghetto. These studies, and others, do agree on certain common traits. The author's own studies have confirmed this. Jews display great dialectical skill, subtle handling of strangers, high esteem for wealth, and a desire to acquire the means for increasing well-being, power, and luxury. As Cohen points out, the Jew remains essentially a nomad in his social orientations. Typical Jewish structures such as the patriarchal type of family, the ghetto, and community organization based on a profound collective sense and a deep religious pride—these and the complex of nomadic characteristics help to explain the endurance and the resurgence of Jewish peoples no matter how severe their persecution or how widespread their dispersion. The rise of Zionism may presage the beginnings of a new type of nation. Political centers, like religious centers, may come to be symbolic of unity for widely scattered peoples. Certainly, the Jews, whatever their differences, do have a highly developed group consciousness. The individual is always conscious of his role as a group member. He is a son, a type within the community, etc. These, and other factors, make

it possible for the Jews to become a nation. But the realization of a Jewish-state seems remote. Certainly, there are grave risks in the attainment of such a state since it would probably increase anti-Semitism. Perhaps the peculiar position of the Jews as a people without a nation will be of profound importance in creating a federation of European states, since the Jew alone is able to think as an international. If such a federation comes into being, Zionism may reach its full development.—G. L. Duprat, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XLI (1933), 229-72. (IIIb.) H. D. D.

157. *Les Sciences sociales dans la philosophie des sciences d'Ampère* [The Social Sciences in Ampère's Philosophy of the Sciences].—In the history of sociology the name of André-Marie Ampère must be linked with that of Auguste Comte and Maïre de Biran. Like Comte, Ampère grappled with the problem of how to relate individual psychology to the study of society. Unlike Comte, Ampère based his theory of science on an introspective psychology. He recognized two divisions of science—the cosmological and the noological. Like Dilthey, he stressed the relative independence of the noological sciences from the sciences of nature and the dependence of the social sciences upon the consciousness of the human subject. Ampère differed sharply from Comte in his acceptance of metaphysics. What for Comte was merely an intermediate stage between theology and positivism was for Ampère a universal and eternal need of the human mind in its quest for knowledge. Metaphysics was science becoming aware of itself. Without developments in epistemology science would be greatly weakened.—Gaston Richard, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XLI (1933), 273-89. (Ib.) H. D. D.

158. *La Prévision sociologique* [Sociological Prevision].—Sociological prevision should be based solely on intellectual perception of the consequences of a method. Intuitive types of prevision based on feelings, insight, etc., must not be confused with sociological prevision. The *specificum sociologicum* is interhuman relational structures and distances. Sociological prevision, as von Wiese has outlined it, when combined with the economic prevision of Marx, can be scientific as long as sociologists are content to deal with measureable, objective relations in place of ethical, political, or religious ideologies. When we attempt to foresee the possible duration of the educational regime in France, we find that certain processes such as integration, differentiation, disassociation, and reconstruction can be studied and their effects predicted. The sociologist, then, can foresee only the future of relations and forms, i.e., measureable distances between individuals and equally measureable distances between human institutions.—Tazerout, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XLI (1933), 377-85. (Ia.) H. D. D.

159. *L'Éthique guildiste du travail* [Guild Work Ethics].—English guilds have offered to assume responsibility for the management of enterprises in which their workers are engaged, with the ultimate goal of assuming greater responsibility in the control of production. Where the guilds or similar groups have assumed control in full or part of productive processes, enough has been achieved to validate the assumption of such responsibility. A great change has taken place in the work motivations and attitudes of guild members working under such conditions. Socialized motivations have replaced profit motivations. Morale has been bettered because workers become willing to recognize their interdependence and their responsibilities to one another in a whole process. Workers take pride in their work. Sabotage—conscious or unconscious—seems to be nonexistent in these groups. Professional, craft motivations replace mass-production types of motivation.—Jeanne Duprat, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XLI (1933), 387-408. (IIIg.) H. D. D.

160. *La Part du sentiment dans les origines de la croyance à l'immortalité* [The Part of Sentiment in the Origins of the Belief in Immortality].—We must distinguish between primary and secondary types of beliefs concerning survival after death. Primitive attitudes toward survival are really the genesis of modern attitudes which are often expressed not so much in theories of reincarnation but in theories about the realization of social ideals. A historical survey of secondary types of survival ideas shows that the pessimism of earlier religions has been replaced by an optimistic belief in survival like that in early Christianity. In modern society personal bereavement takes the form of assurance of the survival of the loved one. The contradictions of the problem of evil may be resolved if we seek its roots in the will-to-live and the will-to-believe.

Thus we see how strong desire may be the father of thought and how modern man, like his savage ancestors, makes use of the same psychic mechanisms to assure himself that there is a place and a value for his personality within the cosmic order.—Howard Becker, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XLI (1933), 487-511. (IIa, IIIc.) H. D. D.

161. *Sociologie et philosophie* [Sociology and Philosophy].—The philosopher concerns himself with methodological reflections on the totality of knowledge. The scientist deals with relation not with substance. A third type of experience which is neither relation nor substance may be posited. It is the realm of action of ideologies, of applied science. Sociologists must deal with this third element, and they must deal with it from a relational, not from a substance, or metaphysical point of view. Thus, when we speak of social distance, we are not speaking of it as a substance but as a relation which should be conceived of in the same manner as motion. And, since social distance is viewed neither as a substance nor as an aspect of applied science or practical activity, it may be that interhuman relation is a third type of reality. This allows us to escape the dilemma of the organismic point of view which tends to destroy the individual. Here the individual is accepted not as autonomous but as an integral part of the group. Further, this relational or interhuman aspect has not been dealt with by other social sciences; hence it gives sociology a unique point of departure from social reality. It also does away with such sterile dualisms as individual-society, individual-group, etc. The individual is given, as well as society, but attention is focussed on the relational aspect of existence.—Tazerout, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XLI (1933), 513-40. (Ia.) H. D. D.

162. *La Democratie et les moeurs* [Democracy and Morality].—The election of superiors by inferiors which is characteristic of democracies has modified the forms of superordination and subordination but not the sentiments of leaders toward followers or followers toward leaders. A democratic leader cannot enforce discipline; he is dependent on the will of a majority and at the same time must bear the hatred of a minority. The spirit of equality creates a society in which no clear understanding of social place is possible. And since there are no authoritative standards, everyone feels able to create his own. Everything which raises an individual above the common level is suspect but no one wants to stay in careers which are not given public prestige. Moral and intellectual élites soon find themselves hated by the masses. In their place the democratic public accepts an élite made up of parvenues, demagogues, etc. The tendency to favor the greatest number leads to corruption since a constant process of vote bribery of one sort or another must go on. Office-holders corrupt the electorate who in turn corrupt their elected leaders. The expert declines in status. "Common sense" is glorified. Judgments are passed without necessary knowledge. Ambivalent social attitudes develop. People are urged to rise above their class, yet are scorned for having "betrayed" their class interest. A soft, humanitarian attitude toward criminals develops. Law becomes what the largest number or the party in power wants, not what a legal élite deems best. For such conditions government by élites is the sole remedy.—André Joussain, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XLI (1933), 601-22. (IIIc.) H. D. D.

163. *Matériaux pour une sociologie du rêve* (Material for a Sociology of Dreams).—Unless the student of dreams knows who dreamt what and where, his analysis will suffer. A sociologist will insist, therefore, that such personal factors as profession or occupation, cultural level, social milieu, etc., must be included in dream records. Once a sufficient number of dreams have been recorded in such a fashion from different cultural milieus, it should be possible to create a typography of dreams far more complex than that of the psychoanalyst. In primitive societies the dream is a favorite mechanism for exploiting nontraditional desires, meeting new situations, making adjustments to social crises, etc. In our society where social pressure is so great, the dream often depicts mechanisms of escape. The type of dream varies according to social density. Thus Freud's analysis may not hold good in a culture where social density is not evident. Also, the tenor of a dream seems to depend on the degree of integration to a given society which the individual manifests. In the studies of Foucault and Combes it has been shown that good students dream about class experiences; poor students, very rarely.—Roger Bastide, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XLI (1933), 623-27. (IIa.) H. D. D.

164. *Les Troubles de la personnalité sociale* [The Disorders of the Social Personality].—Social disorders are related to alterations in the development of the social personality, which include difficulties not only in the development of the self but also in the construction of the *socius*. These two personalities appear to be closely intertwined, and such an interpretation might show their role in social disorders. Objectivization consists in attributing an act more or less completely to the personality of the *socius*. The difficulty in the personality is rather a difficulty in the personality of the *socius*. Personal statements often show this difficulty in distinguishing between objective and subjective. James, Royce, and Baldwin have contributed to the notion of the development of the social personality. Sociological studies and psychiatry, through the work of Blondel, have adopted this conception in varying degrees. Social conduct has always a double character and is a mixture of the conduct of the subject and the conduct attributed by him to the *socius*. The psychological description admits a series of stages in the evolution of the personality, and each stage presents a special aspect of personal behavior in the subject and in the *socius*. In an important psychological operation called socialization, a part of the acts of the preceding stage are transformed to another level and take a social character. Progress in the evolution of the personality takes place when persons are better distinguished and are designated by their proper names. Nevertheless, at first appearance of these distinctions confusion is marked, and the same act is attributed in language and belief to the subject who speaks and the *socius*. This primitive confusion has left its trace in a great number of feelings and conduct forms. Observations on psychotics, primitives, and infants confirm our analysis and show at the first appearance of thought this same confusion of subject and *socius*. As the child develops, this confusion gradually is broken down. The division between the subject and the *socius* cannot be affected completely until the total act exists in the mind of the subject and the parts of the act take on a particular character in which a part is relegated to the subject and a part to the *socius*. Ideas, feelings, and intentions considered interior to the subject are transferred to the object considered as exterior. This process might be called social objectivization. Social acts are divided into three groups: imaginary and unreal actions, actions of the subject, and actions of the *socius*. Both subject and *socius* take at the time the form of the person. The *socius* cannot become a particular person without the subject becoming a corresponding and complementary person. Social actions imply always a collaboration and take place between several men. If one has the capacity to command, another must perform acts of obedience. This notion of personality capacity gives rise to another element, the social hierarchy. The master and subject complete themselves by the unequal importance attributed to such and such conduct in the whole of the social act.—Pierre Janet, *Annales médico-psychologiques*, XCV (1937), 149-200, 421-68. H. W. D.

165. *Public Assistance*.—The problem of public assistance in relation to able-bodied unemployment is still unsolved. It was not really until 1929 that public assistance authorities really felt the pressure of large-scale unemployment. As a result of the 1909 *Report* two schemes were set in operation—a national labor exchange (1909) and a limited and experimental scheme of unemployment insurance (1911). By various stages the distinction between insurance and relief was established. Three agencies now (September, 1933) share the problem of providing for able-bodied unemployed: (1) The insurance system for those (about 1,000,000 in September, 1933) who have contributed and have not yet been unemployed long enough to be excluded from benefit. (2) Those who have never been within the insurance system—agricultural workers and those who have been in business for themselves—or who, having been within it, have lost their eligibility. These, perhaps 170,000-200,000 in number, are dealt with wholly by the local public assistance service. In between are those who have been within the insurance scheme and have some chance of being employed again (about 1,000,000), who come within the scope of the scheme of transitional payments. These receive their benefit wholly at the cost of the national exchequer. Insurance is the best solution thus far for normal short-term unemployment, for noncontributory relief national funds must be used. Unemployables are entitled to maintenance on a standard which provides the elementary conditions of physical preservation or restoration. This

class may be defined easily, but able-bodied unemployed are more difficult to define. Any provision for unemployed will increase their number.

Public acceptance of relief for the able-bodied unemployed is by no means unanimous. In the part, dire need has been the accepted criterion for giving relief. At the other extreme are those who hold that it is not need satisfaction alone but the maintenance of a standard of living which must be aided.

What must be sought is a service specially adapted to the situation of fit and willing unemployed workers, but yet conceived in terms of the relief of need. Administrative discretion can be exercised only by a body which is not subject to parliamentary interrogation and which has a measure of independence. The appropriate bodies are the local authorities. There is no way by which this matter can be taken out of politics. There is much to be said for a system which makes relief a concern of both local and national government rather than exclusively of either. Mere economy is a shortsighted attitude.—H. J. W. Hetherington, *Sociological Review* (British), XXVI (January, 1934), 1-21. (IIIc.) H. D. D.

166. **Recent Theories of Exogamy.**—The theories of Briffault, Seligman, Malinowski, Freud, and Lord Raglan are reviewed. Briffault's theories are rejected on the basis that his theory of a primitive stage of matriarchy is untenable. Seligman's theory that sexual relations are antagonistic to authority is, Westermarck says, controverted by Ellis' statement that it is usual for the female willingly to subjugate herself to the male in her love dreams. Malinowski's adoption of the Freudian thesis that "there are no experiences in later life which would not stir up analogous memories from infancy" misinterprets Freud, who bases his explanation not on memory but on "the repressed infantile incest desire that becomes active at puberty." But this, Westermarck says, is "no reason to suppose that the temptation to incest with the mother is greater than with any other woman of her age."

The ultimate cause of all incest prohibitions is the feeling of aversion to sexual intercourse between persons who have been living closely together from the childhood of one or both. To say, as Seligman does, that because incest does take place between house-mates, there is, therefore, no validity to the propinquity aversion is overlooking the fact that there are exceptions to every rule. No explanation covers all cases.—Edward Westermarck, *Sociological Review*, XXVI (January, 1934), 22-40. (IIIa, IIa.) H. D. D.

167. **Prevision in Religion.**—Early nineteenth-century sociology attempted to forecast the actual form and content of the religion of the future. In doing so, sociology transgressed its proper limits and aspired to create a system of ethics and a nontheological substitute for religion. The sociologist cannot study any religion until he realizes that "religion is an autonomous activity which has its own independent principles and laws." Religion is not simply a function of society nor can we identify social and religious categories, as Durkheim attempted to do. Religion is a factor in the social process. The other aspect of religion—the "trans-social one"—has to be taken into account, and here the sociologist is dependent on data furnished by theology.

By applying such a sociological formula as the Geddes-LePlay formula of "place, work, and folk," we find that the sociological form of a religion is determined by the way in which it supplies a religious sanction or consecration to place, to work, and to the social bond itself. But where religion transcends these categories (as it does in the experience of the mystic), the role of sociological prevision is almost negligible.

Cultural unity is always closely associated with religious unity. A society that loses its religion loses inner cohesion. When the process of secularization is completed, social dissolution is consummated and the culture comes to an end. Our culture faces two alternatives: (a) decay and the reassertion of dormant traditional religious cultures of Asia and (b) the coming of a new religion or the revival of an old. A successful religion is one that appeals not to the philosopher, sociologist, or politician but to the religious man.—Christopher Dawson, *Sociological Review*, XXVI (January, 1934), 41-54. (IIIId.) H. D. D.

168. **Social Class—a Preliminary Analysis.**—Empirically there are three marks of class in British society: (1) hierarchical social stratification, (2) social recognition, and

(3) some permanence in the grouping. Social recognition implies admission to certain social relationships. A social class, then, is a group of persons with similar social chances. Experience, environment, and education along with "external" assets, skill, and knowledge (to a lesser degree, however) determine social recognition. Social class is concerned not merely with economic ends but with all ends of a person's activity. It is bi-sexual. Its true unit is the family.

In the last analysis social class is based on similarity of attitudes rather than on identity of interests. It is derivative from the whole social personality of the individual, and hence the individual has not been split up into the associative elements analyzed by Simmel. Each member of a class mirrors the total image of his class. The institutional rather than the "associational" nature of class should be stressed.

Marx's classes are marked by the importance of external contacts which are the sole cause of their existence. This analysis is marked by the "relative absence of such contacts and the relative self-sufficiency of the group for its own purposes." The border line between Marx's classes is defined in terms of functional interaction. This analysis defines the border line between classes by an attitude of comparison which recognizes qualitative differences.—T. H. Marshall, *Sociological Review*, XXVI (January, 1934), 55-76. (IIIc.) H. D. D.

169. **The Future of Judicial Institutions.**—In England legal reform will come solely from the legal profession itself, since the lay public shows little concern for this problem. The following changes seem probable: (1) The establishment of a judicial profession will be slow because of the serious threat this would be to the prestige of the higher judges and the profound indifference of the English people toward equalitarian conceptions. (2) The role of the lay "justice of the peace" will decline. (3) The civil jury will decline since the enlightened opinion of the bar is hostile to it. (4) England will probably adopt public prosecutions as in Scotland and America. (5) It may be that a public defender, responsible for the defense of the poor, will be appointed. (6) There will be a further socialization of the bar. (7) There will be a recognition of the importance of administrative justice.—Sir Maurice Amos, *Sociological Review*, XXVI (January, 1934), 77-83. (IIIc.) H. D. D.

170. **The Psychological Background of Dictatorship.**—Neither Freud's hypothesis of the father image nor the instinct theory can explain the change from democracy to dictatorship. External changes, not inner nature of man, must be considered. The points to be considered in the study of dictatorship are (1) likeness of attitude toward dictator to that of deification; (2) the desire for power and for submission are satisfied by dictators; (3) the social situation in which dictator arises is one in which self-assertiveness is inhibited and the feeling of helplessness is paramount; (4) parent-child emotional relation is established; (5) self-identification with glory of the dictator; (6) satisfaction (vicariously) of power impulse; (7) gratification of masochistic and sadistic tendencies; (8) hero-worship becomes a crowd emotion.—Diana Spearman, *Sociological Review*, XXVI (April, 1934), 158-74. (IIIc.) H. D. D.

171. **Physical Anthropology and Ignorance in Great Britain.**—In contrast to Sweden, where much knowledge of the national racial constitution has been gathered, Britain is woefully behind. Anthropological surveys, of the order of Paul Broca's in France, are just as necessary as social surveys.—G. M. Morant, *Sociological Review*, XXVI (April, 1934), 175-82. (IIIb.) H. D. D.

172. **The Psychological Analysis of War.**—There is no need for a special psychology—"the psychology of war." Unless war brings into play unique mental mechanisms or behavior processes, it must be dealt with in much the same manner as any other series of data susceptible to psychological analysis. This article analyzes the instinctionist or hormic approach to war, outlines the social-psychological interpretation of the same problem, and attempts to estimate which of these two approaches is the more fruitful and the degree to which they supplement each other.

War, though discontinuous, is an institution. Social attitudes toward war are shaped by members of these war groups. To investigate how this occurs, we need more knowledge of the psychology of political and economic élite groups. Peace, like war,



must become an institution with its loyalties and ideals.—H. Goldhamer, *Sociological Review*, XXVI (July, 1934), 249-67. (IIIe.) H. D. D.

173. **The Political Consequences of Economic Planning.**—For the masses planning means enriched production and hence greater consumption, while for other classes it means curtailed production and hence greater security for those in control of such production. But national planning always means public control, and this public control implies equality of treatment. Even fascist dictatorships need the support of the masses, and they must claim, and prove, that they are devoted to the needs of the people, upon a socially democratic basis. Planning need not mean the dawn of a bureaucracy, but it must mean the twilight of parliamentarism. Laissez faire could be combined with freedom of international intercourse, but twentieth-century *étatisme* cannot allow such freedom. Either it will block international intercourse or it will itself organize it. Yet how can any one nation's plan succeed unless it heeds the plans of other nations? Self-sufficiency must lead to aggression (except in America and Russia). Under planning, then, economic decisions tend to become political decisions. There is a tendency to assume that the restraints and control which we now think needful for economic life will serve equally well the needs of political life.—David Mitramy, *Sociological Review*, XXVI (October, 1934), 321-45. (IIIg.) H. D. D.

174. **Property and Courts of Justice.**—The English concept of property has grown in common law rather than by legislative enactment. Property includes the whole of the material sources of the community and thus "any industrial worker who endeavours to create material wealth by the exercise of his energies, must, directly or indirectly, make terms with the proprietor of some interest in land."—Edward Jenks, *Sociological Review*, XXVII (January, 1935), 56-74. (IIIe.) B. O.

175. **The Individual and Society.**—From the psychoanalytic point of view most social institutions come into being as arrangements for giving expression to primary impulses by canalizing them, and also restrain and check the free expression of these primary impulses.—Ernest Jones, *Sociological Review*, XXVII (July, 1935), 245-63. (IIa.) B. O.

176. **Democracy and Capitalism in Max Weber's Theory.**—Max Weber made the last great attempt of German thinkers to replace the authoritarian state by Western democracy. Finding no proof for the possibility of democracy in the nature of men, he attempted to discover other foundations on which it could be built in a relatively late stage of capitalism such as Germany represented. He found instead no hope of democratic reform because of such reasons as the lack of a spirit of opposition in the middle classes to the upper class and antagonism between the middle and the working class. The government acted to guard the middle class from the proletariat and thus stripped the middle class of its power. Out of this arose a strong bureaucracy which could be counterbalanced by a parliament save that parties themselves become bureaucratic. The rise of the leader contrasts to this. Weber sees the probable development as a democracy of leaders where such "democracy" is differentiated from dictatorship by the ability of the voter to replace one leader by another. Mass democracy develops inevitably in this direction.

The crucial issue for a possibility of democracy in Germany lay in finding a common basis of interest between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This Weber thought could be found in foreign policy. World-power for the nation is fundamentally common to both classes. Liberal principles are not applicable to international policy.—Werner Falk, *Sociological Review*, XXVII (October, 1935), 373-93. (IIIe.) B. O.

177. **Bias in Social Study.**—Bias in social study is not a different problem from bias in all science. At present there is a spirit of defeatism before the problem of bias. If all thought is biased, none is valid. But, although all thought is to some extent biased, there is great difference in degree. Bias is used in several senses: ignorance of part of the evidence, undue weight to a part of the evidence which is most vivid to the thinker, and emotional preference for a particular view. These are different and should be precisely distinguished. Using the term in the third sense, to avoid bias we do not

attempt to give up all feeling but to make feelings as conscious as possible and prevent them from influencing opinion unless recognized and admitted. Developing attitudes of neutrality and suspicion of any single, simple principle of explanation will diminish the degree of bias. Judgments of fact always take place within frames of general assumptions which imply judgments of value, and those who claim to be purely scientific by avoiding value judgments are deceiving themselves. Likewise, judgments of value are never merely statements of personal feeling but involve statements of fact which can be proved right or wrong. "The choice is not between allowing judgments of value to intrude or keeping them out, but between recognizing the judgments of value we are making or assuming them without realizing it."—G. C. Field, *Sociological Review*, XXVII (October, 1935), 394-407. (Ia.) B. O.

178. **The Possibilities of a Sociology of Art.**—The task of a sociologist of art is "to attempt to discover the principles or laws which underlie the relations of types and variations in the arts with other social manifestations." The field is divided into (1) the artist, (2) the art-object, and (3) the observer. There is much material available on all three of these aspects from the art-historian and the biographer.—A. C. Sewter, *Sociological Review*, XXVII (October, 1935), 441-53. (Iib.) B. O.

179. **Lombroso and His Place in Modern Criminology.**—The theories of Lombroso have had much influence on modern criminology. He was chiefly instrumental in introducing consideration of the personality of the criminal. European criminology with its emphasis on criminal type and stress on the internal factors of crime represents a gradual process of partial abandonment of Lombroso's viewpoint. Herman Mannheim, *Sociological Review*, XXVIII (January, 1936), 31-49. (Vb.) B. O.

180. **The Recruitment of the Nation's Leaders.**—The nineteenth century built up two systems of education on class lines not because the state was more undemocratic but because the family is the one social force which has always stood for inequality. Educational history is inclined to view these two systems as supplementing each other, but there are many gaps and weaknesses so that the poorer class is unequally represented at the universities.—E. L. Clarke, *Sociological Review*, XXVIII (July, 1936), 246-66. (IIIc.) B. O.

181. **Social Surveys and Sociology.**—There are several kinds or "schools" of social survey, represented by the methods of LePlay, DeTourville, Ratzel and Semple, Durkheim, M. Mauss, Park, Thomas, Shaw, King, Petty, Eden, Booth, Rowntree, H. H. Mann, Bowley, and others. The social survey is essentially concerned with the relations between changes in the substratum of society and those in social attitudes and institutions. The danger of a social survey is that it isolates the institutions studied; its function should be to show their co-operation.—A. F. Wells, *Sociological Review*, XXVIII (July, 1936), 274-94. (Ic.) B. O.

182. **National Socialism and the Family, Part II.—Husband and wife.**—National Socialism encompasses two contradictory viewpoints toward the position of women. On the one hand, there is instituted a patriarchal-authoritarian program and, on the other, there is training of efficient women soldiers. *Parents and children.*—Although affirming the right of parents to bring up their children, National Socialism in fact rears children in semimilitary youth organizations on authoritarian principles. This does not provide adequate education for a modern army where self-consciousness and initiative are necessary.—Alfred Meusel, *Sociological Review*, XXVIII (October, 1936), 389-411. (IIIa.) B. O.

183. **Authority and the Family.**—This article explains the nature and purpose of the *Studien über Autorität und Familie* ("Forschungsberichte aus dem Institut für Sozialforschung" [Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1936]). The book reports the uncompleted researches of the Institut für Sozialforschung. In the introductory essays Max Horkheimer writes on the problem in general, Erich Fromm presents an alliance between Freudian psychology and Marxian sociology, and Herbert Marcuse writes on the philosophy of authority. Interim reports on researches follow, and there are a

collection of sixteen special studies on a variety of subjects and surveys of recent literature.—T. H. Marshall, *Sociological Review*, XXIX (January, 1937), 1-19. (IIIa.) B. O.

184. **State and Revolution in the Paris Commune, the Russian Revolution, and the Spanish Civil War.**—"Recent revolutions have clearly shown that there are ruling classes which do not derive their domination from economic privileges; on the contrary, they draw their economic privileges (though not necessarily of great extent) from the extra-economic position of domination which they occupy." Revolution develops according to laws from mass revolt to terroristic bureaucratic dictatorship.—F. Borkenau, *Sociological Review*, XXIX (January, 1937), 41-75. (IIIe.) B. O.

185. **Variability of the Sex-Ratio of Criminality.**—Reports the sex-ratio of criminality for the central and eastern voivodships of Poland for the years 1924-28. The general sex-ratio is 19.7 females per 100 males. Other breakdowns are reported by age groups, age and civil status groups, voivodships, rural-urban habitation, and religion. The sex factor is regarded as largely a function of other "concealed" factors.—L. Radzinowicz, *Sociological Review*, XXIX (January, 1937), 76-102. (Vb.) B. O.

186. **Nature and Nurture in Mental Development.**—"The [school] achievements of orphans are worse than of the children living with parents. The achievements of children depend to a considerable degree on the environment. Nature plays an essential part in the development of talents.

"According to the sex of children there are differences in the reaction to a deteriorated milieu."—Sigismund Peller, *Sociological Review*, XXIX (January, 1937), 103-8. (III f.) B. O.

187. **Maitland as a Sociologist.**—In his analysis of trusts in the Middle Ages, Maitland showed that the interest of the feudal landowner originally precipitated the law of trust but that ultimately the law came to serve vastly different and greater social interest, e.g., church and trades unions, and, because a law may serve interests almost the opposite of those of its origin, a law cannot be explained on the principle of class interest.—Ernest Barker, *Sociological Review*, XXIX (April, 1937), 121-35. (Ib.) B. O.

188. **The Social, Spiritual, and Cultural Elements of the Interhuman Life.**—The social has been variously thought to be equivalent to the vital, the historical, the psychical, the spiritual, and the cultural, and sociology to be equivalent to political theory or ethics. The social must be differentiated from these other categories. Interpersonal relations from approach to avoidance constitute the data of sociology. These are occurrences between men in social space and not inward events of souls. On the other hand, the study of culture is that of man-things relationships. This is likewise important but not properly sociology.—L. von Wiese, XXIX (April, 1937), 136-53. (Ia.) B. O.

189. **Social Differentiation and Assimilation.**—Neither assimilation nor differentiation is the only force at work in the human world. The number of universalized values which make up a human civilization are increasing while at the same time our respect for and enjoyment of the individual qualities which distinguish one personality from another is intensified. Race mixtures in all nations do not prevent national cultures which in turn restrain class differences. Interpenetrations of cultures are always at work.—C. Bouglé, *Sociological Review*, XXIX (April, 1937), 154-74. (Ia.) B. O.

190. **Economic Consequences and Problems.**—Economic consequences and problems of the altered trend of populations in the Western world include diminution of the opportunity for sound international investment. "The problems of redundant capacity and of a surplus of labour in particular industries are likely to be more frequent than they were in the nineteenth century, and the tendency to replace laissez faire by deliberate organization must be expected to develop increasing strength."—H. D. Henderson, *Sociological Review*, XXIX (July, 1937), 258-71. (IIIg.) B. O.

191. **Social Science and Social Philosophy in the Universities.**—Social-sciences courses in universities are almost completely divorced from those in social philosophy. "The students of philosophy have seldom any detailed knowledge of social facts or even of the actual working of moral codes; while the students of social science are given no training in ethical analysis. It is clear that under these circumstances the synthesis of social studies which is so urgently needed is not likely to be attained, and that great changes will have to be made in the teaching of both social science and social philosophy if the universities are to make the contribution they ought to make toward the rational ordering of society."—Morris Ginsberg, *Sociological Review*, XXIX (October, 1937), 321-30. (*Id.*) B. O.

192. **General Conceptions in the Study of the Press and Public Opinion.**—Propaganda may with some accuracy be distinguished from other social influences particularly education as it is ideally conceived on the basis of the quality of the act of agreement. Under the term "public opinion" there should be distinguished such other expressions as permissible opinion, ruling opinion, and collective judgments of social groups. The essential process in the formation of ruling opinion is the occurrence of a series of overlapping and interlocking intuitive judgments made by people in key positions, as to what the population would do in given eventualities. In using newspaper material for assessing public opinion subjective interpretation is inevitably demanded.—D. W. Harding, *Sociological Review*, XXIX (October, 1937), 370-90. (*Ib.*) B. O.

193. **The Social Structure of an English Country Town.**—The town of Hertford, twenty miles from London, is described with respect to institutional organization, age groupings, neighborhood, social class, occupation, etc. It was found that "(1) a generation ago Hertford might legitimately be studied as a social entity; this is hardly possible today. (2) The decline of the personal, face-to-face groups such as the kindred, neighborhood, and age groups. (3) The shifting of the plane of community from direct and personal to the indirect and impersonal, from the local to the national. (4) The major factor in these changes is increasing mobility. (5) The result is greater opportunity for individualization" with its consequent problems.—E. R. Roper Power, *Sociological Review*, XXIX (October, 1937), 391-413. (*IVc.*) B. O.

194. **Soziologische Studien zur Verstädterung der Prager Umgebung** [Sociological Studies concerning the Urbanization of the Environs of Prague]. Edited by Zdeněk Ullrich. Prague: Im Verlage der *Revue Soziologie und soziale Probleme*, 1938. Pp. vii+335. Kč. 95.—A group of Czech sociologists, gathered around Král's Sociological Institute in the Charles University of Prague, presents here a summary of its researches into the ecology of ten communities on the northeastern margin of Prague, inquiring into the social changes promoted by the influence of the capital. A geographical and historical introduction (by R. Turčín, E. Dellin, and E. Hauner) is followed by studies of the morphological evolution of the communities and of their inhabitants (Z. Ullrich). These settlements are good examples of the sociological law of "urbanization and sucking in" shown in the sudden growth of large peasant holdings, while the smaller holdings had already changed into workers' houses. The newly formed suburbs are joined unorganically to the original settlement formerly interested only in agriculture. The process of urbanization, characterized by sudden influxes of population, reflects itself also in the structure of the population: a small majority of women tends to be supplanted by a male majority, and age groups between twenty-five and thirty-five, as well as younger marriage couples, strongly predominate. While the center of the capital is dominated by younger and unmarried individuals, the peripheries are controlled by the couples at the beginning of their married life. With the invasion of the people of the capital comes also the growing intensity of the daily commutation cycle. The next two studies are devoted to occupations (Z. Ullrich) and agriculture (E. Dellin). Industrial employment is the first bearer of urbanization and has the most far-reaching geographical influence, while merchants, public servants, and transportation workers tend to settle nearer the capital. Agriculture changes its structure in terms of the concentration of the agrarian holdings; smaller properties cease to be profitable and the larger ones survive the longest. The latter begin to specialize, rationalize, and replace the traditional forms of produc-

tion by "capitalist methods." This process forces them to hire the workers from the more distant regions. Urbanization is speeding up the dissolution of traditional morals and of religion (O. Machotka and Z. Ullrich). In politics (Jan Mertl) the communities away from the capital tend to be interested in local issues and to be influenced by personal political agitation, while the settlements nearer the city prefer impersonal and ideological issues. It appears that the city types of entertainments are becoming more conservative and more personalized in the suburbs.

The editor deals, in his conclusion, with the four phases of the urbanization process: (1) the phase of influence, (2) the phase of the coming urbanization, (3) the phase of invasion, and (4) the phase of integration. For him, the communities studied are only transitory types, alienated in their social relations, characterized by culture lag.

This research financed by a grant of the Rockefeller Foundation indicates that the Czech sociology has "come of age."—(IVc.) J. S. R.

195. *Zájmy velkoměstských dětí* [The Interests of the Children of Large Cities].—A study of the interests of 246 children from the ages of eleven to sixteen, pupils of the upper elementary schools of Prague, shows that they are more interested in movies and sports than those of smaller cities.—Jan Souček *Sociologie a sociální problémy*, VI (1938), 31-38. (IIb.) J. S. R.

196. *Monismus—náboženství vzdělanců* [Monism as Religion of the Intelligentsia].—Monism of pre-war Germany, a typical movement of the intellectual middle class, endeavored to enlighten the people and to divulge truth. This implied the assumption that knowledge of the truth increases the people's welfare and that the people are capable of making good use of the truth. The proponents of monism were scientists forming an intellectual élite, fighting against theologians and metaphysicians supporting the old order. The philosophy of monism was founded upon a synthesis of the doctrine of the ideological evolutionism of Comte with the biological evolutionism of Lamarck, Darwin, and Haeckel. History was viewed as a process of world-redemption by science and scientific organization.—Otto F. Goltz *Sociologie a sociální problémy*, VI (1938), 39-45. (IIIc.) J. S. R.

197. *Masaryk sociolog* [Masaryk as Sociologist].—Masaryk belongs to the generation of outstanding sociologists of the last two decades of the nineteenth century (L. F. Ward, Giddings, Small, Fouillée, Tarde, Durkheim, De Greef, Tönnies, L. Stein, Simmel, Karejev, De Roberty, Gumplowicz), who emphasized that sociology could become an independent science. Masaryk's theory was based on that of Comte. During the twentieth century Masaryk was interested in practical sociology. Humanity and democracy remained the main problems of his thinking. In social dynamics he was greatly interested in the questions of the evolution of society and of progress and accepted a formula of evolution from myth toward science and from theocracy to democracy.—Josef Král, *Sociologie a sociální problémy*, VI (1938), 1-18. (Ib.) J. S. R.

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## FREUD'S INFLUENCE ON THE CHANGED ATTITUDE TOWARD SEX

HAVELOCK ELLIS

### ABSTRACT

The strength of reactions, pro and con, to Freud's theories may be attributed in large part to the traditional sanctity and yet obscenity of the subject of sex and Freud's extravagant presentation of the subject. Freud's art is the poetry of psychic processes which lie in the deepest and most mysterious recesses of the organism. To emphasize the artist in Freud is not to diminish his significance for science. Despite the validity of radical criticisms of most of his results, Freud is to be recognized as one of the greatest masters in thought. By making no allowance for the "sacredness" of sex and by supplying emphasis to the recognition and acceptance of its place in life, Freud made a specific contribution to the changed attitude of our time toward sex.

No pioneer in science or art has aroused such fiercely opposed reactions, enthusiastic and hostile, as Sigmund Freud. The first reaction to every pioneer is indeed opposition. One such, Lombroso—like Freud a Jew—considered this an instinctive and invariable impulse and named it "misoneism," the hatred of novelty.

Whatever we may think of this view, there were special reasons why in the case of Freud a double reaction of enthusiastic acceptance and indignant rejection should be emphatically marked and long persistent.

In the first place, there is no subject, save only religion, which has been so long and so firmly intrenched by tradition and so passionately guarded as sex. In the field of religion opposition has grown milder during the past century, except in so far as we may regard the

modern racialism as a religious myth. But the traditional attitude toward sex had remained almost untouched and, indeed, in some respects even stronger both as regards its sanctity and as regards its obscenity. For this attitude became concerned quite as much with expression as with action, a matter of speech fully as much as of morality. Freud cannot be said even to have attacked conventional sexual morality. He pointed out some of the evils which it involves, but he can scarcely be said ever to have advocated definitely any revolutionary moral change. In that respect he preserved the correct attitude of the conventional physician. But in the matter of expression and speech his attitude was completely revolutionary. In this way he shocked alike those who viewed sex as very sacred and those who viewed it as very indecent. In a simple, precise, and detailed manner he described the sex phenomena presented by his patients, without attenuation or apology, but as a matter of course. This had never been done before in medical literature. Even in the outspoken days of the seventeenth century anatomists would ask to be excused if they referred to the sexual organs. Freud never seemed to be aware that even the professional public he was addressing still expected some sort of similar apology from those who thus ventured to offend its modesty. More even than this, Freud attached a new and fateful significance to sex in fields where such significance seemed to most of the professional public an alarming novelty. This was notably the case in his insistence on infantile sexuality and his introduction, first clearly made in 1905, of such terms as "incest" and the "Oedipus complex" which have no meaning for children who are simply likely to manifest affection to those persons who happen to be nearest.

Various medical authorities before Freud had recognized the importance of sex as well as its aptitude to appear in childhood. But they had been careful to make their statements with moderation and to express them temperately, so that they might be accepted without arousing either enthusiasm or hostility. Freud's outspoken and even extravagant presentation of the subject, fortified by a literary skill which has not always been recognized, was, on the one hand, warmly welcomed by those who had never dared to reveal a secret sense of the importance of sexual phenomena, and, on the

other hand, indignantly rejected by those who cherished all the ancient traditions of the mingled sacredness and obscenity of sex.

The frank appeal of Freud's doctrines carried away several men of ability who became his close disciples but later drew back, unable in the end to accept his more extreme views. Freud himself, whose mind has ever been receptive, flexible, and versatile, was constantly modifying even what seemed his most essential principles. It is a characteristic of his genius, but it is largely responsible for the contradictory impressions which that genius has made upon psychologists and sometimes even upon the same psychologist. If, for instance, we take as distinguished and influential a psychologist as the late Professor McDougall we find even him extravagant alike in praise and dispraise of Freud. ✓

My own rather difficult position in regard to Freud may be said to exhibit something of the same kind of opposition. I have from the first recognized his importance, with a resulting friendly personal relationship by correspondence, while at the same time I have been constantly critical of special doctrines and special tendencies. By a curious coincidence his first book (in conjunction with Breuer) appeared in the year 1895 when the first published volume of my *Studies* was already in the press, and both—by another curious coincidence—were in German and both were published at Leipzig. I was slightly younger than Freud, but he was newer to the study of sex, having only recently been brought to it by his association with Breuer, while I had been preparing myself through many years, even from youth. It was natural, therefore, that I should have obtained the Freud and Breuer volume on publication and found it of great interest. I was preparing my study of auto-erotism for what was later to be the first volume of my *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*. (My study of *Sexual Inversion*, which was the first volume of the *Studies* to be published, appeared in German in the same year as the Breuer and Freud volume.) I was impressed by Breuer's and Freud's method of presentation even apart from its ingenious skill in detecting sexual origins at the source of hysteria, which I was not inclined altogether to reject. Hysteria had been originally associated with the womb, and in more recent days some eminent psychiatrists, like Clouston, had emphasized the part played by the sexual impulse in

setting up hysterical states. I had myself in *Man and Woman*, published a few years earlier, ventured to express the opinion that the part played by the sexual emotions in the causation of hysteria had been underestimated. But there had in general been a reaction against that view, perhaps notably due to the influence—indirect rather than direct—of Charcot, but largely furthered and supported by the puritanic discredit into which sexual phenomena had fallen in the nineteenth century, so that there was a tendency to avoid ascribing a disordered nervous condition to a source of this kind. I had myself, of course, no sympathy whatever with this attitude, so that I took pleasure in meeting what might even be an extreme insistence on the importance of the sexual impulse. In dealing with the study of auto-erotism, which I had then in hand, I devoted half-a-dozen pages to an exposition of the doctrine of Breuer and Freud, the volume being published in 1899 in London and shortly afterward in Philadelphia. It has always been a satisfaction to me that this was the first book in the English language in which Freud's name was introduced and his work (i.e., in its immature first stage) expounded. It was evidently also a satisfaction to Freud himself to receive this early recognition. He entered into correspondence with me and sent me his books as they appeared; the friendly relations thus set up continued unbroken, although my attitude was always somewhat critical and Freud never regarded me as a disciple. But he gained suggestions from my work, as well as one or two new terms, notably "auto-erotism," although he used it somewhat differently.

It is a proof—though it may seem an ambiguous proof—of Freud's profound and fruitful genius that some of the most brilliant and gifted of his early disciples have branched off along various lines of their own, usually with considerable vexation to the master himself. We have to remember, however, that, as Dr. Hans von Hattingberg has remarked in his *Technique of Psycho-analysis*: "At the first approach psycho-analysis is an almost impenetrable chaos."<sup>1</sup> It was inevitable that the more penetrating minds among those who sought to find their way in this chaos should fix on special lines of advance to which they happened to be individually drawn. So it was that

<sup>1</sup> London: C. W. Daniel Co. (1932).

Adler and Jung and Stekel found their own paths, sufficiently definite and individual to separate them from Freud, yet each clearly revealing the Freudian starting-point. They may not always be entitled to term their methods "psycho-analysis" but these methods are all essential outcomes of the Freudian movement. Significant is the attitude of Otto Rank, who was for long years closely associated with Freud and the development of his most typical doctrines, being indeed his most scholarly associate. Rank, however, finally left him to become an acute critic of Freudianism, yet still upholding an attitude that is definitely Freudian. At an early stage Freud himself declared that his doctrine (he later found that there had been a suggestion of it by Schopenhauer) of sexual suppression with transference and resistance was "the foundation stone on which the edifice of psycho-analysis rests," and that every investigation which starts from these points, whatever results it leads to, is psycho-analysis. It is more usual now to confine the term to strictly Freudian methods and to refer to others simply as "analysis." The doctrine of infantile sexuality came later; that, too, already existed, not indeed as a doctrine but simply as an occasional fact; but Freud sought to generalize it. The emphasis on dream interpretation developed gradually (very considerably by Freud's self-analysis), with its two aspects of the symbolism of dream imagery and the reduction of dream representation to inner conflict, together with the distinction between the manifest and the latent. Freud's book on the interpretation of dreams is the most elaborate of his works and that to which he attaches most importance.

But to return for a moment to his first book, the studies of hysteria written with Breuer, we already see the typical Freud. It contains the germs of many of his later doctrines and that flexibility of mind that made possible those developments. We may perhaps also detect that looseness in definition which has always marked Freud and while in one respect a weakness, especially by leading to misapprehensions, also a valuable quality because it lends itself to new developments and enlargements; in this way, for instance, the fundamental term "libido" has so enlarged in Freud's hands as completely to change its meaning and to be perhaps better expressed by the term "conation." We may at the same time find here that charm

of personal style to which I should attach importance as a factor in securing Freud's immense influence. Immature as this first book may be, it always seems to me—as I myself chanced to find it—one of the best portals to the elaborate Freudian edifice of later data.

At one vital point indeed Freud soon outgrew it. That was the hypnotic method which with Breuer he was inclined to rely on at this first period. But he quickly rejected hypnotism as an unsatisfactory method. Indeed, even in this first book he was moving with Breuer toward his own later method which was the opposite of hypnotism, being a method not of putting in but of drawing out, a method of bringing to the surface a repressed and corroding element. Breuer termed this method "cathartic," but Freud a little later preferred to term it "analytic," probably because he could not accept Breuer's conception of "a foreign body in consciousness." Freud's method is indeed, as in hypnotism, not that of putting something in but that of taking something out—as Freud has himself expressed it, after a manner analogous to the sculptor's art.

When he had fully developed his own method, Freud began to see in it far-spread possibilities much beyond its original scope, as a new process of diagnosing and treating nervous troubles. Even so, this method was not in itself quite so new as Freud supposed. Many years ago I pointed out that in 1857 Dr. Garth Wilkinson, a noted Swedenborgian and mystic of his day, set forth what he considered a "new method" and termed "Impression." It consisted in listening to the deepest unconscious expressions from within, the first of which follow the writing-down of a theme, for thus we catch the response to the man's desire for the unfolding of the subject. Garth Wilkinson, however, though a physician, confined this method to literary and religious aims, while Freud directed it into medical and scientific channels. The adoption of such a method has confirmed my view that Freud is a great deal of an artist, though he himself vigorously repels that attribution, declaring that he is nothing but a man of science.

In any case, as his use of his method developed he came to see in it the widest possibilities. These he enumerated in an article in *Scientia* in 1913. The various sciences to which he held that psychoanalysis had become applicable included (1) language; (2) the hy-

potheses of philosophy; (3) biology, by doing justice to the impulse of sex and mediating between biology and psychology; (4) it recreated the conception of evolution and showed how even in the psychic sphere the individual repeats the experience of the race; (5) it contributed to the history of civilization, and helped to explain myths and legends and social institutions; (6) similarly in the fine arts it revealed the artist's hidden motives; (7) it likewise concerned sociology and the repression of the individual to social demands; (8) it was important for methods of education by revealing the nature of childhood and the significance of sublimation, for, as Freud views it, "our highest virtues have arisen as reactive sublimations from the foundation of our worst predispositions."

To survey the vast field in which he has desired to move is indeed to raise the question whether Freud is properly regarded as a man of science. To raise that question, as I have long since done, is not to belittle Freud, for it is possible to maintain that the greatest men of science really belong to the sphere of art. While Freud himself, as I have found in correspondence with him, at once protests that he is a man of science and nothing else, one may ask: "What science?" The obvious answer should be: "Psychology." But many are the psychologists who cannot regard the investigation of an unknown "Unconscious" as the legitimate field for any would-be scientific psychology. And the varied fields of unquestioned scientific study which Freud has entered, he has entered as an amateur, deliberately disregarding any other method of approach and, when he seeks support, not always selecting that which carries most weight. This attitude of mind suggests that of the artist rather than that of the scientist. It seems in itself enough to account for the mixed enthusiasm and hostility which Freud even still arouses among men of science. When Garth Wilkinson initiated that method of "Impression" by which he became in a small way a precursor of Freud he had no idea—though he was a physician—of giving it any scientific validity. But it left open the field for the largest display of artistic genius. Freud's art is the poetry of psychic processes which lie in the deepest and most mysterious recesses of the organism. He has even at times allowed himself a free hand which to the most casual observer is that of the artist. I need only mention the essay on



Leonardo da Vinci or that on Jensen's novel, *Gradiwa*. It would be fantastic to find any trace of science in either of these delightful essays, and yet they are typically Freudian.

To emphasize the artist in Freud is not, I would hasten to add, by any means to diminish his significance even for science. At the highest points of human genius science and art become indistinguishable. To admit that Freud may be viewed at such a point is clearly to recognize the wide significance of his work, even if we cannot define that significance with precision.

To me it seems that we are still too near to achieve that precise definition. I accept as still reasonable, even if a little extravagant, the ambivalent attitude of Freud's distinguished contemporary in the same field, W. McDougall: the recognition of Freud as one of the greatest masters in thought together with a radical criticism of most of the results he has reached.

To sum up: In what way has Freud most specifically affected the changed attitude toward sex alike in the scientific and in the popular mind?


It must be plainly stated that there can be no doubt whatever that the frank and open recognition of sex would have been reached even if Freud had never been born. As we look back it would be easy to enumerate the various paths, theoretical and practical, along which sex was slowly moving to that place in human economy which it now occupies. The immense importance of sex is indeed implicit in the biological conception of life as it began to take shape in the middle of the last century and the ancient dictum that hunger and love are the pillars of life became developed in all the human sciences. Claims for the scientific, medical, hygienic, and social recognition of sex were being independently put forward, while at the same time on quite different ethical lines the assertion of the "sacredness" of sex was being remade by pioneers in morals. But nearly all those approaching this alarming and dangerous subject were careful to do so with discretion and consideration and full allowance for the still flourishing traditions and conventions.

Freud made no such allowance. He was thus fully justified in claiming that his approach was strictly and exclusively scientific. Whether or not he was justified in seeing the place of sex as so large,

he was simply stating what he saw. That the expression of his statements often seemed unnecessarily extravagant and offensive cannot be denied. There was no occasion for Freud to be surprised or hurt at the world's response to his new revelations.

There is thus really no doubt about Freud's specific contribution to the changed attitude to sex which marks our time. Whatever we may ultimately come to think of psycho-analysis as a technical method, it supplied an immense emphasis to the general recognition and acceptance of the place of sex in life.

The emphasis was primarily confined, as was natural, to the psycho-pathological field. Freud's incursions into other fields of science and art may be said to belong to a different order. They are more definitely those of an amateur. It is true that Freud might be termed an amateur throughout, since he has always almost ostentatiously ignored the results of previous workers, except when he chanced to find that they supported his own. But in all these other fields he was obviously an outsider, and his views were often novel. It may be claimed that such novelty exerted by a thinker of distinction from outside is of high value even when far from carrying conviction, because it stimulates new inquiry and research. The results, as estimated by recognized authorities, may be sometimes positive, sometimes negative, but in either case are of unquestionable value in their stimulating and challenging quality. As I have elsewhere sought to make clear, Freud has in these fields revealed the possibility of new depths, new subtleties, new complexities, and new possible mechanisms.



## THE INTRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF FREUD'S WORK IN THE UNITED STATES<sup>1</sup>

A. A. BRILL, M.D.

### ABSTRACT

The introduction of the work of Sigmund Freud and the development of psychoanalysis in the United States may be viewed in terms of the experiences of American students who had the first direct contacts with Freud and the movement which he led. Early training in psychoanalysis was not systematic. Reading and discussion of case materials, the study of Freud's written works, and especially the discovery of Freudian mechanisms in personal experiences served to convince students of the value of psychoanalysis. Lectures by psychoanalysts to American medical and lay audiences provoked antagonisms but at the same time stimulated discussion and interest, and in spite of great resistance to the new ideas, the subject gained an increasing number of adherents. The translation of Freud's works into English was an added impetus. Contacts with nonmedical groups were of equal importance to those with medical groups in popularizing and establishing Freud in this country.

The introduction of the work of Sigmund Freud and the development of psychoanalysis in the United States may be profitably viewed in terms of the experiences of those American students who had the first direct contacts with Freud and the movement which he led. Toward the end of the first decade of this century it was by no means easy to accept the tenets of psychoanalysis, simple as they were at that time. Until I reached the middle of the *Traumdeutung*, I

<sup>1</sup> After about five years in the Central Islip State Hospital, I entered the service of Dr. Pierre Marie (Hospice de Bicêtre) in Paris in the spring of 1907. At the same time I frequented all the other clinics, where I hoped to learn something about the borderline cases of mental diseases or psychoneuroses. I soon found that there was very little new that I could learn there concerning these maladies.

While in this state of disappointment, I received a letter from my psychiatric mentor, Dr. Frederick Peterson, suggesting that I go to the Clinic of Psychiatry in Zurich. He said, "They are doing the Freud work there, and I think you will like it." That was the third time in my life I had heard the name of Freud, concerning whom I knew nothing; and although Peterson's remark, "I think you will like it," provoked in me some uncertainty, I decided to follow his suggestions. I finished my work in Bicêtre and went to Zurich in the middle of August.

My psychiatric interest was, as it were, "revivified" soon after I entered the Zurich clinic. The atmosphere that prevailed in Burghölzli was most conducive to inspire any young psychiatrist brought up on the dry, descriptive psychiatry of the German school. Under the wise guidance of Bleuler and the aggressive inspiration of Jung, his *Sekundär-*

had to force myself to read it, and it was not until I found the Freudian mechanisms in my own dreams with the help of my more experienced colleagues that I became, as it were, a Freudian by conviction. And I have noticed that the same situation has always prevailed whenever I have presented psychoanalysis to others. They accepted and adhered to it only after they had found the Freudian mechanisms in themselves and in others. For nothing is as convincing as finding something in one's self which is common to all. Freud has taken away the stigmata of degeneration from the neuroses by demonstrating that they are distorted continua of past experiences. Before the advent of Freud everything psychiatric was considered something *sui generis*, something alien from so-called normal behavior. In my pre-psychoanalytic life it had never occurred to me to associate obsessions, phobias, or delusions with the patient's past or so-called normal state.

There was no systematic training in psychoanalysis at Burghölzli as it exists at the present time in our psychoanalytic institutes. We all read Freud's works on dreams, his and Breuer's book on hysteria, and his book on sex. The only easy and interesting reading were the case records and some of the papers on the neuroses. Everything else had to be studied, usually with the help of those who had had considerable experience in analysis.

Although some of the case histories read like interesting romances and detective stories, one soon gained the impression that it was such universal human experiences which constitute the essential drives of human activity. Every case showed the pleasures and woes of mankind; they really held up the mirror, as it were, to nature.

In 1896 Freud published a case of paranoid dementia, a most pronounced form of insanity, and showed that the hallucinations and delusions of this patient were as definitely determined by experiences of the past as the hysterical symptoms that he had described with

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*arzt*, everybody worked assiduously to test Freud's theories, and as I was soon appointed as a regular assistant in the clinic, I worked heart and soul in the pioneer work of testing and applying the Freudian mechanisms to psychiatry. The interpretative psychiatry, which now largely dominates the psychiatric world, and which has contributed so much to the allied disciplines, owes its origin and development to this enthusiastic circle.

Breuer. In 1906 Jung published his *Psychology of Dementia Praecox*, in which he followed Freud, but described at length a chronic patient of the same type. He showed that despite all the distortions in thought and action which the disease wrought in the patient for many years everything could still be traced back to the patient's previous struggles and conflicts with her environment.

To give briefly the main difference between the views of Freud and those of his predecessors one would say that the latter attributed neurotic symptoms to organic disturbances in the brain, and not finding them, they dubbed them "functional," which really meant "I do not know." Freud, on the other hand, explained all the so-called "functional neuroses" on a psychogenetic basis. The hysterical symptoms, which were hitherto considered mysterious because they had no organic bases, were, according to Freud, a distorted representation of repressed wishes. They were substitutive gratifications for thwarted needs, which were denied the patient by the environment. Through the symptoms the patients obtained indirect outlets for their needs sufficient to enable them to remain in the group. The functional psychoses, or insanities, on the other hand, are such marked deviations from everyday realities that they represented a definite turning-away from the group. The patient then lives in a world of fantasy, which he has created for himself. Socially speaking, such a dereistic or unreal existence is equivalent to a self-imposed monastic isolation.

Looking at patients in this manner, one naturally became interested in the relationship of the environment to the individual, in the narrower sense in the previous adjustment of the patient to his or her group. Analytically examined, every case showed a definite social maladjustment, some more glaring than others.

Nowadays, most of the sociologists recognize the erotic element in social relations, but it was quite different a generation ago, when the mere mention of sex was enough to create some disturbance. Let me illustrate this statement by an interesting experience.

I was invited to read a paper before a group of economists and sociologists, and I illustrated my talk by two cases. The first was a woman of over fifty, who had been living the life of a recluse for many years. She hated everybody, her relatives, her former friends, and society in general. She was brought to me almost forcibly by her pastor, the only person who dared approach her. The

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other was an unmarried physician of about thirty-five years of age, who called himself an "independent anarchist." He was against society in general and in sympathy with anarchism. Yet, he never joined the existing anarchist organization because he considered it paradoxical for anarchists to be organized. His contrasocial behavior consisted in ranting against the existing social system and in performing abortions gratis for those women who sought his help.

I cannot dilate upon these cases here, but in my talk to this group I showed that in spite of financial independence and college education, these two patients became contra- and extrasocial as a result of early experiences in their own homes. I traced back their neuroses to their position and accidental factors in the family. The woman was the second of three girls who was neglected by her parents and dominated by her older sister; and the man had lost his mother at the age of about four, and was then burdened with a disagreeable step-mother. At the age of twelve, when his father died, he ran away to his aunt with whom he lived for three happy years, but on her death he had to return to his step-mother. But as his aunt had left him a small allowance, he was then able to live in boarding schools and colleges until he received his medical degree. But throughout his student and hospital life he had difficulties with women and men who represented, as it were, unconscious replicas of the people of his early environment. He had no neurosis in the narrow sense; that is, he had no special symptoms which in any way incapacitated him, but he showed an antisocial character, which forever conflicted with his environment.

In brief, both of these patients ran away from society because their early disagreeable experiences followed them everywhere like a pursuing fate. My audience was quite impressed with my lecture, judging by the questions and generous applause, but because I stressed the libidinal elements, which were very plain in these cases, I was considered unfit to write a paper on psychoanalysis and sociology for a forthcoming publication. I heard this years later, when two of the chief editor's children were treated by me, I am glad to say, very successfully.

As I continued to practice, I was now and then unconsciously impelled to make excursions into sociological fields. In 1912 I wrote a paper on *The Only or Favorite Child in Adult Life*,<sup>2</sup> in which I showed that to be an only child is a definite handicap for adult adjustment. The criticisms which this view evoked would now be considered naïve, to say the least. The concept, however, soon found its way into the literature and has been generally discussed and largely accepted since then.

In 1915 I spoke before a medical society in Pittsburgh,<sup>3</sup> and I mentioned the fact that southerners who have forever kept the

<sup>2</sup> *New York State Journal of Medicine*, 1912.

<sup>3</sup> *International Clinics*, Vol. II (1915).

Negro in a state of subjugation, have nevertheless produced most of the mixed Negro-whites in this country. I explained this phenomenon on the basis of the "mammy" institution, which has always existed among the better classes, and on the close proximity between the Negroes and the southern whites in general. This explanation was forced upon me by the fact that in the erotic dreams of my southern male patients, Negro females played a predominating and often an exclusive part, a peculiarity which I had never observed among other whites. At first, I was criticized for this statement, but it was soon amply confirmed by a prominent southern investigator, Dr. Beverly Tucker of Richmond, Virginia, and others, and formed a nucleus for future sociological studies.

In 1918 I published a paper on *The Adjustment of the Jew to the American Environment*,<sup>4</sup> in which I endeavored to explain the maladjustments of the immigrant Jewish children or those born of immigrants, on the basis of the conflicts between the home (orthodox Jewish) and the outer, American world, particularly the public school. This paper, too, aroused considerable discussion.

In addition to these papers, I have been lecturing literally dozens of times on other aspects of sociobiologic problems, both to medical and lay audiences, for as soon as I became known as an exponent of Freud, I was actually swamped with invitations to speak on problems of sex. Thus, very soon after I began to practice, I was invited by a rather small group of ladies, who requested that I speak to them on what they called "a very delicate subject." I am sure that my talk on "Masturbation" delivered to these pioneers of the now well-known Child Study Association, was in many respects epoch making, judging by the reaction it then evoked, and by the subsequent growth and development of this important organization.

Another interesting group before whom I spoke during the winter of 1913 was at Mabel Dodge's salon. The person who invited me to speak there was a young man named Walter Lippmann, a recent Harvard graduate working with Lincoln Steffens. There I met radicals, littérateurs, artists, and philosophers, some of whom have influenced the trends of our times in no small way. Lippmann's first work contains many quotations from Freud. My talk aroused a very

<sup>4</sup> *Mental Hygiene*, Vol. II.

interesting and lively discussion, and the questions I was asked there by such people as John Collier, Sam Lewisohn, Bill Hayward, and others equally distinguished, were quite different from those posed by medical men. In his *Autobiography* Lincoln Steffens states: "There were no warmer, quieter, more intensely thoughtful conversations at Mabel Dodge's than those on Freud and his implications" (p. 656).

I shall never forget the evening I spent as the guest speaker of the Authors' League of America. I do not recall the title of my speech, but I gave them a number of "plots" which frequently came to my attention through patients, but of which they had never heard or imagined. Here again, I was confronted by an unmedical audience to whom Freud opened new vistas.

I can naturally give only very few of the experiences I had as an expositor of Freud. Nor can I possibly depict the enormous resistances expressed both seriously and comically, which I encountered whenever I spoke before medical and lay audiences. Yet, when all was said and done, the new ideas gained more and more adherents right from the very beginning of their appearance. They fascinated the layman because they removed the mysteries and superstitions which have always obscured abnormal mental behavior and the physicians because they explained and cured peculiar mental states, which were hitherto incomprehensible and inaccessible to treatment.

In the early part of 1908 Freud and I arranged that I should translate his works, which at that time consisted of the *Studies in Hysteria* (in collaboration with Joseph Breuer),<sup>5</sup> *The Interpretation of Dreams*, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex* (1905), *Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious*<sup>6</sup> (1905), and a number of papers on *The Theory of the Neuroses*, which had just appeared in book form.

I had just finished a translation of Jung's *Psychology of Dementia Praecox*, which gave me some experience in adapting psychoanalysis to English readers.

It was not, however, a simple task to translate Freud's works; new

<sup>5</sup> "Monograph Series" (New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co.).

<sup>6</sup> All these works appear in *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud* (New York: Modern Library, 1938).



expressions had to be coined and familiar words had to be invested with new meaning. I found it just as hard to get them published. Dr. Smith Ely Jelliffe readily accepted the small volumes on the neuroses and sex for his new monograph series, but it took a few years before I finally found English publishers for the *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* and *The Interpretation of Dreams*. No American publisher was willing to take the risk of putting them out in this country. Every time a new translation appeared, there were new outbursts, new arguments, but in the end they produced more followers than opponents.

Some psychologists and sociologists met Freud when he came to the twenty-fifth anniversary celebration of Clark University, at the invitation of Stanley Hall. The repercussions of this visit were very beneficial. William James was impressed, but he was too old and weak to take any attitude about these new doctrines.

My first direct contact with sociologists, or quasi-sociologists, was in 1915, when I was invited by John Collier, then leader of the Peoples' Institute in Cooper Union, to give a course of lectures to the training school of community workers. I regret that of this interesting pioneer group, I recall only the names of Mrs. Woodward and Everett Dean Martin, Collier's successor in the Peoples' Institute and the author of *The Behavior of the Crowd*, etc.

In introducing me, Collier reviewed what the students had learned from James, Van Dyke, Lester Ward, and McDougall, and then said:

I think we have gotten a sort of picture of the great surging sea of humanity. There is a coating of oil on the surface of the sea, which holds down the waves. When you are above the sea, you see only the coating of oil and all sorts of things reflected in that oil surface. But down below, the sea with its tides and its great currents is sweeping on. The conventions, the institutionalized morals are a good deal like that coating of oil, and we don't know anything about the currents that are flowing beneath.

I was then asked to tell something of what goes on beneath the surface. Judging by the discussions which followed each lecture, and the later activities of these students in the community, I am sure that my lectures produced lasting impressions.

A year later, in 1916, I met Carleton H. Parker, with whom I

spent a very pleasant evening. His wife, who published his biography following his untimely death, quotes him: "From seven-thirty to eleven-thirty I argued with Dr. A. A. Brill, who translated all of Freud! And it was simply wonderful."<sup>7</sup> If my memory serves me correctly, I would say that we discussed only social problems. I learned from him that Freud had made more headway among the sociologists in the Middle West and on the Pacific coast than among those of the east. Carleton Parker told me that he first heard of Freud from William F. Ogburn, who was then teaching at Reed College. I later met Professor Ogburn (in 1917), who was to my knowledge the first sociologist to recognize the value of the Freudian concepts in the teaching of sociology.

For over thirty-one years I have been actively functioning as an expositor of Freud's views. There is no doubt that the medical profession, to whom I have directed most of my efforts, has been markedly influenced by psychoanalysis. Anyone comparing the psychiatric literature of today with that of thirty years ago will readily admit this. But what is even more important is the fact that Freud has wiped out the line of demarcation between mental medicine and the allied sciences. He forced a sort of union between them. To understand the neuroses one must know something about biology, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and pedagogics; and vice versa, students in any of these disciplines must also have a knowledge of Freudian psychiatry. For there is no real gap between the child and the man, between the so-called normal and abnormal, between the civilized and primitive man. The individual differences in their various adjustments or maladjustments to their group can only be explained by looking at the total personality from all angles.

Looking back, I feel that my contacts with the nonmedical groups, like those mentioned above, and my association over a period of years with the department of pedagogics of New York University, where I gave regular courses and seminars to undergraduate and graduate students, teachers, psychologists, sociologists, etc., have done at least as much to popularize and establish Freud in this country as my work in the medical groups.

NEW YORK CITY

<sup>7</sup> *An American Idyll*, p. 108.

# SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHIATRY

## A PARTIAL APPRAISAL

SMITH ELY JELLIFFE, M.D.

### ABSTRACT

Freud entered the study of psychiatry after a period of training and experience in physiology and neurology. Because he has not always been in the main stream of psychiatry, his work is more difficult to appraise than that of Kraepelin. Freud's skepticism of the hereditary interpretation of the etiology of neuroses and psychoses, his new technique for uncovering etiological factors, and his regrouping of the major and minor neuroses constitute important contributions, as do the findings of his excursions into phylogenetic problems. His triadic formulation of the Id, Ego, and Super-ego reveal the conflict of biological and social phenomena. Despite great opposition, psychoanalytic conceptions have infiltrated psychiatry, and in this country they have resulted in a vital approach to the many problems of social relationships.

Neurological conceptions and data, as generally thought of, may be stated to be somewhat simpler and more capable of definite verbal manipulation than those of psychiatry. At least so it seemed when I attempted a short epitome entitled "Sigmund Freud as a Neurologist. Some Notes on His Earlier Neurobiological and Clinical Neurological Studies"<sup>1</sup> which gave a glimpse of his early training in medicine and of his interests and achievements before he entered into the investigations of the intricate, complex, and universal problems envisaged as psychiatry.

In that sketch it was noted that as a gymnasium student he gave evidence of being singularly gifted, and, when he became a student of medicine, he was encouraged to enter the physiological laboratory of Ernst Brücke where he worked happily for several years. In the early period he was put at a problem of comparative neurology which gave evidence of his early appreciation of matters of embryology, and phylogeny and the evolution of the nervous system. His keen vision, sharpened by Darwinian concepts and deepened by Goethe's thought, was already evident, and it is not strange that he should have gone on from questions of structure to those of more exacting observation, i.e., those of function, from relations of simpler intramural organ adjustments to the more diverse and intricate

<sup>1</sup> *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, LXXXV (1937), 696-711.

problems of organization of function and social adaptation, which constitute generally the field of psychiatry.

As a closing sentence in this presentation I quote from R. Brun,<sup>2</sup> a neurological confrere of Zurich, who wrote a paper on Freud contemporaneous with my own:

Looking back once again over the neurological work of Freud we distinctly recognize a fairly clear guiding line in the progress of his studies. Freud had started, as it were, from the ranks as a private, yet from the beginning he carried the Commander's staff in his knapsack. From his first investigation (as a medical student of 19-20 years of age) on the spinal cord of the most primitive vertebrates, from his observations on the finer structure of the elements of the nervous system, his cerebro-anatomical studies, he gradually advanced to the recognition of the most complicated clinical affections. Not until then did he venture upon the complex problems of brain pathology, such as the teachings on aphasia (1891—Hughlings Jackson formulations), passing at the very last to the investigation of the functional neuroses. His thorough anatomical and clinical neurological training served as a guarantee that also in attacking this last and most difficult problem, he would remain on a solid biological basis and therefore not be led far astray. Thus the unprejudiced in the critical evaluation of the results of psychoanalytic investigation will remember the long and tedious road which Freud had travelled, and before simply rejecting one of these, will have to admit modestly that also the later findings of the eminent neurobiologist in the realm of neurosis pathology (psychiatry) presumably are at best not less solidly founded than the neuropathological results of the early period of his scientific studies.

Of his neurological works listed in my short outline, about twenty-five in number, ten were written before he obtained a traveling fellowship and spent six months with Charcot at the Salpêtrière (1885-86), and the rest later. It may be noted in passing that none of these works is printed in his *Gesammelte Schriften*. In 1881 he received his degree in medicine and he tells us in his *Selbstdarstellung* that economic factors and academic prejudices motivated him to follow clinical medicine instead of the more interesting theoretical fields. He began working as an intern in the Allgemeine Krankenhaus in Vienna and also started to work in Theodor Meynert's neuroanatomical laboratory. Meynert was professor of psychiatry at the University of Vienna. This was his first official contact with psychiatry, the only branch of medicine in which he professes to be interested. It

<sup>2</sup> "Sigmund Freuds Leistungen auf dem Gebiete der organischen Neurologie," *Schweiz. Arch. f. Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, XXXVII, Heft 2 (1936), 200-207.

also dates his contact with Joseph Breuer (1882) and their mutual interest in the case of Anna O., from which ultimately stemmed their combined *Studien zur Hysterie* (1893-95).<sup>3</sup>

Obviously it would be a task of great difficulty to attempt to bring together all the influences that started Freud on his psychiatric odyssey and that carried him along the path he has so brilliantly illuminated.<sup>4</sup> For in the older sense of the word, Freud was not a psychiatrist. He entered into the problems of the "psychoses" proper comparatively late and then by an entirely different pathway, but most important—and herein lies the major accent of his importance—he forged and fashioned an entirely new method for the study of human behavior—now termed psychoanalysis—which has modified entirely man's understanding of man's behavior, his organs, and his social activities.

Looking backward, a brief and crude picture may be drawn of the psychiatric situation of the latter half of the nineteenth century. Mental hospitals had existed ever since the days of Jundishapur—legend tells us as far back as the sixth or seventh century. Gheel had its shrines and beginnings a few centuries later. Bedlam and a host of others sprang up throughout Europe during the Middle Ages. Friedreich, Monkmöller, and others have written of these. The world knows of Esquirol, of Pinel, the Conolleys, the Tukes, but in a general sense the earlier psychiatric clinics and clinical psychiatry began, with Griesinger in Berlin as a prototype, about the year 1860. L. Binswanger has done full credit to this and later developments.<sup>5</sup>

Meynert, Wernicke, Ziehen, and Kraepelin carried on, reaching the acme of descriptive delineation in Kraepelin's four volume *Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie*. Adolf Meyer<sup>6</sup> has set forth the picture of

<sup>3</sup> Sigmund Freud and Joseph Breuer, *Studies in Hysteria*, trans. A. A. Brill, M.D. ("Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series," No. 61 [3d ed.; New York, 1937]).

<sup>4</sup> See M. Dorer, *Historische Grundlagen der Psychoanalyse* (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1932) for a summary of the intellectual activities in Vienna at the time.

<sup>5</sup> "Freud und die Verfassung der klinische Psychiatrie," *Schweiz. Arch. f. Neurologie u. Psychiatrie*, XXXVII, Heft 2 (1936), 177-99; also "Psychoanalyse und klinische Psychiatrie," *Int. Ztschr. f. Psychoanalyse*, VII (1921), 135.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Archibald Church and F. Peterson, *Textbook of Nervous and Mental Disease* (8th ed.; Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1915), and also "A Few Trends in Modern Psychiatry," *Psychological Bulletin*, I (June 15, 1904), 217-40.

the movement in clinical psychiatry to the beginning of the twentieth century in his brilliant résumés.

One can look nowhere for a better orientation of this aspect of psychiatry than in the account of one hundred years of psychiatry with which Kraepelin opened the exercises of the foundation of his research institute in Munich<sup>7</sup> about twenty years ago. Even as late as the eighteenth century he notes the tragic situation that made wanderers, hoboes, and beggars of the mentally ill, thieves of the less disorderly minded among them, and as for the noisy and violent, they were locked up in jails, cellars, attics, and in various types of "fool cages" not unlike those of the monkeys in the zoo or chained to posts and pillars such as one sees in the classical picture of "Pinel's" deliverance or tucked away in some closed and barricaded room, lying on straw and chained by the neck, waist, and arms to the walls. Kraepelin pictures this all-too-lurid chapter in words and in illustrations taken from actualities as they existed all over Europe well into the nineteenth century. No less harmful, even if apparently more humane, were the leather belts, jackets, binding sheets, and camisoles that followed and are still in use in certain places.

All of this was not only predicated upon the cultural milieu of the times but was more particularly centered in the fatalistically pessimistic attitude concerning prognosis in mental illness. "They were hopeless, good for nothings, and hence throw them to the dogs" was too prevalent a point of view, against which numerous psychiatrists of the day made persistent attacks.

The political factor and the influence of vested interests have long delayed the development of scientific treatment of the psychotic. William A. White's *Insanity and the Criminal Law* and his *Crimes and Criminals*<sup>8</sup> present a mild exposé of the political possibilities of the present-day setup.

Kraepelin's review, however, does not dwell upon these matters,

<sup>7</sup> "Arbeiten aus der deutschen Forschungsanstalt für Psychiatrie," *Ztschr. Neurologie*, Vol. XXXVIII, I, 1 (1919).

<sup>8</sup> *Crimes and Criminals* (Farrar & Rinehart, 1933), *The Meaning of Disease* (Williams & Wilkins, 1926), *Insanity and the Criminal Law* (Macmillan Co., 1923), and numerous related addresses. Cf. "Bibliography—Obituary: William A. White," *Psychoanalytic Review*, XXIV (1937), 210-30.

and he was not content only to show us "Bedlam" as a titbit for the curiosity mongers but goes on toward a more important psychological set of problems—i.e., to the old metaphysical, scholastic body-mind dichotomy, which is still a favorite problem in certain psychiatric circles.

Others in this symposium will discuss the Freudian conceptions as influencing social science, literature, and civilization, all of which in their earlier psychiatric correlations Kraepelin discusses in this one hundred years. With respect to Freud's attitude toward religion, however, since much nonsense has been written, some mention should be made. Everyone knows that for the Greeks "possession by a god" was a working hypothesis in explanation of anomalous mental behavior. See the "Mad Hercules" as an example, and almost every intelligent person has heard of Freud's term the "Oedipus complex" which harks back to those "Pilgrim Fathers of the modern scientific imagination—Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides" as A. N. Whitehead<sup>9</sup> has so penetratingly elaborated. The notion persisted and still remains that something foreign invested the "mind." The scholastics and churchmen called it the "devil" and devised many ingenious procedures for "shaking him out," well illustrated in the Kraepelin thesis, and in other works. Even "shock" therapies were practiced before vaccines, insulin, or camphor. Heinroth and other psychiatrists of the early days could not escape noting this aspect and in "evil" of some sort, other than black bile or devils, etc., they approached a spiritual concept in etiology. Our purpose in so briefly touching upon this is to indicate a certain prototypal resemblance to the more specific Freudian formulation of the "Super-ego" which presents a penetrating hypothesis in explanation of the religious, spiritual, and mystical formulations, still hanging over from the Greeks and never put in such tangible form before Freud's "Oedipus complex" formulation. One finds here a meeting-ground for much that is still called heredity, for many involved emotional repugnances, peculiar covert incest prohibitions, murder taboos, and other superstitious and ethical precipitates, all serving with other reasonable and feeling devices for control of the energy behind the pattern of racial survival and progression, a much mightier force than indi-

<sup>9</sup> *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Macmillan, 1932).

vidual survival, even if the satirist immediately brings the chicken-and-the-egg trick from out of his sleeve.

Kraepelin also brings into the front of his discussion the problem of the form of the psychoses (nosology), one of great practical significance. Here Kraepelin's genius was of high order, especially as it cut into the question of the relation of cause to form. With the Kraepelinian descriptive criteria fully in mind, etiology at once became approximately apparent. His delineations of behavior were so accurate and minute that an immediate supposition as to the reasons why could be at once put to the therapeutic test and thus the well-being of the patient and the community were advantageously advanced. When it is brought to mind that there are half a million hospital beds in the United States for the mentally ill, there becomes immediately obvious the economic significance of good diagnosis, founded on sound etiology which can bring prompt therapy to work and expedite recovery. No economist, to my knowledge, has brought together all these factors as yet in short pregnant phrases. They are, however, on the way in New York State and in the Mental Hygiene Committee. The core of this argument is that the more promptly etiological factors are recognized, the sooner a better therapy is started and the lighter is made the economic load to the individual, relatives, friends, and the state. As I may be able to point out later, one of Freud's most valuable contributions has been to bring into better proportionate relief certain factors of etiology. The discussion of the significance of these in the therapy of very complicated types of illness will be deferred here.

Apart from the inevitable difficulties that surround any appraisal of large issues in contemporary science, if one were to estimate the life-work and position in psychiatry of such a modern as Emil Kraepelin, for example, rather than that of Sigmund Freud, one's approach would be singularly unencumbered by side issues. Here, it might be said, was a man who was in the direct line all his life. Trained as a psychiatrist, advancing from one psychiatric clinic to another, professor of psychiatry in one university after another, author of a textbook which in the course of eight or nine editions marched from a small pocket manual to four massive tomes containing perhaps the best descriptive phases of clinical psychiatric



thought of the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, and finally founder of a research institute of psychiatry of unique pattern.

It would be a comparatively simple matter to offer both cross- and long-sections of the Kraepelinian psychiatry which had generally captured the psychiatric thought of the world in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Kraepelinian psychiatry marked the end of an era of great advance in psychiatric activity. It still goes marching on, especially in its descriptive clinical phases and the Kraepelinian criteria for study and the Kraepelinian diagnostic labels still bulk large throughout the world.

The life-history, long-section study method, for which he labored so assiduously will probably always be held up as an ideal. New methods of study of such life-histories with their innumerable variants from hypothetical average-norms have gained wide acceptance and offer entire reappraisals of human behavior. Even to read and digest a modern textbook of but one of these aspects, the "mental testers," is the work almost of a lifetime.

I am asked, however, to give an estimate of the significance of the work of Sigmund Freud in the field of psychiatry. As already intimated, had Freud been in the direct line of psychiatry in the sense that Kraepelin has been, the appraisal would have been a comparatively simple matter as such appraisals go. But Freud entered psychiatry by an entirely different doorway, with a different methodology, and with different goals in view. Hence the desirability of a few words about what will here be meant by psychiatry other than Kraepelinian or Wernicke psychiatry.

To those who would know more of the very uneven planking of the psychiatric platform at the end of the last century, I would again refer to Adolf Meyer's presentations as of the first importance,<sup>10</sup> and shall take advantage of some of his presentation although it may readily be surmised that no adequate generalizations

<sup>10</sup> See chapter on Wernicke, Kraepelin, and Ziehen in Church and Peterson, *Textbook of Nervous and Mental Disease* (8th ed.). Also his review in *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. I, and further for a very delightful and personal excursion into English psychiatry of the time in his Maudsley Lectures (*Journal of Mental Science*, LXXIX [July, 1933], 435).

are possible. The platform resembles more the plotting of the stock-exchange movements than what one might expect of a platform.

Psychiatry in this period was largely intramural psychiatry. It dealt almost exclusively with the psychoses proper and the chief trend would seem to be, following the paradigm of general paralysis first worked out by Bayle, to discover disease entities—at all events to get away from the legalistic Roman anachronism of “one insanity.” The intermediary steps I shall omit; Kraepelin arrived at a point where a workable compromise between pathological and etiological entities offered, as noted, his supreme and grand scheme of “clinical psychiatry.”

Under the influence of Morel's fascinating works the entire neuropsychiatric world of the middle of the last century had one ready answer for all their etiological problems. *Dégénéré* was the slogan, the cause and diagnosis of nearly all the major as well as the minor neuroses and even the psychoses were partly covered by the same blanket indictment. The exact etiology of general paralysis was struggling by the aid of Fournier and Erb toward a better causative foundation. Even Charcot would have none of Fournier. Nervous pathology was still in the van when compared with etiological concepts in general pathology.

But we are here concerned more with the specific problems of the psychoneuroses and psychoses. Freud was very skeptical of the etiological interpretation in terms of heredity which prevailed in the Charcot clinic, especially as it related to “hysteria.” In a paper published in 1896 he advanced convincing arguments that made obvious the fallacies in the *dégénéré* explanation. Not that the old vis-à-vis of nature and nurture are settled today, but ever since Freud's work a new technique for uncovering more exact etiological factors has been as efficacious as that for discovering the *Treponema pallida*.

In his work on the etiology of the major neuroses Freud came to certain new nosological conceptions; thus he entered into the problems of classification and began to do for these so-called minor mental disorders what the old-line psychiatrists had been accomplishing with the psychoses.

In general pathology, certain skin lesions—their form, location, margins, development, etc.—permit the skilled dermatologist to de-

tect at a glance, from morphology alone, just what is happening. A syphilitic ulcer can be thus recognized without a Wassermann test or a dark-ground microscopic examination. The situation with the neuroses is quite different. They have a foglike character of coming and going, of shifting and changing, and out of Beard's old neurasthenia generalization, out of the vapors and hypochondrias and "hysterick" disorders of the eighteenth century, Freud brought into fairly clear outline certain configurations of greater validity than had existed before. Thus "neurasthenia," if it should be retained at all, should be understood not alone on its shadowy content and form but should be restricted to definite etiological factors. These were strictly somatic, and if in the cloudy picture the psychical fixation factors of infantile sexuality appeared, the disorder should be put into another nosological group. This regrouping of the major and minor neuroses, neurasthenia, anxiety neurosis, hysteria, compulsion neurosis, etc., on the basis of (1) universal indispensable conditions, (2) concurrent causes, and (3) specific causes, marked a major advance in psychiatry.

What came from Jenner's work in smallpox in his day is arriving for the present generations in the ameliorations of neurotic disorders which are as widespread today as was smallpox in its day, even if not so visually apparent in its disfiguring consequences. Present-day psychiatry looks far afield into the disgusting and hideous pockmarks of contemporary political chicanery, business dishonesty, ethical complacency, slothful bureaucratic ineptitudes, national paranoias, etc., as parallel situations to be attacked by the weapons offered by the newer insights which Freud found operating in the neurotic field. The spurious argument that Freud was working only with "abnormal" people is mere hypocritical camouflage. Everybody is "abnormal" from the standpoint of unproved "ideal" social evolution. Everybody has his small coin of hysteria, as it was said in the days of Charcot; or in more recent days, as the psychiatrist Stürcke puts it, he has been hunting for a "normal" person all his life and has not yet found one. There are Hitler-Mussolini "normals," and there are the antithetical Mahatma Ghandi "normals," and all grades between, but as for the statistical-average norm in the personality equations, not even a millionth part of the one and a half billion

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people of the globe have been "measured" with sufficient completeness or accuracy to determine a statistical norm, except for extremely simple group factors. Everybody who goes to a horse race or gazes at the stock-exchange tape knows this, but "autistic" thinking still remains dominant over the masses as well as the classes. It will take some centuries before the Freudian bedrock will be firmly traversed by the masses.

From the material gathered in the study of the average masses, discontented with their lack of understanding or discommoded by their difficulties in adjustment to social environments, it is clear that not only the personality gearings were working badly but the environmental road itself might be anything but auspicious. The idealistic communist wishes to put all the responsibilities on the environment. He knows nothing of his own inner ineptitudes. The revolutionary's sadistic omnipotency-wish makes everybody out of step except himself. The ultra-moralist sets up standards of inner theoretical construction, equally farcical. Freud points this out in his elaboration of the development of the "Super-ego" in the personality setup.

Mankind knew a lot about human nature before Freud, as everybody knows. The significance of what came to be called our instinctual needs was also fairly well grasped, after Darwin had rounded out the biological picture of instinct in a better form than Aristotle offered, but no one before Freud offered any tangible systematic scheme of getting at these instinct drives either as to quality or as to quantity.

Some statue-draping delicate souls have sniffed at what they term his oversimplification and dubbed it "pansexuality," as if anything other than gonadal activity and libidinal drive has created and will continue to create the world of living things. Hence the importance of Freud's "life instinct" and the "libido theory" and the "death instinct."

As is also known in the history of psychoanalysis, Freud's earliest excursions into phylogenetic problems, combined with his interest in aphasia and his grasp and extension of Hughlings Jackson's equally informed developmental concepts, led him to reach back into the history of the child and infant, to learn more of the forms

taken in the expression of the instinct (libido) drives. Here was territory almost entirely unexplored except for the formalistic treatment of Preyer and the child psychologists of his day. It soon developed that a rapid symbolizing activity was taking place in the expressions of the pleasure-principle in the primary erogenous areas of the child's body. Here identifications began to be made, displacements offered, symbolizations constructed which no one failing the insight of this phylo-ontogenetic viewpoint could really comprehend, least of all those still under the ban of the Garden of Eden's grape leaf ideology and the romantic, sentimental "innocence-of-children" flapdoodle.

Then came the dismemberments of the schizophrenic personality. The completed machine was taken down and its parts (forms and functions) scrutinized. The unformed machine was watched day by day as it grew, unfolded, and integrated. Disintegration (devolution of Jackson) and integration (evolution) studies were going on at the same time, and this important issue was seen from a dynamic, moving, living viewpoint that accepted the biologists' theories regarding the origin of life and pushed these into the study of the continuance of life and all of its modes of expression as affecting human relations. This was a new thrust of psychiatric understanding, deeper and wider and essentially creative. The old descriptive psychiatry was sound so far as observation of form was concerned, but its explanations were in terms of "silly mannerisms," "senseless phrasing," "meaningless gestures," "crazy ideas," etc. This type of explanation was purged from psychiatry by the Freudian insight. Nothing was silly, senseless, or meaningless either in individual or in mass behavior, except the ignorant pseudo-observer. As Sarton has observed about the Dark Ages, none were so dark as those who called them so. Etiology here again was called upon, and the hidden meanings of symbolization, displacement, distortion, secondary elaboration, etc. came to be clearly understood by those whose repressions did not keep them blind and deaf and without comprehension.

It is not our purpose to present a formal essay on the psychoanalytic conceptions, but one very important source of enlightenment needs emphasis. This came from Freud's study of the dream process,

which may be said, culturally speaking, to be one of his most original contributions. It is true that this universal phenomenon had been studied by innumerable predecessors and, as Freud's own historical summaries show, some had had true insight, but the clues that had come from seeing the machine taken down (disintegrating) and seeing it building up from infancy (integrating) and with the innumerable "paleopsychological" fossils at hand—all were rehearsed by the dream process in the everyday workshop of the "normal" individual, and the simple formula of "autistic thinking" (wish fulfilment), studied with the aid of the mechanism instrumentations, finally gave a form and consistency to the Freudian conceptions of truly universal character. Practically every bit of behavior of individuals in groups of two or millions could now be thrown into hypothetically simple forms and evaluated.

The "Id," as the ancestral home of the biological realities (physical, chemical, organismal, individual, social), contains everything. It expresses everything that life can express or that death can accomplish. Here—mostly "unconscious"—are the forces that, rightly studied, lead to interpretation and control. Out of this "Id" eons of experience have constructed controlling institutions—repression being the major function. One aspect of this is the "Ego"—a tester of reality—intelligence, reason, and knowledge of cause and effect to enhance the libido gratifications and curb the death instinct. The other aspect is called the "Super-ego"—perhaps older, phyletically speaking, and mostly made up of feeling-attitudes, aversions, disgusts, can'ts, and must-nots (the theologians' conscience in part), superstitious dreads, the uncanny, mystic, etc. It is a repressing mental institution but increasingly yielding to the "Ego" as man grows to undeluded, undisillusionized maturity—as of his present general "infantile" pattern. This pattern is everywhere manifest as infantile, regressive, neurotic, and even psychotic when operating in mass reaction, such as in minor mobbings of a movie star, an aviator's flight, a prefervid labor organization, political propaganda, war, etc., while in its ambivalent aspect it rises to mass heights of renunciation, bravery, heroism, altruism, and true social construction thrusting the individual social pattern along the evolutionary pathway.

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The infiltration of psychoanalytic conceptions into official psychiatry took place slowly and irregularly over a large area and not without enormous opposition from those in high places. Freud, to quote Hebbel, "had disturbed the sleep of the world." Lack of space forces a distorting simplicity in our discussion of the history of this situation, partly covered by Freud's own *History of the Psychoanalytic Movement*.<sup>11</sup> It has been shown how the psychoanalytic conceptions grew up chiefly from a neurotic-psychoneurotic soil.<sup>12</sup> The material for direct application to the major psychoses was already there. The *Interpretation of Dreams* had the whole story worked out in detail and applications of the principles were being made everywhere. In Zurich, however, a special "hot frame" was operating. Drs. Eitingon, Abraham, Jung, Brill, and Bleuler were bringing psychoanalysis into immediate contact with official psychiatry and the mental hospital. Here, as Freud expresses it, "the situation changed at one stroke." He is speaking of the general psychoanalytic movement. We are here applying it to its "psychiatric" significance, using psychiatric in its older, restricted, and isolated sense. At about this time the *Jahrbuch für Psychoanalyse* was founded (1909) and edited by Jung. Brill at Burghölzli went to Vienna and brought Ernest Jones into personal contact with Freud. At this time, C. G. Jung's work on dementia praecox<sup>13</sup> was of psychiatric importance and E. Bleuler's on schizophrenia<sup>14</sup> completed this particular link in the psychoanalytic-psychiatric chain.

Zurich for a time was the special psychoanalytic-psychiatric center. Eitingon and Abraham returned to Berlin, Brill to New York, Jones went to Toronto, and Jung and Bleuler for a time carried on in Zurich. Freud's visit (1909) to Worcester, Massachusetts and his championing by G. Stanley Hall, gave a special fillip to America, which was already being stirred by Putnam, Brill, White, Jelliffe, Oberndorf, MacCurly, and others.

<sup>11</sup> 1914. Cf. p. 309; Otto Rank & H. Sachs, *Significance of Psychoanalysis for the Mental Sciences* ("Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph [New York, 1916] No. 23).

<sup>12</sup> E. Hitschmann, *Freud's Theories of the Neuroses* ("Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series" No. 17 [New York, 1910-13]).

<sup>13</sup> *The Psychology of Dementia Praecox*, trans. Dr. A. A. Brill ("Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series," No. 3 [1907]).

<sup>14</sup> *Schizophrenie* (Vienna: Deuticke, 1911).

Again lack of space forbids picturing the extension of psychoanalytic psychiatry throughout Europe. In spite of the opposition from official psychiatry, it exerted its influence everywhere, and although the professors with occasional exceptions still frowned upon it, the old-fashioned psychiatry was doomed.

The picture of psychoanalytic psychiatry in the United States is worth a few notes, for here it has spread more widely if not more deeply than anywhere else. William James was alert to Freud's 1893 studies but would have none of them. Of a similar attitude were his pupil, Southard, and his colleague, Morton Prince, a stout devotee of Janet. G. Stanley Hall was catholic. J. J. Putnam was the first official "authority" in neurology to come over. The New York Psychoanalytic Society (1910), with Brill as leader, was the first to organize. From the very start psychoanalysis in America has been pre-eminently a medical and even more significantly a psychiatric discipline. Furthermore, we follow E. Jones,<sup>15</sup> speaking at the opening of the New York Psychiatric Institute (1929)—an enterprise unique in the history of psychiatry—when he says that America has created a new profession of psychiatry such as exists nowhere else in the world. Here the broadest interests in the mental hygiene movement are of psychoanalytic-psychiatric forging. Certain superlative natures have been happy to view this enormous extension as an expression of American superficiality. It takes a hot fire to have wide-spread irradiations. This is as elementary in psychiatry as it is in physics. For some of the aspects of this universal entrance of psychoanalytic psychiatry into every avenue of activity here in the United States I may point to the essay of Jones just cited. I would also call attention to the opinion of a cultivated outsider, Thomas Mann, who in the same year (1929) contributed an essay on "Freud's Position in the Modern Mental Sciences."<sup>16</sup>

One more important progressive thrust of psychoanalytic psychiatry should be mentioned. It lies close to and is included in the pedagogic discipline and is of cardinal significance for education, for penology, for the very foundations of human social development.

<sup>15</sup> *Papers on Psychoanalysis* (4th ed.; Baltimore: Wood & Co., 1938), p. 487.

<sup>16</sup> "Die Stellung Freuds in der modernen Geistesgeschichte," *Psychoanalytische Bewegung*, I (1929), 3-32.



The dishonesties and resistances to understanding of the primary compelling motives of infantile and childhood behavior are being looked at honestly and with increasing objectivity, and early evidences of fixation and distortions are being evaluated and remedied.

Orthopsychiatry thus enters into every activity of the nursery, the kindergarten, the school, the gang, the labor aggregates, college, and later social life of every type and aspect. Let us hope for its betterment as the "mills of God grind slowly." A noted entomologist once showed the writer an insect in some fossil amber. It was three hundred million years old, he said and somewhat quizzically added that its exact representatives live today. I had been expressing some pink, if not rosy, hopes for the advance of civilization through orthopsychiatry. Bergson's<sup>17</sup> remarks concerning the binding and limiting forces of insect organization as compared with the mammalian liberation was my rejoinder.

At all events we left it on the lap of the gods, thankful that we were not insects and that there was such a liberator as Freud.

NEW YORK CITY

<sup>17</sup> H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans. A. Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911).

## SOCIOLOGY AND THE PSYCHOANALYTIC METHOD

GREGORY ZILBOORG, M.D.

### ABSTRACT

Successively influenced by geography and demography, anthropology, biology, and economic determinism, sociology found its major orientation at the beginning of the present century in psychology, after Comte turned away from pure philosophy and became increasingly preoccupied with the analysis of social functioning. Freud's first contributions, which appeared at this time, had an early influence on sociology and anthropology. In spite of this, the contributions of psychoanalysis to sociology at present extend little beyond the awareness that a new psychology has been born and that it can be applied to the understanding of social phenomena. There are two main reasons for this: first, objections to Freudian theories, especially to his theory of instincts, are still being raised; second, the impression was gained, because Freud applied to social phenomena the same methods of investigation as he did to individual neuroses, that the social reactions of the individual are direct criteria for the reactions of society as a whole. This assumption does not present a complete picture, and Freud never intended that his method of parallelism be carried to these extremes. Although the infiltration of psychoanalytic ideas into sociology has not been productive so far, sociology is sufficiently mature to adopt the methods of contemporary psychological science, and the latter already possesses a wealth of empirical data and a well-systematized set of scientific hypotheses. Among the latter, the phenomenon which Freud called the return of the repressed is of particular importance to sociology. Society itself provides outlets for the return of the repressed, for every society represents the crystallized function of the majority of repressive forces of its members and must provide adequate outlets or it will become functionally useless. One is led to a somewhat paradoxical conclusion: one must study the individual in society in order to understand society as a whole, but in order to understand the dynamics of social life, one should look not for the characteristics of the individual's socialized reactions but for those outlets which society offers for the return of the repressed. Utilization of this methodological suggestion depends upon the complete discarding of evaluative preconceptions, of which fact no one is more aware than Freud himself.

### I

After Auguste Comte sociology turned away from pure philosophy. It took over Comte's positivism, became less and less political and more and more social in the broadest sense of the word. The accent on the political, structural aspects of society was abandoned as increased emphasis was given to the expression of frank, though purely theoretical, animosity against the state (Spencer) or through passive but ever increasing disregard of purely political problems. The philosophic tradition lingered on for a while, particularly in Germany, in the guise of philosophy of history (Paul Barth), but in the main sociologists became more preoccupied with problems of social living, with laws governing the origin and the development of

social life, and with the transformations of man as an element in social functioning.

Sociology as a system of analysis and synthesis of social functioning has always been confronted with the fact that it had a complex subject matter at hand but no definite, sufficiently specific methodology; it had to draw upon various other sciences for the construction of its conclusions. Geography and demography lay at the basis of the embryonal sociology of the eighteenth century. Toward the turn of our century sociology reached a point in its development at which it had to choose a basic trend to rest upon. Anthropology presented very valuable material indeed, but it failed to offer a proper and systematic linkage with the problems which the sociologist wished to solve. The older anthropologists were too descriptive and morphological; the later ones, while more psychological in their orientation (Lévy-Bruhl, Niewenhuis), gravitated toward the purely intellectual. This was, of course, highly unsatisfactory to the sociologist who, over a generation ago, had embarked upon the search of the dynamic rather than the formal forces presiding over man's social life. As often happens in the history of scientific systems, the trend became monistic even though the individual social scientist himself consciously disavowed any predilection for a monistic philosophy. Sociology was looking for one single method of investigation and the one solution to its problems. Hence there was a brief though telling period during which biology dominated the minds of sociologists. Society was conceived as a gigantic animal made up of cells (human individuals), an animal subject to all organic, biological laws (Novicow, Lilienfeld, Worms). Biology in sociology led to some amusing, naïve constructions which had no serviceable value; it failed to explain a great deal and offered little except a series of transliterations of major social phenomena into the Darwinian lexicon, such as natural selection or survival of the fittest.

The next wave of influence was that of historical materialism or economic determinism. This system of thought brought a great deal of comfort to the puzzled sociologist. The rapidly developing industrial civilization rapidly imposed upon the student an awareness of the interdependence of individuals, cities, states, and hemispheres, and it emphasized the importance of economic problems. Economic

determinism seemed to explain not only the current social problems, as wars and labor strikes, but even the past—the French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars, the conquest of Constantinople, and the Italy of Marco Polo and Dante. Maxim Kovalevsky wrote his history of capitalism among primitive peoples. Although overtly a Comtian positivist and proponent of parliamentarian, monarchic democracy, he was scientifically under the sway of historical materialism. Kelles-Krauz tried to utilize the Mazzian concepts to construct a conservative, almost imperialistic but strictly economic deterministic sociology and Enrico Ferri espoused the cause of socialism. Economic determinism had become the *ultima ratio* of social development.

In the background of these two main streams of thought, the purely biological and the purely economic trends, certain remnants of Comte's ethico-philosophical system were still distinguishable (De Roberty), but the major voice was that of a newer and as yet diffuse orientation—it was that of psychology. In less than twenty years a great number of brilliant and profound sociological thinkers came to the fore to assert themselves and gain considerable ground: Georg Simmel, Emile Durkheim, Gabriel Tarde, Lester Ward, Franklin Giddings. Despite the many divergences in their points of view, it is characteristic of them all that they turned toward psychology as the source of and basis for their sociological deductions. A curious situation arose: That there was a true need for a scientific psychology was seemingly felt in all quarters, but it was obvious that the traditional physiological psychology could not supply this need. The sociological investigator was thus forced to fall back on his intuition and ingenuity; descriptive terms *ad hoc* had to be evolved, such as Simmel's and Durkheim's "solidarization" of interests, Giddings' "consciousness of kind" or Gabriel Tarde's "laws of imitation and opposition." These proved to be more than examples of terminological inventiveness. A wealth of phenomena theretofore unobserved caught the student's attention and a wealth of phenomena theretofore overlooked was carefully described and properly systematized. Perhaps Tarde achieved the greatest psychological insight into various social phenomena, yet he, like every other sociologist of his generation, could not but considerably fail in his efforts because there

was no true dynamic psychology. The mass psychology of Le Bon and Fouillée dealt with mob psychology, not with social psychology. Wundt's associativism and its various elaborations failed to reach beyond the descriptive and physiological tradition of the past. In other words, a dynamic psychology dealing with psychological forces and their constellations and operation in the individual and society was in order but still wanting.

## II.

It was at about that time, at the beginning of the present century, that the first contributions of Freud appeared. Considering the need so poignantly manifest in the whole tenor of the sociological literature, it is rather surprising that Freud's views did not percolate more rapidly in the field of social sciences. American students proved much more receptive to the new ideas than the Europeans and the popularization of Freud in this country attracted the attention of many outside the confines of psychopathology. American sociology and anthropology began to utilize some of the Freudian ideas very early and with considerable enthusiasm. For a while it seemed as if anthropology and sociology would almost merge; the cultural anthropologist began to encroach upon the broad domain of the sociologist, and the sociologist found it more and more necessary to study the dynamics of primitive instinctual conflicts and the psychological affinity between primitive cultures and our own. The history of Freud's influence on modern sociological thought is perhaps too recent, too current, to allow for recapitulation, but it is not out of place to take stock of what has been successful and what has been in error.

Our achievements, despite the increasing interest in and utilization of Freud's fundamental concepts, do not extend much beyond the definite awareness that a new psychology has been born and that it can be profitably applied to the understanding of social phenomena. The whole conception of the dynamics of these phenomena is undergoing a profound change. Instead of Gabriel Tarde's "interpsychology" and "synergic psychology," which are little more than terminological advances, efficient working hypotheses have been offered which deal with instinctual conflicts and their interac-

tion. The psychosexual foundation of these conflicts is gradually becoming recognized as a basic fact. The levels of psychosexual development have been more or less clearly delineated; the instinctual, psychobiological basis of economic phenomena is better understood; the relationship of sadomasochistic drives to group psychology and group behavior has been elucidated. Lombroso, to some extent, and Enrico Ferri and Tarde had already sensed that the criminal and the psychopath play a social role, but the more recent clarification of criminal psychology has opened new avenues for a better understanding of the problems of normal life, punishment, penology, jurisprudence, and law-making and law-breaking in general. If one considers the fact that psychoanalysis has not yet reached its fiftieth year and that its true influence outside psychological medicine, particularly in the field of sociology, is but a quarter of a century old, one might be inclined to become too impressed, mistake the vitality of psychoanalysis for actual performance, and overestimate the true influence of Freud on the development of sociology. There is no doubt that the potential force of Freud's contribution to sociology is well-nigh incalculable but, in point of its actual utilization by social sciences, it would be a mistake to say that the influence of Freud has been accepted to its full extent and with due scientific thoroughness.

There are two chief reasons for this situation. First, great as Freud's influence is, there are still many objections, more potent than valid, being raised within and outside of psychoanalysis. His theory of instincts still seems to many quite unpalatable, too daring. Only recently the voice of Karen Horney was added to those who would grant Freud the distinction of having discovered little more than the unconscious and who see in his theory of instincts rather an obstacle than a contribution to the understanding of individual and social behavior. Culture and social phenomena are brought forth as factors which, instead of being explained on the basis of the theory of instincts, are in themselves supposed to be explanations of human behavior, thus confuting Freud's major hypotheses. Culture and social phenomena seem to be conceived as unitary compounds, irreducible even though complex, requiring little if any analysis, and presenting postulative manifestations of human life. Karen Horney

is not alone in her orientation. Before her, Adler and, in a more metaphysical way, Jung turned in the same direction. Freud's *Totem and Taboo*, his hypotheses about the primal horde, his *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* are not yet sufficiently digested by the very conservative stomach of traditional thought. This tradition contends that Freud invented an imaginary primitive man and an imaginary primitive society, and it refuses to accept them for fear that it will have to give up its own imaginary primitive man and society. Freud's views are resisted either by this way of rejection or by way of naïve overestimation of practical, all too practical, eclecticism. The tendency to stress "interpersonal relationships," allegedly derived from Freud, is a case in point (Sapir, Sullivan). It denotes the same type of indefinite groping which led Tarde to speak of "interpsychology." It creates an interstitial psychology, not an intra- but an inter- and extra-individual one, the existence of which is as unthinkable in nature as the blood circulation is unthinkable outside the circulatory system of an individual.

The second reason why the true utilization of Freud in the study of social phenomena should be undertaken and evaluated with considerable caution is this: Because Freud applied to social phenomena the same methods of investigation as he did to individual neuroses (*The Future of an Illusion*, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, and more recently *Moses and Monotheism*), the impression was gained in some quarters, and imperceptibly it asserted itself almost as a postulate, that social phenomena can be viewed as pathological and healthy and that the same criteria of health and disease can be applied to society as are applied to the individual. That this parallelism is admissible only as a figure of speech and not as a scientific method is quite obvious. Social schizophrenias are no more possible than social cancer; an eruption of Vesuvius is not a case of arson or pyromania no matter how many peasants' houses burn as a result; an unfavorable trade balance is no more an expression of a self-defeatist trend in a nation than a favorable trade balance is an expression of narcissistic hedonism. Freud never intended to reduce his method of parallelism to a methodological absurdity in sociology. Nor did he intend to create the seemingly generalized illusion and utopian idea that a society composed of psychologically healthy individuals will

be a psychologically healthy society, free of strife, crises, wars, revolutions, economic depressions, and political competition. This trend has attained certain articulateness in the writings of Lasswell, for instance, and it exists in a less articulate form but as a potent force underlying the thinking of those sociologists who have accepted some principles of the Freudian theory. One cannot help but view these manifestations of Freud's influence as temporary phenomena. They are the result of a too rapid development of ideas. A quarter of a century is too brief a period for a scientific hypothesis to take proper hold and give sufficiently vigorous sprouts to outgrow the weeds and underbrush which surround it and feed on its soil.

### III

Although from the standpoint of scientific analysis and synthesis the infiltration of psychoanalytic ideas into social sciences has thus far proved not sufficiently productive, it would be a mistake to assume that this is due either to some singular inability of the sociologist or to some esoteric and recondite quality of psychoanalysis. On the contrary, sociology seems sufficiently mature to adopt the methods of contemporary psychological science, and the latter already possesses a wealth of empirical data and a well systematized set of scientific hypotheses. The stumbling block which prevents more productive co-operation seems to be a methodological mistake which is based on the almost unconscious equation of the psychological characteristics of the individual with those of society. Whether or not a statement of this equation is made in so many words, the assumption seems to prevail that the social reactions of the individual are direct criteria for the reactions of society as a whole and that healthy civilized behavior presents a direct and total sublimation of the individual's unsocial or antisocial impulses. This assumption is the more misleading because, to a great extent, it is correct. In so far as the individual is concerned it reflects one of the fundamental findings of psychoanalysis but, in so far as society is concerned, it does not present a complete picture.

In order to understand the major aspects of social phenomena, the various mechanisms of sublimations must be properly assessed. Repression, displacement, reaction formation (substitution by the



opposite) are important and they all enter into play in the organization of sublimated, social or, to put it more precisely, socialized behavior. These mechanisms, it should be noted, are directed against the instinct or the object of the instinct. Repression attempts to get rid of the instinctual impulse; it tries to abolish it, as it were. Displacement tries to turn the instinctual impulse away from an object. It may be considered improper to attack one's father, but it is not at all unseemly to dislike the head of an insurance company or the president of a bank. Reaction formation attempts to deny the very nature of the instinctual impulse. It is not acceptable to us to admit that we hate our fathers, our elders, and wish (unconsciously) to dispose of them in the summary manner of certain primitive people who usually kill their aged parents. We not only repress this wish but transform its manifestations into the opposite and become fervent proponents of the prolongation of human life *ad infinitum*, of old age pensions, and of endless care for senescent human beings.

The uninitiated might gain the impression that the mechanisms of sublimations merely abolish the instinct in some mysterious but rather simple manner. The fact is overlooked that instinctual impulses, like any other form of energy, cannot be abolished and that an absolutely successful repression of instinctual impulses would automatically bring about either the psychological or the organic death of the personality. No matter how well repressed, an instinctual impulse remains a dynamic force in the unconscious and, with no regard for the conscious wishes of the individual and his automatic (also unconscious) repressive reactions, it seeks, it demands, expression and asserts itself in a million ways. Sooner or later in some form or another, willingly or unwillingly, wittingly or unwittingly, the individual will find or permit an outlet for the instinctual drive. There are many ways which the instinctual impulse canalizes to come out of the substratum where it has been driven by repression. Perhaps the simplest and, from the standpoint of the instinctual drive, the most convenient is the one seen in the mechanism of displacement. Here the expression of the drive is almost complete and unadulterated; it merely turns from a forbidden object to one more socially acceptable. When we are charged with hostility, for instance, we may "take it out on the dog"; we may curse Hitler,

denounce Mussolini. In this way all the venom we may have stored up against those whom we never dare to attack comes into the open without any danger to ourselves. It must be remembered, however, that under certain circumstances the mechanism of displacement cannot be brought into operation and the instinct must find another way to assert itself. It is never lost, nor may it be dammed up within us beyond a certain, although variable, point of tolerance. Should the instinct happen to be an aggressive one, and at no time in our personal and social history are we free from aggressive drives, it is important to bear in mind that we do not find in every era a Hitler or a Mussolini who could serve as useful objects for the displacement of accumulated tension. Moreover, not every individual is sufficiently sensitized to purely political phenomena to make them serviceable in the process of displacement. Other unconscious methods are brought into play. Among them is one of particular importance to the sociologist which Freud described under the name of the return of the repressed. It is this mechanism that is frequently overlooked by sociologists, an omission which makes the psychoanalytic approach to social life confusing if not incomprehensible. Ferenczi once cited a less realistic, metapsychological example of this mechanism.

In the so-called normal person there lingers an ever unconscious trend to return to the quietistic, prenatal state, a wish to return to intra-uterine existence. The forces of life do not permit this privilege. Unless one "chooses" to develop a stupor, to lie seemingly unconscious in a position of universal flexion (as in a catatonia) and inertly give one's self to the pleasurable sensation of being surrounded by water, which the catatonic actually does, one must go on living, doing things, responding to people and receiving the response of others. What happens to the trend for an intra-uterine existence? Overwhelmed though it is and unconscious though it remains, it keeps pushing and demanding recognition. We appear to pay no attention to it; we are much too busy inventing telephones, telegraphs, labor-saving devices, all sorts of gadgets which allow us to do difficult things easily and quickly, even entirely without effort. Let us imagine that this process of inventiveness comes to its logical, ideal end. Everything is done for us. From the predigested newspaper head-

lines which keep us from thinking to the electric bell which summons the answer to every need, we deal only with things which permit us to live in a world of no exertion and with minimal or no thought, a world so arranged, so civilized, so well and efficiently organized that we exist quite happily doing nothing—an intra-uterine world, as it were. This is the repressed that returns to play an important role and to become master. The thwarted trend smuggles itself into our complex technological civilization and controls its very direction.

Not every manifestation of the return of the repressed is as innocent and creative, as sterile in its original and ultimate goal, and as productive in its self-assertion as this assertion of our intra-uterine drives in the midst of our civilized activities. Let us examine, for instance, the drive to kill. The individual who labors under the pressure of strong murderous impulses is offered in his personal life few, if any, outlets for his drives. He may fish and hunt or become an efficient hand in an abattoir or, if sufficiently inhibited, he may develop a pathological depression and kill himself. These automatic, instinctive choices are available to only certain members of civilized society. The majority must repress their murderous impulses with utmost efficiency, live in accordance with the best principles of "Love thy neighbor as thyself," and hope unconsciously but ardently for a decent, civilized opportunity to have the uncivilized wish to murder return from its repressed state and come out into the open in an acceptable manner. Society may appear only as the repressing agency of his unacceptable impulses but, since it is the natural product of man's adaptation to his psychological conflicts, society itself offers this opportunity. A war comes, or a really violent election, and all good citizens are invited to take active part in the business of hating, destroying, in the triumphal mastery over the annihilated enemy. Society, the nation, the race, the state take over the function of murder and permit the individual either directly to partake of sanctioned and sanctified destruction or to kill vicariously with the same results to the individual psychic economy; the repressed returns and is lived out openly, alloplastically, by actions, not autoplastically, by means of symptoms. Thus the function of the ancient tradition of public executions becomes psychologically intelligible. Of course, it might be argued that executions, wars, and revolutions are exceptional, cataclysmic phenomena, that a well-

ordered society does not frequently offer such spectacular outlets for man's accumulated wish to kill. This is true. A well-ordered society does not resort exclusively to these outlets but always it must minister to man's drives; it must in some way present an arena, or reservoir, where all that is forbidden by ethics and civilization can be displayed, gratified, even glutted.

I do not wish to suggest that, in our tendency toward anthropomorphic conceptions, I visualize civilized society as endowed with an "interpsychological" will and extra-individual intelligence. Like every function of man (psychological or purely physiological), society acquires a form, an organization, which becomes by its very nature a necessity to human existence. Man would not and could not give it up any more than he would or could give up his stomach or liver. The performance of civilization is determined by virtue of the function it represents and it is therefore protected, cajoled, and preserved with utmost diligence and fervence by every individual. Even the anarchist who would seemingly destroy society and the professional criminal who disregards and provokes it, even these ostensibly antisocial persons congregate into groups of like-minded individuals and, despite their conscious attitudes, they at once become highly social human beings. They bind themselves by a code and principles; they are guided by their own laws of conduct and they administer their own justice. This process in itself is another manifestation of the return of the repressed.

Since every society or culture represents the crystallized function of the majority of repressive forces of its members, it must, as a matter of psychological inevitability, provide adequate outlets or it will become functionally useless. On purely theoretical grounds, society must by definition fulfil these requirements. If we now turn to empirical, realistic grounds and ask ourselves whether society actually does provide outlets for the return of the repressed, the answer is promptly offered by our social life itself: It does. Take, for instance, the comparatively simple example of the man who is a very kind and considerate father, proud of his children and eager to give them a good education, sensible to aesthetic values of our culture, a real and generous Maecenas. One hears so frequently the amazement in the rhetorical question: "Who would have thought this gentle and decent man would be so harsh in business, so nig-

gantly with his employees, so heartless toward his competitors, and so cruel to his political opponents?" The contrasts between the man at home and in business appear at first incongruous anomalies, impossibilities. If, however, we consider this man's business as the most convenient domain in which society allows him to practice almost fully his sadistic drives, the whole pattern appears less unreasonable. Should all the sadistic outlets be blocked, the man will be thrown back onto the autoplasic level and become depressed. The rationalization that "financial reverses" have made him sad and unhappy will not stand up before the test of scientific, psychological inquiry. Though the career was his true outlet, it is not the loss of the business per se but his repressed and ever returning sadism that makes him mentally ill. His sadism will continue to assert itself without the benefit of business. It may use the individual (autoplasic outlet); he will attempt to commit suicide. It may begin to express itself in relation to his wife and children (a combination of auto- and alloplastic reactions); he will become cranky, unkind, displace onto them the resentment and anger for his trouble. In brief, he will show what are called "character changes" and may even lay hands on his family with the pathological rationalization that he wants to save them from the ignominious misery of poverty.

From the psychological point of view our social existence presents a series of stratifications which permits us to be comfortably repressed on one stratum, provided the adjacent one permits us to be just as comfortably unrepressed. The latter possibility must, of course, remain properly integrated, dressed up in all the paraphernalia of that code of life which we follow on the level of repression. It must be a business, a political position, a military post, or, at least, a professorial chair. It must be something that for "higher considerations" and for the good of the public weal permits us to exploit, to rule ruthlessly, to kill or, at least, mercilessly to flunk students.

Though it may appear somewhat simplified when viewed from this angle, the problem of social development becomes in reality more complex. It is now impossible to consider social life as a marvelous growth guided by kindly fate, called progress, and obstructed by the gnomes of evil revealed to us under such names as injustice, inequality, reaction, or evolution. Whatever true foundation such a concept might have, social progress cannot be conceived as a process

which abolishes human instincts, even a few carefully selected human instincts, because nature does not live on evaluative principles but depends upon the constant interplay of instinctual drives. On the few occasions when Freud chose to discuss these problems, he advisedly desisted from confusing the utopian existence which man ideally and consciously wants with the reality of civilization and culture as they are. In an exchange of letters with Einstein, Freud did not permit his own wish for peace to grow into a fantasy of a forthcoming and eternal strifeless life among men. Instead he pointed to the psychobiological sources of war and recognized its psychological, functional significance. This point is extremely important not only because it presents a valid scientific deduction but because it illustrates a very serious inner sacrifice on the part of the social scientist who is intent on seeing life as it is. Freud's statements on war and peace show the necessity of overcoming the personal need to live with and in the fantasy of the ultimate, the ideal, and the eternal. The effort to observe social phenomena clearly despite interference of personal fantasies is one of the most important contributions of psychoanalysis. It is an effort similar to, if not greater than, the one that was required when scientists began to dissect human bodies. Knowledge of anatomy had to be acquired and the dissection of cadavers was the only way to acquire this knowledge. A man can scientifically dissect a human body only if he can divorce himself from the fear of death and the fantasy of immortality. True, the fear and the fantasy can never be fully eradicated but, if a considerable degree of independence had not been achieved, anatomy could never have been learned and taught. The comparison with anatomy is not accidental. Like anatomy, psychoanalysis is strictly and coldly a descriptive science. Even its psychodynamics are still in the descriptive stage. The fact that an effort is made to understand human civilization as it actually manifests itself does not mean that injury is inflicted by it on our ethico-idealistic proclivities and great service is done to knowledge.

Many illustrations could be added to the example of our murderous drives cited above. The average man, for instance, considers politics a "dirty business," and the standard of politics is measured by current criteria of good and bad in the lives of private citizens; one should not lie, or boast, or work for purely personal powers; it is

dishonest to eavesdrop and to steal or betray someone else's secret. The forbidden trends are duly repressed in the average honest individual, but the same man condones the untruths of professional diplomacy, he participates in the constant display of the virtues and greatness and historical mission of the nation, race, or state to which he belongs. Though John Doe wishes to declare that he is the greatest man on earth, he manifests modesty instead, he represses his infantile megalomania and sense of omnipotence until he is permitted by various eventualities to state: "We Germans, or we Frenchmen, are the saviors of civilization; we have a great mission to perform, a mission of which only we and no one else are capable. In order to fulfil this duty, it is good to spy on our potential enemies, steal their military and secret commercial plans, and make whatever use of them we see fit."

It may be said without fear of exaggeration that there is not a single forbidden instinctual drive which our civilization does not accommodate by virtue of its very nature, by the process of being civilized. One is consequently led to a somewhat paradoxical conclusion: To be sure, one must study the individual in society in order to study and understand society as a whole but, in order to understand the dynamics of social life and culture, one should look not for the characteristics of the individual's socialized reactions but for those outlets which society offers for the return of the repressed, for the expression rather than the repression of instinctual drives. The measure of civilization is not in what is repressed in the individual but rather in what is recaptured and gratified after repression. It will now have become obvious why the equation between social dynamics and the summational resultant of individual psychodynamics was called at the beginning a methodological mistake. If the fundamental hypotheses of psychoanalysis are properly understood and accepted, social scientists would be required to occupy themselves with the study of how a given civilization accommodates and gives expression to all the impulses which in private life are considered unsocial, or antisocial.

Needless to say, the return of the repressed is not the only fundamental mechanism which underlies social behavior and cultural development. It is, however, probably the most important from the standpoint of the development of a psychoanalytic methodology in

sociology. While there is a great deal more to be said about this mechanism as well as about other pertinent contributions of Freud to sociological thought, further elaboration would lead far beyond the scope of this paper. At the risk of repetition, I would like to emphasize this point to avoid possible confusion: The only approach to an understanding and profitable utilization of the methodological trend suggested here is by completely discarding evaluative preconceptions. Otherwise, one will experience acutely what are called the "discomforts of civilization." It will, for instance, cause a sense of discomfort to observe the return of the repressed with such limitless license as in present-day Germany, for fear that one might have to conclude that this is an idealized form of civilized living. Moreover, there is a difference between the outlets offered to the return of the repressed by way of preservation of the individual's conscious sense of freedom and the outlets offered as a compensation for the loss of the conscious sense of personal freedom. A civilization that forces the individual to repress to the extreme his own sense of importance is naturally unstable, less integrated, and more apt to lead to eruptive cataclysms. This was characteristic of European civilization for a thousand years before the Renaissance and during the period of strife and upheaval which followed the Reformation until the French Revolution. Despite the external manifestations of iron strength, the same instability is clearly discernible in our culture today. Eruptive inconstance naturally taxes sociological thought to the utmost; changing conditions enhance the difficulties of the student, whose measure of success lies in his ability first to preserve that attitude of a detached descriptive science and to resist the fascination of practical potentialities of his psychological knowledge. As a result of too little regard for this principle, we are deluged with unusually frequent outcroppings of social theories of scientific managements which are supposed to cure our social ills now and at once. Such systems need a rich body of empirical data which are not yet available, since psychoanalytic sociology still lacks a properly developed methodology. No one is more aware of this fact than Freud himself. Though he made numerous excursions into the field of cultural psychology and sociology, he never gave evidence of succumbing to the temptation of offering practical panaceas.



## THE INFLUENCE OF SIGMUND FREUD UPON SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES

ERNEST W. BURGESS

### ABSTRACT

The failure of psychoanalysis to make headway with sociologists in the United States during the first decade after its introduction into this country may be explained partly on the basis of the lag between the time of publication and actual consideration of Freudian theories, but more basically because of an aversion toward the explanation of human behavior in terms of sexual motivation, its particularistic emphasis, the simpler and apparently adequate cultural interpretations of behavior, a predisposition against absolute explanations as opposed to the relative, its apparently questionable technique, the rise of rival schools of psychoanalysis, its lack of integration with previous studies of instinct, existing sociological conceptual schemes of motivation, a trend away from the theory of instincts, and a preoccupation on the part of sociologists with their own problems. The further working-out and integrating of methods for investigating the subjective life of their phenomena are viewed as the basic methodological problems of the psychological and social sciences. To Freud must go credit for the creation of psychoanalysis as an intellectual discipline, and particularly for the perfection of the method of free association, the utilization and analysis of dream material, and the organization of a unified conceptual system. It was the mutual need in psychoanalysis and socioanalysis that both aspects of conduct, psychogenic and cultural, be understood that led students in each field to seek what the other had to offer. The levels of influence of psychoanalysis upon sociologists since 1920 may be summarized as (1) indirect influence upon those who reject it; (2) uncritical acceptance; (3) attempts at testing its theories; (4) utilization of its concepts in terms of social processes; and (5) attempts at integration of viewpoints, concepts, and, in a few cases, research methods of psychoanalysis and sociology. A final stage in the combination of psychoanalytic and sociological methods remains to be taken, that of co-operative research. In the writer's opinion Freud's most valuable contributions to sociology are (1) establishing of the role of unconscious factors in human behavior, (2) emphasis on the role of wish fulfilment, and (3) analysis of the formation of dynamic traits and patterns in personality development independent of cultural influence.

The year 1909 may be considered as the date of the official introduction of psychoanalysis into the United States. In the autumn of this year Freud and Jung were invited by Stanley Hall, president of Clark University, to participate in the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of that institution. In the following year A. A. Brill published his first translation of Freud's three essays on sex.

A careful examination of the programs of the American Sociological Society and of textbooks in sociology show that for some years little or no attention apparently was paid to psychoanalysis by American sociologists. The year 1920 may perhaps be taken as a dividing-point. Before this date there is little evidence of Freudian

influence; beginning with 1920 sociologists manifest an increasing interest in psychoanalysis.

This paper proposes to discuss three questions: (1) Why at first did the theories and findings of Freud make no or slight headway in sociology? (2) In what ways since 1920 has psychoanalysis influenced sociologists and sociology? (3) What are the present trends and future possibilities in the interrelationship between psychoanalysis and sociology?

#### THE PERIOD OF RESISTANCE, 1909-19

The indifference of many sociologists to discoveries outside their field undoubtedly explains, in part, the lag between the publication and consideration of the theories and findings of Freud. But where a hearing was given the reactions of sociologists were almost invariably negative. Their resistance to psychoanalysis may be explained partly by the same reasons as that of biologists, psychiatrists, and psychologists; but in addition other factors were present peculiar to sociologists and cultural anthropologists.

First of all, sociologists as human beings shared the aversion of the average man to an explanation of all behavior as motivated by sex. Freud experienced these attitudes of prejudice and in "The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement" has given a vivid picture of "reactions of resentful rejection" by colleagues and by the public which he came to realize "as my painful destiny."<sup>1</sup>

Second, Freud's explanation of behavior by one cause alone was subject to all the criticism then being directed throughout the entire scientific world against the particularistic fallacy. In psychology William James posited a "pluralistic" rather than a "monistic" universe. In science emphasis was placed upon the multiple rather than upon the single hypothesis. Sex as the one cause of all human behavior explained nothing, unless sex were to be differentiated; but sex to be differentiated would introduce other elements than sex, and the problem would become the study of these other nonsexual ele-

<sup>1</sup> *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*, ed. A. A. Brill (New York: Modern Library, 1938), p. 936. Dr. Brill in his article in this issue gives an intimate account of the early and general antagonism to the theory, findings, and proponents of psychoanalysis upon its introduction into this country.

ments. This crucial scientific problem seemed to be inadequately recognized and dealt with in psychoanalysis.

In the third place, and more characteristic of the resistance of the sociologist, was his predisposition to favor cultural rather than psychoanalytic interpretations of behavior. In most cases cultural explanations appeared to him entirely adequate and simpler than those of psychoanalysis. In many instances psychoanalytic interpretations appeared fantastic and absurd, or at best metaphorical. Cases in point were the asserted universality of the castration complex, the Freudian emphasis upon penis envy of the girl as the basis for female feelings of inferiority, the unconscious as the submerged reservoir of racial memories, the identification of money with feces, and the alleged actual occurrence of the primal deed—the murder of the father by his sons.

The predisposition of the sociologist to cultural and relative rather than to constitutional and absolute explanations has a long history which goes back to Auguste Comte.<sup>2</sup> Only three years before the introduction of psychoanalysis in the United States Sumner had published his *Folkways*<sup>3</sup> with its emphasis upon the control of human behavior by the folkways and the mores and their relativity to the culture of a people. Sociologists were therefore oriented toward viewing sex as any other aspect of behavior in the context of the culture of a given society rather than as a constant factor unmodified by cultural conditioning. They were, therefore, prepared to accept Malinowski's finding<sup>4</sup> based upon his study of Trobriand culture that the Freudian conceptions derived from a study of a few patients from middle- and upper-class Western society did not apply except with drastic modification to other cultures or even to the working class in European and American countries.

Fourth, the technique of psychoanalytic investigation appeared to sociologists and to others open to question. Could it be called a method of natural science? Was it not rather a perfected special technique of intuition, a new and highly subjective way of getting

<sup>2</sup> Auguste Comte, *Cours de philosophie positive* (5th ed.; 6 vols.; Paris, 1892).

<sup>3</sup> William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston, 1906).

<sup>4</sup> Bronislaw Malinowski, *Sex and Repression in Savage Society* (New York, 1929).

insights into the motivations of human behavior? Was psychoanalysis, therefore, not a science, but an art?

The proponents of psychoanalysis in answer appealed to the pragmatic test that it works. They argued that the therapeutic value of the psychoanalytic interview and analysis validated the method. Some sociologists were inclined to look askance at this test of verification and to agree with Knight Dunlap in his rejoinder.

The fact that cures may be performed through the technique associated with the theories of psychoanalysis is of course no proof of the truth of the theories. Christian Science, hypnotism, osteopathy, relics of the saints, and the laying on of hands also produced cures. . . . The patient craves the personal interest of the psychoanalyst or other practitioner and accepts in a superficial way any suggestion made by the sympathetic listener provided these suggestions have a certain flavor of profundity and are vehicles of hope. In this respect Christian Science, psychoanalysis and the one thousand and one techniques for whose operations the neurotics are the natural prey present no essential differences. The confessional of the church achieves the same result in a more scientific way.<sup>5</sup>

The rise of rival schools of psychoanalysis confirmed the sociologist in his skepticism. When associates and students of Freud like Adler, Jung, and Rank seceded and formulated radically divergent theoretical systems of the basic motivation of behavior, the Freudian methodological foundation seemed to the outsider none too secure. Disciples of the different schools pointed to cures to substantiate the correctness of their divergent theoretical explanations of the unconscious motivations of conduct.

Fifth, many sociologists were repelled because Freud presented a new theory of the instinctive determination of human behavior, derived allegedly from his clinical study but unintegrated with previous studies of instinct. In 1909 sociologists, almost without exception, subscribed to the theory then dominant in biology and psychology<sup>6</sup> that instincts were the original sources of human motivations and were consequently critical of the evident improvisation of Freud's theory. Introspective psychology, culminating in the work of Wil-

<sup>5</sup> *Mysticism, Freudianism and Scientific Psychology* (St. Louis: C. V. Mosby Co., 1920), pp. 99-100, 103-4.

<sup>6</sup> "As late as 1918 or even 1920 the active or passive support of the instinct hypothesis in the United States by psychologists, sociologists and educationalists appeared to be almost unanimous" (L. L. Bernard, "Instinct," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* [New York: Macmillan Co., 1930-35], VIII, 82).

liam McDougall published in 1908, had had as one of its concerns the isolation and the identification of the instincts of man. The lists of instincts presented by James, Thorndike, and McDougall, conflicting as were the specific instincts enumerated, seemed far more adequate for explaining behavior than the monistic fallacy of Freud of deriving it from one instinct—sex.

Then, too, almost all sociologists had considered as motivations of behavior instincts as modified by experience. They had worked out and tested by investigations their own sociological conceptual schemes of motivation, namely, the desires which Ward regarded as the psychic forces; the six basic interests of Small; and the four fundamental wishes of Thomas. One or the other of these classifications which took into account cultural influences seemed more adequate for the interpretation of man's behavior in society than the Freudian interpretation of the libido in terms of instinctual drives.

Finally, sociologists, notably Ellsworth Faris<sup>7</sup> and L. L. Bernard,<sup>8</sup> took the lead in detecting and unmasking the fallacies of explaining by "instincts" what was obviously habitual and customary behavior. This demolishing of the theory of instincts as significant motivations of human behavior made it increasingly difficult for sociologists to give favorable consideration to the valuable elements in the psychoanalytic contribution.

A sixth and probably the chief reason for the early failure of psychoanalysis to attract and to hold the attention of sociologists was their deep absorption in work upon their own basic problems, as partially indicated by sociological studies of basic motivations just mentioned. They were, therefore, not inclined to be distracted into a consideration and mastery of another field, even one like that of psychoanalysis which was close and which dealt with problems of vital importance to sociology. The nature of this preoccupation of the sociologist, particularly with reference to its effect upon his attitude toward psychoanalysis, can perhaps best be understood by a comparison of the history of sociology and psychology.

<sup>7</sup> "Are Instincts Data or Hypothesis?" *American Journal of Sociology*, XXVII (1921-22), 184-86.

<sup>8</sup> "The Misuse of Instinct in the Social Sciences," *Psychological Review*, XXVIII (1921), 96-119.

The methodological problems of sociology have been and are markedly and significantly similar to those of psychology. This identity of basic problems is no less great because the orientation of their effort is somewhat dissimilar. Sociology has always concentrated upon the study of the collective life of human beings under the assumption, implicit or explicit, that an understanding of the culture, the customs, and the social forms of behavior would illuminate the motivations of personal conduct. Psychology has stressed the intensive study of the mind of the individual with the expectation that the derived knowledge would be significantly applicable to solving the mysteries of man's social behavior.

In prosecuting these tasks, psychologists and sociologists alike came to rely upon two procedures which, for the purposes of this paper, may be called, the one predominantly "external" and relying upon statistics, the other predominantly "subjective" and depending upon human documents. The employment of the latter method with its techniques of the personal interview, sympathetic introspection, and empathy arose out of the fact that psychology and sociology are not limited to methods of observation and comparison of external behavior. In contrast with astronomy, physics, chemistry, and biology, psychology and sociology have access to the subjective life of their phenomena. Therefore, they use not only the methods of natural science for the study of the external aspects of man's behavior but must also devise new methods applicable to the discovery and analysis of the processes and mechanisms of mental and social life, before the essential questions of human conduct involving motives, meanings, and values can be answered. These latter methods are, of course, exclusively the property of the mental and the social sciences. The further working-out of these methods and the integrating of them with the methods of experimental psychology and of social statistics are in the judgment of the writer the basic methodological problems of the psychological and social sciences.

In psychology the method of "external" observation was preeminently but not exclusively that of experimental psychology, with its prestige arising from the use of natural science methods. Psychologists with the aid of this method have dug up a mass of informa-

tion upon many aspects of human behavior, but they have not been enabled to penetrate to its dynamic motivations.

Psychoanalysis represents after the decline of introspection the most thoroughgoing demonstration of subjective investigation in psychology. It has been highly successful in disclosing the workings of unconscious mental processes and most fertile in its suggestions for their explanation. To Freud must go the credit for the almost single-handed creation of psychoanalysis as an intellectual discipline.<sup>9</sup> His most important contributions include the invention and perfection of the method of free association as a substitute for hypnotism, the utilization and analysis of dream material, and the organization of a unified conceptual system.

In psychology these two methods of study, one experimental and the other subjective, developed with little or no interaction between them. Experimental psychology considered itself rigidly scientific and rejected or discounted the findings of psychoanalysis as intuitive and not verified, and perhaps not verifiable by comparative and experimental methods.<sup>10</sup> The latter conceived itself as having perfected an instrument for the discovery of the dynamics and the mechanisms of behavior and regarded the findings of experimental psychology as a meaningless mass of irrelevant details upon the external and superficial aspects of human behavior.

In sociology the use of the methods of statistical investigation of the so-called "external" aspects of behavior and of the analysis of life-histories and other human documents also developed in relative isolation from each other. Statistical studies, some of them conducted like those of experimental psychology with rigid scientific precision, accumulated masses of empirical data too often unilluminated by sociological analysis. At the same time significant attempts were under way to investigate the "subjective aspect of culture." The most serious and sustained effort to organize a system of

<sup>9</sup> Freud, of course, acknowledges his indebtedness to his teachers, his colleagues, and his students. Such recognition does not detract from the fact that psychoanalysis is largely the product of his insight, originality, and creative genius.

<sup>10</sup> "As behaviorists we have grown skeptical too of psychoanalysis as a sound method. The reason for the failure of analysis is due to the practitioners' complex, clumsy, top-heavy presuppositions which led them to search for something which does not exist" (John Watson, *The Ways of Behaviorism* [New York: Harper & Bros., 1928], p. 108).

conceptual explanation in relation to life-histories, letters, and other personal documents was that of W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki in their work *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*. This attempt in sociology to create what might be called *socioanalysis* has many methodological similarities to the parallel effort of Freud in his development of psychoanalysis in psychology. For that reason some consideration will be given to a recent critical discussion of this contribution.

The chief point made by Herbert Blumer in his critical appraisal of the contribution of Thomas and Znaniecki applies with almost equal force to the lifework of Freud:

Thomas and Znaniecki, cognizant of the need of getting material upon the subjective factor, have advocated the use of "human documents," of which they regard the life record as the most perfect form. . . . The authors began their study of the Polish peasant with the rudiments of their theoretical schemes, built out of much experience with human beings, many reflections and observations on human conduct, and considerable appreciation of human nature. . . . Indeed the major outlines are foreshadowed in the previous writings of Thomas. . . . Only individuals with such experience and gifts could have made the stimulating and incisive interpretations that they have made. . . . While there can be no question that much of the theoretical conception came from handling the documents, it is also true that a large part of it did not. . . . Some interpretations, indeed, are borne out by the content of the documents, and sometimes the interpretations do not seem to be adequately verified; in both instances, of course, the materials are a test. Usually, however, one can not say that the interpretation is either true or not true, even though it is distinctly plausible. . . . In the authors we have two excellent minds with a rich experience with human beings, with a keen sensitivity to the human element in conduct, with some fundamental notions and interests, with a number of important problems, with a variety of hunches, with a lively curiosity and sense of inquiry, with a capacity for forming abstract concepts—two minds, of this sort, approaching voluminous accounts of human experience, mulling over them, reflecting on them, perceiving many things in them, relating these things to their background of experience, checking these things against one another, and charting all of them into a coherent and analytical pattern. . . .

The inadequacy of human documents in testing interpretation is a primary reason why they are rejected by many as materials for scientific study. When one adds to this the fact that usually the separate document cannot very well stand evaluation according to the criteria of representativeness, adequacy, and reliability, it is easy to see why human documents become suspect as a scientific instrument. Yet to renounce their use in the scientific investigation of human



life would be to commit a fatal blunder, for theoretically they are indispensable and actually they may be of enormous value.<sup>11</sup>

Thomas and Znaniecki in sociology, like Freud in psychology, devised instruments of investigation and conceptual systems designed for the study of the subjective aspect of human experience. The task both in socioanalysis and in psychoanalysis was greater than that of the application of natural science methods to social and mental phenomena; it involved exploration and discovery of the basic forces in human behavior, cultural and psychogenic.

Alike as was the central methodological problem of the two disciplines and equally unorthodox as were their methods of investigation, each was preoccupied with its own problems and had little or no interest in the similar problem or even in the findings of the other. Then, too, the orientations of the two fields were at opposite poles: society, collective behavior, and culture for the socioanalytic sociologist, and mind, individual behavior, and mental complexes for the psychoanalytic psychologist. Furthermore, the procedures of investigation were widely different: the method of free association and the deep probing of the unconscious by the psychoanalyst and the technique of the life-history and the conscious recall of remembered past experience in the perspective of the present by the sociologist. They were alike mainly in that both were attempting to create a conceptual system adequate for the aspect of human behavior with which they were dealing. Yet an understanding of both aspects of conduct, psychogenic and cultural, and particularly of their interaction with each other is essential for adequate knowledge of human behavior. Actually, in the long run it was this mutual need, at first vaguely appreciated but later clearly recognized, that ultimately led each to seek what the other had to offer.

#### GROWTH OF INTEREST IN PSYCHOANALYSIS, 1920-39

In the last twenty years the influence of psychoanalysis upon sociologists and sociology has been steadily increasing. The first official recognition of psychoanalysis by sociologists was the inclusion

<sup>11</sup> Herbert Blumer, *An Appraisal of "The Polish Peasant in Europe and America"* by W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1939), pp. 73-80.

of a round table on the sociological significance of psychoanalytic psychology upon the program of the American Sociological Society in December, 1920, at Washington, D.C. Ernest R. Groves opened the discussion with a paper on sociology and psychoanalytic psychology, which was followed by short papers by William A. White, Edith R. Spaulding, Phyllis Blanchard, Clarence A. Robinson, and Ivy R. Peters. In many following sessions of the Society, particularly in the section on the family and in the section on sociology and psychiatry (organized in 1928), papers have been presented by psychoanalysts.

The first textbook in sociology to mention Freud and to introduce psychoanalytic concepts and findings was *An Introduction to the Science of Sociology* by R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess. In an article published in 1927 on "The Use of Psychoanalytic Classification in the Analysis of Social Behavior" Thomas D. Eliot names the students of social science who up to that time have used "psychiatric classification in the analysis of social behavior." The sociologists in this list are Groves, Ogburn, Miller, Peters, Wolfe, Sorokin, Burgess, Rice, and Becker. In recent years psychoanalytic conceptions and methods have been employed in a systematic way, particularly by younger sociologists, among whom the following may be mentioned: L. S. Cottrell, John Dollard, J. K. Folsom, Erich Fromm, Harold D. Lasswell, Willard Waller, and Kimball Young.

The effect of psychoanalysis upon sociology and sociologists has been manifested at the following levels of influence:

1. There are those sociologists who reject psychoanalysis, but who, nevertheless, are indirectly influenced. Certain psychoanalytic concepts have found their way into sociology, sometimes with greater or less change in meaning, and have been incorporated into its vocabulary. These include such terms as "inferiority complex," "mental conflict," "rationalization," "repression," "sublimation," and "transference."
2. There are those who uncritically accept the theories and formulations of psychoanalysis and either substitute them for sociological theories and concepts or make use of both with little or no attempt to reconcile them or bring them into some working relation with each other.
3. Those more critical have attempted to put psychoanalytic

theories and explanations to some sort of natural science test. The interest has been to devise some comparison that would measure the degree of correspondence between the theoretical expectation and the actual outcome in the test situation. In the majority of such instances the findings have been negative or have shown only a slight degree of correlation with the expectation according to the Freudian theory. Only a few illustrations of such testing by sociologists will be offered.

The only child by an analysis both of schedule data and of life-histories shows little or no differences in personality traits and in social adjustment when compared with oldest, middle, and youngest children.<sup>12</sup> This conclusion is substantiated by a review of the literature of study of the only child in comparison with other birth orders.<sup>13</sup>

An exploratory study making use of biographies failed to show statistically reliable evidence to substantiate the theory that conflict with fathers in childhood was associated with laissez faire theories of social philosophers.<sup>14</sup>

A marriage study showed that close attachment with father and with mother was favorable to adjustment in marriage, a conclusion seemingly at variance with the psychoanalytic theory of the unfavorable effect upon married life of overattachment to one or both parents.<sup>15</sup>

A recent study "aimed to test the hypothesis suggested by Freud that young women form conceptions of ideal husbands who are more closely related to their conceptions of their father than to that of any other most intimate male associate." All the findings of the study "showed in general that as judged by the subjects the ideal mate is most closely associated with the male companion than with either the father or other most intimate blood relative."<sup>16</sup>

These negative findings in test studies, while disappointing, are in no sense conclusive and final. It is extremely difficult to devise questions the answers to which fulfil the two preconditions necessary for

<sup>12</sup> W. Paul Carter, "The Only Child in the Family: A Comparison with Other Orders of Birth" (University of Chicago thesis, 1937).

<sup>13</sup> H. E. Jones, "The Influence of Family Constellation," *Personality Development in Childhood* (Monograph of the Society for Research in Child Development), I, No. 4 (1936), 120-26.

<sup>14</sup> Helen Griffin Woolbert, "Type of Social Philosophy as a Function of Father-Son Relationship" (University of Chicago thesis, 1930).

<sup>15</sup> E. W. Burgess and L. S. Cottrell, *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939), pp. 92-98.

<sup>16</sup> A. R. Mangus, "Relationships between the Young Woman's Conceptions of Her Intimate Male Associates and of Her Ideal Husband," *Journal of Social Psychology*, VI (1936), 403-20.

determining the validity of psychoanalytic theories: (1) that they be in the form susceptible to comparison and verification according to natural science methods and (2) that at the same time they reveal the unconscious motivations of behavior. The second precondition is particularly hard to meet, especially because rationalizations and defenses mask, oftentimes, basic dynamic impulsions. Nevertheless, it is increasingly realized by the friends and foes of psychoanalysis that its ultimate contribution to human knowledge will in large part be determined by objective measurement.

4. Many sociologists have utilized psychoanalytic concepts for their value in illuminating social processes in the behavior of the person and the group. Inevitably psychoanalytic concepts thus employed underwent considerable change in meaning as compared with their original significance in the explanation of mental processes. A few examples will illustrate this point.

Concepts derived from psychoanalysis applied by sociologists to the behavior of the person naturally emphasized cultural components in its motivation. *Resistance*, a basic Freudian concept used to denote the "energy with which an individual protects repressed feelings or thoughts against their integration into conscious awareness,"<sup>17</sup> when used by sociologists tended to emphasize the nature and the degree of the impress of familial and cultural backgrounds or social attitudes and values upon the person which inhibited certain forms of action. *Rationalization* in psychoanalytic usage signifies the defensive explanations by which a person masks his unconscious motivations, but was reinterpreted by the sociologist to emphasize their inevitable reference to standards of his group and to the values of his culture. *Sublimation*, defined in psychoanalysis as "a process of deflecting libido or sexual-motive activity from human objects to new objects of a non-sexual socially valuable nature,"<sup>18</sup> received a redefinition in the perspective of social approval and self-expression through literature, art, religion, ethics, and philosophy. *Mental conflict* in the person was susceptible to explanation by cultural conflict in society. *Inferiority* feelings and the inferiority complex were to be understood in relation to the "definition of the situation" by the group. In their use of the *Oedipus complex*, one of the cornerstones of the Freudian structure, sociologists were inclined to emphasize less its sexual component and more the rebellion of the son against the dominance of the father and the cultural conflict of the older and the younger generations.

Sociologists did not restrict their reinterpretations of psychoanalytic concepts

<sup>17</sup> Karen Horney, *New Ways of Psychoanalysis* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1939), p. 34.

<sup>18</sup> Definition by Brill in *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19.

to their application to personal conduct but boldly proceeded to employ them in the description and analysis of collective behavior. They began to write of the *resistance* of society to cultural change. Society as well as the individual under certain conditions *sublimates* its activities. Social conflict between classes, nations, and races seemed to take on new meaning in the context of the Freudian significance of *mental conflict* in the individual. The *inferiority* feelings of classes, nations, and races were stressed in the explanations of social conflicts, including class conflicts, strikes, race riots, nationalistic revival movements, the "oppressed nationality psychosis," and war.

These illustrations suffice to indicate the vitality and the adaptability of psychoanalytic concepts transplanted to the field of another discipline. To the degree that this procedure enriched the conceptual system of sociology and rendered it more adequate for its task, it unquestionably was advantageous. To the extent that these terms were employed by way of analogy to social phenomena, short-circuiting research to reach pretentious but specious conclusions, the effect was unfortunate. The value of a conceptual system as demonstrated by Freud's own experience in developing psychoanalysis is that it is in intimate contact, interaction, and revision with the reality of behavior. Without this vital relationship, concepts are or become formal and meaningless.

5. In the past few years attempts have been made by sociologists in the integration of viewpoints and concepts, and in a few instances of methods of research of psychoanalysis and of sociology. Two recent textbooks on the family by J. K. Folsom and by Willard Waller attempt to combine sociological and psychoanalytic interpretations. A pioneer demonstration of the feasibility of using both methods in a research project has been made by John Dollard in his study of *Class and Caste in a Southern Town*.<sup>19</sup> In his *Criteria of the Life History*<sup>20</sup> Dollard advocates a union of the methods of psychoanalysis and sociology in the study of personality. A case study in the field of marriage adjustment, where the viewpoints and concepts of both disciplines were employed, is reported by L. S. Cottrell.<sup>21</sup> Where sociologists have participated in child-guidance clinics they have nat-

<sup>19</sup> New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938.

<sup>20</sup> New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936.

<sup>21</sup> "Roles and Marital Adjustment," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, XXVII (1933), 107-15.

urally and inevitably stated their role in relation to that of the psychiatrist.<sup>22</sup>

The foregoing five ways in which psychoanalysis has influenced sociology and sociologists represent different levels of the utilization of Freudian conceptions. A final stage in the combination of psychoanalytic and sociological methods remains to be taken, that of co-operation of psychoanalysts and sociologists in joint research. The situation is becoming ripe for such a venture.

#### PRESENT STATUS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

Signs, at present, are multiplying of fruitful interaction between sociology and psychoanalysis. Evidences of this on the part of sociology have already been given. Psychoanalysis, on its side, arriving at maturity, is becoming self-critical, in no small part as a result of contact with sociology and with cultural anthropology. Leaders in this movement to reorient the viewpoint and conceptual system of psychoanalysis with those of the social sciences have been and are Franz Alexander, Trigant Burrow, William Healy, Karen Horney, David Slight, Harry Stack Sullivan, and William A. White, from the side of psychiatry, and B. Malinowski, Margaret Mead, and Edward Sapir, from cultural anthropology. The most systematic attempt to fund the essentials of the psychoanalytic contribution and to integrate it with the contributions of sociology and cultural anthropology has been made by Karen Horney in her two works, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*<sup>23</sup> and *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*.<sup>24</sup> She says:

My desire to make a critical re-evaluation of psychoanalytic theories had its origin in a dissatisfaction with therapeutic results. I found that almost every patient offered problems for which our accepted psychoanalytical knowledge offered no means of solution, and which therefore remained unsolved. . . .

The resistance which many psychiatrists as well as laymen feel towards orthodox psychoanalysis is due not only to emotional sources, as is assumed, but also to the debatable character of many theories. . . . Thus the purpose of this

<sup>22</sup> See E. W. Burgess, "The Cultural Approach to the Study of Personality," *Mental Hygiene*, XIV (April, 1930), 307-25, and Louis Wirth, "Clinical Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXVII (July, 1931), 49-66.

<sup>23</sup> New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1936.

<sup>24</sup> New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1939.

book is not to show what is wrong with psychoanalysis, but, through eliminating the debatable elements, to enable psychoanalysis to develop to the height of its potentialities. . . . The range of problems which can be understood is enlarged considerably if we cut loose from certain historically determined theoretical premises and discard the theories arising on that basis. My conviction, expressed in a nutshell, is that psychoanalysis should outgrow the limitations set by its being an instinctive and a genetic psychology. . . . When character trends are no longer explained as the ultimate outcome of instinctual drives, modified only by the environment, the entire emphasis falls on the life conditions molding the character and we have to search anew for the environmental factors responsible for creating neurotic conflicts: thus disturbances in human relationships become the crucial factor in the genesis of neuroses. A prevailing sociological orientation takes the place of a prevailing anatomical-physiological one. . . .

I regard as the most fundamental and most significant of Freud's findings his doctrine that psychic processes are strictly determined, that actions and feelings may be determined by unconscious motivations and that the motivations driving us are emotional forces. . . .

Not least in importance, Freud has given us basic methodological tools for therapy. The main concepts which have contributed to psychoanalytical therapy are those relating to transference, to resistance and to the method of free association.<sup>25</sup>

Open to criticism, debatable, and dispensable, Horney regards Freud's attempt to make psychology a natural science, his ascribing our feelings and strivings ultimately to "instinctual" sources, his extension of the concept of sexuality, his belief in the general importance of the Oedipus complex, his assumption that personality is divided into "id," "ego," and "super-ego," his concept of repetition-al patterns in life which are formed in childhood, and his expectation of effecting a cure by reviving early experiences.<sup>26</sup>

This attempt by Horney and by others to revise the theoretical framework of psychoanalysis is a natural, healthy, and necessary stage in the growth of the discipline. In psychoanalysis and in social psychology, as has already been seen, the conceptual scheme of analysis is not derived inductively exclusively from the data under observation. It is in greater or less degree influenced by what has been called the "apperception mass" of the investigator. In the psychological and the social sciences these preconceptions are somewhat influenced by the social order and by the place which the investigator occupies in it but more especially by his background of training and

<sup>25</sup> *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*, pp. 7-33.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

experience in the biological, psychological, and social sciences. The conceptual system of psychoanalysis was profoundly influenced by Freud's biological and medical viewpoint and training. In fact, the dubious and debatable elements in psychoanalysis appear to be those derived from this source rather than from behavior observed in his clinical cases.

At any rate, a conceptual system that is static and unchanging belongs, if anywhere, to the absolutes of religion and philosophy. A dynamic conceptual system characteristic of science is one in constant change in action and reaction with the phenomena of investigation. Freud himself is far less dogmatic and doctrinaire than his loyal disciples. Although the founder of psychoanalysis, he does not prescribe that workers in the field shall subscribe to Freudian conceptions. In the following quotation he leaves the door wide open to those who working with his methods arrive at conclusions different from his own:

Psychoanalytic theory endeavors to explain two experiences, which result in a striking and unexpected manner during the attempt to trace back the morbid symptoms of a neurotic to their source in his life history; viz., the facts of transference and of resistance. Every investigation that recognizes these two facts and makes them the starting-points of its work may call itself psychoanalysis, even if it leads to other results than my own.<sup>27</sup>

Freud recognized that psychoanalysis was a field broader than the work of any one investigator, even its founder. In this statement he prepares the way for revision and reformulation of its conceptual system.

The increasing recognition by psychoanalysts of cultural factors in human behavior parallels and facilitates the perception by the sociologist of the role of psychogenic influences upon conduct. A statement differentiating between psychogenic and cultural factors in the molding of personality and indicating their interrelation to each other has been made by Edward Sapir, a formulation which may be of service both to psychoanalysts and to sociologists in clarifying their relationship:

The psychiatrist's concept of personality is to all intents and purposes the reactive system exhibited by the precultural child, a total configuration of reactive tendencies determined by heredity, and by prenatal and postnatal condi-

<sup>27</sup> *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*, p. 939.



tioning up to the point where cultural patterns are constantly modifying the child's behavior. The personality may be conceived of as a latent system of reaction patterns and tendencies to reaction patterns finished shortly after birth or well into the second or third year of the life of the individual. With all the uncertainty that now prevails with regard to the relative permanence or modifiability of life patterns in the individual and in the race it is unwise, however, to force the notion of the fixation of personality in time.

The genesis of personality is in all probability determined largely by the anatomical and physiological makeup of the individual but cannot be entirely so explained. Conditioning factors which may roughly be lumped together as the social psychological determinants of childhood must be considered as at least as important in the development of personality as innate biological factors.<sup>28</sup>

In the judgment of the writer the three contributions of Freud of most value to sociology are:

1. The enormous role of unconscious factors in human behavior was conclusively established by Freud. True enough that sociologists—for example, Le Bon, Sumner, and Pareto—have pointed out that irrational conduct was peculiarly the phenomenon for sociological investigation. But Freud succeeded in concrete and verifiable ways, as in his *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* and in his analysis of dreams, in revealing the processes of repression, suppression, transference, and sublimation, and thus furnishing the sociologists with new research instruments.

2. Freud's emphasis upon the dynamic role of wish fulfilment in the life of the person has had considerable influence upon social psychologists especially since it articulated with developments independently taking place in personality research. W. I. Thomas states that his theory of fundamental wishes was formulated prior to his acquaintance with Freudian concepts, and it is obvious that the differences in their definition and orientation are as great as, if not greater than, any similarity. Mead's analysis of the act appears to show little or no Freudian influence, but an integration of psychoanalytic concepts into the analysis of the stages in the act carried through by Mead's disciples has undoubtedly enriched the value of this instrument for research.

3. The analysis by Freud of the formation of dynamic traits, trends, and patterns in personality development independent of

<sup>28</sup> "Personality," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, XII, 86.

cultural influencing has had a wholesome effect upon sociologists prone to ascribe all behavior to cultural conditioning. Sapir's distinction between psychogenetic and cultural factors in personality formation now makes it possible for the sociologist, as it also does for the psychoanalyst, to engage in research upon his appropriate aspect of behavior. Incidentally, the present recognition of the determining effect of early life-experiences upon later behavior stems largely from Freud.

The further development of psychoanalysis and of sociology and of their interrelationship cannot, of course, be predicted with absolute certainty. Some new discovery, revolutionary in revealing motivations of human behavior, is not beyond the realm of possibility. The writer, however, does not put his faith in waiting for "a bolt out of the blue." He believes rather that the psychological and the social sciences are now in possession of the requisite methods appropriate to the problems to be investigated. But each discipline, psychology and sociology, and the two main methodological divisions within them, experimental and psychoanalytic psychology and statistical and case-study sociology, have reached the limits of diminishing returns in their independent attacks upon the problems of human behavior. What is now needed in order to push forward the frontiers of knowledge is an integration of points of view and a joint utilization of the well-differentiated techniques of the psychological and social sciences, directed to the study of personality and of collective behavior.

A few suggestions may be pertinent to the achievement of this consummation. Conferences, particularly upon concrete research projects of common interest, of representatives of these different points of view and methods should be further encouraged. Certain individuals may seek to include in their training the points of view and techniques of psychoanalysis, social psychology, and statistics. Research projects upon significant problems may profitably be undertaken by a staff of persons who among them have competence in these several methods.

Fields particularly promising for the combined use of psychoanalytic and sociological concepts and methods of investigation appear to be (1) those of interpersonal relations, as problem behavior

of children, juvenile delinquency, crime, suicide, insanity, family interaction, and the various social deviations (drug addiction, drunkenness, gambling, homosexuality, vagabondage); (2) those of collective behavior which are influenced by unconscious motivations, as crowd behavior, manias, fashion, resistance to social change, advertising, propaganda, and leadership; and (3) those of the nature and processes of thought, as the personal equation in research, irrational elements in belief and criticism, and the sociology and psychology of knowledge.

There can be no doubt that the present period of specialization and of significant discoveries by research of isolated disciplines is drawing to a close. An era of the synthesis of the contributions and of the methods of the basic life-sciences—biology, cultural anthropology, psychology, and sociology—is beginning. In the integration of knowledge in preparation for further research the work of Sigmund Freud will have a first place.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

## THE CONTRIBUTION OF FREUD'S INSIGHT INTERVIEW TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

HAROLD D. LASSWELL

### ABSTRACT

The most abiding contribution of Freud to social science is the observational standpoint which he invented. The psychoanalytic standpoint is intensive rather than extensive, scientific and therapeutic rather than indoctrinating. It is an interview rather than a participant, spectator, or collector relationship; and it is an insight interview. The criteria of insight are formulated, and the point is made that simultaneous insight into the person, personality, and culture is obtained. From this standpoint the insight interview is a means of acquiring skill in the discovery of culture and hence is important for social scientists who are mainly concerned with culture. The psychoanalytic standpoint has prompted the use of more intensive methods in social observation; psychoanalytic hypotheses and findings have stimulated research. The rich yield of intensive investigation has called for more refined definitions of basic terms like "trait," "reaction," "person," "personality," "conduct," "behavior," and "culture" and has posed the task of calibrating the observations made from one standpoint with observations made in any other position along the continuum of intensiveness-extensiveness.

The most abiding contribution of Sigmund Freud to the psychological and social sciences is his special standpoint for the observation of interpersonal events. Some of his own tentative "applications" of psychoanalysis to society have already been superseded, notably the formulations put forth in *Totem and Tabu*.<sup>1</sup> His distinctive terminology is already in process of liquidation as his work merges with the broad stream of scientific development. But his observational standpoint remains ever fruitful for the investigation of interpersonal relationships; it is capable of providing data which disconfirm, as well as confirm, his early hypotheses.<sup>2</sup>

What are the significant characteristics of the standpoint taken up by Freud? The first mark of interest to us is intensiveness rather than extensiveness. An intensive standpoint has two distinguishing characteristics: it is prolonged and complex. The observer focuses his attention upon the subject for a protracted period of time and

<sup>1</sup> A convenient statement of the objections to "the crime that began culture" is by M. E. Opler, "The Psychoanalytic Treatment of Culture," *Psychoanalytic Review*, XXII (1935), 138-57.

<sup>2</sup> Freud's most extended direct contributions to social science are *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, *The Future of an Illusion*, and *Civilization and Its Discontents*.

uses special ways of exposing structure and functions. The psychoanalyst may see the analysand for an hour a day for months or years, and he uses the technique of prolonged free association (and of interpretation) in order to uncover the significant features of the pattern in front of him. This is anything but extensive observation, in which the relationship between the observer and the subject is cursory and simple. An extreme example is the standpoint of the canvasser who takes a poll of opinion during an election. His contact with the career line of each subject is brief, and no more complex means are employed than the utterance of a limited list of questions which are intended by the questioner to elicit "Yes" and "No" replies.

There is an infinite number of observational positions along the intensive-extensive continuum, only some of which have been occupied as yet. Some observers remain in prolonged contact with their subjects but use no special procedure to study them. This is the usual relationship of an untrained Boswell to his Johnson. Sometimes the contact between the observer and the subject is short, yet the method may be complex, as when a battery of tests is administered to measure aptitude, skill, or attitude.<sup>3</sup>

The psychoanalytical standpoint is scientific and therapeutic. It is used to obtain data which are relevant to the confirmation or the disconfirmation of a body of explanatory propositions, and it is used to heal disease. The mere fact that intimate data are assembled by psychoanalysts does not distinguish them from many other specialists. Intimate details have been collected for a great variety of non-scientific and nontherapeutic purposes in the history of culture. Political élites have been particularly active in obtaining intimate knowledge to further the survival of the politician rather than to contribute to science or health.<sup>4</sup>

The élites of ceremony, both magical and sacerdotal, have been

<sup>3</sup> A recent guide to relevant research is Gordon W. Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation* (New York, 1937).

<sup>4</sup> An Indian classic of political science, the Arthaśāstra of Kautilya, dating perhaps from 300 B.C., furnishes an elaborate set of instructions for the spies who study the reliability of officials. The royal household, and many other groups within and without the kingdom, are objects of special surveillance (see chap. xi in Book I, and other sections of the treatise).

active in procuring intimate data. In many primitive societies the confession of any violation of a rule is itself supposed to save the individual or the group from the deleterious consequences of the violation.<sup>5</sup> The sacred élites were probably the first to use the study of the self as a means of improving the efficiency (and "morality") of individuals. The confession partly served this purpose. It also supplied valuable information to the members of the group, and bound the confessing person by strong emotional ties to the symbols of the group as a whole. Secret societies have often copied for secular purposes the practices of sacred orders.<sup>6</sup>

The use by Freud of intimate data supplied by the subject as a means of healing is consonant with a long medical tradition.<sup>7</sup> But it is evident that many therapeutic relationships which involve intimacy are not based upon science. Sufferers may be exhorted to take a more optimistic view of life in order to rid them of suicidal thoughts. This is not science until it is associated with a naturalistic theory of how persons come to entertain such thoughts, and under what conditions admonitions by authoritative persons may diminish their occurrence. Such scientific theories are formulated by Freud to account for both disease and recovery. Thus the psychoanalytic standpoint may be said to be "scientific" in two different meanings: it is "instrumental for science" in so far as it is used to obtain data which confirm or disconfirm explanations and it is "applied science"

<sup>5</sup> Secular élites have fostered the confession as a means of expediting legal administration. Confession leads to alleviation of sanction in nearly every code.

<sup>6</sup> Thus Adam Weishaupt was deeply influenced by the model of the Society of Jesus when he founded the Illuminati in Bavaria in the eighteenth century for the purpose of spreading the new secular knowledge. A novice was required to draw up a detailed report for the archives of the order containing complete information about his family and his own life. He was to list the titles of all the books he possessed, the names of his personal enemies and the occasion of their enmity, his own strong and weak points of character, the dominant traits and interests of his parents, their acquaintances and friends, and many other items. Monthly reports on his conduct were required, supplemented by special reports from time to time. The "Illuminated Minervals" were to become expert psychologists, especially by studying the behavior of the little group of minervals who were placed under their direction. It was hoped that the study of man would be so complete that two results would follow: the reformation of the world and adequate self-knowledge (Vernon Stauffer, *New England and the Bavarian Illuminati* [New York, 1918]).

<sup>7</sup> See Pierre Janet, *Psychological Healing* (2 vols.; London, 1925).

in so far as psychoanalysts claim to base whatever methods of healing they employ upon such explanations as, it is alleged, have already been confirmed to a certain extent.<sup>8</sup>

A third characteristic of the psychoanalytic standpoint is that it is an interview. The participants know that they are being studied, and they know something about the special procedure by which they are studied. The interview relationship may be distinguished from the participant, spectator, and collector relationships.

The participant observer engages in activities which are part of the ordinary life-pattern of his subjects.<sup>9</sup> Persons may or may not know that they are being studied; but, if they are aware of being observed, they must at least remain unaware of the special procedure which is being used. The participant relationship thus calls for the use of devices which are recognized as conforming to the customary activities of the culture. The psychoanalytic procedure is so special that it stands out as exceptional even in our own culture.<sup>10</sup> In every case in which the psychoanalytic standpoint is taken up, the subject is presumed to be aware of it. The administration of tests is also a special procedure; but it is often possible to induce children or adults to undergo them without knowing it, since the tests may fall within accepted conventions concerning games. The moment the subjects become aware of the special pro-

<sup>8</sup> Secular élites other than those mentioned utilize personal history data on a large scale. Specialists on the poor, the delinquent, and the immature (social workers, criminologists, educators) have recently displayed a great expansion of interest in this direction. A convenient guide to this literature is Pauline V. Young's *Interviewing in Social Work* (New York, 1935). The modern profit-seeking élite has made use of personal data for purposes which range all the way from espionage to the understanding of the relationship of business to the total cultural environment. The psychoanalytic standpoint may be taken up as "instrumental for science" in business situations. But science is the proximate goal under these circumstances of an activity whose ultimate goal is some other value. An account of the experiments at the Western Electric Company's plant at Hawthorne is found in Elton Mayo's *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (New York, 1933), and in the publications of T. N. Whitehead, and other collaborators.

<sup>9</sup> Note the comments by E. C. Lindeman in *Social Discovery* (New York, 1924).

<sup>10</sup> For the limitations which surround efforts to apply the full psychoanalytic procedure in field work among primitive peoples see Géza Róheim, "Psycho-analysis of Primitive Cultural Types," *International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, XIII (1932), 15-16.

cedure, the participant relationship no longer continues; it has become an interview.

In the spectator relationship the subjects are unaware that they are being observed for scientific purposes (and hence they are unaware of any special procedure). The observer may or may not share in the ordinary life-activities of his subjects; in any case he is the object of very little attention from them. The play activities of children may thus be observed by onlookers who are concealed from them.<sup>11</sup> The least extreme case—the one nearest to “participation”—occurs when the observer does share the observed activities, but when the amount of attention directed toward him by the subjects is very small, as when the observer is an unobtrusive member of a vast concourse of people witnessing a ceremony.

The collector relationship is distinguished from all others by the fact that the observer utilizes records which he has not himself made. Some of the records may have been created for the purpose of communicating about events (autobiographies, histories, biographies, and some inscriptions left on steles, obelisks, triumphal arches, and public edifices). The unintentional records include documents which are not meant for the eyes of others (like very private diaries).

The four relationships just discussed may be summarized in simple tabular form as follows (for the sake of simplification, zero quantities of certain variables are indicated in cases where precise definitions would admit either zero or very small quantities. Thus in the precise definition of “spectator” there may be zero or very little “sharing” or of “awareness of being under observation”):

	Direct Observation	Indirect Observation	Observation Evident	Observation Not Evident	Special Method Evident	Special Method Not Evident	Shared Activity	Not Shared Activity
Interviewer.....	*	.....	*	.....	*	.....	.....	*
Participant.....	*	.....	.....	.....	.....	*	*	.....
Spectator.....	*	.....	.....	*	.....	.....	.....	*
Collector.....	.....	*	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

<sup>11</sup> At the Institute of Human Relations, for example, in the experimental setup designed by Arnold Gesell.



A special method (or procedure) of observation is defined as one which influences appreciably the events which constitute the observer's field. Manifestly the degree of such influence varies from standpoint to standpoint, and also between variants of each standpoint. There may be great differences in this respect even within the psychoanalytical interview situation. Ferenczi, for example, experimented with "active" therapeutic methods in which the role of the analyst as the source of prohibitions and prescriptions is exceptionally prominent.<sup>12</sup> The orthodox procedure is more "passive"; but, although it is true that the free-association procedure puts initiative in the hands of the subject, the psychoanalytical interviewer is far from mute, as is implied in what Karen Horney called the "myth of the silent analyst."

In the numerous modifications which have been made by different psychiatrists in the orthodox interview of Freud, the role of the guiding hand of the interviewer has been both minimized and exaggerated. The group analysis of Trigant Burrow is supposed to take the leader off his authoritative pedestal and to add his analysis of himself to the material furnished by the group as a whole.<sup>13</sup> The modifications introduced by Alfred Adler and Carl Jung gave prominence to the part played by the physician, decreasing the scope of the subject.<sup>14</sup>

The influence of the interview is greatly emphasized when there is a list of interrogations to be answered orally or in writing by the subject, or when tests are given by the experimenter. Life-history documents may be elicited from subjects who are given all degrees of guidance by the interviewer.<sup>15</sup>

Participants and spectator may all exert some influence over what they see. The device of the faked debate, intended to provoke per-

<sup>12</sup> Refer to the papers on "Technique" in *Further Contributions to the Theory and Technique of Psycho-analysis* (New York, 1927).

<sup>13</sup> Consult William Galt, *Psychoanalysis: A Study in the Group or Phyletic Method of Behaviour-Analysis* (London, 1933).

<sup>14</sup> For a mature and stimulating statement of the physician-patient relationship read Carl Jung's essays on "Problems of Modern Psychotherapy" and "The Aims of Psychotherapy" in his *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (New York, 1933).

<sup>15</sup> Owing to the initiative of William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, the sociological group at Chicago has made much use of "the life-history method," notably under the direction of Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Ellsworth Faris.

sons into committing themselves, may be adapted to scientific purposes.<sup>16</sup> The infants and children who are observed by modern researchers are not always aware that their playmates and their play-making materials are supplied by scientific observers.

A fourth characteristic of the psychoanalytic standpoint is that it is a special kind of interview—the insight interview. The intention of the interviewer is to increase the skill of the subject in self-analysis. That this aim is not the exclusive property of psychoanalysts is evident from the allusion which has already been made to one of the purposes of the Illuminati. In that society, however, the transmission of skill was associated with indoctrination. The outstanding characteristic of the psychoanalytic procedure developed by Freud is the concentration upon skill without indoctrination. The interviewer offers “interpretations” to the subject which are intended to assist him in recognizing and avowing with serenity those aspects of himself which are concealed from full waking awareness, or which are recognized, if at all, with great perturbation of affect.

The distinction between the insight interview and the indoctrination interview may be understood by contrasting psychoanalysis with the confession conducted by the élite of any ecclesiastical organization. There are certain similarities: in both the subject may relate anecdotes from his past and avow many impulses in his present life. But the differences are more profound than these comparatively superficial likenesses. The confessor classifies the incidents and the intentions communicated to him according to a preconceived set of preferential standards. They are “sins” or not; and, if sins, there are prearranged “penances” and “indulgences.” He makes use of the affects which are liberated in the confession to strengthen the sentiments toward the symbols affirmed by the church. Positive affects are directed toward the church; negative affects are turned against nonconforming aspects of the self and others.

The psychoanalyst does not categorize the incidents and inten-

<sup>16</sup> The antiquity of the device itself, though used for nonscientific purposes, is indicated by the fact that Kautilya recommends that “spies formed as opposing factions shall carry on disputations in places of pilgrimage, in assemblies, houses, corporations, and amid congregations of people” (chap. xiii of Book I).

tions which are told him into preferential categories, nor does he deal in penances and indulgences, nor does he focus loyalties upon symbols. He insists that the subject persevere in his quest for, and his skill in, self-analysis. He stimulates the subject to consider different propositions ("interpretations") which relate his acts (including self-styled "transgressions") to the rest of his personality. This includes the study of the part of the personality which regards the rest of it as "transgressing" (namely, the conscience, or "super-ego"). The subject discovers his own preferences in the act of subjecting them to such naturalistic analysis. Some remain; others dissolve. The conscience itself is subject to profound modification.<sup>17</sup>

The interviewer systematically challenges the interpretations accepted by the subject (especially if these stem from the analyst). The interviewer knows that subjects are disposed to acquiesce in interpretations as a means of appeasing the anxieties of the moment; yet this may stand in the way of deeper insight.

Just what are the characteristics of insight? An insight is an avowal of a present impulse to complete an act; but bare avowal is not enough to signify to the psychoanalyst that insight has occurred. If the patient listlessly says, "I hate you physicians, and would like to kill all of you," the psychoanalyst does not accept this as an authentic instance of insight. Insight into hitherto inhibited impulses is accompanied by anxiety, and this may be gauged by noting the degree of excitement which is exhibited by the subject who makes an avowal. Even this attending excitement cannot be relied upon to establish the probability of insight beyond reasonable doubt. The subject who doubles up his fists and denounces the interviewer may immediately qualify his avowal, declaring that he just made a silly remark. If, on the other hand, the subject adds expressions of certainty to his avowal, the probability is increased that insight has taken place. But even expressions of certainty are not conclusive. It is notorious that under stress of anxiety subjects will affirm all sorts of transitory propositions. This is what is usually meant by physicians who speak of the "suggestibility" of the neurotic. When avowals come after rejection by the patient of the proposition, we

<sup>17</sup> Some of the implications for ethical theory have been stated in T. V. Smith's *Beyond Conscience* (New York, 1934).

are more willing to accredit it, and especially if the material recurs spontaneously (without suggestions from the interviewer). An avowal should survive; it should survive obstructions (such as questions or challenges from the interviewer); and it should survive the diminishing excitement.

The highest order of insight requires the characterization of the present impulses of the personality with reference to the immediate situation, which means the self and the interviewer. In fact, one of the most illuminating ways of characterizing what occurs in the psychoanalytic situation is to say that an opportunity is afforded for one personality to explore all of its propensities with reference to a sample of the human species.<sup>18</sup>

It should be recognized that insight is a limit which is approached and not reached as the length of a psychoanalytic interview series extends. There are cases in which the existing neurosis is comparatively mild, in which the self-analytical goal and skill of the subject are low, when psychoanalysis is a long-drawn-out and relatively useless outlay of energy. There are cases in which neurosis may pass into psychosis if the anxiety level of the subject is increased. Indeed, one of the practical problems of psychoanalysts is precisely when not to analyze.<sup>19</sup>

In addition to such gross considerations as these, psychoanalysts are affected by a host of factors. At the beginning they were physicians with little understanding of the cultural context in which they and their patients were living. Some of them were not far removed from the traditional bias that diseases are processes which are destructive of the integration of the tissue bundle which comprises the individual. The use of the psychoanalytical method itself led to the discovery of the relevancy of cultural configurations. Gradually they reach out for a new "whole" whose integration-disintegration enters into the definition of "health" and "disease." Increasingly "health"

<sup>18</sup> These criteria were formulated in my *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago, 1930), chap. xi, and "Verbal References and Physiological Changes during the Psychoanalytic Interview," *Psychoanalytic Review*, XXII (1935), 13-14.

<sup>19</sup> In semitechnical terms it may be said that the psychoanalyst tries to keep the anxiety level of the subject within the range of progressive adjustment. He wants to avoid such extreme concentrations of anxiety that the subject seeks to escape from the interview situation itself, or resorts to psychosis or conversion into somatic difficulties. The treatises by Otto Fenichel and Hermann Nunberg may be consulted in connection with the clinical aspects of psychoanalysis.

is defined as productive interpersonal relationships. But does every definition of "productive" not contain particular preferences of a particular culture?

Psychoanalysts, made more sensitive to cultural relativity than other psychopathologists, contribute to those who do not choose to include cultural "adjustment" in the definition of health, and search for such a definition of this term which admits the possibility that healthy persons may be comparatively unsuccessful (maladjusted) in relation to prevailing preferences. Indeed, the definition sought is such that the acceptance of the norms of a given culture may be a case of disease. This might be true, for example, in the case of compulsive conformity as a means of escaping from the anxieties generated in the course of growing up within the culture.

By defining health as freedom from anxiety, the rejection of local norms is consonant with health when it is noncompulsive. An anxiety-free individual may recognize that he wants to perform acts which are viewed with hostility by the carriers of the culture which constitutes his environment. He may know that exposure will be followed, with a certain probability, by a change in the environment which constitutes a deprivation of a certain magnitude. He may perform the acts anyhow with a full view of this. It must, of course, be said that, according to the definition of health accepted by most physicians, an individual who rejects, that is, deliberately acts counter to, all survival opportunities offered by the environment, would not be called healthy. Yet there are cases of suicide in which the critical physician is not willing to make an offhand diagnosis of neurosis or psychosis.<sup>20</sup>

Psychoanalysts become increasingly aware of the numerous and subtle ways in which their own preferences diminish the extent to

<sup>20</sup> Among those who have struggled most strenuously to emancipate themselves from the entangling tentacles of a particular culture—and of any culture—is Trigant Burrow. His most elaborate treatise thus far is *The Biology of Human Conflict: An Anatomy of Behavior, Individual and Social* (New York, 1937). A complementary process to separating "health" from adjustment to a particular culture is the characterizing of some cultures or culture patterns as themselves "diseased." An exhaustive and critical bibliography of the application by psychiatrists of concepts of the "pathological" to society is F. Schneersohn's "Zur Grundlegung einer Völker- und Massenpsychopathologie (Soziopsychopathologie)," *Ethos*, I (1925-26), 81-120.

which they approach the naturalistic ideal in their relationships to the patient. Intonations of voice may convey approval or disapproval of professional or sexual attitudes of the subject.

Some psychoanalysts discover that their own psychoanalysis did not free them from compulsive acceptance of many of the symbols and practices of the culture in which they happened to be reared. Indeed, their psychoanalysis may not even have brought these possibilities sharply and often into the full focus of waking awareness.

This insight gives rise to the suspicion that psychoanalysts, in common with other psychopathologists, may obtain mitigation of some of the neurotic symptoms of their patients by permitting them to be displaced from primary to secondary symbols which they leave unanalyzed. A stout affirmation of hostility to the New Deal, to take a banal instance, may be passed without challenge, and the hostilities of the subject may be displaced more and more from symbols of reference to his wife or himself to symbols of reference to political policies and groups. If the analyst is a political radical, he may find himself on the alert against thoughtless repetitions of preferences for the *status quo*, though he remains deaf to the voice of protest. Strictly speaking, loyalties to secondary symbols of the environment are no more exempt from the austere requirements of insight analysis than loyalty to primary symbols of the patient's environment.

It has been a sociologist with psychoanalytical training who has coped most boldly with the problem of putting the psychoanalytical procedure itself in explicit relationship to the cultural-historical setting in which it originates and survives. Erich Fromm has characterized the conscious attitude of Freud toward his patients as one of "tolerance," based upon "relativism" toward all preferences, and has posed the question of the nature of the unconscious attitude which supports it. Fromm undertakes to demonstrate that this conscious liberalism of outlook is associated with an unconscious negative preference for those impulses which are tabooed by bourgeois society. Hence Freud is said to stand as the representative of an order of society which demands obedience to certain specific prohibitions and prescriptions. This attitude is alleged to augment the anxiety level of the patient and thereby to diminish the probability

that his resistances will be overcome and therapy will be successful.<sup>21</sup>

It is not within the scope of this paper to evaluate the foregoing affirmations but to indicate the profound problems which have received a rich, new context as psychoanalytic experience has advanced. More and more psychoanalysts are discovering culture. And, what is even more to the point, they are discovering culture as it operates within their own personalities during the prolonged intimacy of the psychoanalytical situation. They have a technique which they can incessantly use upon themselves in discerning the resistances within themselves which are attributable to the previously unsuspected incorporation of patterns of their own culture. This tool for the awareness of culture can be employed by social scientists for the sake of insight into themselves in relation to the personality-culture manifold in which they are imbedded. Skill in prolonged free fantasy, which is skill in self-analysis, becomes one of the indispensable tools of whatever social scientist is concerned with the fundamental problems of personality and culture.

The acquisition of skill in self-analysis by the route of psychoanalysis is becoming more common among social scientists. Training in psychoanalysis which is undertaken less for therapeutic than for scientific purposes is called "didactic" analysis. Psychoanalytical training institutes are often willing to give special encouragement to the qualified social scientist who desires to enlarge his repertory of skills by means of psychoanalysis.

Those who acquire psychoanalytic technique, or who become familiar with the kinds of data which are revealed in the psychoanalytic interview situation, usually refine their own methods of observation in standpoints which are less intensive than the psychoanalytic. It is safe to say that more care is now being given by social scientists to the recording of dreams, slips of the tongue, random movements, and possible somatic conversions than ever before.<sup>22</sup> Neurotic and psychotic personalities are sought after in different

<sup>21</sup> "Die gesellschaftliche Bedingtheit der psychoanalytischen Therapie," *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, IV (1935), 365-97.

<sup>22</sup> See, for an extreme example, Maurice Krout, *Autistic Gestures: An Experimental Study in Symbolic Movement* ("Psychological Monographs," No. 208 [1935]).

cultures for the sake of discovering the depth to which selected culture patterns are integrated in personality structure.<sup>23</sup>

The propositions which have been stated by psychoanalysts have been tremendously stimulating, even to those who were without the special training necessary to understand them fully. Among social anthropologists of standing who have been explicitly affected by psychoanalytical hypotheses, Bronislaw Malinowski and Margaret Mead have been particularly prominent.<sup>24</sup> Among sociologists Erich Fromm<sup>25</sup> and John Dollard<sup>26</sup> are conspicuous examples. In the field of political sociology and psychology the study of the genesis of attitudes toward authority has been given a new impetus.<sup>27</sup> The theory of law has not been unaffected, notably by way of Hans Kelsen.<sup>28</sup>

The result of inaugurating the study of the personality-culture manifold by the intensive method of Freud has been to make imperative the formulation of more serviceable concepts and to concentrate attention upon the observer's relationship to his field of reference. The Social Science Research Council's Committee on Personality and Culture has stimulated discussion and publication in the general field of methodology.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Bingham Dai, a sociologist with psychoanalytical training, has been engaged in such research at the Peking Union Medical College, Peking, China.

<sup>24</sup> An early book which reflects this interest in Malinowski is *Sex and Repression in Savage Society* (New York, 1925); an early book by Margaret Mead is *Coming of Age in Samoa* (New York, 1928).

<sup>25</sup> See his articles in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*.

<sup>26</sup> Notably in *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (New Haven, 1937).

<sup>27</sup> See *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, ed. Max Horkheimer (Paris, 1936), especially the theoretical discussion by Erich Fromm. Allusion may also be made to H. D. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York, 1935), and Mousheng Lin, "On Anti-statism," (University of Chicago dissertation [Chicago, 1937]).

<sup>28</sup> A critical statement of Kelsen's position is in Hyman E. Cohen, *Recent Theories of Sovereignty* (Chicago, 1937), chap. v. In America, Jerome Frank and Thurman Arnold have been appreciably influenced by psychoanalytical findings.

<sup>29</sup> Consult John Dollard, *Criteria for the Life History* (New Haven, 1935); Margaret Mead (ed.), *Cooperation and Competition among Primitive People* (New York, 1936). Statements by Edward Sapir, Ruth Benedict, and L. K. Frank have been particularly stimulating. For a suggested method of mediating between the difficulties of the "horizontal" and the "cross-sectional" modes of studying personality and culture see H. D. Lasswell, "The Method of Interlapping Observation in the Study of Personality and Culture," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XXXII (1937), 240-43. The *rap-*



A stable and determinate terminology can be worked out by giving careful consideration to the position of observers in the manifold of personality and cultural events. By personality we may mean the stable features of the acts of an individual (during a specified period of time). By culture we may refer to the stable features of the acts of individuals who are representative of a certain community (during a specified period of time). Any event at the focus of attention of an observer may (or may not) be a stable feature of personality or culture.

The stable acts of an individual may be called traits; the unstable acts, reactions. Thus personality is an ensemble of traits; an infrequent act of truculence toward strangers may be said not to belong to a given personality. Strict procedure would require the observer to specify the minimum frequency with which an act has to occur before it is called an instance of a trait. The act may be called an instance of a culture pattern if it meets certain criteria of (1) testimony and (2) occurrence. Do participants in the culture expect the act to be performed under certain conditions by participants in the culture? Do occurrences conform to testimony? The strict procedure in the definition of a culture pattern would be to specify the minimum frequency of agreement necessary for this inclusion. We might, for example, say that at least seven in ten of the witnesses and seven in ten of the possible occurrences are necessary. Acts which conform to culture patterns are conduct; other acts are behavior. One may then say that culture is an ensemble of culture patterns, which in their turn are ensembles of conduct. It is evident that traits and reactions may not occur with sufficient frequency to be conduct; they are then behavior.

At any given time the person (the ensemble of trait and reaction channels) is divisible into id, superego, and ego. The id comprises all the channels of acts whose completion arouses anxiety. The

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*prochement* has been stimulated by the activities and the writings of specialists who are primarily physicians, notably Franz Alexander, Edward Glover, Karen Horney, James S. Plant, Theodor Reik, Harry Stack Sullivan, Robert Wälder, William A. White, and Gregory Zilboorg. Articles of general interest often appear in *Imago* (formerly of Vienna, now London-Amsterdam), the *Psychoanalytic Review*, and *Psychiatry* (published by the William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation).

superego includes all act channels which interfere with the completion of id acts. The ego is made up of all non-id and non-superego channels. The culture is divisible at a given period into mores, countermores, and expedencies. A mores pattern arouses indignation when violated. A countermores pattern is composed of violations of a mores pattern.<sup>30</sup> The expedencies arouse little or no indignation when breached; such is the case with the use of most technical gadgets in our culture.<sup>31</sup>

A growing necessity of scientific work, made even more pressing by the emergence of psychoanalysis, is the calibrating of observations made from standpoints of varying degrees of intensiveness. Suppose we are told by one who has elicited a "life-history document" from Mr. A that Mr. A is a self-centered person who blames his environment for his difficulties, and that this trait has been stable in his personality for many years. Terms like "self-centered" and "blame" may be defined so that they refer to a very frequent use of complimentary expressions in alluding to the self, and of adverse references to the environment ("pro-self," "anti-other" references).<sup>32</sup> The evidence for the stability of the trait is the lack of contradictory reminiscences about the early life of the subject.

How are such observations to be related to observations made from an intensive standpoint, such as psychoanalysis? If groups of persons who fitted the foregoing description from an extensive standpoint (*S'*) were psychoanalyzed, we might find that a certain proportion, say 70 per cent, would be described in a certain way by the psychoanalyst. The intensive observer (standpoint *S''*) might say that 70 per cent were overcompensated persons, who were pro-

<sup>30</sup> An example of this might be sexual promiscuity in a given culture. Public knowledge of promiscuity might arouse indignation, but it is admitted by witnesses and confirmed by occurrences that members of the culture often engage in promiscuous relationships. It should be noted that some violations of some mores patterns are behavior, not conduct, and hence not countermores. Thus the rape of a small child may be a breach of a mores pattern, but not itself a countermores pattern, if witnesses testify to the sense of outrage which greets such an act, and the act very infrequently occurs.

<sup>31</sup> I introduced the terms "countermores" and "expedencies" in "The Triple-Appeal Principle: A Contribution of Psychoanalysis to Political and Social Science," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXVII (1932), 523-38.

<sup>32</sup> For categories see my "Provisional Classification of Symbol Data," *Psychiatry*, Vol. I, No. 2 (1938).

jecting certain accusations directed against themselves against the environment; and locate at a certain year the time when this trait was stabilized.

There is no need of standardizing terminology from one standpoint to another. In fact, less confusion in meaning may result from devising a separate vocabulary for each standpoint. All that is requisite is to predict from observations made in one standpoint observations made in all standpoints. Such calibrating procedures are well established among physical scientists, where instruments are checked against standards and constants are found for instrumental error.<sup>33</sup>

It seems safe to conclude this general statement of the influence of psychoanalysis on social science by the remark that we are on the threshold of rapid advance throughout the entire range of social scientific research, and that this advance will be enormously facilitated in the future, as in the past, by the work of Freud, and particularly by the insight interview which he invented.

WILLIAM ALANSON WHITE PSYCHIATRIC FOUNDATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

<sup>33</sup> Allusion may be made here to my discussion of "Intensive and Extensive Methods of Observing the Personality-Culture Manifold," *Yenching Journal of Social Studies*, I (1938), 72-86.

## FREUD—AND THE ANALYSIS OF POETRY

KENNETH BURKE

### ABSTRACT

There is an important margin of overlap in the aesthetic and the neurotic, in that the act of both the poet and the neurotic are symbolic acts. In so far as this margin prevails, co-ordinates developed for the charting of the one field may be taken over for the charting of the other. There are also important divergencies between the two fields. And in so far as the aesthetic and neurotic fields diverge, there must be a corresponding difference in co-ordinates. Freud's perspective, developed primarily for the charting of neurosis, is better suited to the margin of overlap than to the area of divergency. As regards the margin of overlap, two modifications of Freudian co-ordinates are offered: (1) A poem's structure should be discussed as a recipe or synthesis of several motives rather than in terms of one essential motive with all others treated as derivatives from it; (2) Freud's overly patriarchal emphasis obscures the matriarchal factors operating in literary works that symbolize a change of lineage or identity. As regards the area of divergency, Freud's co-ordinates, in stressing the poem as dream, understress the poem as a communicative structure and as a realistic gauging of human situations. Communication, rather than wish fulfilment, is the key term for literary analysis.

The reading of Freud I find suggestive almost to the point of bewilderment. Accordingly, what I should like most to do would be simply to take representative excerpts from his work, copy them out, and write glosses upon them. Very often these glosses would be straight extensions of his own thinking. At other times they would be attempts to characterize his strategy of presentation with reference to interpretative method in general. And, finally, the Freudian perspective was developed primarily to chart a psychiatric field rather than an aesthetic one; but since we are here considering the analogous features of these two fields rather than their important differences, there would be glosses attempting to suggest how far the literary critic should go along with Freud and what extra-Freudian material he would have to add. Such a desire to write an article on Freud in the margins of his books, must for practical reasons here remain a frustrated desire. An article such as this must condense by generalization, which requires me to slight the most stimulating factor of all—the detailed articulacy in which he embodies his extraordinary frankness.

Freud's frankness is no less remarkable by reason of the fact that he had perfected a method for being frank. He could say humble,

even humiliating, things about himself and us because he had changed the rules somewhat and could make capital of observations that others; with vested interests of a different sort, would feel called upon to suppress by dictatorial decree. Or we might say that what for him could fall within the benign category of observation could for them fall only within its malign counterpart, spying.

Yet though honesty is, in Freud, methodologically made easier, it is by no means honesty made easy. And Freud's own accounts of his own dreams show how poignantly he felt at times the "disgrace" of his occupation. There are doubtless many thinkers whose strange device might be *ecclesia super cloacam*. What more fitting place to erect one's church than above a sewer! One might even say that sewers are what churches are for. But usually this is done by laying all the stress upon the *ecclesia* and its beauty. So that, even when the man's work fails to be completed for him as a social act, by the approval of his group, he has the conviction of its intrinsic beauty to give him courage and solace.

But to think of Freud, during the formative years of his doctrines, confronting something like repugnance among his colleagues, and even, as his dreams show, in his own eyes, is to think of such heroism as Unamuno found in Don Quixote; and if Don Quixote risked the social judgment of ridicule, he still had the consolatory thought that his imaginings were beautiful, stressing the *ecclesia* aspect, whereas Freud's theories bound him to a more drastic self-ostracizing act—the charting of the relations between *ecclesia* and *cloaca* that forced him to analyze the *cloaca* itself. Hence, his work was with the confessional as cathartic, as purgative; this haruspicy required an inspection of the entrails; it was, bluntly, an interpretative sculpting of excrement, with beauty replaced by a science of the grotesque.

Confronting this, Freud does nonetheless advance to erect a structure which, if it lacks beauty, has astounding ingeniousness and fancy. It is full of paradoxes, of leaps across gaps, of vistas—much more so than the work of many a modern poet who sought for nothing else but these and had no search for accuracy to motivate his work. These qualities alone would make it unlikely that readers literarily inclined could fail to be attracted, even while repelled. Nor can one miss in it the profound charitableness that is missing in so many modern writers who, likewise concerned with the *cloaca*, be-

come efficiently concerned with nothing else, and make of their work pure indictment, pure oath, pure striking-down, pure spitting-upon, pure kill. True, this man, who taught us so much about father-rejection and who ironically became himself so frequently the rejected father in the works of his schismatic disciples, does finally descend to quarrelsomeness, despite himself, when recounting the history of the psychoanalytic movement. But, over the great course of his work, it is the matter of human rescue that he is concerned with—not the matter of vengeance. On a few occasions, let us say, he is surprised into vengefulness. But the very essence of his studies, even at their most forbidding moments (in fact, precisely at those moments) is its charitableness, its concern with salvation. To borrow an excellent meaningful pun from Trigant Burrow, this salvation is approached not in terms of religious hospitality but rather in terms of secular hospitalization. Yet it is the spirit of Freud; it is what Freud's courage is for.

Perhaps, therefore, the most fitting thing for a writer to do, particularly in view of the fact that Freud is now among the highly honored class—the exiles from Nazi Germany (how accurate those fellows are! how they seem, with almost 100 per cent efficiency, to have weeded out their greatest citizens!)—perhaps the most fitting thing to do would be simply to attempt an article of the “homage to Freud” sort and call it a day.

However, my job here cannot be confined to that. I have been commissioned to consider the bearing of Freud's theories upon literary criticism. And these theories were not designed primarily for literary criticism at all but were rather a perspective that, developed for the charting of a nonaesthetic field, was able (by reason of its scope) to migrate into the aesthetic field. The margin of overlap was this: The acts of the neurotic are symbolic acts. Hence in so far as both the neurotic act and the poetic act share this property in common, they may share a terminological chart in common. But in so far as they deviate, terminology likewise must deviate. And this deviation is a fact that literary criticism must explicitly consider.

As for the glosses on the interpretative strategy in general, they would be of this sort: For one thing, they would concern a distinction between what I should call an essentializing mode of inter-

pretation and a mode that stresses proportion of ingredients. The tendency in Freud is toward the first of these. That is, if one found a complex of, let us say, seven ingredients in a man's motivation, the Freudian tendency would be to take one of these as the essence of the motivation and to consider the other six as sublimated variants. We could imagine, for instance, manifestations of sexual impotence accompanying a conflict in one's relations with his familiars and one's relations at the office. The proportional strategy would involve the study of these three as a cluster. The motivation would be synonymous with the interrelationships among them. But the essentializing strategy would, in Freud's case, place the emphasis upon the sexual manifestation, as causal ancestor of the other two.

This essentializing strategy is linked with a normal ideal of science: to "explain the complex in terms of the simple." This ideal almost vows one to select one or another motive from a cluster and interpret the others in terms of it. The naïve proponent of economic determinism, for instance, would select the quarrel at the office as the essential motive, and would treat the quarrel with familiars and the sexual impotence as mere results of this. Now, I don't see how you can possibly explain the complex in terms of the simple without having your very success used as a charge against you. When you get through, all that your opponent need say is: "But you have explained the complex in terms of the simple—and the simple is precisely what the complex is not."

Perhaps the faith philosophers, as against the reason philosophers, did not have to encounter a paradox at this point. Not that they avoided paradoxes, for I think they must always cheat when trying to explain how evil can exist in a world created by an all-powerful and wholly good Creator. But at least they did not have to confront the complexity-simplicity difficulty, since their theological reductions referred to a ground in God, who was simultaneously the ultimately complex and the ultimately simple. Naturalistic strategies lack this convenient "out"—hence their explanations are simplifications, and every simplification is an oversimplification.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The essentializing strategy has its function when dealing with classes of items; the proportional one is for dealing with an item in its uniqueness. By isolating the matter of voluntarism, we put Freud in a line or class with Augustine. By isolating the

It is possible that the literary critic, taking communication as his basic category, may avoid this particular paradox (communication thereby being a kind of attenuated God term). You can reduce everything to communication—yet communication is extremely complex. But, in any case, communication is by no means the basic category of Freud. The sexual wish, or libido, is the basic category; and the complex forms of communication that we see in a highly alembicated philosophy would be mere sublimations of this.

A writer deprived of Freud's clinical experience would be a fool to question the value of his category as a way of analyzing the motives of the class of neurotics Freud encountered. There is a pronouncedly individualistic element in any technique of salvation (my toothache being alas! my private property), and even those beset by a pandemic of sin or microbes will enter heaven or get discharged from the hospital one by one; and the especially elaborate process of diagnosis involved in Freudian analysis even to this day makes it more available to those suffering from the ills of preoccupation and leisure than to those suffering from the ills of occupation and unemployment (with people generally tending to be only as mentally sick as they can afford to be). This state of affairs makes it all the more likely that the typical psychoanalytic patient would have primarily private sexual motivations behind his difficulties. (Did not Henry James say that sex is something about which we think a great deal when we are not thinking about anything else?)<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, I believe that

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matter of his concern with a distinction between unconscious and conscious, we may put him in a line with Leibniz's distinction between perception and apperception. Or we could link him with the Spinozistic *conatus* and the Schopenhauerian will. Or, as a rationalist, he falls into the bin with Aquinas (who is himself most conveniently isolated as a rationalist if you employ the essentializing as against the proportional strategy, stressing what he added rather than what he retained). Many arguments seem to hinge about the fact that there is an un verbalized disagreement as to the choice between these strategies. The same man, for instance, who might employ the essentializing strategy in proclaiming Aquinas as a rationalist, taking as the significant factor in Aquinas' philosophy his additions to rationalism rather than considering this as an ingredient in a faith philosophy, might object to the bracketing of Aquinas and Freud (here shifting to the proportional strategy, as he pointed out the totally different materials with which Aquinas surrounded his rational principle).

<sup>2</sup> We may distinguish between a public and universal motive. In so far as one acts in a certain way because of his connection with a business or party, he would act from a public motive. His need of response to a new glandular stimulation at adolescence,



studies of artistic imagery, outside the strict pale of psychoanalytic emphasis, will bear out Freud's brilliant speculations as to the sexual puns, the double *entendres*, lurking behind the most unlikely façades. If a man acquires a method of thinking about everything else, for instance, during the sexual deprivations and rigors of adolescence, this cure may well take on the qualities of the disease; and in so far as he continues with this same method in adult years, though his life has since become sexually less exacting, such modes as incipient homosexuality or masturbation may very well be informatively interwoven in the strands of his thought and be discoverable by inspection of the underlying imagery or patterns in this thought.

Indeed, there are only a few fundamental bodily idioms—and why should it not be likely that an attitude, no matter how complex its ideational expression, could only be completed by a channelization within its corresponding gestures? That is, the details of experience behind A's dejection may be vastly different from the details of experience behind B's dejection, yet both A and B may fall into the same bodily posture in expressing their dejection. And in an era like ours, coming at the end of a long individualistic emphasis, where we frequently find expressed an attitude of complete independence, of total, uncompromising self-reliance, this expression would not reach its fulfilment in choreography except in the act of "practical narcissism" (that is, the only wholly independent person would be the one who practiced self-abuse and really meant it).

But it may be noticed that we have here tended to consider mind-body relations from an interactive point of view rather than a materialistic one (which would take the body as the essence of the act and the mentation as the sublimation).

Freud himself, interestingly enough, was originally nearer to this view (necessary, as I hope to show later, for specifically literary purposes) than he later became. Freud explicitly resisted the study of motivation by way of symbols. He distinguished his own mode of analysis from the symbolic by laying the stress upon free association. That is, he would begin the analysis of a neurosis without any pre-

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on the other hand, would arise regardless of social values, and in that sense would be at once private and universal. The particular forms in which he expressed this need would, of course, be channelized in accordance with public or social factors.

conceived notion as to the absolute meaning of any image that the patient might reveal in the account of a dream. His procedure involved the breaking-down of the dream into a set of fragments, with the analyst then inducing the patient to improvise associations on each of these fragments in turn. And afterward, by charting recurrent themes, he would arrive at the crux of the patient's conflict.

Others (particularly Stekel), however, proposed a great short cut here. They offered an absolute content for various items of imagery. For instance, in Stekel's dictionary of symbols, which has the absoluteness of an old-fashioned dreambook, the right-hand path equals the road to righteousness, the left-hand path equals the road to crime, in anybody's dreams (in Lenin's presumably, as well as the Pope's). Sisters are breasts and brothers are buttocks. "The luggage of a traveller is the burden of sin by which one is oppressed," etc. Freud criticizes these on the basis of his own clinical experiences—and whereas he had reservations against specific equations, and rightly treats the method as antithetical to his own contribution, he decides that a high percentage of Stekel's purely intuitive hunches were corroborated. And after warning that such a gift as Stekel's is often evidence of paranoia, he decides that normal persons may also occasionally be capable of it.

Its lure as efficiency is understandable. And, indeed, if we revert to the matter of luggage, for instance, does it not immediately give us insight into a remark of André Gide, who is a specialist in the portrayal of scrupulous criminals, who has developed a stylistic trick for calling to seduction in the accents of evangelism, and who advises that one should learn to "travel light"?

But the trouble with short cuts is that they deny us a chance to take longer routes. With them, the essentializing strategy takes a momentous step forward. You have next but to essentialize your short cuts in turn (a short cut atop a short cut), and you get the sexual emphasis of Freud, the all-embracing ego compensation of Adler, or Rank's master-emphasis upon the birth-trauma, etc.

Freud himself fluctuates in his search for essence. At some places you find him proclaiming the all-importance of the sexual, at other places you find him indignantly denying that his psychology is a pansexual one at all, and at still other places you get something half-

way between the two, via the concept of the libido, which embraces a spectrum from phallus to philanthropy.

The important matter for our purposes is to suggest that the examination of a poetic work's internal organization would bring us nearer to a variant of the typically Freudian free-association method than to the purely symbolic method toward which he subsequently gravitated.<sup>3</sup>

The critic should adopt a variant of the free-association method. One obviously cannot invite an author, especially a dead author, to oblige him by telling what the author thinks of when the critic isolates some detail or other for improvisation. But what he can do is to note the context of imagery and ideas in which an image takes its place. He can also note, by such analysis, the kinds of evaluations surrounding this image of a crossing; for instance, is it an escape from or a return to an evil or a good, etc? Until finally, by noting the ways in which this crossing behaves, what subsidiary imagery accompanies it, what kind of event it grows out of, what kind of event grows out of it, what altered rhythmic and tonal effects characterize it, etc., one grasps its significance as motivation. And there is no essential motive offered here. The motive of the work is equated with the structure of interrelationships within the work itself.

"But there is more to a work of art than that." I hear this objection being raised. And I agree with it. And I wonder whether we could properly consider the matter in this wise:

For convenience using the word "poem" to cover any complete made artistic product, let us divide this artefact (the invention, creation, formation, poetic construct) in accordance with three modes of analysis: dream, prayer, chart.

<sup>3</sup> Perhaps, to avoid confusion, I should call attention to the fact that symbolic in this context is being used differently by me from its use in the expression "symbolic action." If a man crosses a street, it is a practical act. If he writes a book about crossings—crossing streets, bridges, oceans, etc.—that is a symbolic act. Symbolic, as used in the restricted sense (in contrast with free association) would refer to the imputation of an absolute meaning to a crossing, a meaning that I might impute even before reading the book in question. Against this, I should maintain: One can never know what a crossing means, in a specific book, until he has studied its tie-up with other imagery in that particular book.

The psychoanalysis of Freud and of the schools stemming from Freud has brought forward an astoundingly fertile range of observations that give us insight into the poem as dream. There is opened up before us a sometimes almost terrifying glimpse into the ways in which we may, while overtly doing one thing, be covertly doing another. Yet, there is nothing mystical or even unusual about this. I may, for instance, consciously place my elbow upon the table. Yet at the same time I am clearly unconscious of the exact distance between my elbow and my nose. Or, if that analogy seems like cheating, let us try another: I may be unconscious of the way in which a painter-friend, observant of my postures, would find the particular position of my arm characteristic of me.

Or let us similarly try to take the terror out of infantile regression. In so far as I speak the same language that I learned as a child, every time I speak there is, within my speech, an ingredient of regression to the infantile level. Regression, we might say, is a function of progression. Where the progression has been a development by evolution or continuity of growth (as were one to have learned to speak and think in English as a child, and still spoke and thought in English) rather than by revolution or discontinuity of growth (as were one to have learned German in childhood, to have moved elsewhere at an early age, and since become so at home in English that he could not even understand a mature conversation in the language of his childhood), the archaic and the now would be identical. You could say, indifferently, either that the speech is regression or that it is not regression. But were the man who had forgot the language of his childhood, to begin speaking nothing but this early language (under a sudden agitation or as the result of some steady pressure), we should have the kind of regression that goes formally by this name in psychoanalytic nomenclature.

The ideal growth, I suppose—the growth without elements of alienation, discontinuity, homelessness—is that wherein regression is natural. We might sloganize it as “the adult a child matured.” Growth has here been simply a successive adding of cells—the growth of the chambered nautilus. But there is also the growth of the adult who, “when he became a man, put away childish things.” This is the growth of the crab, that grows by abandoning one room

and taking on another. It produces moments of crisis. It makes for philosophies of emancipation and enlightenment, where one gets a jolt and is "awakened from the sleep of dogma" (and alas! in leaving his profound "Asiatic slumber," he risks getting in exchange more than mere wakefulness, more than the eternal vigilance that is the price of liberty—he may get wakefulness plus, i.e., insomnia).

There are, in short, critical points (or, in the Hegel-Marx vocabulary, changes of quantity leading to changes of quality) where the process of growth or change converts a previous circle of protection into a circle of confinement. The first such revolution may well be, for the human individual, a purely biological one—the change at birth when the fetus, heretofore enjoying a larval existence in the womb, being fed on manna from the placenta, so outgrows this circle of protection that the benign protection becomes a malign circle of confinement, whereat it must burst forth into a different kind of world—a world of locomotion, aggression, competition, hunt. The mother, it is true, may have already been living in such a world; but the fetus was in a world within this world—in a monastery—a world such as is lived in by "coupon clippers," who get their dividends as the result of sharp economic combat but who may, so long as the payments are regular, devote themselves to thoughts and diseases far "above" these harsh material operations.

In the private life of the individual there may be many subsequent jolts of a less purely biological nature, as with the death of some one person who had become pivotal to this individual's mental economy. But whatever these unique variants may be, there is again a universal variant at adolescence, when radical changes in the glandular structure of the body make this body a correspondingly altered environment for the mind, requiring a corresponding change in our perspective, our structure of interpretations, meanings, values, purposes, and inhibitions, if we are to take it properly into account.

In the informative period of childhood our experiences are strongly personalized. Our attitudes take shape with respect to distinct people who have roles, even animals and objects being vessels of character. Increasingly, however, we begin to glimpse a world of abstract relationships, of functions understood solely through the medium of symbols in books. Even such real things as Tibet and

Eskimos and Napoleon are for us, who have not been to Tibet, or lived with Eskimos, or fought under Napoleon, but a structure of signs. In a sense, it could be said that we learn these signs flat. We must start from scratch. There is no tradition in them; they are pure present. For though they have been handed down by tradition, we can read meaning into them only in so far as we can project or extend them out of our own experience. We may, through being burned a little, understand the signs for being burned a lot—it is in this sense that the coaching of interpretation could be called traditional. But we cannot understand the signs for being burned a lot until we have in our own flat experience, here and now, been burned a little.

Out of what can these extensions possibly be drawn? Only out of the informative years of childhood. Psychoanalysis talks of purposive forgetting. Yet purposive forgetting is the only way of remembering. One learns the meaning of "table," "book," "father," "mother," "mustn't," by forgetting the contexts in which these words were used. The Darwinian ancestry (locating the individual in his feudal line of descent from the ape) is matched in Freud by a still more striking causal ancestry that we might sloganize as "the child is father to the man."<sup>4</sup>

As we grow up new meanings must either be engrafted upon old meanings (being to that extent double *entendres*) or they must be new starts (hence, involving problems of dissociation).

<sup>4</sup> Maybe the kind of forgetting that is revealed by psychoanalysis could, within this frame, be better characterized as an incomplete forgetting. That is, whereas table, for instance, acquires an absolute and emotionally neutral meaning, as a name merely for a class of objects, by a merging of all the contexts involving the presence of a table, a table becomes symbolic, or a double *entendre*, or more than table, when some particular informative context is more important than the others. That is, when table, as used by the poet, has overtones of, let us say, *one* table at which his mother worked when he was a child. In this way the table, its food, and the cloth may become surrogates for the mother, her breasts, and her apron. And incest awe may become merged with "mustn't touch" injunctions, stemming from attempts to keep the child from meddling with the objects on the table. In a dream play by Edmund Wilson, *The Crime in the Whistler Room*, there are two worlds of plot, with the characters belonging in the one world looking upon those in the other as dead, and the hero of this living world taking a dream shape as werewolf. The worlds switch back and forth, depending upon the presence or removal of a gate-leg table. In this instance I think we should not be far wrong in attributing some such content as the above to the table when considering it as a fulcrum upon which the structure of the plot is swung.

It is in the study of the poem as dream that we find revealed the ways in which the poetic organization takes shape under these necessities. Revise Freud's terms, if you will. But nothing is done by simply trying to refute them or to tie them into knots. One may complain at this procedure, for instance: Freud characterizes the dream as the fulfilment of a wish; an opponent shows him a dream of frustration, and he answers: "But the dreamer wishes to be frustrated." You may demur at that, pointing out that Freud has developed a "heads I win, tails you lose" mode of discourse here. But I maintain that, in doing so, you have contributed nothing. For there are people whose values are askew, for whom frustration itself is a kind of grotesque ambition. If you would, accordingly, propose to chart this field by offering better terms, by all means do so. But better terms are the only kind of refutation here that is worth the trouble. Similarly, one may be unhappy with the concept of ambivalence, which allows pretty much of an open season on explanations (though the specific filling-out may provide a better case for the explanation than appears in this key term itself). But, again, nothing but an alternative explanation is worth the effort of discussion here. Freud's terminology is a dictionary, a lexicon for charting a vastly complex and hitherto largely uncharted field. You can't refute a dictionary. The only profitable answer to a dictionary is another one.

A profitable answer to Freud's treatment of the Oedipus complex, for instance, was Malinowski's study of its variants in a matriarchal society.<sup>5</sup> Here we get at once a corroboration and a refutation of the Freudian doctrine. It is corroborated in that the same general patterns of enmity are revealed; it is refuted in that these patterns are

<sup>5</sup> It is wrong, I think, to consider Freud's general picture as that of an individual psychology. Adler's start from the concept of ego compensation fits this description par excellence. But Freud's is a family psychology. He has offered a critique of the family, though it is the family of a neo-patriarch. It is interesting to watch Freud, in his *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* frankly shifting between the primacy of group psychology and the primacy of individual psychology, changing his mind as he debates with himself in public and leaves in his pages the record of his fluctuations, frankly stated as such. Finally, he compromises by leaving both, drawing individual psychology from the role of the monopolistic father, and group psychology from the roles of the sons, deprived of sexual gratification by the monopolistic father, and banded together for their mutual benefit. But note that the whole picture is that of a family albeit of a family in which the woman is a mere passive object of male wealth.

shown not to be innate but to take shape with relation to the difference in family structure itself, with corresponding difference in roles.

Freud's overemphasis upon the patriarchal pattern (an assumption of its absoluteness that is responsible for the Freudian tendency to underrate greatly the economic factors influencing the relationships of persons or roles) is a prejudicial factor that must be discounted, in Freud, even when treating the poem as dream. Though totemistic religion, for instance, flourished with matriarchal patterns, Freud treats even this in patriarchal terms. And I submit that this emphasis will conceal from us, to a large degree, what is going on in art (still confining ourselves to the dream level—the level at which Freudian co-ordinates come closest to the charting of the logic of poetic structure).

In the literature of transitional eras, for instance, we find an especial profusion of rebirth rituals, where the poet is making the symbolic passes that will endow him with a new identity. Now, imagine him trying to do a very thorough job of this reidentification. To be completely reborn, he would have to change his very lineage itself. He would have to revise not only his present but also his past. (Ancestry and cause are forever becoming intermingled—the thing is that from which it came—cause is *Ur-sache*, etc.) And could a personalized past be properly confined to a descent through the father, when it is the *mater* that is *semper certa*? Totemism, when not interpreted with Freud's patriarchal bias, may possibly provide us with the necessary cue here. Totemism, as Freud himself reminds us, was a magical device whereby the members of a group were identified with one another by the sharing of the same substance (a process often completed by the ritualistic eating of this substance, though it might, for this very reason, be prohibited on less festive occasions). And it is to the mother that the basic informative experiences of eating are related.

So, all told, even in strongly patriarchal societies (and much more so in a society like ours, where theories of sexual equality, with a corresponding confusion in sexual differentiation along occupational lines, have radically broken the symmetry of pure patriarchalism), would there not be a tendency for rebirth rituals to be completed by



symbolizations of matricide and without derivation from competitive, monopolistic ingredients at all?<sup>6</sup>

To consider explicitly a bit of political dreaming, is not Hitler's doctrine of Aryanism something analogous to the adoption of a new totemic line? Has he not voted himself a new identity and, in keeping with a bastardized variant of the strategy of materialistic science, rounded this out by laying claim to a distinct blood stream? What the Pope is saying, benignly, in proclaiming the Hebrew prophets as the spiritual ancestors of Catholicism, Hitler is saying malignly in proclaiming for himself a lineage totally distinct.

Freud, working within the patriarchal perspective, has explained how such thinking becomes tied up with persecution. The paranoid, he says, assigns his imagined persecutor the role of rejected father. This persecutor is all-powerful, as the father seems to the child. He is responsible for every imagined machination (as the Jews, in Hitler's scheme, become the universal devil-function, the leading brains behind every "plot"). Advancing from this brilliant insight, it is not hard to understand why, once Hitler's fantasies are implemented by the vast resources of a nation, the "persecutor" becomes the persecuted.

The point I am trying to bring out is that this assigning of a new lineage to one's self (as would be necessary, in assigning one's self a new identity) could not be complete were it confined to symbolic

<sup>6</sup> Or you might put it this way: Rebirth would require a killing of the old self. Such symbolic suicide, to be complete, would require a snapping of the total ancestral line (as being an integral aspect of one's identity). Hence, a tendency for the emancipatory crime to become sexually ambivalent. Freud's patriarchal emphasis leads to an over-stress upon father-rejection as a basic cause rather than as a by-product of conversion (the Kierkegaard earthquake, that was accompanied by a changed attitude toward his father). Suicide, to be thorough, would have to go farther, and the phenomena of identity revealed in totemism might require the introduction of matricidal ingredients also. Freud himself, toward the end of *Totem and Taboo*, gives us an opening wedge by stating frankly, "In this evolution I am at a loss to indicate the place of the great maternal deities who perhaps everywhere preceded the paternal deities. . . ." This same patriarchal emphasis also re-enforces the Freudian tendency to treat social love as a mere sublimation of balked male sexual appetite, whereas a more matriarchal concern, with the Madonna and Child relationship, would suggest a place for affection as a primary biological motivation. Not even a naturalistic account of motivation would necessarily require re-enforcement from the debunking strategy (in accordance with which the real motives would be incipient perversions, and social motives as we know them would be but their appearances, or censored disguise).

patricide. There must also be ingredients of symbolic matricide intermingled here (with the phenomena of totemism giving cause to believe that the ritualistic slaying of the maternal relationship may draw upon an even deeper level than the ritualistic slaying of the paternal relationship). Lineage itself is charted after the metaphor of the family tree, which is, to be sure, patriarchalized in Western heraldry, though we get a different quality in the tree of life. MacLeish, in his period of aesthetic negativism, likens the sound of good verse to the ring of the ax in the tree, and if I may mention an early story of my own, *In Quest of Olympus*, a rebirth fantasy, it begins by the felling of a tree, followed by the quick change from child to adult, or, within the conventions of the fiction, the change from tiny "Treep" to gigantic "Arjk"; and though, for a long time, under the influence of the Freudian patriarchal emphasis, I tended to consider such trees as fathers, I later felt compelled to make them ambiguously parents. The symbolic structure of Peter Blume's painting, "The Eternal City," almost forces me to assign the tree, in that instance, to a purely maternal category, since the rejected father is pictured in the repellent phallus-like figure of Mussolini, leaving only the feminine role for the luxuriant tree that, by my interpretation of the picture, rounds out the lineage (with the dishonored Christ and the beggarwoman as vessels of the past lineage, and the lewd Mussolini and the impersonal tree as vessels of the new lineage, which I should interpret on the nonpolitical level as saying that sexuality is welcomed, but as a problem, while home is relegated to the world of the impersonal, abstract, observed).

From another point of view we may consider the sacrifice of gods, or of kings, as stylistic modes for dignifying human concerns (a kind of neo-euhemerism). In his stimulating study of the ritual drama, *The Hero*, Lord Raglan overstates, it seems to me, the notion that these dramas appealed purely as spectacles. Would it not be more likely that the fate of the sacrificial king was also the fate of the audience, in stylized form, dignified, "writ large"? Thus, their engrossment in the drama would not be merely that of watching a parade, or the utilitarian belief that the ritual would insure rainfall, crops, fertility, a good year, etc.; but, also, the stages of the hero's journey would chart the stages of their journey (as an Eliza-

bethan play about royalty was not merely an opportunity for the pit to get a glimpse of high life, a living newspaper on the doings of society, but a dignification or memorializing of their own concerns, translated into the idiom then currently accepted as the proper language of magnification).<sup>7</sup>

But though we may want to introduce minor revisions in the Freudian perspective here, I submit that we should take Freud's key terms, "condensation" and "displacement," as the over-all categories for the analysis of the poem as dream. The terms are really two different approaches to the same phenomenon. Condensation, we might say, deals with the respects in which house in a dream may be more than house, or house plus. And displacement deals with the way in which house may be other than house, or house minus. (Perhaps we should say, more accurately, minus house.)

One can understand the resistance to both of these emphases. It leaves no opportunity for a house to be purely and simply a house—and whatever we may feel about it as regards dreams, it is a very disturbing state of affairs when transferred to the realm of art. We must acknowledge, however, that the house in a poem is, when judged purely and simply as a house, a very flimsy structure for protection against wind and rain. So there seems to be some justice in retaining the Freudian terms when trying to decide what is going on in poetry. As Freud fills them out, the justification becomes stronger. The ways in which grammatical rules are violated, for instance; the dream's ways of enacting conjunctions, of solving arguments by club offers of mutually contradictory assertions; the importance of both concomitances and discontinuities for interpretative purposes (the phenomena of either association or dissociation, as you prefer, revealed with greatest clarity in the *lapsus linguae*); the conversion of an expression into its corresponding act (as were one, at a time when "over the fence is out" was an expression in vogue, to apply this comment upon some act by following the dream of this act by a

<sup>7</sup> Might not the sacrificial figure (as parent, king, or god) also at times derive from no resistance or vindictiveness whatsoever, but be the recipient of the burden simply through "having stronger shoulders, better able to bear it?" And might the choice of guilty scapegoats (such as a bad father) be but a secondary development for accommodating this socialization of a loss to the patterns of legality?

dreamed incident of a ball going over a fence); and, above all, the notion that the optative is in dreams, as often in poetry and essay, presented in the indicative (a Freudian observation fertile to the neo-positivists' critique of language)—the pliancy and ingenuity of Freud's researches here make entrancing reading, and continually provide insights that can be carried over, *mutatis mutandis*, to the operations of poetry. Perhaps we might sloganize the point thus: In so far as art contains a surrealist ingredient (and all art contains some of this ingredient), psychoanalytic co-ordinates are required to explain the logic of its structure.

Perhaps we might take some of the pain from the notions of condensation and displacement (with the tendency of one event to become the synecdochic representative of some other event in the same cluster) by imagining a hypothetical case of authorship. A novelist, let us say, is trying to build up for us a sense of secrecy. He is picturing a conspiracy, yet he was never himself quite this kind of conspirator. Might not this novelist draw upon whatever kinds of conspiracy he himself had experientially known (as for instance were he to draft for this purpose memories of his participation in some childhood *Bund*)? If this were so, an objective breakdown of the imagery with which he surrounded the conspiratorial events in his novel would reveal this contributory ingredient. You would not have to read your interpretation into it. It would be objectively, structurally, there, and could be pointed to by scissor work. For instance, the novelist might explicitly state that, when joining the conspiracy, the hero recalled some incident of his childhood. Or the adult conspirators would, at strategic points, be explicitly likened by the novelist to children, etc. A statement about the ingredients of the work's motivation would thus be identical with a statement about the work's structure—a statement as to what goes with what in the work itself. Thus, in Coleridge's *The Eolian Harp*, you do not have to interpret the poet's communion with the universe as an affront to his wife; the poet himself explicitly apologizes to her for it. Also, it is an objectively citable fact that imagery of noon goes with this apology. If, then, we look at other poems by Coleridge, noting the part played by the sun at noon in the punishments of the guilt-laden Ancient Mariner, along with the fact that the situation of the narrator's con-

fession involves the detention of a wedding guest from the marriage feast, plus the fact that a preference for church as against marriage is explicitly stated at the end of the poem, we begin to see a motivational cluster emerging. It is obvious that such structural interrelationships cannot be wholly conscious, since they are generalizations about acts that can only be made inductively and statistically after the acts have been accumulated. (This applies as much to the acts of a single poem as to the acts of many poems. We may find a theme emerging in one work that attains fruition in that same work—the ambiguities of its implications where it first emerges attaining explication in the same integer. Or its full character may not be developed until a later work. In its ambiguous emergent form it is a synecdochic representative of the form it later assumes when it comes to fruition in either the same work or in another one.)

However, though the synecdochic process (whereby something does service for the other members of its same cluster or as the foreshadowing of itself in a later development) cannot be wholly conscious, the dream is not all dream. We might say, in fact, that the Freudian analysis of art was handicapped by the aesthetic of the period—an aesthetic shared even by those who would have considered themselves greatly at odds with Freud and who were, in contrast with his delving into the unbeautiful, concerned with beauty only. This was the aesthetic that placed the emphasis wholly upon the function of self-expression. The artist had a number—some unique character or identity—and his art was the externalizing of this inwardness. The general Schopenhauerian trend contributed to this. Von Hartmann's *Philosophy of the Unconscious* has re-enforced the same pattern. This version of voluntaristic processes, as connected with current theories of emancipation, resulted in a picture of the dark, unconscious drive calling for the artist to "out with it." The necessary function of the Freudian secular confessional, as a preparatory step to redemption, gave further strength to the same picture. Add the "complex in terms of the simple" strategy (with its variants—higher in terms of lower, normal as a mere attenuation of the abnormal, civilized as the primitive sublimated); add the war of the generations (which was considered as a kind of absolute rather

than as a by-product of other factors, as those who hated the idea of class war took in its stead either the war of the generations or the war of the sexes)—and you get a picture that almost automatically places the emphasis upon art as utterance, as the naming of one's number, as a blurting-out, as catharsis by secretion.

I suggested two other broad categories for the analysis of poetic organization: prayer and chart.

Prayer would enter the Freudian picture in so far as it concerns the optative. But prayer does not stop at that. Prayer is also an act of communion. Hence, the concept of prayer, as extended to cover also secular forms of petition, moves us into the corresponding area of communication in general. We might say that, whereas the expressionistic emphasis reveals the ways in which the poet, with an attitude, embodies it in appropriate gesture, communication deals with the choice of gesture for the inducement of corresponding attitudes. Sensory imagery has this same communicative function, inviting the reader, within the limits of the fiction at least, to make himself over in the image of the imagery.

Considering the poem from this point of view, we begin with the incantatory elements in art, the ways of leading in or leading on the hypothetical audience X to which the poem, as a medium, is addressed (though this hypothetical audience X be nothing more concrete, as regards social relations, than a critical aspect of the poet's own personality). Even Freud's dream had a censor; but the poet's censor is still more exacting, as his shapings and revisions are made for the purpose of forestalling resistances (be those an essay reader's resistances to arguments and evidence or the novel reader's resistance to developments of narrative or character). We move here into the sphere of rhetoric (reader-writer relationships, an aspect of art that Freud explicitly impinges upon only to a degree in his analysis of wit), with the notion of address being most evident in oration and letter, less so in drama, and least in the lyric. Roughly, I should say that the slightest presence of revision is per se indication of a poet's feeling that his work is addressed (if only, as Mead might say, the address of an "I" to its "me").

Here would enter consideration of formal devices, ways of pointing up and fulfilling expectations, of living up to a contract with the

reader (as Wordsworth and Coleridge might put it), of easing by transition or sharpening by ellipsis; in short, all that falls within the sphere of incantation, imprecation, exhortation, inducement, weaving and releasing of spells; matters of style and form, of meter and rhythm, as contributing to these results; and thence to the conventions and social values that the poet draws upon in forming the appropriate recipes for the roles of protagonist and antagonist, into which the total agon is analytically broken down, with subsidiary roles polarized about one or the other of the two agonists tapering off to form a region of overlap between the two principles—the ground of the agon. Here, as the reverse of prayer, would come also invective, indictment, oath. And the gestures might well be traced down eventually to choices far closer to bodily pantomime than is revealed on the level of social evaluation alone (as were a poet, seeking the gestures appropriate for the conveying of a social negativity, to draw finally upon imagery of disgust, and perhaps even, at felicitous moments, to select his speech by playing up the very consonants that come nearest to the enacting of repulsion).

As to the poem as chart: the Freudian emphasis upon the pun brings it about that something can only be in so far as it is something else. But, aside from these ambiguities, there is also a statement's value as being exactly what it is. Perhaps we could best indicate what we mean by speaking of the poem as chart if we called it the poet's contribution to an informal dictionary. As with proverbs, he finds some experience or relationship typical, or recurrent, or significant enough for him to need a word for it. Except that his way of defining the word is not to use purely conceptual terms, as in a formal dictionary, but to show how his vision behaves, with appropriate attitudes. In this, again, it is like the proverb that does not merely name but names vindictively, or plaintively, or promisingly, or consolingly; etc. His namings need not be new ones. Often they are but memorializings of an experience long recognized.

But, essentially, they are enactments, with every form of expression being capable of treatment as the efficient extension of one aspect or another of ritual drama (so that even the scientific essay would have its measure of choreography, its pedestrian pace itself being analyzed as gesture or incantation, its polysyllables being as

style the mimetics of a distinct monasticism, etc.). And this observation, whereby we have willy-nilly slipped back into the former subject, the symbolic act as prayer, leads us to observe that the three aspects of the poem, here proposed, are not elements that can be isolated in the poem itself, with one line revealing the "dream," another the "prayer," and a third the "chart." They merely suggest three convenient modes in which to approach the task of analysis.<sup>8</sup>

The primary category, for the explicit purposes of literary criticism, would thus seem to me to be that of communication rather than that of wish, with its disguises, frustrations, and fulfilments. Wishes themselves, in fact, become from this point of view analyzable as purposes that get their shape from the poet's perspective in general (while this perspective is in turn shaped by the collective medium of communication). The choice of communication also has the advantage, from the sociological point of view, that it resists the Freudian tendency to overplay the psychological factor (as the total medium of communication is not merely that of words, colors, forms, etc., or of the values and conventions with which these are endowed, but also the productive materials, co-operative resources, property rights, authorities, and their various bottlenecks, which figure in the total act of human conversation).

Hence, to sum up: I should say that, for the explicit purposes of literary criticism, we should require more emphasis than the Freudian structure gives, (1) to the proportional strategy as against the essentializing one, (2) to matriarchal symbolizations as against the Freudian patriarchal bias, (3) to poem as prayer and chart, as against simply the poem as dream.

But I fully recognize that, once the ingenious and complex structure has been erected, nearly anyone can turn up with proposals that it be given a little more of this, a little less of that, a pinch of so-and-so, etc. And I recognize that, above all, we owe an enormous debt of gratitude to the man who, by his insight, his energy, and his remarkably keen powers of articulation, made such tinkering pos-

<sup>8</sup> Dream has its opposite, nightmare; prayer has its opposite, oath. Charts merely vary—in scope and relevance. In *Kubla Khan*, automatically composed during an opium dream, the dream ingredient is uppermost. In *The Ancient Mariner*, the prayer ingredient is uppermost. In *Dejection* and *The Pains of Sleep*, the chart ingredient is uppermost: here Coleridge is explicitly discussing his situation.



sible. It is almost fabulous to think that, after so many centuries of the family, it is only now that this central factor in our social organization has attained its counterpart in an organized critique of the family and of the ways in which the informative experience with familiar roles may be carried over, or "metaphored," into the experience with extra-familiar roles, giving these latter, in so far as they are, or are felt to be, analogous with the former, a structure of interpretations and attitudes borrowed from the former. And in so far as poets, like everyone else, are regularly involved in such informative familiar relationships, long before any but a few rudimentary bodily gestures are available for communicative use (with their first use unquestionably being the purely self-expressive one), the child is indeed the adult poet's father, as he is the father of us all (if not so in essence, then at least as regards an important predisposing factor "to look out for"). Thence we get to "like father like son." And thence we get to Freud's brilliant documentation of this ancestry, as it affects the maintenance of a continuity in the growing personality.

Only if we eliminate biography entirely as a relevant fact about poetic organization can we eliminate the importance of the psychoanalyst's search for universal patterns of biography (as revealed in the search for basic myths which recur in new guises as a theme with variations); and we can eliminate biography as a relevant fact about poetic organization only if we consider the work of art as if it were written neither by people nor for people, involving neither inducements nor resistances.<sup>9</sup> Such can be done, but the cost is tremendous in so far as the critic considers it his task to disclose the poem's eventfulness.

<sup>9</sup> Those who stress form of this sort, as against content, usually feel that they are concerned with judgments of excellence as against judgments of the merely representative. Yet, just as a content category such as the Oedipus complex is neutral, i.e., includes both good and bad examples of its kind, so does a form category, such as sonnet or iambic pentameter, include both good and bad examples of its kind. In fact, though categories or classifications may be employed for evaluative purposes, they should be of themselves nonevaluative. Apples is a neutral, nonevaluative class, including firm apples and rotten ones. Categories that are in themselves evaluative are merely circular arguments—disguised ways of saying "this is good because it is good." The orthodox strategy of disguise is to break the statement into two parts, such as: "This is good because it has form; and form is good." The lure behind the feeling that the miracle of evaluation can be replaced by a codified scientific routine of evaluation seems

However, this is decidedly not the same thing as saying that "we cannot appreciate the poem without knowing about its relation to the poet's life as an individual." Rather, it is equivalent to saying: "We cannot understand a poem's structure without understanding the function of that structure. And to understand its function we must understand its purpose." To be sure, there are respects in which the poem, as purpose, is doing things for the poet that it is doing for no one else. For instance, I think it can be shown by analysis of the imagery in Coleridge's "Mystery Poems" that one of the battles being fought there is an attempt to get self-redemption by the poet's striving for the vicarious or ritualistic redemption of his drug. It is obvious that this aspect of the equational structure is private and would best merit discussion when one is discussing the strategy of one man in its particularities. Readers in general will respond only to the sense of guilt, which was sharpened for Coleridge by his particular burden of addiction, but which may be sharpened for each reader by totally different particularities of experience. But if you do not discuss the poem's structure as a function of symbolic redemption at all (as a kind of private-enterprise Mass, with important ingredients of a black Mass), the observations you make about its structure are much more likely to be gratuitous and arbitrary (quite as only the most felicitous of observers could relevantly describe the distribution of men and postures in a football game if he had no knowledge of the game's purpose and did not discuss its formations as oppositional tactics for the carrying-out of this pur-

to get its backing from the hope that a concept of quality can be matched by a number. The terms missing may be revealed by a diagram, thus:

Quantity.....	Number
Weight.....	Pound
Length.....	Foot
Duration.....	Hour
Quality.....	{ }
Excellence.....	{ }
Inferiority.....	{ }

Often the strategy of concealment is accomplished by an ambiguity, as the critic sometimes uses the term "poetry" to designate good poetry, and sometimes uses it to designate "poetry, any poetry, good, bad, or indifferent." I do, however, strongly sympathize with the formalists, as against the sociologists, when the sociologist treats poetry simply as a kind of haphazard sociological survey—a report about world-conditions that often shows commendable intuitive insight but is handicapped by a poor methodology of research and controls.

pose, but treated the spectacle simply as the manifestation of a desire to instruct and amuse).

Thus, in the case of *The Ancient Mariner*, knowledge of Coleridge's personal problems may enlighten us as to the particular burdens that the Pilot's boy ("who now doth crazy go") took upon himself as scapegoat for the poet alone. But his appearance in the poem cannot be understood at all, except in superficial terms of the interesting or the picturesque, if we do not grasp his function as a scapegoat of some sort—a victimized vessel for drawing off the most malign aspects of the curse that afflicts the "greybeard loon" whose cure had been effected under the dubious aegis of moonlight. And I believe that such a functional approach is the only one that can lead into a profitable analysis of a poem's structure even on the purely technical level. I remember how, for instance, I had pondered for years the reference to the "silly buckets" filled with curative rain. I noted the epithet as surprising, picturesque, and interesting. I knew that it was doing something, but I wasn't quite sure what. But as soon as I looked upon the Pilot's boy as a scapegoat, I saw that the word silly was a technical foreshadowing of the fate that befell this figure in the poem. The structure itself became more apparent: the "loon"-atic Mariner begins his cure from drought under the aegis of a moon that causes a silly rain, thence by synecdoche to silly buckets, and the most malignant features of this problematic cure are transferred to the Pilot's boy who now doth crazy go. Now, if you want to confine your observations to the one poem, you have a structural-functional-technical analysis of some important relationships within the poem itself. If you wish to trail the matter farther afield, into the equational structure of other work by Coleridge, you can back your interpretation of the moon by such reference as that to "moon-blasted madness," which gives you increased authority to discern lunatic ingredients in the lunar. His letters, where he talks of his addiction in imagery like that of the "Mystery Poems" and contemplates entering an insane asylum for a cure, entitle you to begin looking for traces of the drug as an ingredient in the redemptive problem. His letters also explicitly place the drug in the same cluster with the serpent; hence, we begin to discern what is going on when the Mariner transubstantiates the water snakes, in removing them from the category of the loathsome and accursed to the category of

the blessed and beautiful. So much should be enough for the moment. Since the poem is constructed about an opposition between punishments under the aegis of the sun and cure under the aegis of the moon, one could proceed in other works to disclose the two sets of equations clustered about these two principles. Indeed, even in *The Ancient Mariner* itself we get a momentous cue, as the sun is explicitly said to be "like God's own head." But, for the moment, all I would maintain is that, if we had but this one poem by Coleridge, and knew not one other thing about him, we could not get an insight into its structure until we began with an awareness of its function as a symbolic redemptive process.

I can imagine a time when the psychological picture will be so well known and taken into account—when we shall have gone so far beyond Freud's initial concerns—that a reference to the polymorphous perverse of the infantile, for instance, will seem far too general—a mere first approximation. Everyone provides an instance of the polymorphous perverse, in attenuated form, at a moment of hesitancy; caught in the trackless maze of an unresolved, and even undefined, conflict, he regresses along this channel and that, in a formless experimentation that "tries anything and everything, somewhat." And in so far as his puzzle is resolved into pace, and steady rhythms of a progressive way out are established, there is always the likelihood that this solution will maintain continuity with the past of the poet's personality by a covert drawing upon analogies with this past. Hence the poet or speculator, no matter how new the characters with which he is now concerned, will give them somewhat the roles of past characters; whereat I see nothing unusual about the thought that a mature and highly complex philosophy might be so organized as to be surrogate for, let us say, a kind of adult breast-feeding—or, in those more concerned with alienation, a kind of adult weaning). Such categories do not by any means encompass the totality of a communicative structure; but they are part of it, and the imagery and transitions of the poem itself cannot disclose their full logic until such factors are taken into account.

However, I have spoken of pace. And perhaps I might conclude with some words on the bearing that the Freudian technique has upon the matter of pace. The Freudian procedure is primarily de-

signed to break down a rhythm grown obsessive, to confront the systematic pieties of the patient's misery with systematic impieties of the clinic.<sup>10</sup> But the emphasis here is more upon the breaking of a malign rhythm than upon the upbuilding of a benign one. There is no place in this technique for examining the available resources whereby the adoption of total dramatic enactment may lead to correspondingly proper attitude. There is no talk of games, of dance, of manual and physical actions, of historical role, as a "way in" to this new upbuilding. The sedentary patient is given a sedentary cure. The theory of rhythms—work rhythms, dance rhythms, march rhythms—is no explicit part of this scheme, which is primarily designed to break old rhythms rather than to establish new ones.

The establishing of a new pace, beyond the smashing of the old puzzle, would involve in the end a rounded philosophy of the drama. Freud, since his subject is conflict, hovers continually about the edges of such a philosophy; yet it is not dialectical enough. For this reason Marxists properly resent his theories, even though one could, by culling incidental sentences from his works, fit him comfortably into the Marxist perspective. But the Marxists are wrong, I think, in resenting him as an irrationalist, for there is nothing more rational than the systematic recognition of irrational and nonrational factors. And I should say that both Freudians and Marxists are wrong in so far as they cannot put their theories together, by an over-all theory of drama itself (as they should be able to do, since Freud gives us the material of the closet drama, and Marx the material of the problem play, the one worked out in terms of personal conflicts, the other in terms of public conflicts).

The approach would require explicitly the analysis of role: salvation via change or purification of identity (purification in either the moral or chemical sense); different typical relationships between in-

<sup>10</sup> There are styles of cure, shifting from age to age, because each novelty becomes a commonplace, so that the patient integrates his conflict with the ingredients of the old cure itself, thus making them part of his obsession. Hence, the need for a new method of jolting. Thus, I should imagine that a patient who had got into difficulties after mastering the Freudian technique would present the most obstinate problems for a Freudian cure. He would require some step beyond Freud. The same observation would apply to shifting styles in a poetry and philosophy, when considered as cures, as the filling of a need.

dividual and group (as charted attitudinally in proverbs, and in complex works treated as sophisticated variants); modes of acceptance, rejection, self-acceptance, rejection of rejection<sup>11</sup> ("the enemies of my enemies are my friends"); transitional disembodiment as intermediate step between old self and new self (the spirituality of Shelley and of the Freudian cure itself); monasticism in the development of methods that fix a transitional or other-worldly stage, thereby making the evanescent itself into a kind of permanency—with all these modes of enactment finally employing, as part of the gesture idiom, the responses of the body itself as actor. (If one sought to employ Freud, as is, for the analysis of the poem, one would find almost nothing on poetic posture or pantomime, tonality, the significance of different styles and rhythmic patterns, nothing of this behaviorism.) Such, it seems to me, would be necessary, and much more in that direction, before we could so extend Freud's perspective that it revealed the major events going on in art.

But such revisions would by no means be anti-Freudian. They would be the kind of extensions required by reason of the fact that the symbolic act of art, whatever its analogies with the symbolic act of neurosis, also has important divergencies from the symbolic act of neurosis. They would be extensions designed to take into account the full play of communicative and realistic ingredients that comprise so large an aspect of poetic structure.

ANDOVER, NEW JERSEY

<sup>11</sup> I am indebted to Norbert Gutermann for the term "self-acceptance" and to William S. Knickerbocker for the term "rejection of rejection."

# PSYCHOANALYTIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNDERSTANDING AND TREATMENT OF BEHAVIOR PROBLEMS

WILLIAM HEALY, M.D.

## ABSTRACT

Without denying the tremendous influence of psychoanalysis upon the study of human behavior, yet a tendency toward overvaluation of psychoanalytic concepts as providing solutions for many individual and social ills has to be recognized. Freud is not to be blamed for this—he has clearly recognized physical and social determinants and that what has been built upon the foundations of psychoanalysis is not a closed system. Behavior problems are mainly such because of their social significance. Although many illustrations are possible of the deeper causations of misconduct, yet these factors have often been overplayed. There is no reason why the strengths of psychoanalysis cannot be retained while a broad scientific orientation concerning behavior problems is maintained. Psychoanalysis and sociology should represent collaborative efforts.

It is not necessary here to dwell on the stimulus that professional students of the problems of human behavior have received through the development and practice of psychoanalysis in general, and particularly through the fundamental discoveries and the theoretical concepts of Sigmund Freud. The impress of psychoanalysis is found everywhere in this field, affecting the thought of even those who have not been trained in psychoanalysis, and, indeed, often of those who choose to belittle its progressive growth. Modern psychiatry and social work, both of which currently play such an important role in the understanding and treatment of behavior problems of many varieties, are deeply indebted to psychoanalysis for valuable insights through which some of their therapeutic aims may be brought to fruition.

But, in a purview of the whole situation as it exists today, it must be acknowledged that on the part of those who are less well trained in medicine, psychology, sociology, and anthropology—the sciences which separately and co-operatively are necessary for fundamental understandings of behavior patterns and trends—there is a distinct tendency to overvaluation of psychoanalytic concepts as alone providing workable solutions for a large share of individual and social ills. It is only too human to seize upon a specific idea or group of

ideas as offering sufficient explanation of causes and, consequently, affording a basis for remedies. History shows analogies in the rise of various forms of religious beliefs, or the attempt to apply such theories as that of the "economic man," or the abundant making of legal restrictions—all offered as pointing the way to rectification of the behavior of humankind, individually or collectively. And yet we have the dismal chaos of present-day conditions. Of course, it can be argued that no one of these beliefs or theories has been fully applied—and then comes the eternal question of the essential nature of man and what there is about him that leads him not to respond more completely to the ideas and prescriptions that have been considered essential for better personality development and for better social progress.

Since the more recent growth of medical and social psychology and of sociology we sometimes say that science has never had its innings in making plans for more wholesome adjustments of the affairs of man. Very true, but any special branch of science—and I certainly conceive psychoanalysis to be such a branch—is not the whole tree of scientific knowledge. Freud has never denied that, while psychoanalysis delves into the complex causations of human behavior, it is often found that other than the deeper materials unearthed from the mental life are determinants of behavior—factors intrinsic in the personality makeup of the individual and extrinsic in the physical and social milieu. Over and over, for example, he has emphasized the constitutional determinants, the organic structure of the individual, as having a large share in the production of attitudes and specific forms of behavior. And while he has been far from attempting to do justice to the whole gamut of social and economic pressures and influences, he has written enough about social and group phenomena to show his recognition of the importance of these external forces in the origins of conduct trends.

The foundations of psychoanalysis rest upon the overwhelmingly provable facts that superimposed upon—or, rather, coincident with—the organic background of human beings there are not only the long-recognized functionings of the mind but also certain heretofore largely unrecognized processes in the mental and emotional life. First of all, there is the vastly important dynamic quality of the



unconscious portion of mental activity. So-called "voluntary behavior" is often directly related to the activities of the unconscious. Freud has done far more than anyone else to make this clear. Moreover, he has demonstrated at least some of the main laws inherent in human nature by which material entering through the receptor portions of the central nervous system is worked over in the psyche, stored in the unconscious, and then can and does become productive of behavior. Indeed, the keystone of the valid structure of psychoanalysis is the fact of repression. Utilizing the structural organization—the mechanism, as it were, of our minds—there are active mental processes which not only allow us to forget infinitely more than we consciously remember but which also forcefully hold down in the unconscious such kinds of material as are obnoxious to or even disavowed by our conscious selves. And the holding-down creates turmoils and stresses which seek outlets, and hence in one form or another find expression in ideas or behavior, the causation of which we are unaware because of the indirectness and partial submergence of the chain of antecedents.

Then, adding to prior knowledge of the fundamental drives, instincts, and strivings of human nature, Freud also has with considerable success elucidated further the nature of these forces. ("Dynamics," I prefer to call these forces, rather than to use the term "mechanisms," which, though common in psychoanalytic phraseology, insufficiently indicates their working aspects.) And so much of Freud's thought has been generally accepted as applicable to the manifestations of human behavior that we have now the commonly understood terms "sublimation," "identification," "projection," "symbolization," "displacement," etc. It is easy to comprehend from all this, based so largely on empirical observations, why Freud offered one definition of psychoanalysis as "a dynamic conception which reduces mental life to an interplay of reciprocally urging and checking forces." And, one might add, this is quite in line with what we know of the receptor, inhibitory, and excitatory functions of the brain itself.

Also drawn from observational sources there are, to be sure, various other psychoanalytic considerations of great value for the interpretation of behavior—such as the "complexes," mainly originating through the emotional relationships of family life; reactions to

the universal experiences which accompany the various stages of the individual's development; the types of personality which result from a combination of intrinsic structural qualities and life's experiences; or the rationale of conscience (superego) formation. All these have great import for the student of the genetics of character and conduct tendencies.

As I stated in an earlier work:

Most distinctly to be recognized are the following psychobiological facts accepted as foundation stones of psychoanalysis: (a) Biological and psychological development are inseparably interrelated. (b) The essential nature of the individual consists in strivings and urges, innate or unlearned, which originally are quite independent of environment. (c) Whatever the individual is or does at any given moment is very largely predetermined by his earlier experiences and his reactions to them. (d) The earliest years of life represent the period when biological and mental experiences most profoundly influence the individual because he is then less pre-formed or conditioned. (e) Existing actively in the mental life of the individual there is a vast amount of which he is unaware. (f) The biological, and consequently the psychological, constitution varies in different individuals.<sup>1</sup>

It is upon such foundations that Freud has built a body of theory which he insists is not a closed system. Coping stones of this superstructure may be removed without damage to either the foundations or the framework.

Nearly all behavior problems are such because of their social significance. Conduct in general has positive or negative social values, and the problems we deal with clinically are of the latter type—ranging from those which merely cause annoyances to those which precipitate a demand for protection of society. The points to be made here are that conduct represents interaction with the environment and that necessarily the nature and the qualities of the environment, especially as this involves relationships with other human beings, have their part in effecting conduct manifestations. At the same time implicit in the fact that conduct is volitional behavior is the corollary that in every case it is not the environment alone but also what is going on within the individual that produces conduct trends.

<sup>1</sup> Healy, Bronner, and Bowers, *The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis* (New York: Knopf, 1930).

We cannot here even enumerate all the forms of behavior difficulties which, as referred to a child-guidance center, are discovered to be susceptible to psychoanalytic interpretations. If we take, as only one example, enuresis, a large accumulation of literature could be cited proving the indubitable values of psychoanalytic investigations of causes in a definite proportion of cases. Unconscious hostilities to parents, regressions to infantile attitudes, sexual components, and some fear complexes may, any of them, be involved.

Much less diverse for consideration are the definitive delinquencies, which if committed by an adult would be termed crimes. One approach to the theme of this paper would be to discuss each kind of delinquency and the bearings of psychoanalytic interpretations upon the origins of the antisocial behavior. Our limitations, however, allow only the simplest suggestions of these implications. Consider fire-setting—as differentiated from arson—and our knowledge that in an extraordinary proportion of cases the causes of this delinquency have been found to be bound up with sexual experiences and conflicts. (Fire or flame we all know is a symbol for sexual activity.) One typical instance is that of a boy of ten, too amply warned about the sin of sex, who set a rather disastrous fire in a lumber yard at the very spot where a little girl initiated sex play with him.

Or take stealing, which, of course, has a hundred-and-one possible interacting causations. It may represent the individual's response to dire need, or to the social pressure of suggestion, or to the mores of a given tribe or gang or neighborhood. Confronted by such external issues, neither the professional worker nor the interested layman need seek any deeper explanation; but we know very concretely that in other cases the individual is driven to engage in this form of antisocial conduct by the activating dynamisms of the unconscious mental life.

For one simple and explicit matter—some twenty-five years ago in my book, *Mental Conflicts and Misconduct*,<sup>2</sup> I gave in case histories concrete evidence of how seemingly irrational tendencies to steal may occasionally develop through some peculiarly dynamic association of ideas of stealing with ideas concerning sexual matters. When, through a feeling of guilt in such cases, urges to sexual experience or

<sup>2</sup> Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1915.

to entertain sexual thoughts are repressed, the emotionally associated idea of stealing breaks through into action—and entirely without realization of the causal nexus.

Clinical studies have brought out many other contributions proving the force of unconscious mental processes in the production of antisocial conduct, the commonest form of which is stealing. In particular, Alexander and I have been at pains to set forth, in *Roots of Crime*,<sup>3</sup> accurate details of what was learned concerning their unconscious drives through analytic sessions with offenders who had long records of delinquency and criminality. There it can be seen that we discovered various types of repressed factors at work. Actually unearthed as elements of the unconscious which activated the misbehavior were unwholesome identifications; emotional fixations at an early receptive or dependent stage of development with, as in other instances of reactions to inferiority feelings, overcompensation by indulging in delinquency as a proof of aggressive, bravado masculinity; spite or avengement reactions to deeply sensed ego or libidinal deprivations and thwartings; the seeking of relief from neurotic anxieties and tensions caused by unfulfilled repressed desires; and even an unacknowledged wish to return to the infantile state of irresponsible dependency implicit in a prison regime.

From all this it seems clear that the direct role of repressed sexual desires in the development of stealing tendencies has been greatly overplayed by some psychoanalysts in their earlier enthusiastic acceptance of this theory. In particular, the symbolism of the nature of articles stolen has been overstressed, even when stealing has largely originated from unconscious internal conflicts. To be sure, one does occasionally discover such sexual symbolism, but, in general, the stealing itself as a forbidden act is much more likely to be symbolic. One recent case studied in our clinic demonstrates the symbolism of a criminal activity in very unusual fashion. A boy of fifteen, during a period of three months or so, engaged in a score of serious burglaries. It appeared that he always forcibly entered some office or shop and then, with or without stealing all the money that was there to appropriate, broke or destroyed or threw around much of what was in the place. He said he did not in the least know why

<sup>3</sup> New York: Knopf, 1935.

he did this—he was seized with a terrific impulse to do it. Through numerous interviews it gradually came out that he had some extraordinary notions of the nature of sexual intercourse—it was a forcible entering, a destroying, tearing, cutting, vicious affair. And on one occasion in the daytime, when his father was intoxicated, he witnessed “the primal scene,” with his beloved mother the supposed victim. Thoughts, highly charged with emotion, about sexual violence preceded his own outbursts of sadistic criminal aggression.

Another approach to our subject would be to consider the different types of dynamisms of which we have become aware through psychoanalytic investigations, their possible relationship to varieties of experience, and the known possible resultant effect upon behavior trends. Just as any given phenomenon, such as some special kind of antisocial conduct, may have any one of a number of causes, so any given composite of causes may have different effects. But if we do this, then again we are face to face with the partial causal factors involved in the life-situation—environmental limitations and thwartings, or social pressures to misconduct in the shape of special opportunities, invitations, or suggestions.

I have often spoken of the tremendous quantitative difference between the exhibition of delinquency and crime in different countries, offering for comparison Sweden and the United States. Human nature with its instinctive urges and its dynamic unconscious must be the same in both national settings, but the environmental experiences contrast greatly. And it is not the material aspects of the two sorts of civilization that differ nearly so much as the ideational life of the two peoples. Coming from whatever source they may, the two types of ideologies show great contrasts—a matter that should be of great interest to the student of social psychology. Alexander, with the sharper perception of divergences that a new country affords, has done well to call attention to some of the main psychosocial origins of the notorious lawbreaking tendencies prevalent among our population. In his chapter on “The Interplay of Social and Psychological Factors”<sup>4</sup> he points out the heroic exhibitionistic evaluation of criminality in America; the leveling tendencies of the machine age as contrasted with the traditions of aggressive independence and

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*

individualism of our pioneering ancestors; the craving for prestige which accompanies a sense of inferiority derived from the loss of wholesome opportunities for self-expression—prestige which can be won by display of masculinity in lawbreaking. I cite all this as showing the broad and scientifically well-oriented outlook that psychoanalysis can develop toward behavior problems.

The hope in this field is for a closer rapprochement between psychiatry—with its newer understandings derived from psychoanalysis—and sociology. Professional workers in either of these two sciences have their limitations, but their own practical contributions to the betterment and prevention of conduct and social disorders will be much enhanced if they draw liberally upon the knowledge, practices, and techniques belonging to the other.

JUDGE BAKER GUIDANCE CENTER  
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

## WHAT IS A NEUROSIS?

KAREN HORNEY, M.D.

### ABSTRACT

The need to define a neurosis has developed only recently with the realization that psychic disturbances need not consist only of gross malfunctions, as was held in the latter part of the nineteenth century, but may consist of character trends of a particular nature, the sum total of which interferes with the individual's happiness. The impression of two kinds of neuroses—symptom neuroses and character neuroses—which resulted from this new conception is again misleading, for every neurosis is essentially a character disorder. This view introduces social viewpoints into a field claimed by medical psychiatry. From a social standpoint a neurosis can be defined as a deviation from the "normal" in the sense of the statistically average in a given culture. From a clinical viewpoint neuroses may be regarded as an attempt to cope with life under difficult internal conditions which center about a basic anxiety toward life in general. An attempt to bridge the difference between the socially oriented definition of neurosis and that which is clinically oriented would describe a neurosis as a deviation from the average but add that the deviation does not primarily concern the manifest behavior but the quantity or quality of basic anxiety as well as that of the deviation developed for the sake of security.

The need to define a neurosis has developed only recently. The psychic phenomena which in the latter part of the nineteenth century became an object of psychiatric curiosity concerned gross circumscribed disturbances, such as convulsions, functional paralysis, obsessional ceremonies, phobias, striking changes in mood, and gross sexual malfunctions. There was no doubt that they constituted an illness of a special kind.

Though we are not far removed in time from this state of blissful simplicity, we have emerged thoroughly from it and find ourselves confronted with much more puzzling problems. Several factors have combined to complicate the picture. To begin with, the gross disturbances mentioned have become comparatively rare and have given room to more diffuse disorders resisting psychiatric classification.

Moreover—mainly due to the pioneering work of Freud—our understanding of the neurotic processes has so far progressed that we are able to recognize expressions of them which formerly would have escaped attention. In this regard the development which has taken place is comparable to that of our knowledge of an organic illness, such as tuberculosis. Originally only the most conspicuous stages of

the illness were known giving rise to the name "consumption." Increased knowledge permitted us to recognize phases of the disease which formerly were not seen at all or which were not recognized as manifestations of the same underlying process.

Our better understanding of neuroses has taught us that the so-called neurotic "symptoms," such as phobias, depressions, fatigue, and impotence, can be absent altogether; that a neurosis may "merely" consist in character trends of a particular nature, the sum total of which interferes with the individual's proper functioning under given external conditions and thereby interferes with his happiness. As a result of these trends his relationships with people are handicapped by a greater number of fears and hostilities than is warranted by the environment; he does not develop his potentialities as fully as he could under given conditions; his work is less effective, less successful, and, particularly, less creative than it might otherwise be; his capacities to assert himself and to enjoy whatever life offers him are impaired.

Thus the impression was created that two kinds of neuroses existed: symptom neuroses and character neuroses, the latter being roughly characterized by an apparent tendency to stand in one's own way. Such a definition however is misleading. It suggests that a symptom neurosis is not necessarily a character neurosis as well, while in reality every neurosis is essentially a character disorder regardless of whether or not there are "symptoms." Symptoms, though often conspicuous and important to a person's life, do not constitute the essence of neuroses but are a by-product only.

This realization further adds to our confusion concerning the nature of neuroses inasmuch as it introduces social viewpoints into a field which heretofore had been claimed by medical psychiatry. A fear of high places or a hysterical paralysis of the arm may be referred to as an illness. But a rigid and indiscriminate attitude of defiance or a compulsive compliance would involve social evaluations though either could become an object of psychiatric treatment in so far as its consequences interfere with a person's life. The effect of such overlapping of social categories—social functioning, behavior, and attitudes—and medical clinical ones represents the main difficulty in arriving at a definition of neuroses. The following remarks



represent an attempt to clarify these issues and to understand their interrelations.

From a social standpoint a neurosis can be defined as a deviation from the "normal" in the sense of the statistically average in a given culture, as has been pointed out by Margaret Mead and other authors. Frigidity, for instance, will be suspect of an underlying neurosis only when the majority of women are not frigid. A compulsive perfectionism would strike no one as a problem in a rigidly puritanical group. This approach to neuroses is valuable because it shows that the evaluation of a phenomenon such as "illness" is dependent on social factors. It prevents us from making naïve generalizations and value judgments. The limitations of this definition lie in that it necessarily deals with manifest behavior only and disregards the underlying processes. It does not and cannot give us any insight into the factors operating in these processes. It does not take into account the fact that people may be adapted to environmental requirements and yet suffer from severe psychic disturbances.

Moreover, regarding a neurosis as a deviation from the cultural pattern entails the danger of using a deceptive measuring rod concerning the value of such deviations. It enhances the temptation to regard the statistically average as right or superior, and neurotic manifestations as wrong or inferior. But it may be that a "problem child" who rebels against parental encroachments is essentially right and that the "well-adapted" parents are essentially wrong. It may be that a person who rebels against seeing the meaning of life in the acquisition of prestige and wealth has a better and deeper feeling for the values of life than has a society advocating these goals.

From a clinical viewpoint I would regard neuroses—chronic neuroses—as an attempt to cope with life under difficult internal conditions. In the center of these difficulties is a diffuse basic anxiety toward life in general. Such an anxiety—*Urangst*—is a fundamental human phenomenon. The basic anxiety of the so-called neurotic is more intense than is warranted by the environment for two main reasons. Owing to a combination of adverse influences in his childhood he feels more isolated and more helpless toward the tasks and dangers of life. And likewise, owing to his early experiences his anxiety is not only related to dangers of a more impersonal kind—

illness, accidents, social or political vicissitudes, frightening events of nature—but in addition is specifically related to the hostilities of people around him, hostilities which he dimly senses as a permanent potential menace.

Since the objective of this paper is not to elucidate the genesis of neurotic phenomena but to elicit a feeling for what constitutes their essence, I shall merely indicate which early adverse influences I hold relevant in the generation of neuroses. I am thinking roughly of all those environmental attitudes and types of behavior which impair a child's capacity to assert himself and to fight and thereby render him helpless, which elicit a feeling of isolation, which provoke hostility, which in effect tend to crush the child's individuality. In this situation the child must find ways of dealing with the environment and of preserving the integrity of his own self. He develops trends which are subtly adapted to meet the particular difficulties with which he is confronted. Their main objective is not only to attain a measure of safety in life but also to find certain satisfactions attainable within the limits set by his overwhelming need for safety. It is their protective function which gives these "neurotic trends" their peculiar character of rigidity and which leads to their indiscriminate application. If for any reason the neurotic trends fail to operate, manifest anxiety may arise.

Mention may be made of a few of such neurotic trends frequent in our culture: to ward off one's real self and to over-adapt one's self to environmental standards to such an extent as to become unassailable; to be unobtrusive and to become utterly dependent on others, expecting them to take one's life into their hands; to inflate an image of one's self and to strive for admiration and prestige.

Never does any change occur in any part of a living organism which does not influence the entire organism. Thus it would not be thinkable that neurotic trends develop while the personality as a whole remains unchanged. Invariably the neurotic trends have decisive consequences varying in kind according to the type of neurotic trends which have developed. These consequences ensue in an elaborate system of avoidances and inhibitions; every trend or reaction not in line with the safety devices must be suppressed since otherwise the safety devices would be jeopardized. If the emphasis is, for in-

stance, on a passionate pursuit of rectitude and perfection, anxiety may arise at any failure to measure up to these standards. Hence, spontaneous expressions of all kinds must be checked. Personal feelings and wishes must be rigorously subordinated to the requirement of doing and feeling the "right" thing. Any activity must be avoided which entails the risk of failures. If safety is sought in a leaning dependency on others, anything must be avoided that might alienate them. Not only fights must be avoided but also critical thoughts and independent actions.

Furthermore, secondary anxieties will arise which in turn have their own consequences. Thus if the appearance of "rightness" must be maintained at any price, disparities existing between the immaculate façade and trends not fitting into the façade may give rise to an almost permanent fear of being "found out," with the resulting emphasis on secrecy and seclusion or with the resulting tendency to offer self-recriminations in order to ward off accusations on the part of others. Thus the hostilities which must be repressed in the leaning "symbiotic" type form a hidden source of explosive material which in turn adds to the individual's insecurity and requires new measures of precaution.

I shall mention, last, the sensitivities which develop and which render human relationships still more precarious than they were originally. Also any number of gross and subtle rationalizations will be built up in order to justify the behavior determined as it is by the neurotic trends.

Thus a whole intricate character structure develops around the neurotic trends. No feature in it is accidental. Every trait develops because of inexorable necessity and serves a necessary function. Peculiarities or "symptoms" emanate from this structure and must be understood on that basis.

It is this neurotic character structure that constitutes the essence of a neurosis. The "difficult internal conditions" under which a neurotic tries to cope with life are those inherent in his character structure.

Whether such a definition of neuroses is applicable to other civilizations than ours would require psychiatric observations in various cultures to decide. An offhand estimate is all the less opportune

since the concept presented reckons most intimately with social and cultural factors. While the definition stresses individual character difficulties these in turn have been engendered through environmental factors—that is, ultimately through cultural conditions. They are not only brought about through external conditions but also are kept alive through these conditions, as is indirectly proved by the therapeutic effects of early changes of environment. Moreover, the kind of safety devices which are developed and the kinds of satisfactions which are attainable depend entirely upon the existing life-conditions. It is hardly imaginable that a striving for the appearance of moral perfection would be used as a means toward security in a culture in which such perfection would meet with amazement and disapproval, in which, for instance, it would be regarded as inhuman. An attitude of helpless personal dependency would scarcely appeal as a safety device in a culture in which it would not elicit attention and protection, but would meet with ridicule.

Generally speaking each of the safety devices we find in our neuroses has its factual security value and contains certain factual possibilities for attaining gratification. It is only their one-sided compulsive and indiscriminate application that lends them their precarious character. Thus a wish to achieve something and to obtain some recognition for one's achievement would appear as a "normal" striving in a competitive culture like ours. But if a wish for recognition becomes a devouring passion pursued at the expense of all other values in life, if simultaneously one's creative abilities are inhibited, and if instead of putting one's energies into one's work one tends to attain superiority through disparaging others, then we would call such an ambition "neurotic."

The latter considerations also suggest an approximate distinction between the "normal" and the "neurotic." Two ways of reasoning might lead to such a distinction. One would lie in the attempt to arrive at an absolute distinction valid everywhere. Then we might speak of neuroses whenever we meet with a basic anxiety and with neurotic trends in the above sense. Furthermore, we would then have to agree on a generally valid norm for what constitutes psychic health, such as, for instance, to be able to have a good attitude toward self and others and to have the free use of one's energies.

To adopt this way has, however, definite drawbacks. We could hardly avoid making ourselves the judge as to what is a "good" attitude toward self and others or as to what is a "free" use of energy. Moreover, we would find ourselves compelled to designate as neurotic a whole people or a large group belonging to it. This would be awkward because "neurotic," however we may define it, has the connotation of impairment of function. But the group as a whole and an individual belonging to such a group may function well within the given cultural limitations as do others within other limitations.

The other way would be to abandon the search for an absolute meaning of neuroses and apply the term in a relative fashion only, to restrict it to mean the psychic conditions of individuals in relation to the statistically average psychic conditions in a given culture. Supposing every culture involves a measure of general anxiety toward life and provides for certain ways of coping with life safely, then we would call neurotic an individual whose anxiety surpasses the average and whose safety devices differ from the average in quantity or quality. Needless to say such a definition does not permit the drawing of a neat demarcation line between neurotic and normal (average) in a given culture. Here as everywhere in nature, we have to reckon with a great range of transitional phenomena. The decision whether or not to call an individual neurotic must ultimately be based on merely practical criteria, such as the degree of being handicapped or the degree of suffering.

This concept allows us to draw a bridge between a definition of neuroses which is merely socially oriented and one which is merely clinically oriented. We can agree with the anthropologist who holds a neurosis to be a deviation from the average, but we would add that the deviation does not primarily concern the manifest behavior but the quantity or quality of basic anxiety as well as that of the deviation developed for the sake of security.

NEW YORK CITY

## THE NEO-ADLERIANS

FRITZ WITTELS, M.D.

### ABSTRACT

Freud and his psychoanalysis are today being assailed as taking insufficient cognizance of the direct influence of the social situation upon the individual. Insecurity, competition, lack of charity, we hear, are the chief causes of neuroses, and not—as Freud's school teaches—our native constitution plus early childhood impressions, such as the well-known oedipus complex, its forerunners and derivatives. The field of "social" etiologies was the exclusive object of Alfred Adler's research, and although his heirs rarely quote him, the "new" discoveries in this field are based on his theories. For this reason I call this school which is now in formation the Neo-Adlerians.

Inasmuch as psychoanalysis long ago absorbed a good deal of Adler's investigations, the "discoveries" of these newcomers appear to be the products of cryptomnesia. Psychoanalysis has always reckoned with social factors, the oedipus complex itself being one of the first social experiences of the infant. Without dialectic interweaving of the biological with social ego, there could be no psychoanalytic progress. In contesting the salient features of Freud's psychology the Neo-Adlerians are attempting to set the clock back to pre-Freudian times.

It has often been said that Freud committed two sins against the "sleep of the world": (a) he found sexuality to have hitherto unthought-of importance in human psychology and (b) he found that our impulses spring from an unconscious and hence uncontrolled psychic system—in short, we do not know ourselves or what motivates our actions. This latter would have been overlooked and pardoned by an easygoing world had not psychoanalysis dug unspeakably shocking matter out of the dark abyss. An unconscious filled with perfumed angels and divine missions would be well and good, but to be pronounced unconsciously perverse and criminal—parricides, man-eaters, incestuous beasts! The great invention of a method wherewith to recognize and control our underworld ("id must change to ego") was ignored. Even the theory that instincts can be desexualized and sublimated to the highest human achievements was not accepted. The mid-Victorian world was too outraged to pay heed. Psychoanalysis was declared a chimera, an ugly construction concocted by an obviously depraved pseudoscientist.

We know that in the decades following the first shock, public opinion, "compact majority," gave in very little and Freud, himself, not at all. His discoveries followed one another in rapid succession

and almost invariably had considerable nuisance value. One of the first was the language of the dream. What we knew to be nonsense, if anything was nonsense, was declared to be filled with profound, almost unfathomable, meaning. Today, at least in its general outlines, dream interpretation is unquestionably established for all time. What disclosed this newly discovered language? The never ending struggle against antisocial, vicious, perverse instincts existing within us all.

Then followed discovery that our innocent blunders and errors of everyday life had unheard-of and provocative meaning; our hysterical and otherwise deranged fellow-men did not produce nonsensical and ludicrous symptoms as we had before assumed but were waging a sinister war against themselves and their surroundings. Still worse, Freud did not stay in his doctor's office but, with an eye on so-called "normal" people, extended the insight gained from his patients over all men. How could the world come to terms with statements which say—to mention but a few—that children, too, have a sex life, albeit different from that of adults; that girls desire a penis and that boys suffer from a secret fear of castration; that all men are bisexual, eventually betraying homosexual tendencies; that, to the unconscious, money was dirt? When Freud, describing a strict and to a great extent unconscious conscience (the superego), showed that our personality even in its sublime tendencies was unconsciously reaching out much farther than we had previously assumed, this completion of his psychology remained incomprehensible—a barely audible adagio in the midst of boisterous satanism.

All this is well known. Also well known is the fact that Freud, in his own private life, never deviated from Victorian morals and in almost all problems not immediately connected with his psychoanalysis remains to this day a child of the nineteenth-century bourgeois class, as evidenced in his philosophical essays. When his main task was done, the creator of psychoanalysis turned to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, two philosophers who, departing from the style of their century, served for a metaphysical understructure to psychoanalytic observations. How much enlightenment can the opponents of Freud's theory of sex receive from Schopenhauer's treatise *Metaphysics of Sex Love*? Read it and then take a stroll in a garden in full

bloom. It is impossible not to become aware that all fragrantcy, all that which is colorful and sweet and melodious, is created by the spirit of propagation, of immortality—Schopenhauer's "Will" at its constructive best. Freud employs the term "libido" for this energy.

Onlookers and critics feel just as moody about his work today as forty years ago when it was first promulgated. If anything, they have become more malevolent. At first, they cherished the hope that Freud's structure would collapse in a short time. Today, this hope is forlorn; editorial writers, clergymen, and other educators are entirely cognizant of the fact that psychoanalysis is here to stay: a repetition of the struggle for Darwin and, long ago, for Copernicus.

As in retreat, skirmishes are used to delay the enemy, so dissenters, and, more eagerly, deserters from the psychoanalytic front itself, are employed. There have always been deserters of psychoanalysis. With a piece of the doctrine they break away from the central light, and the distance from their origin grows wider and wider. Thus, they arrive at something having an entirely different aspect, but usually an old and well-accepted doctrine painted afresh. Other dissenters continue to revolve around the central light as planets around the sun, but back out when their time has come. Some of the tangential doctrines originating from psychoanalysis have been reabsorbed, as most noteworthy in the case of Alfred Adler, the most important rebel of them all.

In the first decade of the century Freud devoted himself largely to the biological phase of his work and the system which he later called the id: instincts and their vicissitudes; psychic mechanisms faulty from the viewpoint of the logical ego; repressed wishes and their distorted return to the conscious mind. In those days psychoanalysis knew little about the structure of the *ego* (here used in contrast to the *id*). Notwithstanding a few hasty constructions, Freud had nothing definite to say about it. His preliminary constructions were the censorship of the ego as discernible most clearly in our dreams; repressing powers that eliminate from the conscious mind all it does not like to face; and a few remarks about "flight into disease" and "sick reward." To none of these two did Freud attach much significance, but Alfred Adler took them over and made them the main pillar of his *Individual Psychology*. He perceived aggressive instincts



which Freud at first denied as genuine instincts. He taught the position of the individual within his group; how every individual depends on his own social sense from which he cannot free himself, how its repression engenders unhappiness and neurosis. Adler pointed out how secure and cheerful we feel when a part of the group in which we move and how we become victims of anxiety and inferiority when alone with ourselves—hence the flight into mental or nervous disease. Our sick reward is the enforced compassion and charity in compensation for the success and esteem we cannot achieve. The die-hard inferiority complex continues to bore from within, nonetheless.

That all this is true none can deny. But it is neither new nor does it solve the riddle of human neuroses. Adler saw the social side of the problem, employing Nietzsche's "will to power." Becoming more and more of a preacher, he saw "useful" and "useless" activities, the unconquerable desire for individual superiority, discouragement, attitude of hesitancy amid the struggle for superiority, and the terminus in disease. He taught the "virtues": conform with your group, be good to your neighbor. All of us, he taught, have goals, often secret goals because we have lost the courage to attain them in the open.

All these teachings indubitably remain in rational, logical spheres. With considerable sagacity, Adler untwisted the tricks of the neurotics, debunking a thousand alibis, like: "I would if I could, but I can't, because. . . ." The world, Adler divided into three circles: occupation, social life, and sex. He declared them to be equal in value and distinct from one another as the species which, before the theory of evolution, were regarded as so many different acts of creation. Naturally, in this exclusively sociological psychology, most of the accomplishments of psychoanalysis get lost. Adler denied the incomparable nature of sexuality fundamental to everything. Against Eros, enthroned by Freud, he invoked good old common sense, and a shocked common sense it was. He circumvented Freud's unconscious and denied the existence of erotogenic zones, the repetition compulsion, and the mechanism of transference. There is as little recognition of love in his conception of the world as there are flowers in the desert. His success came not from anything altogether new or revolutionary—quite to the contrary. He found a lucky formula for

something which all of us had known or felt at one time or another: the tormenting sense of inferiority which by overcompensation is metamorphosed into a sense of superiority.

Pointing out goals and tasks exclusively, purposefully overlooking all impulses from within (instincts), Adler finally came to a psychological universe in which there were no instincts and no specific individual talents. When, later, Freud inserted in his edifice the instinct of destruction whose independent existence he had first denied, Adler remained above it all. People become aggressive and destructive when stimulated from outside, from social contacts, as a rule. Love is merely the result of stimulation by a sex partner. All is stimulus and response. There are no impulses independent of (usually social) stimuli. He came, as we can see, within the proximity of Pavlov's "conditioned reflex" and its American offspring, "behaviorism." These schools, however, never accepted his teachings, probably because of Adler's theory that we are free to respond to such stimuli as we consider good and correct; the free will appears again. "Only discouraged people have instincts which they must satisfy," exclaimed one of Adler's disciples. According to Adler, the aim of psychotherapy is to instil social courage into discouraged people, to give them back their free will in the most rational and yet miraculous way.

Psychoanalysis is an instinct theory based on the age-old dualism of hunger and love. The denial that we are born with instincts, sex and destructive, removes the very foundation on which psychoanalysis rests. Adler's earlier doctrines, however, psychoanalysis found adaptable. Although Freud's greater profundity and insight undermined Adler's edifice, a number of his theories were harvested and made part of Freud's ego analysis, notably his theory that we are pushed from within and drawn from without: our thoughts and acts are directed from within (instincts), and goals, aims, tasks are stimulated also from without. Can anyone shut his eyes to this dialectic reciprocity of ego and id?

Human psychology is unthinkable without a thorough consideration of social surroundings, and the slogan of our day—that Freud's penetrating spirit overlooked this obvious fact—becomes readily comprehensible when we remember that anything that promises

effective ammunition against psychoanalysis never failed to find a ready public and press. Adler founded a school that in part teaches Freud without quoting him. On the other hand, other investigators, some of them discontented disciples of Freud, teach Adler's theories almost verbatim without quoting him. These are the Neo-Adlerians. It is not easy to quote them because some have not as yet published what they teach verbally, while others have published obscure short communications or popular books written for the general public and hence full of demagoguery. They have one purpose, one goal—the denunciation of Freud's instinct theory as an obstacle to scientific progress. They offer, in its place, tendencies aroused in us by stimuli from without. There is, they say, no inherited sadism (pleasurable destruction). Boys who maliciously tie an empty can on a cat's tail are born good, but (it is almost impossible not to add "unfortunately") are seduced from without. Cruelty and the enjoyment of cruelty are in the boy's surroundings and transferred onto him; they do not dwell primarily in the human soul. Nor, they assert, is our lip zone primarily erotogenetic. It is drawn into our sex life as an outgrowth of the habit of kissing enforced upon us again from without. Evidence: there are races and cultures where the kiss is unknown. To suck his thumb seems to give pleasure to the baby, but it is an imitation of the sucking at his mother's breast, and even the sucking instinct could not develop (remember, there are no instincts!) were the baby not first stimulated by the nipples inserted in his mouth. Thirty-five years after Freud's *Contributions to the Theory of Sex*, the Neo-Adlerians protest the right to call anything sexual which is not directly connected with the genitalia, and even they are sexually stimulated not from within but entirely from outside. In the absence of such stimulation neither the genitalia nor their psychic correlations function. Thus, perversions circumventing the genitals of one or both partners are favors extended by people who expect certain social advantages to accrue. And—believe it or not—the Neo-Adlerians tell us in all seriousness that the woman's position at intercourse was invented and forced upon her in order to subdue her. Adler, himself, said that so-called love was chiefly a shrewd method of subjugating one's partner.

There would be no reason to reiterate such obvious sophistry were

there not, alas, people eager to annihilate psychoanalysis in this desperate way. "Common sense," employed so advantageously by Adler in a world that was still shocked by Freud's findings, has been taken up by the Neo-Adlerians. With the supercilious remark: "It doesn't make sense," they are attempting to obliterate tried and proven facts. Of course, it was with much common sense that Adler explained homosexuality on the basis of the sense of inferiority of men who cannot or who decline to struggle for women as other men do. "I have no use for her," says the homosexual and feels superior to it all. In so simple and alluring a way is one of the obscurest biological riddles solved. Psychoanalysis, while not pretending to understand the problem in its entirety, did arrive at causations but different ones. We will not endeavor to go into them here, except to say that these causations must be detected against a specific resistance within one's self in order to realize them. But they will never become popular, whereas Adler's theory has a better chance, the more so as it is correct—in a sense. It is a half-truth, overemphasizing as it does the secondary reward of the homosexual added to his primary motives.

One of the still contested discoveries of psychoanalysis—rejected by the Neo-Adlerians—is Freud's oedipus complex. The human baby is helpless much longer than any other, and, without adequate care, he perishes. For this reason, the triangle resultant from his close contact with his mother and father becomes his first problem. As the child's sex life, despite his prolonged helplessness, awakens prematurely, his problem is sexualized with all the attending paraphernalia, from envy and jealousy down to death wishes, affectionate longing, and genitalization. Naturally, a great deal of the problem engenders from the parental situation. They can facilitate or aggravate the settlement of the oedipus problem. But this does not mean that the phenomena of this complex originate entirely in the stimuli produced by the parents, as the Neo-Adlerians would have us believe. A rock does not respond when you behave affectionately to it. A child responds because of instruments within himself capable of response which we call instincts. Psychoanalysis broke these instincts into their component parts, studying them in their objectives, following them a certain distance into biology, and also describing

their relations to social energies. One cannot deny their existence without denying a vast field of facts which psychoanalysis has ascertained beyond any doubt. Hundreds of analytically trained workers must surely have convinced the world by now that these facts exist undeniably, as do other laws of nature. Yet, out of emotional antipathy against the findings of psychoanalysis, praise falls upon the refuter of Freud who substitutes for him "Virtue" or "The Dignity of Man" or "Free Will."

According to theologians and other educators, man's dignity derives from his free will. Almost all of Freud's former pupils who found their way out of the psychoanalytic doctrine ride on the back of this winged horse—the free will which they assert psychoanalysis neglects. On their ride out of the scientific atmosphere of a strictly deterministic doctrine, they reach the serene field of morals, philosophy, and religion. The true psychoanalyst is unable to follow. Free will, virtue, and wishes may become the objects of psychoanalytic investigation, but they cannot be accepted as scientific categories. Only in so far as psychoanalysis is also a therapeutic method are we unable to dispense with these messianic forms. All doctors know that therapy is not within the realm of pure science.

Psychoanalysis establishes the influence of society upon the individual on three levels: an archaic influence inherited from our ancestors which may be traced back as far as our animal past; the influence of environment upon the child with its weak and yet undeveloped ego receiving impressions more in a "plastic" way than with rational understanding; and the reciprocity between the adult and his surroundings. Neo-Adlerians pretend that psychoanalysis favors the first and second over the latter, particularly the second. Some of them go farther and say that the second—containing all the revolutionary statements of psychoanalysis—is unimportant and the first more than doubtful.

True, before Freud's appearance on the psychological scene, the first two levels remained obscure. We didn't know that a child's first experiences, a product of his *Anlage* and his first impressions from the outside world, are decisive for his psychological future. Psychotherapy then blamed the patient's ill will; on the one hand, and his unhealthy surroundings, on the other. "You have your free will!"

the doctor counseled the patient. "Pull yourself together! Try hard and you will be all right." To society he said: "This patient is exhausted from overwork, too much competition, too much frustration—not enough sympathy." That our general insecurity indeed overstimulates the sense of property, that our sex instinct is overstimulated particularly in big cities and exaggerated by discouraged individuals who use it in compensation for social problems, who will deny? I wonder whether we require a psychological genius to make us aware of this.

Our patients do not let us forget their social frustrations, complaining about them all the time. They feel that society, not they, ought to be changed. One of my patients said that my therapy would be successful only if I put two hundred and fifty thousand dollars at his disposition and iterated this demand so stubbornly that I had to discontinue treatment. As his financial position had never been bad, the Neo-Adlerians would probably say that his sense of security or his social anxiety were particularly hard to please. Sometime later, this man inherited a considerable fortune but committed suicide, nevertheless, a few years later. I make mention of this case in order to emphasize, first, that I cannot give large sums of money to my patients (i.e., doctors as a rule cannot alter the social status of their patients); second, that money—to utter a trite but apt truism—makes no one happy. Let us suppose that a patient is fixated on her mother whom she considers—justly or unjustly—bad. What can the doctor do? Since he cannot do away with the mother in order to bring his patient back to normality, he must do away with the fixated idea. An employee suffering from compulsive procrastination until the work on his desk piles up to the sky and drives him to despair cannot be helped by diminishing his duties; he is sick and must be treated.

Of course, the Neo-Adlerians know this, too, and do not look on the patient's desk for the causes of his procrastinating compulsion but elsewhere in his life. He may be unhappy in his marriage and may want to lose his job in order to punish his wife. Perhaps he hates his job and wants to change it. Or, perhaps, his ambition has been frustrated. In short, they grope for causes in his current life of which the patient may know nothing. Psychoanalysts do this too,

but our chief interest does not lie in the present. We search for pathological changes in the historical development of the patient's libido because we know that there will be found the roots of the evil. We find and uproot these "notorious" complexes of castration anxiety, anal eroticism (procrastination of defecation in the first two years of life), oedipus wrath and oedipus despondence, feminine fixation—all of which are responsible for our patient's unfitness in society. It is fifty years now since Freud asked: "Why do not all men break down under the strain—insecurity, frustration, unkindness of our social order of things? Why does only a certain percentage run into neuroses and psychoses?"

Psychoanalysis found that adults are influenced and warped by their surroundings incomparably less than by early impressions. The earlier in life an experience enforces itself upon the infant, the stronger is its molding power and the deeper its roots in the unconscious. We perceive these roots in the shape of oral-sadistic and anal-sadistic components, of primary and secondary narcissism, of passive feminine tendencies in men and masculine protest in women (this term was first used by Adler but in a different sense). Here, the Neo-Adlerians demur, declaring that common sense does not permit the presumption that the difficulties and problems encountered in infancy should be decisive for all the later life of the so much more intelligent adult. Our early difficulties, they allege, concerning affection, cleanliness, duties, wishes, are of necessity discarded and forgotten because much more important tasks confront us later on. This would be ground for argument were it not that after forty years of psychoanalytic research, little doubt remains about the preponderant weight of our first experience. We do not presume; we know. Certainly, if our statesmen, politicians, or whosoever can, will improve the insecurity of our existence, the hard competition and injustice, it will be an occasion for much rejoicing. Neurotics, perverts, criminals, psychotics, however, will continue to exist. Mental sanity or derangement does not depend on political or other social orders but stems from fundamental, sociobiological facts centering around the oedipus complex, its forerunners and its derivatives.

How can the rigidity of our personality (our "character") be blamed upon the influence of the adult environment or upon the

compulsive taboos which exist in not only a few obsessionals but in all of us, the absence of a sense of time in hysterical types, paroxysms of anxiety, all symptoms resisting logical influence? Even in nations this can be seen, where whole masses of peoples regress to infancy in the arms of the "great man" their father, who, omnipotent and omniscient, shoulders all their burdens and asks nothing in return but blind obedience and enthusiastic love, which they cheerfully give.

The Neo-Adlerians "encircle" Freud, attacking him not only from the sociological side but also from the anthropological rear. The oedipus complex, they assert, cannot be the nucleus of all neuroses and of all civilization because the father figure appears relatively late in the history of mankind, whereas in the matriarchate and other former dominant forms of culture the child's position must have been altogether different. They describe conditions among primitive peoples, eliciting the conclusion that their libido follow an entirely different line of development.

Rather than accompany the Neo-Adlerians along this slippery terrain, the psychoanalysts remain on their own proven ground: we see what exists now in our own culture. Strict facts cannot be wiped out by theories based on the past and uncertain reports from the South Seas. The paramount importance of the father figure is proved in all cases, in those of the Neo-Adlerians as well as in ours, along with the entire picture of the oedipus conflict appearing different in each case. Castration fear and other phenomena known in psychoanalytic terminology as primal fantasies are so universal that they could not be enucleated entirely out of early individual experiences, let alone from social influences in later life. In tracing the neurotic's individual history, we often find that violent reaction-formation of children in the sense of our primal fantasies is not—as at first psychoanalysis assumed—always counteraction to violent behavior on the part of the adults. Boys who are never threatened, never strictly treated, develop castration fear. Children of the mildest parents may contain murderous impulses of which they, themselves, are afraid. Although we could always enter this psychological thicket with our analytic searchlight and make some headway, we have felt that we never penetrated completely and thus came to the con-



clusion that tracing neurotic symptoms to the child's first experiences does not suffice. Even in their first years, children develop partly independent of what happens to them from without. The answer to the riddle lies counterwise to that elicited by the Neo-Adlerians.

We could speak at this time of "bedrock," where all psychology ends and biological or physiological factors decide. However, before giving up, we asked ourselves whether there were not deep unconscious wells within, inherited as an archaic psychology and therefore independent of any individual experience. C. G. Jung speaks of a "collective unconscious." As animals are born with certain experiences inherited from their parents (hunting instinct and other expedient activities often of surprisingly complicated nature), so men, too, seem to be born with a psychological inheritance, although less discernible because of our superimposed mind, and also more difficult to separate from individually acquired reasonable and unreasonable experience. The phenomena of group psychology make patent how much cruelty, impulsiveness, viciousness, and, conversely, courage, enthusiasm, self-sacrifice, there are in us when the rational and moral acquisitions of "progress" fall off; our archaic inheritance comes to the fore. The symbol and picture language of our dream must be an archaic tongue which we do not understand on waking, yet use during our sleep.

Freud has published a number of conjectures about our archaic inheritance which, while they do not satisfy the demands of scientific evidence, clear a possible trail in the dark. Twenty-five years ago he pronounced the more important of his surmises in his book *Totem and Taboo* and returned to them time and again, most recently in his book *Moses and Monotheism*. The killing of the primal horde father and its consequences may be called a myth created by Freud, along with his remarks about the taming of fire or his tracing of man to some apeman who attained sexual maturity at the age of five. We know today that myths contain profound meaning, coming as they do from so mighty a guesser of riddles as Freud. It is essential, however, to separate Freud, the mythologist, from Freud, the scientist. This he has himself done throughout his lifetime. Some of Freud's

archaic investigations, such as his interpretation of dreams, are definitely scientific.

We must split up our archaic inheritance into that from our animal past, from the acquisitions probably gained in times of sexual advances as in warm interglacial epochs, and from the setbacks brought about in the glacial era; moreover, inheritance from different periods of prehistoric civilization. Tracks of these old layers must be studied by psychoanalysis as well as by anthropology. Their results must be compared, and they must proceed from observation to conclusion and theory and back again to observation. We will have to avoid carefully any confusion between deduction and observation.

Neo-Adlerians censure us because we fail to recognize the influence of our actual social condition; others because Freud has not given sufficient heed to our archaic (collective) inheritance. Yet, without Freud, none of these critics would even know how to approach sociological or archaic psychology. They disdain the bulk of Freud's discoveries: the psychology of the child. Is it really possible to set the clock back to pre-Freudian conceptions of psychology and psychiatry? I think not. I can see no future in Neo-Adlerianism except by a vigorous return to Freud. It might be more correct, perhaps, to call this swing, easy to predict because inevitable: Forward to Freud!

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## TOTEM AND TABOO IN RETROSPECT

A. L. KROEBER

### ABSTRACT

Freud's explanations of cultural origins waver between being historic and being psychological in character. As history they remain wholly unfounded, but they may prove to contain elements contributing to understanding of the generic human psychology underlying the history of human culture, especially its recurrent or repetitive features. Psychoanalytic intransigence as to historic interpretation is due partly to an "overdetermination" in Freud's own thinking and partly to rigidity in his followers, as exemplified by Jones and Roheim. Psychoanalysis has maintained an all-or-none attitude toward general science. Science has profited by definite absorptions from psychoanalysis.

Nearly twenty years ago I wrote an analysis of *Totem and Taboo*—that brain child of Freud which was to be the precursor of a long series of psychoanalytic books and articles explaining this or that aspect of culture, or the whole of it.<sup>1</sup> It seems an appropriate time to return to the subject.

I see no reason to waver over my critical analysis of Freud's book. There is no indication that the consensus of anthropologists during these twenty years has moved even an inch nearer acceptance of Freud's central thesis. But I found myself somewhat conscience-stricken when, perhaps a decade later, I listened to a student in Sapir's seminar in Chicago making his report on *Totem and Taboo*, who, like myself, first spread out its gossamer texture and then laboriously tore it to shreds. It is a procedure too suggestive of breaking a butterfly on the wheel. An iridescent fantasy deserves a more delicate touch even in the act of demonstration of its unreality.

Freud himself has said of my review that it characterized his book as a *Just So* story. It is a felicitous phrase, coming from himself. Many a tale by Kipling or Anderssen contains a profound psychological truth. One does not need therefore to cite and try it in the stern court of evidential confrontation.

However, the fault is not wholly mine. Freud does speak of the "great event with which culture began." And therewith he enters history. Events are historical and beginnings are historical, and hu-

<sup>1</sup> "Totem and Taboo: An Ethnologic Psychoanalysis," *Amer. Anthropologist*, XXII (1920), 48-55.

man culture is appreciable historically. It is difficult to say how far he realized his vacillation between historic truth and abstract truth expressed through intuitive imagination. A historic finding calls for some specification of place and time and order; instead of which, he offers a finding of unique cardinality, such as history feels it cannot deal with.

Freud is reported subsequently to have said that his "event" is to be construed as "typical." Herewith we begin to approach a basis of possible agreement. A typical event, historically speaking, is a recurrent one. This can hardly be admitted for the father-slaying, eating, and guilt sense. At any rate, there is no profit in discussing the recurrence of an event which we do not even know to have occurred once. But there is no need sticking fast on the word "event" because Freud used it. His argument is evidently ambiguous as between historical thinking and psychological thinking. If we omit the fatal concept of event, of an act as it happens in history, we have left over the concept of the psychologically potential. Psychological insight may legitimately hope to attain to the realization and definition of such a potentiality; and to this, Freud should have confined himself. We may accordingly properly disregard any seeming claim, or half-claim, to historic authenticity of the suggested actual happening, as being beside the real point, and consider whether Freud's theory contains any possibility of being a generic, timeless explanation of the psychology that underlies certain recurrent historic phenomena or institutions like totemism and taboo.

Here we obviously are on better ground. It becomes better yet if we discard certain gratuitous and really irrelevant assumptions, such as that the self-imposed taboo following the father-slaying is the original of all taboos, these deriving from it as secondary displacements or distortions. Stripped down in this way, Freud's thesis would reduce to the proposition that certain psychic processes tend always to be operative and to find expression in widespread human institutions. Among these processes would be the incest drive and incest repression, filial ambivalence, and the like; in short, if one like, the kernel of the Oedipus situation. After all, if ten modern anthropologists were asked to designate one universal human institution, nine would be likely to name the incest prohibition; some have

expressly named it as the only universal one. Anything so constant as this, at least as regards its nucleus, in the notoriously fluctuating universe of culture, can hardly be the result of a "mere" historical accident devoid of psychological significance. If there is accordingly an underlying factor which keeps reproducing the phenomenon in an unstable world, this factor must be something in the human constitution—in other words, a psychic factor. Therewith the door is open not for an acceptance *in toto* of Freud's explanation but at any rate for its serious consideration as a scientific hypothesis. Moreover, it is an explanation certainly marked by deeper insight and supportable by more parallel evidence from personal psychology than the older views, such as that familiarity breeds sexual indifference, or recourse to a supposed "instinct" which is merely a verbal restatement of the observed behavior.

Totemism, which is a much rarer phenomenon than incest taboo, might then well be the joint product of the incest-drive-and-repression process and of some other less compelling factor. Nonsexual taboo, on the other hand, which rears itself in so many protean forms over the whole field of culture, might be due to a set of still different but analogous psychic factors. Anthropologists and sociologists have certainly long been groping for something underlying which would help them explain both the repetitions and the variations in culture, provided the explanation were evidential, extensible by further analysis, and neither too simplistic nor too one-sided. Put in some such form as this, Freud's hypothesis might long before this have proved fertile in the realm of cultural understanding instead of being mainly rejected or ignored as a brilliant fantasy.

What has stood in the way of such a fruitful restatement or transposition? There seem to be at least three factors: one due to Freud himself, another jointly to himself and his followers, the third mainly to the Freudians.

The first of these is Freud's already mentioned ambiguity which leads him to state a timeless psychological explanation as if it were also a historical one. This tendency is evident elsewhere in his thinking. It appears to be the counterpart of an extraordinarily explorative imagination, constantly impelled to penetrate into new intellectual terrain. One consequence is a curious analogy to what he himself has discovered in regard to the manifest and the latent in

dreams. The manifest is there, but it is ambiguous; a deeper meaning lies below; from the point of view of this latent lower content, the manifest is accidental and inconsequential. Much like this, it seems to me, is the historical dress which Freud gives his psychological insight. He does not repudiate it; he does not stand by it as integral. It is really irrelevant; but his insight having manifested itself in the dress, he cannot divest himself of this "manifest" form. His view is overdetermined like a dream.

A second factor is the curious indifference which Freud has always shown as to whether his conclusions do or do not integrate with the totality of science. This led him at one time to accept the inheritance of acquired traits as if it did not clash with standard scientific attitude. Here again we have the complete explorer who forgets in his quest, or represses, knowledge of what he started from or left behind. In Freud himself one is inclined not to quarrel too hard with this tendency; without it, he might have opened fewer and shorter vistas. Of his disciples, however, who have so largely merely followed, more liaison might be expected. I recall Rank, while still a Freudian, after expounding his views to a critically sympathetic audience, being pressed to reconcile certain of them to the findings of science at large and, after an hour, conceding that psychoanalysts held that there might be more than one truth, each on its own level and independent of the other. And he made the admission without appearing to realize its import.

A third element in the situation is the all-or-none attitude of most avowed psychoanalysts. They insist on operating within a closed system. At any rate, if not wholly closed, it grows only from within; it is not open to influence from without. A classical example is Ernest Jones's resistance to Malinowski's finding that among the matrilineal Melanesians the effects directed toward the father in our civilization are largely displaced upon the mother's brother, the relation of father and children being rather one of simple and relatively univalent affection. Therewith Malinowski had really vindicated the mechanism of the Oedipus relation. He showed that the mechanism remained operative even in a changed family situation; a minor modification of it, in its direction, conforming to the change in given condition. Jones, however, could not see this, and resisted tooth and nail. Because Freud in the culture of Vienna had determined that

ambivalence was directed toward the father, ambivalence had to remain directed to him universally, even where primary authority resided in an uncle.

The same tendency appears in Roheim, whose "Psycho-analysis of Primitive Culture Types"<sup>2</sup> contains a mass of psychological observations most valuable to cultural anthropologists, but so organized as to be unusable by them. None have used it, so far as I know. This is not due to lack of interest on the part of anthropologists in psychological behavior within cultures, for in recent years a whole series of them have begun avowedly to deal with such behavior. Nor is it due to any deficiency of quality in Roheim's data: these are rich, vivid, novel, and valuable. But the data are so presented as to possess organization only from the point of view of orthodox psycho-analytic theory. With reference to the culture in which they occur, or to the consecutive life histories of personalities, they are inchoate. The closing sentence of the monograph—following immediately on some illuminative material—is typical: "We see then, that the sexual practices of a people are indeed prototypical and that from their posture in coitus their whole psychic attitude may be inferred." Can a conclusion be imagined which would appear more arbitrarily dogmatic than this to any psychologist, psychiatrist, anthropologist, or sociologist?

The fundamental concepts which Freud formulated—repression, regression and infantile persistences, dream symbolism and overdetermination, guilt sense, the effects toward members of the family—have gradually seeped into general science and become an integral and important part of it. If one assumes that our science forms some kind of larger unit because its basic orientation and method are uniform, these concepts constitute the permanent contribution of Freud and psychoanalysis to general science; and the contribution is large. Beyond, there is a further set of concepts which in the main have not found their way into science: the censor, the superego, the castration complex, the explanation of specific cultural phenomena. To these concepts the several relevant branches of science—sociology, anthropology, psychology, and medicine alike—remain impervious about as consistently as when the con-

<sup>2</sup> *Internat. Jour. Psycho-analysis*, XIII (1932), 1-221 (Roheim Australasian Research number).

cepts were first developed. It may therefore be inferred that science is likely to remain negative to them. To the psychoanalysts, on the contrary, the two classes of concepts remain on the same level, of much the same value, and inseparably interwoven into one system. In this quality of nondifferentiation between what the scientific world accepts as reality and rejects as fantasy, between what is essential and what is incidental, the orthodox psychoanalytic movement reveals itself as partaking of the nature of a religion—a system of mysticism; even, it might be said, it shows certain of the qualities of a delusional system. It has appropriated to itself such of the data of science—the cumulative representative of reality—as were digestible to it and has ignored the larger remainder. It has sought little integration with the totality of science, and only on its own terms. By contrast, science, while also of course a system, has shown itself a relatively open one: it has accepted and already largely absorbed a considerable part of the concepts of psychoanalysis. It is indicative of the largeness of Freud's mind that, although the sole founder of the movement and the originator of most of its ideas, his very ambiguities in the more doubtful areas carry a stamp of tolerance. He may persist in certain interpretations; he does not insist on them; they remain more or less fruitful suggestions. Of this class is his theory of the primary determination of culture. As a construct, neither science nor history can use it; but it would seem that they can both accept and utilize some of the process concepts that are involved in the construct.

I trust that this reformulation may be construed not only as an *amende honorable* but as a tribute to one of the great minds of our day.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

NOTE.—Since the above was written and submitted, Freud has published *Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion*. The thesis of *Totem and Taboo* is reaffirmed: "Ich halte an diesen Aufbau noch heute fest" (p. 231). One concession in the direction of my argument is made: the father killing was not a unique event but "hat sich in Wirklichkeit über Jahrtausende erstreckt" (p. 146). Of his stimulator, Robertson Smith, Freud says superbly: "Mit seinen Gegnern traf ich nie zusammen" (p. 232). We, on our part, if I may speak for ethnologists, though remaining unconverted, have met Freud, recognize the encounter as memorable, and herewith resalute him.



## EDWARD ALEXANDER WESTERMARCK: 1862-1939

E. A. Westermarck was born in Helsingfors, Finland, November 20, 1862, and died in Lapilahti, Finland, September 3, 1939. He studied at the University of Finland. From 1907 until 1930 he was professor of sociology, University of London, and was also emeritus professor of philosophy at the Academy of Åbo.

His early work, *The History of Human Marriage*, published in 1891 when he was only twenty-nine, established his reputation and remains a sociological classic. It brilliantly exposed the errors and inadequacies of the evidence upon which the theory of primordial promiscuity had been based and presented a plausible, if not a completely convincing, case for the thesis of monogamy as the original form of human marriage. His two-volume work *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas* (1906-8) was a contribution to an understanding of the relativity of morals to their cultural setting.

These early important works of Westermarck were distinguished by their literary style, ability in organization, capacity for generalization, and emphasis upon the biological and psychological explanations of behavior. The chief limitation in his use of the comparative method was his disposition to draw far-reaching conclusions from comparisons of customs and ideologies detached from their organic setting in the social life of the people.

Westermarck's field work as a social anthropologist in Morocco led to the publication of *Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco* (1914), *Ritual and Belief in Morocco* (1926), and *Wit and Wisdom in Morocco* (1930).

Westermarck's later writings were characterized by much the same qualities as his earlier work, with no essential change in viewpoint or method, as is perhaps best indicated by his book on *The Future of Marriage in Western Civilization* (1936). The influence of his position in sociology and anthropology finds expression in the *Festschrift*, published in his honor in 1912 (*Festkrift Tillägnad Edvard Westermarck* [Helsingfors]).

Among his other works are *A Short History of Marriage* (1926); *Memoirs of My Life* (1929); *Ethical Relativity* (1932); *Early Beliefs and Their Social Influence* (1932); *Pagan Survivals in Mohammedan Civilization* (1933); *Three Essays on Sex and Marriage* (1934); and *Christianity and Morals* (1939).

## SIGMUND FREUD: 1856-1939

Sigmund Freud, to whose life-work the present number of the *Journal* is devoted, died at the age of eighty-three at his home in exile in Hampstead, England, September 23, 1939. He was born in Moravia, May 6, 1856, and educated in Vienna. Having become aware of the limitations of the conventional psychiatric practice, he went to Paris to study with Charcot. This contact opened up to Freud the vistas that subsequently led to psychoanalysis. In the course of clinical practice he was led to the recognition of the significance of early childhood experiences in the understanding of life-careers. He found hypnotism inadequate to resolve the conflicts arising out of the frustration of instinctive drives by social pressures and developed the technique of free association to circumvent the resistance of the patient to the attempt to recall disagreeable experiences. The dream life and the slips made in everyday conduct were used by him as further clues to the unconscious motives. His elaboration of the role of the sexual impulse in man, aside from its diagnostic and therapeutic implications, had profound repercussions upon the contemporary attitude toward sex in virtually every realm of social life and the social and psychological sciences, as the papers in this issue convincingly show. His analysis of the wish gave to the study of individual and collective behavior a plausible deterministic theory; and his illumination of the mechanisms of wish fulfilment is symbolized by the permanent place of such concepts as repression, suppression, rationalization, sublimation, and transference in the vocabulary of social psychology. In uncovering the role of the unconscious and of the nonrational elements in action he became one of the great pioneers and molders of the modern sciences of personality and culture. He was undoubtedly one of the great secularizing influences of our time. He received the Goethe Prize, the highest scientific and literary distinction in Germany. Clark University honored him with an LL.D. upon his visit to the United States in 1909. He organized the International Congress of Psychoanalysis, and was the editor of *Imago*, the *Internationale Zeitschrift fur Psychoanalyse*, and *Schriften zur Angewandten Seelenkunde*. His numerous works commanded a world lay and professional public and range from technical treatises on neurology and psychiatry to such widely read books as the *Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), *The Psychopathology of Every Day Life* (1901), *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (1917), *Totem and Taboo* (1918) and *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930).

## NEWS AND NOTES

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### RESEARCH NEWS

*American Association for the Advancement of Science.*—Under the title *Mental Health* there was published in September the papers presented at the symposium on mental health organized in collaboration with the American Psychiatric Association which held six sessions in Richmond in December, 1938. This symposium was significant in including a full representation of the contributions to mental health of the different life-sciences, biology, psychiatry, psychology, sociology, and cultural anthropology.

*Bureau of Research and Statistics, Social Security Board.*—A ten-year summary showing the trend of public and private aid in 116 urban areas during the period 1929-38 is nearly completed. This document will comprise a record of public and private relief extending over a longer period of time than any other comprehensive series of relief statistics. It brings together in revised form data heretofore published by the Children's Bureau and by the Social Security Board. The report will contain a brief statement about the origin of the urban series, a description of legislative changes affecting the development of the various federal, state, and local relief programs, and an analysis of expenditures in these areas for the ten years under review. In addition, tabulations and charts showing the trend of relief in each city will be included. The first article in a series on aid to dependent children, "The Influence of Federal and State Maxima on Grants Approved for 118,000 Families Accepted for Aid to Dependent Children, 1937-38," will appear in the *Social Security Bulletin*. An index of studies completed or in process in the field of public welfare is being maintained in the Division of Public Assistance Research. For each completed study data on full title, sponsorship, purpose, content, and method employed in making the study is recorded, and all available information is recorded for studies proposed or in process. A list of completed studies, including a brief statement of their content, and an accession to this list have been prepared for the use of employees of the Social Security Board, and further accession lists will be issued from time to time. At the present time this material is not available for general distribution, but plans are

being made for a wider circulation. The division of health studies has extended its disability studies to include the estimated number of dependent children and aged widows of chronically disabled persons for the period 1940-45, inclusive, and for quinquennial years thereafter up to 1980, in terms of sex, marital status, and probable number of dependents. Estimates of the frequency and volume of disabling sickness have also been completed. These estimates are based on the experience of four European countries and on the findings of four domestic sources, including the National Health Survey. The estimates of the frequency and volume of sickness are for various specific waiting and benefit periods. Cost estimates based on the estimated volume of sickness have also been made, assuming an average benefit of 50 per cent of earnings.

With respect to the study of family composition in the United States, a number of articles (see those published in the April, May, and August issues of the *Social Security Bulletin*) and pamphlets in preliminary form have been completed dealing primarily with the problem of income in relation to family size and composition.

*Division of Finance and Statistics, National Youth Administration.*—On July 1, N.Y.A. finance and statistical functions formerly performed by the Works Progress Administration were transferred to the N.Y.A. The newly organized Division is under the direction of Vernon D. Northrop, formerly chief of the W.P.A. Division of Procedures. The statistical section of the Division is under the supervision of Irving Swerdlow, formerly field statistician of the W.P.A. Statistical reports prepared by the Division will include monthly data on employment, hours worked and earnings on work projects, the student aid program, labor turnover on work projects, and expenditures for work projects from federal and co-sponsors' funds. Semiannual reports on work projects employment by county of residence will be prepared. Reports on the distribution of employment by size of monthly earnings will be required about twice a year. Procedures for reporting selected items of physical accomplishment on work projects are being drawn. Social characteristics of youths receiving student aid during the school year 1939-40 will be tabulated from a sample of approved student aid applications. In a recently completed survey of the characteristics of out-of-school youths employed on N.Y.A. work projects, statistical data were obtained on the age, sex, race, previous education, and work experience, and the duration of project employment for about 22,000 youths in six states located in widely separated parts of the country and the District of Columbia.

*Division of Research, Work Projects Administration.*—The status of research projects is as follows: (1) Preliminary field tabulations have been completed for the survey of unemployment in Birmingham, Alabama, Toledo, Ohio, and San Francisco, California. (2) A preliminary report now in preparation on the nature and causes of protracted economic dislocation in seven coal towns in southern Illinois shows that during the peak of seasonal activity in early 1939, two-fifths of the workers were unemployed and nearly half the families were either dependent upon emergency work relief for jobs or had no jobs. (3) A study of workers separated from W.P.A. employment during the period April and early May, 1939, conducted in Detroit, Michigan, Jacksonville, Florida, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, St. Louis, Missouri, and Worcester, Massachusetts, revealed that only a sixth of the workers were found to be employed and nearly a third of the families reported neither private employment nor relief and that the situation was still worse for those who were cut off after eighteen months or more of continuous employment on work projects. (4) A survey of rural areas in ten counties in five southern states and ten counties in six northern and western states will provide information on totally unemployed families which have remained independent of public aid. (5) A report dealing with the factors which determine the relationship between work relief and public works will take into account the significant differences in operational procedure between the two programs, the amount of direct and indirect employment created by each, and differences with respect to timing and flexibility.

The delineation of rural-farm and rural regions and subregions within the United States, now completed, classifies the counties of the United States into 218 rural-farm subregions which are in turn combined into 32 general rural-farm regions. Taking into account the characteristics of the rural-nonfarm population as well as of the rural-farm population into 264 rural regions have been delineated and combined into 34 general rural regions.

*Division of Statistics, Work Projects Administration.*—Now or soon to be available are the following: (1) tabulations showing duration of continuous employment of workers on W.P.A. projects classified in each state according to length of project employment, age, size of family, race, size of community, type of project, and security wage classifications; (2) a preliminary summary of data collected in the survey of the W.P.A. Winter Recreation Program conducted in February, 1939, indicating the characteristics of employees on recreation projects and the number and variety of agencies sponsoring recreation projects and the size of com-

munities in which the program operates; (3) *Analysis of Civil Works Program Statistics*, prepared by Pamela Brown of the Relief Statistics Section, which presents and explains final C.W.A. figures and gives a short history of the program; and (4) *Average General Relief Benefits, 1933-1938*, by Enid Baird with the collaboration of Hugh P. Brinton, a study of average amounts issued to cases.

*Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada.*—The Bureau has installed the "Micro" file system, whereby all census records from 1871 to 1911, largely used for the verification of ages of applicants for old age pensions, will be photographed in greatly reduced size, 1,000 square feet of documents being recorded on 30 square feet of film. Projectors will be used to read the tables from the "Micro" file, and the new system is expected to speed up research work and save the original records from the deterioration caused by repeated handling. For the 1941 census, a new compressed-air tabulating machine will be used. This machine has been designed in the Bureau and is regarded as a distinct improvement on the electrically operated machines now in use.

Preliminary bulletins of the survey of nutrition and family living expenditures have been issued showing summary results for each of twelve cities, and other releases will indicate relationships between family living expenditure and family income, income per person, family composition, tenure and food expenditures of families during one week of the period October 3–November 10, 1938. A final report giving full details of the survey is in course of preparation.

*Harvard University.*—During the summer investigations in the study of the American community, under the direction of Carle C. Zimmerman and supported by the Harvard Committee on Research in the Social Sciences, were carried on in North Carolina, Massachusetts, Missouri, and among the French, both in French Canada and in France.

The origin of the American community is being studied from its European background. Typical Saxon, Anglo-Saxon, Norman French, and Latin communities were picked, respectively, from Hannover, Germany (Klein Lengden); Berkshire, England (Harwell); a middle district between Normandy and Brittany in France; and central Italy (Ripi in Frosinoni). With this background typical American communities of the seventeenth (Westport, Massachusetts), eighteenth (Bath, North Carolina), and nineteenth (Pleasant Hill, Missouri) centuries were followed up. The aims of the study are to get at the foundations of the American community and to study the real basis of American spirit and civilization.

*Institute of Human Relations (Yale University).*—The Cross-Cultural Survey, a project for analyzing and classifying anthropological materials, is being extended to include data on a few higher civilizations as follows: cultural information regarding the Roman Empire is being abstracted by Kingsley Birge; a semirural community in Kansas has been selected as the locus of a cultural survey of a modern American community which will be done by Henry Baker; a field study of the Crow Indians on their reservation in Montana is being executed by Frederick W. Voget.

A study dealing with the personality development of Negro adolescents in New Orleans, Louisiana, and Natchez, Mississippi, by Allison Davis, Dillard University, and John Dollard, will soon be published by the American Council of Education, and there are plans for early publication of *Population Movements and Industrialization in Sweden*, a three-volume work by Dorothy Thomas and Gunnar Myrdal, University of Stockholm.

*National Resources Planning Board.*—A detailed analysis of family expenditures in the United States in 1935-36, a further breakdown of the more general data presented in *Consumer Expenditures in the United States—Estimates for 1935-36* (June, 1939), is now being made under the direction of Hildegard Kneeland. A report by Gardiner C. Means and Louis J. Paradiso, *Capital Equipment Requirements of the Iron and Steel Industry*, designed to develop and exemplify methods for estimating the new capital equipment requirements of separate industries at various levels of economic activity, is nearing completion. A special study of the effectiveness of different classes of public works in providing employment and increasing purchasing power is in process under the direction of J. Kenneth Galbraith. The Science Committee is continuing its study of the research resources of the country, particularly in relation to industrial laboratories, research by business organizations, and the research resources of cities and states.

*Julius Rosenwald Fund.*—The Fund has announced its list of fellowship awards for the academic year 1939-40, of which the following are of interest to sociologists:

W. Allison Davis, Dillard University; to complete a social-anthropological study of the Negro church in the deep South, at the University of Chicago.

Charles R. Lawrence, Jr., Morehouse College, Atlanta; studies in sociology, at Columbia University.

- Hylan G. Lewis, Howard University; a study of social differentiation in the Negro community, at the University of Chicago.
- George F. McCray, Illinois State Employment Service; study of interracial conflicts in the labor movement, at the University of Chicago.
- Edward Nelson Palmer, Newport News; study of the effects of unionization and mechanization upon the Negro automobile worker and his community organization, at the University of Michigan.
- Hugh H. Smythe, Fisk University; studies in social science, at Northwestern University.
- Bonita Harrison Valien, Fisk University; study of the Negro worker in domestic and personal service, at the University of Wisconsin.
- Preston Valien, Fisk University; study of Negro labor problems and Negro occupational maladjustment in terms of occupational status and distribution, at the University of Wisconsin.
- James E. Fleming, University of Georgia; a socio-historical study of southern opposition to industry as revealed in important newspapers, 1865-1900, at the University of North Carolina.
- Wiley Clifford Newman, pastor of the First Methodist Episcopal Church, Indianola, Mississippi, for studies in sociology at Duke University and the University of North Carolina.
- Lillian E. Smith, editor of the *North Georgia Review*, Clayton, Georgia; study of southern literature, sociology, and race relations.
- T. Lynn Smith, Louisiana State University; study of the personnel and facilities for education in agriculture in South and Central America.

Applications for fellowship awards to be granted in 1940 should be addressed to George M. Reynolds, Director for Fellowships, Julius Rosenwald Fund, 4901 Ellis Avenue, Chicago. Awards are made once a year by a committee of Will Alexander, Farm Security Administration; Charles Johnson, of Fisk University; Henry Allen Moe, Guggenheim Memorial Foundation; Raymond R. Paty, Birmingham-Southern College; Edwin R. Embree, Julius Rosenwald Fund; and George M. Reynolds.

*Social Science Research Council.*—A major purpose of the Council since its beginning in 1923 has been to assist in the development of an adequate number of well-trained research workers in the social sciences. To further this purpose, a series of post-doctoral fellowships has been awarded annually since 1925. Recent reconsideration of research-training needs has led to the conclusion that additional financial support at earlier training stages is required, also, for the assurance of competent research personnel,



and the Council has framed its fellowship program to include pre-doctoral fellowships for field training as well as the post-doctoral training fellowships.

Pre-doctoral field fellowships are open to men and women, candidates for the Ph.D. degree, who will have completed prior to the end of the academic year 1939-40 all courses and examinations for which they are eligible before completion of the thesis. The fellowships are not open to persons who will be over the age of thirty on July 1, 1940, or who plan to receive the Ph.D. before the expiration of the period of appointment for which application is made. The purpose of these awards is to supplement formal graduate study by opportunities for field work which will assure firsthand familiarity with the data of social science in the making. While it is taken for granted that programs at this level will be closely correlated with the applicant's Ph.D. theses plans, the aim of these awards is not to aid in finishing theses or to assist in the collection of data as such, but rather to emphasize the opportunities for obtaining realistic bases for the dissertation and subsequent research. Appointments will be for not less than nine nor more than twelve months. The basic stipend is \$1,800 for a period of twelve months. The closing date for the receipt of applications for 1940-41 on blanks to be secured from the fellowship secretary is February 1, 1940. Awards will be announced April 15, 1940. When requesting application blanks, it is important that age, academic qualifications, and tentative field plans be specifically indicated. Application blanks should be secured well in advance of February 1, 1940.

Post-doctoral research training fellowships are open to men and women who possess the Ph.D. degree or its equivalent in training and experience at the time of application, or give assurance that the Ph.D. will be received before February 15, 1940, and who, ordinarily, are not over thirty-five years of age. The primary purpose of these fellowships is to broaden the research training and equipment of promising young social scientists, not to facilitate the completion of research projects or the continuation of investigations undertaken as doctoral dissertations. Programs of study submitted should provide for training of an interdisciplinary nature, for advanced training within the applicant's field of specialization, or for field work or other experiential training intended to supplement more formal academic preparation for research. The basic stipend for a period of twelve months is \$1,800 for single fellows and \$2,500 for married fellows. Supplementary allowances toward the support of dependents, as well as to defray the necessary traveling expenses of the fellow (but not of members of his family), vary according to individual requirements. During

the period of appointment, the fellow is expected to devote full time to his program of study and not to carry on any other work without the consent of the Fellowship Committee. Awards are usually for twelve months but may be made for any period not exceeding two years. Application blanks should be secured from the Fellowship secretary well in advance of February 1, 1940, so that there may be ample time to fill out and return them before that date. Awards will be announced April 15, 1940. When requesting application blanks, it is important that age, academic qualifications, and proposed program of study be specifically indicated.

Grants-in-aid of research are available to mature scholars without reference to age, whose capacity for productive research has been effectively demonstrated by published work. They are not open to candidates for a degree. They are offered especially with a view to assisting members of the staffs of institutions which cannot at present provide adequate funds for social science research, and are designed to aid in completing rather than in initiating projects. The maximum amount granted by the Council will ordinarily not exceed \$1,000. The closing date for receipt of applications for 1940-41 on forms provided by the grants-in-aid secretary is January 15, 1940. Grants will be announced April 1, 1940. When requesting application blanks it is important to indicate previous research experience, nature of project, and amount of aid required. Blanks should be secured well in advance of January 15, 1940.

Two recent publications of the Social Science Research Council are *Fellows of the Social Science Research Council* and *An Appraisal of Thomas and Znamiecki's Polish Peasant in Europe and America*. The former is a review of the experience of the Council from 1925-39 with its training fellowship program. Of the 245 post-doctoral research training fellowships, 27 were granted to sociologists. Of the 88 pre-doctoral field fellowships 4 were in sociology and 2 in psychology. There were 23 additional fellowships awarded in rural sociology and 21 of the 63 southern fellowships were for study in sociology.

The second publication is the first volume in the series of critiques in social science research to be published by the Council. The author is Herbert Blumer, University of Chicago.

*Twentieth Century Fund.*—The staff of the study of collective bargaining is now engaged in field work designed to describe and appraise collective bargaining policies and methods in about twelve of the leading industries. The present schedule contemplates completion of the study by June 30, 1940. H. A. Miller, University of Chicago, is research director of

this study. The study of the relations between the government and the electric light and power industry is under way with Arthur R. Burns as director. The study of the effects of short selling on the stock exchange, of which Frederick R. Macaulay is research director, is now being completed. The study of distribution costs has appeared under the title *Does Distribution Cost Too Much?* by Paul W. Stewart and J. Frederic Dewhurst. Work on the study of salaries of officials of large corporations has been held in abeyance for the time being but it is expected that this survey will be resumed in the near future.

### NOTES

*Social Science Association meetings.*—The Social Science Association's meetings at Philadelphia, December 27–29, include the American Sociological Society, the American Economic Association, the American Statistical Association, the American Association for Labor Legislation, the Rural Sociological Society, and the Sociological Research Association. The American Political Science Association will hold its meeting in Washington, D.C.

The divisional papers of the American Sociological Society meetings have been tentatively scheduled as follows: Division on Social Theory, "Conflict of Ideologies and *Wissenssoziologie*," Louis Wirth, University of Chicago; "The Emergence of the Concept Social Disorganization," F. N. House, University of Virginia; "Criteria of Institutional Disorganization," John F. Cuber, Kent State University; "Crises and Dictatorships," J. O. Hertzler, University of Nebraska; "The Voluntaristic and Positivistic Approaches to Social Disorganization," Robert Bierstedt, Columbia University; "Societal Integration," Robert C. Angell, University of Michigan. Division on Social Biology (joint session with the Population Association of America), "Migration and Rural Population Adjustment," Conrad Taeuber, United States Department of Agriculture; "Workers, Migrants, and Jobs," John N. Webb, Works Progress Administration; "Sociological Aspects of the Agricultural Depression," T. J. Woolfer, Jr., Works Progress Administration. Division on Social Psychology, "Imitative Behavior in Children," John Dollard and Neal E. Miller, Yale University; "The Sociological Causes of Genius," Robert E. L. Faris, McGill University; "Social Roles," Alfred McClung Lee, New York University; "The Sociology of Parent-Youth Conflicts," Kingsley Davis, Pennsylvania State College; "Occupation and Personality Type," Richard T. LaPiere and Carlo Lastrucci, University of Michigan; "An Analysis of Opinioneers on Ethnic Attitudes," Robert K.

Merton, Tulane University. Division on Social Research, "Pretesting of Questionnaires To Secure Maximum Returns," Raymond F. Sletto, University of Minnesota; "Measuring Techniques Used To Study the Habits of Radio Listeners," Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Princeton University; "Some Research on Population Mobility," Samuel A. Stouffer, University of Chicago; "Can the Major Social Processes Be Described in Terms of Varying Degrees of Communication? An Experiment," George Lundberg, Bennington College. Division on Human Ecology, "The Status Factor in Residential Successions," Harold A. Gibbard, Brown University; "A Critical Review of the Zonal Hypothesis and Its Critics," James A. Quinn, University of Cincinnati; "Human Ecology and Social Theory," Warner E. Gettys, University of Texas.

The sociologists and economists will meet in a joint session for the presidential addresses: "Has Gold a Future?" Jacob Viner, American Economic Association, and "The White-Collar Criminal," Edwin H. Sutherland, American Sociological Society. The headquarters of the American Sociological Society will be at the Benjamin Franklin Hotel.

For further information write H. A. Phelps, secretary, American Sociological Society, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh.

*Bureau of the Census.*—Paul Glick, Whitman College, and Henry S. Shryock, Jr., who has been editorial and research assistant in the Office of Population Research, Princeton University, have been appointed to the Bureau.

*Conference on "Tomorrow's Children."*—A group of sponsors has called a conference to meet in Atlanta, November 9-11. Discussion will be focused particularly on the children of the South, their heredity, conditions of conception, birth, health, and welfare. William E. Cole, University of Tennessee, is executive chairman of the conference and Margaret C. Bristol, Florida State College for Women, is a member of the steering committee.

*Ecological Society of America.*—At its December meeting in Columbus, Ohio, the Society plans to conduct a symposium on "The Human Situation—Human Ecology," with papers by biologists, geographers, and sociologists.

*European journals and the war.*—The Cultural Relations Committee of the American Documentation Institute is working on the problem of maintaining the receipt of European scientific journals and hopes to be able to surmount such war obstacles as interrupted transportation, em-

bargoes, and censorship, which greatly handicapped research during the last war. It is the Institute's hope that a principle will be established whereby materials of research having no relation to war will continue to pass freely regardless of the countries of origin or destination. The Institute asks that any subscriber of a European scientific journal seriously needed as research material who fails to receive the journal advise the Institute of the nonreceipt. Reports with full details of where subscription was placed, name and address of subscriber, volume, date, and number of last issue received should be addressed to the American Documentation Institute, Bibliofilm Service, c/o United States Department of Agriculture Library, Washington, D.C.

*International Congress of Sociology.*—Owing to the wishes of several participants and because of many withdrawals the Fourteenth International Congress, to have been held at Bucharest beginning August 29, 1939, was postponed until Easter, 1940.

*Mexican Review of Sociology.*—The Institute of Social Investigations has founded the *Revista mexicana de sociología* with the purpose of publishing its studies in sociological investigations. It also plans to present contributions of eminent foreign sociologists. The review is a bimonthly publication. Correspondence should be addressed to Calle de Cuba, 92, Mexico, D.F.

*Michigan Sociological Society.*—The sessions of the third annual fall meeting of the Society, held November 2 at Wayne University, Detroit, were devoted to the subjects: "Opportunities for Research in Time of War," "Government and Sociology," and "Social Theory."

*Pan-American Airways travel fellowships.*—For several years the Pan-American Airways System has offered, under the auspices of the Institute of International Education, twenty travel fellowships providing return transportation to the United States for one student from each of the Latin-American republics for the purpose of studying a year in this country. This activity has received widespread approval and co-operation among the governments and educational authorities in Latin America and in the United States. The Pan-American Airways System travel fellowship plan has now been extended, one fellowship for each of the following countries of Latin America having been offered to students or teachers from the United States desiring to pursue graduate or research studies at the leading university of each country: Argentina, Brazil,

Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. Further information regarding these fellowships may be secured from the Institute of International Education, 2 West Forty-fifth Street, New York City.

*Social Science Research Council.*—The Council held its seventeenth annual meeting at Skytop, Pennsylvania, September 12-14, 1938. Evening sessions were devoted to the consideration of important topics: "Social Science and the Humanities," President Harold Dodds of Princeton University; "The Scientific Work of the Federal Department of Agriculture," J. M. Gaus, University of Wisconsin; and "The Role of the Council in the Wartime Emergency." The Council authorized the Committee on Problems and Policy to take such steps as may be appropriate in the light of the Council's function in relation to the national emergency.

The Council adopted as its five main fields of effort (1) the planning of research, (2) the appraisal of research, (3) research organization, (4) research personnel, and (5) co-ordination of research data. Committees have been or are to be set up in each of these main divisions of Council effort. Chairmen of committees now at work are: appraisal of research, Robert Redfield; research personnel, Carl C. Brigham; and co-ordination of research data, Arthur M. Schlesinger.

E. B. Wilson was elected president of the Council and E. G. Nourse, Brookings Institute, vice-president.

*White House Conference on Children in a Democracy.*—President Roosevelt has approved the recommendation of the planning committee of the Conference that the Conference be called into session January 18-20. The reason given for advancing the date of the final session, originally scheduled for next spring, was fear lest events in Europe defer public attention from the imperative necessity of meeting the needs of children and opening up for them opportunities now lacking.

*William A. White Psychiatric Foundation.*—Under the auspices of the Foundation and of St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Harry Stack Sullivan is inaugurating the first series of William Alanson White Memorial Lectures. Dr. Sullivan's lectures will be on the general theme of modern psychiatric conceptions and are being held each Friday night from October 27 to November 24, at the auditorium of the Department of Interior, Washington, D.C.

*University of Alabama.*—Donald E. V. Henderson has been appointed instructor in the department of sociology.

*American University.*—William H. Gilbert, recently professor of sociology, New York State College for Teachers, has been appointed assistant professor of sociology, replacing John C. McConnell, who has joined the staff of New York University.

*Bennington College.*—George A. Lundberg is on a leave of absence during the current year. He is spending the first semester finishing work on *Foundations of Sociology* to be published by Macmillan Company in January. During the second semester Professor Lundberg plans to deliver a series of lectures in the universities of South Africa as a representative of the Carnegie Corporation and to serve as consultant in various research projects of these universities. Robert Bierstedt, Columbia University, is giving Professor Lundberg's courses.

*University of Buffalo.*—Arthur Wood has accepted an appointment as instructor in sociology.

*Central State Teachers College (Mount Pleasant, Michigan).*—R. C. Koeninger has been appointed assistant professor to teach sociology and economics.

*University of Chattanooga.*—Virgil E. Long, teaching assistant, University of Wisconsin, has been appointed instructor in the department of sociology.

*University of Chicago.*—The tenth anniversary of the Social Science Building will be celebrated December 1-2 with a series of meetings, round tables, and a banquet. Among those giving papers will be Morris R. Cohen, Charles E. Merriam, Frederick C. Mills, Wesley Mitchell, William F. Ogburn, Robert Redfield, L. L. Thurstone, John Williams, and Louis Wirth.

*Clemson Agricultural College.*—Frank D. Alexander has been appointed associate professor of sociology and psychology.

*Cornell University.*—Josephine Strode has been appointed instructor and will give courses in social case work and problems on rural social welfare as well as supervise the practice work of undergraduate students with social agencies.

*Harvard University.*—For the purpose of collecting materials which will be used to study the social and psychological effects of National Socialism on German society and on the German people, one thousand dollars has

been made available to be offered as prizes for the best unpublished personal life-histories on the theme "My Life in Germany before and after January 30, 1933." The competition is being sponsored by the following members of the faculty, who will serve as a committee of judges: Gordon W. Allport, Sidney B. Fay, and Edward Y. Hartshorne. The following prizes are offered: First prize \$500; second prize \$250; third prize \$100; fourth prize \$50; five fifth prizes of \$20 each. Manuscripts may be submitted under a pseudonym or anonymously but must be authentic. They may be written in English or in German. There is no limit as to length, but 20,000 words should in general be regarded as a minimum. Manuscripts must be mailed by April 1, 1940. The manuscripts will be treated as strictly confidential. For further information write S. B. Fay, 776 Widener Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

*Kent State University.*—Edwin M. Lemert, who recently completed his graduate work at Ohio State University, has been appointed instructor in sociology.

*University of Kentucky.*—Robin Williams has been appointed instructor in rural sociology.

*University of Louisville.*—The work in sociology and social work is now handled in separate departments. Margaret K. Strong will continue as professor and director of the graduate division of social administration and Robert I. Kutak as head of the department of sociology.

Gardner F. Cook has been added to the faculty of the graduate division and will teach courses in group work and child welfare. Lois Blakey will devote full time to teaching in the division of social administration. Samuel C. Newman, Ohio State University, has accepted an appointment as instructor in the department of sociology.

*Manhattanville College of the Sacred Heart.*—Marie Bruns, Rosary College (River Forest, Ill.), has accepted an appointment in sociology.

*University of Maryland.*—Carl S. Joslyn has been appointed professor and acting head of the department of sociology. Logan Wilson, Harvard University, has accepted an appointment as associate professor. Professor Wilson taught at the University of Texas during the summer session. Robert N. Woodworth, University of North Carolina, will serve as assistant in sociology. William H. Form, University of Rochester, and Frederick R. McBrien, Dartmouth College, have been appointed fellows in sociology.



The department has recently inaugurated a program of graduate instruction in sociology and is accepting candidates for higher degrees. This program will be expanded next year to include a full offering of courses leading to the Ph.D. degree.

The United States Department of Agriculture announces the publication of a social research report by Linden S. Dodson, *Social Relationships and Institutions in an Established Urban Community, South Holland, Illinois*.

*University of Michigan*.—During the second semester Arthur E. Wood will be on leave of absence, and Walter C. Reckless, Vanderbilt University, will offer Professor Wood's courses on criminology and social psychology.

After a leave of absence R. D. McKenzie has resumed his duties in the department.

*University of Minnesota*.—Lowry Nelson will attend the meeting of the Permanent Committee of Agriculture of the League of Nations, to be held in Cuba, November 21.

The following new appointments have been made in the department of sociology: Orville F. Quackenbush, formerly assistant professor, University of Mississippi, instructor in sociology; Edgar C. McVoy, research assistant in rural sociology; Vernon Davies, Julian A. Jahn, John Wright Paschke, Harvey Everett Steiger, and William Wilson Washburn, teaching assistants.

*Mundelein College*.—Clarence J. Wittler, University of Maryland, has accepted an appointment as professor of sociology.

*New York University*.—Henry Holt and Company has recently published *People: The Quantity and Quality of Population* by Henry Pratt Fairchild.

*University of North Carolina*.—Under the direction of Ernest R. Groves and Howard Jensen, Duke University, a co-operative program of the two universities for training in the teaching of marriage and the family has been inaugurated. Among those participating in the program, which will lead to special degrees conferred jointly by both universities, are representatives of the medical school at Duke University.

Guy B. Johnson has been given a leave of absence to conduct research for the Carnegie Corporation's study on "The Negro in America."

Last summer the University of North Carolina Press published *Adven-*

*turing in Adoption*, by Lee M. and Evelyn C. Brooks, and has more recently published *Mothers of the South: Portraiture of the White Tenant Farm Woman*, by Margaret J. Hagood.

*Northwestern Missouri State Teachers College*.—Albert Blumenthal, formerly at Marietta College, has been appointed associate professor of sociology.

*Ohio State University*.—Ina Telberg has been promoted from assistant to instructor in the department of sociology. H. P. Lohrman and Orden C. Smucker have been appointed assistants.

*Ohio University*.—Douglas Oberdorfer, who has been engaged in research at the University of Texas, has been appointed instructor in sociology.

*Pennsylvania State College*.—George E. Simpson, formerly of Temple University, has been appointed associate professor, and Peter P. Klassen, formerly of the College of the Ozarks, has been appointed instructor of sociology.

*University of Pennsylvania*.—The University of Pennsylvania Press announces the publication of *Marriage and the Child* by James H. S. Bossard.

*St. Lawrence University*.—Edward J. Kunzer, for four years instructor at New York University, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of sociology.

*University of South Dakota*.—John Useem has been appointed associate professor and chairman of the department of sociology.

*Texas A. and M. College*.—John L. Molyneaux has accepted an appointment as instructor of sociology.

*State College of Washington*.—Paul H. Landis has been appointed dean of the graduate school.

*University of Wisconsin*.—John L. Gillin has been invited to read a paper on the organization of Colonial penitentiary establishments before the Twelfth International Penal and Penitentiary Congress to be held at Rome in the autumn of 1940. The secretary-general of the Congress is Professor E. Delaquis of Berne, Switzerland.

Paul R. Farnsworth, Stanford University, is teaching social psychology for the year 1939-40. Kimball Young is on a year's leave of absence in order to complete a research project.

Helen I. Clarke is preparing a book on *Salient Aspects of Social Legislation* which will be published by Appleton-Century.

*Yale University.*—John Dollard spent the summer in France and made observations upon race relations in Toulon.

Bronislaw Malinowski, of the London School of Economics, is at present with the department of anthropology.

#### PERSONAL

Macmillan Company has announced for publication in the next few months *Dimensions of Society*, by Stuart C. Dodd, American University of Beirut, and *Race, Language and Culture*, by Franz Boas, Columbia University. *Social Control*, by L. L. Bernard, Washington University, was published in August.

## BOOK REVIEWS

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*Moses and Monotheism.* By SIGMUND FREUD. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939. Pp. vi+218. \$3.00.

If a thinker of Sigmund Freud's stature takes a stand on a problem of vital interest to him, the world is bound to listen. If the work so produced is also a remarkable human and historic document, if unwittingly it is a reflection of the profound changes in the entire mental atmosphere of Central Europe during the last decade, the reader's intellectual curiosity will receive stimuli in fields transcending the vast and ramified subject treated therein. Its first two—smaller—sections, which merely adumbrated the major theme, were published in 1937 in the German journal, *Imago*. But the main Part III, which in the author's words "reduces religion to the status of a neurosis of mankind and explains its grandiose powers in the same way as we should a neurotic obsession in our individual patients" (p. 85), appeared too full of dynamite for an author living under the Catholic regime of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg. Its final composition had to await the conquest of Austria by Hitler, the subsequent persecution of Freud on ideological as well as racial grounds, and his escape to England which, although far more Christian than either Austria or Germany, bears with much greater composure a psychoanalytical critique of the Christian dogma. To be sure, this unusual genesis of the work has resulted in considerable technical shortcomings and endless repetitions. Freud himself, hitherto a master of literary presentation which but a few years ago had rightly earned for him the major Goethe prize in contemporary German literature, deeply deplores these shortcomings which make his discussion "as ineffectual as it is inartistic" (p. 162). Inartistic, yes! but far from ineffectual. If anything, the constant hammering of a few *leitmotifs* helps to impress upon the reader's mind those views of the author which at first appear to him farfetched or even repugnant, and to evoke the impression of certainty and logical cogency where, by the very nature of the subject, everything is so profoundly uncertain and hypothetical.

The subject of Moses and the origins of monotheism lends itself, like few others in the history of religion, to extensive, analytical treatment. The availability of a fairly large body of biographic and ethnological

material, principally in the Bible, is enhanced by the great chronological gap between the events narrated therein and their record in its present form which makes it open to an endless variety of interpretation. A great deal of further folkloristic material, some of it doubtless also containing a kernel of historical truth, has been preserved in the more articulate, but still younger rabbinic and patristic, literatures, of which Freud—perhaps to his credit—has made but little use. The well-known lack of agreement among modern biblical scholars and anthropologists on some of the most fundamental issues likewise equips the analytical investigator with a mass of alternative suggestions from which he may choose those which best fit into the pattern of his theory. "The more shadowy tradition has become," says Freud, "the more meet is it for the poet's use" (p. 112). Nevertheless, perhaps as a result of being too much earth bound and source bound, the present reviewer feels that he cannot quite follow the author into this rarefied atmosphere of pure speculation.

In this new work Freud elaborates and illustrates, by the specific example of Moses, his main thesis on the development of religion which he had first advanced in 1912 in his striking volume on *Totem and Taboo*. In its bare essentials the theory assumes a parallelism between the evolution of mankind from its prehistoric stages to contemporary civilization and the individual growth of man from childhood to adult life. Just as in individual life the first five years after birth leave permanent impressions which, carried through a period of sexual latency to the age of pubescence, definitely condition adult psychic life and lay the ground for all human neuroses, so is mankind at large carrying in its subconscious mind the heritage of its all-important formative stage. Although forgotten during the long subsequent period of latency, the impressions of this prehistoric stage time and again come to the fore in the consciousness of civilized man. Following suggestions made by Darwin and Atkinson, Freud has long advocated the hypothesis that mankind had begun its career as a father horde, in which one strong male was the master and father of the whole horde. Unlimited in his power, he appropriated all females and banished all males outside the horde. At last a group of such exiled brothers "clubbed together, overcame the father, and—according to the custom of those times—all partook of his body" (p. 128). Of course, each of these brothers deeply desired to inherit the mantle which had thus fallen from the revered father's shoulders, but unable to overcome the resistance of the others and realizing that internecine fights were as dangerous as they were futile, compromised upon a new form of a social organization based upon the recognition of mutual obligations. These were the begin-

the new arrivals, as yet unprepared for the high spirituality of the new religion, murdered their leader—Freud takes here a clue from a fantastic “discovery” of Ernst Sellin—and joined a number of closely related tribes which had settled there before. Together the two groups soon came under the sway of another leader whom we may conveniently designate as the Midianite Moses. This dualism of two religions and two founders, like the other dualities of Jewish history—two peoples forming one nation, its breaking up into two kingdoms, and the two names of the Deity—is the necessary consequence of the fact that “one section of the people passed through what may properly be termed a traumatic experience which the other was spared” (p. 79). After the Egyptian Moses’ death this, so to say, childhood experience of the Jewish people entered once more a period of relative latency, during which only a small minority of Levites, descendants of the original small circle of native Egyptians around Moses, carried on the tradition of the lawgiver. Several centuries later, under the stimulus of the Israelitic prophets, the original Mosaic religion was re-established as the national religion of Israel. This monotheistic creed thus became the revived memory of the primeval father. “The great deed or misdeed of primeval times, the murder of the father, was brought home to the Jews, for fate decreed that they should repeat it on the person of Moses, an eminent father substitute.” With their new belief in God, the Father, went the expectation of the return of the lawgiver, as the Messiah—Freud could have used here another hypothesis of Sellin, since abandoned, that the expected Messiah of early Israelitic prophecy was Moses redivivus, a belief, held long after by Samaritan schismatics—the conviction of Israel’s chosenness, and most of the teachings of ancient Judaism, including imageless worship, ritualism, growth of spirituality, and circumcision. The latter custom, clearly of Egyptian origin, was unwittingly taken over by Moses because of its inherent connection with the castration complex originating from the relations between the primeval father and his sons. This Mosaic restoration of the primeval father still left some parts of the prehistoric tragedy unrecognized, however. Operating underground for several more centuries, they gradually generated that widespread feeling of guilt which characterized both the Jewish people and the entire Mediterranean world at the beginning of the Christian era. This sense of guilt once more resulted in the murder of a leader, but this time it was the Son who died in expiation for the primeval murder of the Father. This is, according to Freud, the underlying motif for Paul’s doctrine of the original sin, just as the Christian communion is but a resurgence of the bodily partaking of the primeval father and its

derivative, the sacrificial repast of the totem cults. Through the Crucifixion, on the other hand, the Christian religion truly became but a Son religion, and hence its triumph "was a renewed victory of the Ammon priests over the God of Ikhnaton." The Jewish people who, "with its usual stiff-necked obduracy," continued to deny the murder of their "father," consequently suffered severe persecution. The accusation of Christ-killing really means "You won't admit that you murdered God" (the primeval father and his reincarnations), whereas "we did the same thing, but we admitted it, and since then we have been purified" (p. 142).

This bold and ingenious reconstruction of the history of religion, of which a bare, and in many respects incomplete, outline has been presented here, is supported by a great many detailed, no less bold and ingenious, observations which make the book worth-while reading even for one who will ultimately disagree with its main thesis. Methodically, however, the work is open to most crucial objections. The extreme liberties admittedly taken by Freud with available biblical material is illustrative also of his utilization of the findings of modern anthropological and historical research.

When I use Biblical tradition here in such an autocratic and arbitrary way, draw on it for confirmation whenever it is convenient, and dismiss its evidence without scruple when it contradicts my conclusions, I know full well that I am exposing myself to severe criticism concerning my method and that I weaken the force of my proofs. But this is the only way in which to treat material whose trustworthiness—as we know for certain—was seriously damaged by the influence of distorting tendencies [pp. 37, n. 5, and p. 164 f.].

Many of us, unfortunately, will have to disagree. No, this is not the only way; it is not even the way of authors such as A. Allwohn who, with the help of psychoanalysis, has tried to reconstruct the subconscious erotic motivations of the prophetic career of Hosea, a subject, it may readily be granted, much more promising than that of the austere figure of Moses in the biblical tradition. This limitless arbitrariness in the selection and use of the little existing evidence renders the entire factual basis of Freud's reconstruction more than questionable. The primeval-father horde and the murder of the primeval father are considered by almost all contemporary anthropologists as a figment of imagination. The explanation of the subsequent rise of totemism, based upon a suggestion once made by W. Robertson Smith, is here upheld by Freud even though he knows that "more recent ethnologists have without exception discarded" Smith's theories (p. 207). For the career of the historic Moses, he quotes outstanding modern scholars—Meyer, Gressman, Sellin, Breasted—of whom he

speaks with greater awe than of the original biblical sources and ancient monuments. But he selects from these writers some of their most fantastic views, often timidly advanced and sometimes later revoked by the authors themselves, drags them out of their context, and combines them into a new artificial entity. The factual evidence for the Egyptian origin of Moses largely reduces itself to the etymology of the name, but this proof appears no more conclusive than would be a parallel attempt to deduce from the name Zerubbabel, the leader of another exodus of Jewish exiles, that he was a native Babylonian. The Jews have probably then, as ever after, adopted the names prevalent among the national majorities in the midst of whom they chanced to live. Wholly untenable is Freud's attempt at identification of the divine name, *Adonai*, in Israel's credo with the Egyptian Aton. The Deuteronomic source has, of course, *Yahwe*. The substitute, *Adonai*, and its Greek equivalent, *kyrios*, are first clearly indicated in the Hellenistic period, a millennium after Moses. Neither is the violent death of Moses more than a farfetched hypothesis, largely given up by its author and shared by no other biblical scholar. Similar objections could easily be raised also against many other essential links in the Freudian reconstruction. Even if the entire factual background were proved beyond peradventure, however, as it is not, the old question would still remain as to whether the Freudian parallelism between individual and mass psychology (assuming the correct interpretation of the former) can be scientifically upheld. The period of latency, particularly, which in the case of the lapse of time between the alleged murder of the primeval father and the appearance of Ikhnaton would extend over countless generations, presupposes an extent of transmission of memories through some sort of heredity which, Freud himself admits, is unequivocally rejected "by the present attitude of biological science." In short, the cause of psychoanalytical interpretation of the history of religion, brilliantly initiated by Freud and his disciples several decades ago, seems to the present reviewer to have received a setback rather than to have made further progress through its present application to the historic career of Moses.

These considerations will probably carry little weight with "that minority of readers familiar with analytical reasoning and able to appreciate its conclusions" (p. 7) to which the author, notwithstanding his sincere efforts at popularization, primarily addresses himself. To many of these initiates, the present work, despite its scientific argumentation, will appeal as the pronouncement of a revered prophet and sectarian leader, entirely immune from the so-called rational, but essentially psychically



conditioned and hence prejudiced, attacks by outsiders. To the outsiders (and the present reviewer professes to be one of them), however, much as they may admire the author's erudition and dialectical prowess, this ingenious structure will appear as but a magnificent castle in the air.

SALO W. BARON

Columbia University

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*The American Criminal: An Anthropological Study*, Vol. I: *The Native White Criminal of Native Parentage*. By EARNEST ALBERT HOOTON, with the collaboration of the Statistical Laboratory of the Division of Anthropology, Harvard University. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939. Pp. xvi+464. \$10.

To no generation in centuries have the problems of race been more significant than to the current. Political dynasties and systems are posited upon supposed racial differences and racial similarities. The world-map is being radically modified to conform to supposed blood ties. New faiths are supplanting old in accordance with racial allegiances. Our very economy is affected.

Most of the recent studies in the fields of anthropometry and race psychology have attempted to investigate several well- or ill-defined racial groups as to their typical behavior in one or more fields. In *The American Criminal* reference is made to certain reasonably well-defined types of behavior with a view to distinguishing the physical and social characteristics which tend to be associated with each, the behavior patterns being those customarily defined as antisocial.

While the study is most timely, it is probable that the great majority of those who explore the findings of the author will never see this volume, since a briefer and more popular work, *Crime and the Man*, will be more readily available. The present volume deals solely with the native white criminal of native parentage. Two other volumes are promised—one to cover native white criminals of foreign parentage and foreign-born whites and to deal with the criminal and the civil insane; the other, with Negro and Negroid criminals. Of those who do attempt to investigate the 320 pages of text and the 480 pages of tabular material, another large proportion will fail to do more than lose themselves in the maze of descriptive material.

Such students as follow the author's implied advice to confine their attention to chapters i and xiii will find an interesting and instructive treatment of the background of the problem, the method of obtaining the vast mass of material collected, the devices used for handling the data,

the most significant statistical measures derived, and the conclusions which the author has deduced from them. They will wish for a more usable method of internal cross-reference to facilitate exploration of parts of the remaining eleven chapters.

The author is correct in his criticisms of Lombroso and his followers, on the one hand, and of Goring, on the other. The former had poor and scanty data and preceded the development of modern statistics; the latter was fired by violent antagonism, had poor control data, and used statistical techniques in fashions that today might well be questioned. It is by no means clear that Hooton himself has indisputable data, that his controls are adequate, that his statistical methods are beyond reproach, or that his deductions are the logical ones to be derived from his statistics.

Hooton appears to have the mistaken idea that all data gathered in any fashion in jails, penitentiaries, etc., are "sample" data in the sense that they represent the universe of the criminal. He makes brave and convincing defense of his materials and acknowledges certain flaws, even going so far as to correct some deficiencies. But in the light of present-day knowledge of sampling methods his data appear to be open at points to specific challenge. Dr. C. C. Seltzer, consulting statistician, referred to frequently in the footnotes of the methodological section (specifically n. 53, p. 57) seems to be quite aware of danger spots in the material. One cannot but wonder at what point he was introduced to the study and what modifications he would have suggested in the method of case selection.

Two types of control are used—internal and external. Offense groups of various types are compared with the total criminal group studied. Also a civil check sample is used for comparison with both the total criminal sample and the offense groups. This civil check list was acknowledgedly difficult to obtain and small numerically. It was secured as an incident to the study and seems to be open to serious criticism. Nor is it easy to understand how it can be used satisfactorily as a general all-purpose control. Since the data have been gathered under widely varying statutory definitions, the problem of internal control is not simple. It is very difficult to understand how a type of robber can be discovered when robbers are themselves so widely different in their actions under the law.

As to methods used, it is illuminating that the authority cited is G. Udny Yule, *An Introduction to the Theory of Statistics* (8th ed.; London, 1927). One would have expected to have read G. Udny Yule and M. G. Kendall, *An Introduction to the Theory of Statistics* (11th ed., revised throughout and reset; London, 1937). Certainly statistical methods of a

highly critical type and reasonably well suited to the data compiled by Hooton and his staff are absent from the eighth edition but are indicated and to some extent elaborated in the eleventh edition. They are in current use in many fields and are to be found in most up-to-date texts. In general, one cannot criticize the particular mathematical techniques applied. However, it is doubtful if broadcast use is desirable. Many statistical, highly significant indexes would probably become insignificant if extraneous factors were discounted. Nor can the techniques be suitably applied under all conditions of sampling.

The problem of interpretation of the elaborate mass of statistical material has been pursued in a careful if rather naïve and routine fashion. One feels that after the percentages, the differences, the correlation coefficients and ratios, etc., were computed, the original information was forgotten in the struggle to obtain order from the chaos. There is not space here to cite certain seemingly nonsensical conclusions that may logically arise from some of the figures. One is tempted to feel that the author has utilized some of the less apparent ones.

It should be pointed out that Hooton deals essentially with preponderances, pluralities, and means. He arrives at certain types as characteristic of certain modes of antisocial behavior. This does not mean that all those who have offended against society in a specified fashion are possessed of the same physical or morphological characteristics. Nor does the age-old converse hold, that persons of certain characteristics are likely to perpetrate specific crimes. No stigmata, no "criminal types," are found.

Thus the lone spinster in her nightly search beneath her couch cannot with scientific warrant treasure the image of a mature, blue-eyed, widowed male, short and somewhat fat, of deep chest, round head and narrow but long nose—for many a rapist is of the very opposite appearance. Nor are we justified in rushing from our perusal of Hooton to withdraw our funds from our bank because the president has "excessive trunk length, head length, head circumference, and facial height . . ." with sparse hair, thin lips, and medium height of nasal bridge.

Hooton has performed an admirable service in reopening the old subject of the physical characteristics of criminals. He has accumulated a valuable mass of material, collected under easily evaluable conditions, now in form readily adaptable to various types of technical treatment. He has given us his somewhat naïve analysis. These data should be worked and re-worked by other students of criminology and anthropology, well equipped by training and experience to handle materials of this sort. From them, through the years, should come convincing and permanent

generalizations of great value to the social scientist. Raw materials and work cards and sheets should be preserved and made available to this end. One is tempted to urge that the funds for the publication of the two further volumes be diverted to this purpose.

Above all, caution should be observed in excerpting from the volume. Some of the tables are tempting. But in the main the materials must be re-worked before they are suitable for popular or lay consumption.

It should be stated that this review is based on all too cursory a survey of the book. Your reviewer finds his interest in the subject quickened. He is impressed with the effort that has been expended in the inquiry and the conscientiousness with which it has been pursued. He does not find his biases wiped away nor, on the other hand, has he time to explore carefully the data. He will retain a healthy skepticism on the subject until the materials have been rigidly re-worked by experts or until entirely new studies, less extensive and more particularized, with more carefully worked-out samples and controls, have appeared.

FRANK ALEXANDER ROSS

*Syracuse University*

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*Himalayan Village.* By GEOFFREY GORER. London: Michael Joseph, Ltd., 1938. Pp. 510. 25s.

This book deals with a community of Lepchas—an aboriginal tribe of Sikkim. The author's approach is avowedly the psychological one developed by Benedict, Mead, and Dollard, and his interest is centered upon the configuration of Lepcha personality and upon the apparent causes for the development of this personality type. Within these limits he has done an exceedingly good piece of reporting and analysis. In particular he is to be complimented upon his obvious honesty, shown in his inclusion of certain observations and impressions which are not in perfect agreement with his main thesis. The minor inconsistencies of Lepcha attitudes and behavior are neither ignored nor glossed over and he pays considerable attention to the deviant individuals present in the community, even including a life-history of one of them.

The author's judgment of Lepcha character can best be summed up in his own words:

The Lepcha stereotype is unaggressive, sociable, hard working, constantly good humored, greatly interested in direct consumption (eating, drinking and copulation), fundamentally optimistic. The relationship of the Lepcha stereotype with his fellows is based rationally on mutual benefits and obligations; very little stress is placed on personal affection and practically no interest is taken in, and no allowance made for, individual character or temperament [p. 365].

The establishment of this configuration he believes to be due primarily to certain techniques of child-training. All the infant's expressed physical desires are immediately satisfied, but coupled with this there is considerable physical restraint and no encouragement toward self-maximizing activities. "Very young the Lepcha baby learns that social approval is to be obtained, not by self assertion, but by passivity" (p. 450).

While such techniques of child-rearing can be observed directly and recorded objectively, judgments of character inevitably contain a large subjective element. The report itself contains certain items which make it appear possible that another observer of the same society might have come to somewhat different conclusions, at least as regards the constantly good-humored and fundamentally optimistic aspects of the Lepcha stereotype. Thus suicide is fairly common, taking place immediately subsequent to public reproof (p. 269). "Although riches and prosperity are so desirable they are fraught with supernatural dangers; there is a devil called *Ginoo moong* which attacks the over prosperous; it is in a way a Nemesis, and in a way the incarnation of other peoples envious thoughts" (p. 88). Malevolent magic and poisoning are both believed in, although not greatly feared, and there is an amazing multiplicity of devils which are ready to inflict injury for any infraction of taboo or for no offense at all.

They are adamant in resisting any encroachment on their individual and group independence, and they will not permit overt aggression or ambition, or the side-stepping of communal duties. . . . Most Lepchas have two types of behavior; they are far more restrained in public and with strangers than they are in the privacy of their own homes. . . . In people's stories of their own lives there was a constant undercurrent of grumbling and scolding, particularly on the part of the women [pp. 274-75].

In view of all this, may it not be that the Lepchas are actually an exceedingly anxious people and that their apparent good nature and willingness to oblige are fundamentally motivated by fear? The almost pathological timidity of certain individuals has been mentioned by other writers as well as the present one. This might offer an alternative explanation for their lack of aggression among themselves. Their lack of aggression against outsiders might also be linked with the fact that they have been subject to the Sikkimese Tibetans or Bhotias since the early seventeenth century, that they were frequently raided for slaves by Nepali and Bhutanese all through the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, that they have been unable to compete economically with Nepali and Indians since the end of the slave raids, and that they are now a dwindling group, preserved from pauperism and extinction largely by the grace of the Maharaja of Sikkim. Less painful experience, continued over a considerably shorter time, has

produced a marked lack of external aggression in even the far from timid Comanche.

The reviewer would be the last to question the importance of infantile influences in the formation of personality, but the personality is, after all, a continuum and as such is exposed to varying influences throughout the life of the individual. Neither the patterns of culture operating upon adults nor the historic factors which may have contributed to the formation of such patterns can safely be ignored in the study of any people. A multiplicity of factors enter into the shaping of personalities and culture patterns alike and it is often difficult to discover which of these have been of dominant importance. The author of the present work devotes considerable space to a discussion of why the Lepcha failed to develop a feudal system and concludes that this was primarily due to the lack of aggression and desire for dominance in their personality structure. It would seem to the reviewer that here again an alternative explanation might be possible. It is to be regretted that the author nowhere gives an account of former or even present systems of land tenure or inheritance, but it is noticeable that there is no mention of the transfer of land within the tribe in spite of much gift-giving, fines, loans, etc. He does mention the existence of joint-family organization and also conjectures that the *ptso* (patrilineal exogamic clan) was originally a geographic unit (p. 148). Last, prior to the introduction of cardamum and terraced rice cultivation—very recent developments—agriculture was by the cutting and burning method, the land being allowed to lie fallow eight years between crops. The combination of localized descent groups, long fallowed land, and ultimate ownership of land by the descent group with individual rights to it only while it is in crop is a frequent one. It is found among peoples whose personality characteristics differ markedly from those of the Lepcha, yet as far as I know feudalism has never sprung up independently upon this particular economic foundation. Such a system makes impossible the development of the vested property interests which are a prerequisite for the operation of feudalism. Whether this is the explanation of the Lepcha situation it is impossible to say, but it would seem that historic study might throw considerable light on the problem.

R. LINTON

*Columbia University*

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*An Economic History of Modern Britain: Machines and National Rivalries (1887-1914), with an Epilogue (1914-1929).* By J. H. CLAPHAM. New York: Macmillan Co., 1938. Pp. xiv+577. \$7.00.

This completes an outstanding contribution to the history of European industrialism in the crucial century between the Napoleonic and the

World War. Its plan follows the earlier books with the emphasis on the industrial state, its neighbors and vicissitudes, the course of its changes, its agricultural, industrial, commercial, and financial organization, its communications, the activities of the state, and its life and labor. There is the same encyclopedic array of information arranged under these topics and the same extensive bibliography in the footnotes, ranging from important works of literature to the *London Times*, parliamentary papers, and economic writings.

The author has had the advantage arising from publication of the earlier volumes, he has lived through the period of which he writes, and he has learned from travel and direct experience in the holding of such positions as vice-provost of King's College and as a member of the Industries Committee of the war cabinet. There is much amusing autobiographical information tucked away in odd places. In spite of these advantages the task has become more difficult, since, as he quotes Alfred Marshall, "you cannot write *English* history after 1870," and it becomes necessary to write world-history. It is easy to say that he might have written more world-history, especially the history of North America. The period follows the culminating point of British economic superiority of 1870-80 and is marked by a decline in the "acceleration of trade which registered passage into a new era in the economic history of the world." It was a period in which "all free British capital was sucked into the London money market" by an organization which was "functioning almost perfectly."

The work continues the tradition of William Cunningham, who "first taught me Economic History," and of Alfred Marshall. He correctly attributes loss, through the death of Unwin, who, more than anyone else, would have corrected the bias, which even twenty-five years of work fails to eliminate, from dependence on documents of the state. The growth of the civil service and the decline of royal commissions has even weakened this source in the period covered in the last volume. "Mr. Keynes' own approach I have not mastered," nor does he accept views of Mr. D. H. Robertson, at least as to what he regards as the errors of one of his books. While Professor Clapham reflects the views of those on whom he has been compelled to rely in various periods, such as Bagehot in the period after 1850, he develops his own variant of English economic thought. He has been mildly impatient of economic theory,<sup>1</sup> but it could be said that the boxes have been stuffed too full, and the present reviewer

<sup>1</sup> J. H. Clapham, "Of Empty Economic Boxes," *Economic Journal*, 1922, pp. 305-14; A. C. Pigou, "A Reply," *Economic Journal*, 1922, pp. 458-65; and Clapham, "A Rejoinder," *op. cit.*, pp. 560-63.

would like to say here that the stuffing has not been made sufficiently accessible in a detailed index.

A significant feature of the work is its balance—a series of economic panoramas on the face of the country throw a white light on the dark shadows of the industrial history of England which sheltered Marx and other writers. “Marx even at second hand has had little influence on English thought, on English action almost none.” The conservative approach provides an extremely valuable corrective to Whig history.<sup>2</sup> The factory system is praised because of its withdrawal of workers from insanitary homes. Trade associations are discussed as logical complements to trade-unions. Distribution of capital in the form of joint-stock company parallels the growth of co-operatives. The philosophy of what has been called “bourgeois ameliorism” prevails. “The mills of God with a little supervision from man, had ground out . . . some very sound, nourishing stuff worth conserving. . . . In economic fields reform bills work like delayed action mines and do not always blow up what they should.” Throughout the century there had been the “real but still exceedingly slow, spread of property ownership.” Moving on the lower plane of “commodities and comforts” the economic historian “does not hesitate to compare that time to its advantage—not only with other times in the industrial age but with any time certainly known to him.” The smells which hang over the insanitary life of England in the early part of the century gradually clear and eventually drift away.

The epilogue from 1914 to 1929 ends on a less certain note. “It is what men feel that matters.” Population began to pour into Britain rather than out. “The safety valve no longer worked. . . . The privileged position of Britain and indeed of the white races though much less insecure than some pessimists maintained, was not quite certainly a part of the permanent divine order of things.” For the century of peace to 1914 the work of J. H. Clapham must stand as a product which no social scientist can disregard.

H. A. INNIS

*University of Toronto*

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*Public Employment Service in the United States.* By RAYMOND C. ATKINSON, LOUISE C. ODENCRANTZ, and BEN DEMING. Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1938. Pp. xiv+482. \$3.75.

For two very good reasons a comprehensive book about the public employment service has never been published. In the first place, there

<sup>2</sup> Clapham, “Conservative Factors in Recent British History,” *Authority and the Individual* (Cambridge, 1937).



was no such service, except in gesture, until 1933, but since that time the number of such service units has grown from less than 300 to more than 1,400, and personnel from less than 500 to more than 18,000. The second reason for the lack of such a report is found in this book, which is the product of institutional effort, being one of the publications of the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council. This is the fifth study in administration published by the committee.

Although interviewers in public employment offices will not turn to this book for guidance in the day's procedure, they will turn to it if they wish an overview of public employment service and its problems or if they want to know of the development of our federal service through its first dynamic years. The scenes have been shifting fast. Those in charge had to learn as they ran. Training and doing, building and reorganizing, centralization and decentralization, were parallel processes. Integration within the public service as a New Deal agency had to keep pace with orientation to other New Deal agencies—W.P.A., P.W.A., S.S.B., C.C.C., N.Y.A., and the various rural services.

The present report tells how a new service with no experience to draw on has squared off against the variety of problems placed in its charge. This service, like the federal work program and the social-security program, is one of the fruits of the depression and a service long needed. It has evolved swiftly, and in some phases chaotically, but its growth has been adaptable. Concerning those aspects this book reports fully and objectively.

The United States Employment Service has a difficult assignment: to find jobs when jobs are scarce, to place the hard to place, to avoid serving the exploiter of labor, and to avoid involvement in labor conflict. It is placed in a position in which it can serve best only as it is able to secure the maximum of co-operation from employers and workers. While endeavoring to secure that co-operation, the U.S.E.S. must assume certain disciplinary responsibilities with reference to both employers and workers. It appears, moreover, that the ramifications of the public employment service are destined to extend beyond those originally envisioned. In addition to getting jobs and workers together, it is becoming involved in the business of job classification, vocational or training guidance, and administering or aiding in unemployment compensation; not the least are the personal adjustment problems arising out of adapting certain workers to jobs.

While the assignment of the U.S.E.S. is difficult, it is no more so than the one faced by the committee on this study. To view and report on a functioning agency, getting one's information from the inside, and to

display objectively the findings, is a feat in social research. It has been done in this book without much pulling of punches in telling what the employment service has not done, should not do, or should do. It could not be done in reviewing a private service, which may explain why many surveys of private agencies from the inside are so flat and thin.

NELS ANDERSON

Washington, D.C.

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*Social Deviation.* By JAMES FORD. New York: Macmillan Co., 1936. Pp. xix+602. \$3.50.

Rejecting the terms "social pathology" and "social disorganization" because of their "limitations," Ford in this new textbook is concerned with "departure or deviations from accepted standards of reference" (Preface). He considers using arithmetic means or modes as standards but rejects them on the ground that "statistical dividing points . . . do not correspond with the dividing points between health and disease, between organization and disorganization . . ." (p. 11). He also considers legal and "scientific" standards but resorts actually to "empirical" and "optimum" standards which involve impressionistic and speculative evaluations of conditions obtaining in our culture. Thus Ford's new work, like his *Social Problems and Social Policy*, published in 1923, is a textbook in social ethics.

Like most books in this field, *Social Deviation* deals with a miscellaneous array of problem situations. Unlike some others, it has a central theme, namely, the development of personality through "the removal of thwarting factors" and "the creation of developmental opportunities" (p. 65). However, the integration of materials is far from complete, and the book comes perilously near to being another omnium-gatherum.

Sociologists will be attracted by the promise of attention to "the inadequacies of individuals in their social relationships" (p. 6) but will be disappointed in the performance. Nowhere does the author present satisfactory evidence of the extent or ways in which given traits (e.g., feeble-mindedness), experiences (e.g., unemployment), or features of the environment (e.g., housing) affect the quality or quantity of participation in social groups. Nevertheless, many students will find this a useful secondary source of information about many subjects.

STUART A. QUEEN

Washington University

*Five Years of Rural Relief.* By WALLER WYNNE, JR. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938. Pp. xiii+160.

It has always been more difficult to obtain reliable data on relief for rural and town areas than for large cities. Prior to the beginning of the federal program in 1932 and 1933 nothing resembling a national estimate of rural-relief case load or expenditures existed. But the establishment of federal grants-in-aid and actual administration of relief made local reporting of a sort not only possible but legally necessary. The W.P.A. has had a field staff of reasonably competent statisticians who have collected data and have pushed back the period covered by the data to years prior to its establishment in 1935. The staff has developed a sampling procedure for various purposes, which yields fairly consistent results.

Mr. Wynne has made use of the accumulated experience of W.P.A. to develop monthly indices of relief for rural areas from 1932 to 1936 for the entire country. Five types of assistance are used in the construction of the indices: general relief, veterans', the three special categories, resettlement grants, and private relief. Work relief is not included. In Appendix A the original data on costs and case loads are reproduced by states and type of relief and in Appendix B a clear and well-written methodological note is included.

R. CLYDE WHITE

*University of Chicago*

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*Rural Youth: Their Situations and Prospects.* By BRUCE L. MELVIN and ELNA N. SMITH. ("Division of Social Research, Works Progress Administration Research Monograph," Vol. XV.) Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938. Pp. xv+167.

This worthy monograph consists of a general treatment of the circumstances surrounding American rural youth (aged sixteen to twenty-four years) and the problems confronting them. The data used were drawn from official statistics and the findings of numerous special studies. The authors see the rural-youth problem to be "that of an excess in numbers in relation to a dearth of rural opportunities, a situation which becomes greatly aggravated during 'hard' times." They conclude that the economic outlook for rural youth is growing worse because of the growing burden of farm indebtedness, increase of farm tenancy, decrease in the demand for farm labor, mechanization and large-scale land ownership, and other agricultural maladjustments. It is evident from their review

that a number of constructive measures for rural youth are in operation, yet they appear to be quite inadequate to cope with the situation. Furthermore, least is being done in those areas where the need is most imperative. Those interested in rural youth will find this a valuable addition to the literature.

C. E. LIVELY

*University of Missouri*

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*How Socialism Works.* By JOHN STRACHEY. New York: Modern Age Books, 1939. Pp. 212. \$0.50.

This book is a revision of the first part of the author's larger work, *The Theory and Practice of Socialism*, published in 1936. Its purpose is to explain simply what socialism is and how it works. The main theme is the contrast between capitalist production for profit and socialist production for use, between the haphazard play of the market and conscious and predetermined planning. Under capitalism, the unequal distribution of wealth inevitably leads to "the heaping up of new means of production and the holding down of the purchasing power of the masses of the population." This contradiction can only be resolved by socialist methods of distribution, which does not mean equality of income, but a distribution according to the quantity and quality of the work done, and the elimination of distribution by way of rent, interest, and profit, in respect to ownership of property in the means of production. In this connection there is a good chapter on the incentives to work in a socialist state (Soviet Russia) and a discussion of the beneficial consequences that may be expected to follow the abolition of social classes.

No attempt is made to go into intricate problems, and only the most general ideas of Marxist economics are presented. Mr. Strachey rests his case on the Soviet Union, which he regards as a decisive test case of socialism at work.

J. RUMNEY

*Institute for Advanced Study*  
*Princeton, N.J.*

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*The Corporate State in Action: Italy under Fascism.* By CARL T. SCHMIDT. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939. Pp. 173. \$2.25.

*Escape to Life.* By ERIKA and KLAUS MANN. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1939. Pp. ix+384. \$3.50.

Three days after the March on Rome, the General Confederation of Industry came out in enthusiastic support of the new regime which had

pledged itself to protect property rights and the general obligation to work. After seventeen years of Fascist rule the capitalists are not so enthusiastic. True, private property has been formally maintained, but it is cribbed and confined by state control and bureaucratization. In agriculture and trade the middle classes are being crushed by monopoly and combine, while the proletariat, its standard of living greatly reduced, is sullen and discontented. The restriction of profits has benefited not them but the government's war preparations. These are shaping Italy into a closed economic system where the "controls over wealth are being concentrated as a result, not of technological progress but of economic degradation." Fascism's "inhumane creed and economic instability drive Italy towards an ever more aggressive policy and towards war."

These are some of the conclusions arrived at by Dr. Schmidt from a careful study of official documents and from personal observation of "The Nation-in-Arms" and "The Police State at Work." The chapters dealing with the impact of the corporative state upon the agricultural, industrial, and business classes are perhaps the most useful in this book, which is throughout a model of judicious compression. The notes and Selected Bibliography add to its value.

"The atmosphere of uniformity, suspicion, fear, adulation, buffoonery and intellectual fawning . . . fatal to vigorous creative thought," to quote from the second book, appears to be characteristic not only of Fascist Italy but also of Nazi Germany. Erika and Klaus Mann are fortunate to be outside this mental prison, and their book is a vivid account of their "escape to life" and that of thousands of their compatriots, many of whom are world famous for their contributions to science, art, and scholarship. Some of the penetrating portraits given by the authors, such as the one of their father, Thomas Mann (one of the best chapters in the book), and of Einstein, Oskar Maria Graf, Ernst Toller, Max Reinhardt, Luise Rainer, Bruno Frank, Erich Remarque, Stefan and Arnold Zweig, and many others, help us to understand more clearly the richness and value of the German exodus and, in sharp contrast, the spiritual barbarism of the country which they fled. Of especial interest is an appendix, obviously incomplete in its omission of many sociologists, scientists, and philosophers, who are now active in this country. The book is tragic but also brave and hopeful. German thought and achievement is in exile: it is not dead.

J. RUMNEY

*Institute for Advanced Study*  
*Princeton, N.J.*

*Inside Germany.* By ALBERT C. GREZESINSKI. Translated by A. S. LIPSCHITZ. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1939. Pp. 374. \$3.50.

This book by a former high official of the vanished Social Democratic regime in Germany is a valuable addition to the numerous books dealing with Nazi Germany. It tells the vivid story, based in part on firsthand observation of the post-war collapse, revolution, and the struggle of the Weimar Republic against its foes within and without. New light is thrown on the critical period from 1930 to 1933 when Germany democracy was tottering before the rising Nazi power.

The latter half of the book is devoted to a description of Nazi justice, governmental organization, economic regimentation, war preparedness, and foreign policy. The chief interest of the work lies in its explanation of the failure of an important experiment in democracy. The interpretation is synthetic rather than dogmatic. Due consideration is given to unfortunate historical antecedents, unsympathetic behavior of other democracies, economic difficulties, political rivalries, necessary opportunism, toleration of reactionary forces, and lack of vigorous leadership. The author's personal policy as Prussian minister of the interior and as police president of Berlin was of vigorous action against foes of the democratic state. The book gives new significance to the vital question which faces the world. How can democracy be preserved without destroying the very essence of democracy?

CLIFFORD KIRKPATRICK

*University of Minnesota*

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*The History of Public Welfare in New York State, 1609-1866.* By DAVID M. SCHNEIDER. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938. Pp. xix+395. \$3.00.

*Public Welfare Administration.* By MARIETTA STEVENSON. New York: Macmillan Co., 1938. Pp. xi+352. \$2.50.

Dr. Schneider's book is the first of two volumes in which he proposes to give a much-needed and connected account of the development of policies, standards, organization, and administration of public welfare in New York State. The present volume divides the history of state, county, and municipal public welfare activities into four periods: the Dutch, the Colonial, a transitional period from 1776 to 1823, and the trend toward indoor relief from the latter date to 1866. Although the history of public welfare in New York State is so varied and voluminous that it does not lend itself easily to treatment in the short space of two volumes,

Dr. Schneider has sketched an excellent outline of matters of primary importance documented by rather complete footnote references. The book will be useful for students as a guide to public welfare development in New York.

Dr. Stevenson has written an excellent account of recent developments in administrative organization of public welfare. Part I is concerned with the "expanding field of public welfare," Part II with the present "organization of public welfare," and Part III with "administrative principles and problems." Standards of service and methods of treatment are referred to only briefly, which is perhaps justified in a book on administrative problems, and little attention is given to the peculiar problems of institutional administration. The discussion of personnel organization and management is particularly good. For purposes of comparing types of federal, state, and county organization the work should be a useful handbook for public welfare workers.

R. CLYDE WHITE

*University of Chicago*

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*Labour Courts: An International Survey of Judicial Systems for the Settlement of Disputes.* By the INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE. ("Studies and Reports," Ser. A [Industrial Relations], No. 40.) Geneva: International Labour Office, 1938. Pp. 220. \$1.25.

This report includes a comparative discussion of the labor court systems of the twenty-three countries in which they were in existence on December 31, 1937; monographs on the system in each country, usually with statistics of its operation and bibliography; and an appendix listing the principal laws on labor courts. The experiment of a special labor judiciary has been generally successful, and no country has entirely abandoned the experiment, once started. The fundamental purpose has been to provide a less expensive and more speedy settlement of labor disputes than through the regular courts. Expenses are generally met by the public authorities, procedure is simplified, preliminary conciliation efforts are usual, and the court itself is typically composed of representatives of employers and employees, so that the litigants are judged by their peers. Disputes handled are more often than not concerned only with existing rights, either individual or collective, under law or agreements; in exceptional cases they concern collective disputes over changes in conditions or rights.

EMILY CLARK BROWN

*Vassar College*

*Social Insurance Coordination.* By C. A. KULP. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1938. Pp. xiv+333. \$2.50.

This useful volume undertakes to define the relations among insurance bodies and different kinds of social insurance and to discuss the problems involved in the co-ordination of their activities. The study is concerned mainly with Great Britain and Germany, but at appropriate points American problems are introduced. Co-ordination refers to the horizontal relations "between one insurance body and another, between one supervisory body and another, between insurance schemes." By definition, centralization "means close control at the top level of authority, supervisory or administrative." In both Great Britain and Germany there is more or less co-ordination between insurance schemes at a particular administrative level. Old age insurance and old age assistance in Great Britain are closely co-ordinated. German industrial accident and health insurance have for many years been drawing into closer co-ordination. Centralization of control is more characteristic of British than of German social insurance, although under the Nazi regime the drift toward centralization is strong.

Mr. Kulp's task was a difficult one. Social insurance schemes are not logical constructions; they are determined by national, social, and political traditions and contemporary forces. A more liberal use of charts would have clarified the maze of organizations which the author describes.

R. CLYDE WHITE

*University of Chicago*

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*The Placing of Children in Families.* By the LEAGUE OF NATIONS. Geneva, 1938. Vol. I: Pp. 154. \$0.75; Vol. II: Pp. 241. \$1.25.

These two volumes originally constituted a section of a study begun by the Child Welfare Committee on the treatment of neglected and delinquent children. This was expanded through a questionnaire submitted to the states belonging to the League and to nonmember states. Experts in various countries acted as volunteer contributors to the final study, and the Save the Children International Union furnished original data on specific procedures utilized in various countries.

The study is very comprehensive; it includes a discussion of fundamental principles relating to foster-home placement of children, of the historical development of the movement, the extent of use, and comparison with other forms of treatment of delinquent and neglected children. Especially interesting is the account of migration of children to



the western section of the United States, into Canada, and recently to Palestine. Changing standards of social work are clearly revealed in this story; the scheme utilized in Palestine, with its children's village of three hundred, is quite challenging.

The second volume gives a detailed account of the systems of placing children in families as they exist in the various countries of Europe, in North and South America (Argentina and Uruguay), Australia and New Zealand, and in the Union of South Africa. A final chapter discusses objectives and standards of both administration and service.

The study contains voluminous, authoritative, and interesting data of contrasting methods in different countries, including those where no juvenile courts exist, their function being carried on through child welfare councils.

AUGUSTA F. BRONNER

*Judge Baker Guidance Center*  
*Boston, Mass.*

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*The Rehabilitation of Children: The Theory and Practice of Child Placement.* By EDITH M. H. BAYLOR and ELIO D. MONACHESE. New York: Harper & Bros., 1939. Pp. xi+560. \$3.75.

Case records of the Boston Children's Aid Association and the New England Home for Little Wanderers form the material out of which this book is built. The purpose of the book is to evaluate the effectiveness of foster-home care of children largely as a means of modifying or eradicating undesirable characteristics or overt misconduct. The method is that of a statistical analysis of the case material together with discussion.

The book contains a multitude of facts and findings represented in tables of single items from the records, each correlated with favorable or unfavorable response to foster-home care as determined at the time of the discharge of the case. One chapter reports post-treatment investigation covering two to eight years after discharge, another deals with predictability of response to care in which it is frankly stated that the prognostic factors selected may not be valid for current practices of the agencies considered.

One is impressed by the thoroughness of the effort, the painstaking care, the laboriousness of the task, and the obvious sincerity of the study. One must remember several facts: Evaluations are in terms of single items rather than by case-study methods, the records antedate current

therapeutic practices, the discussion is not always based on the actual data of the study.

The book is intended as a text; for this purpose it would need to be used with considerable critical interpretation.

AUGUSTA F. BRONNER

*Judge Baker Guidance Center  
Boston, Mass.*

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*Contemporary World Politics: An Introduction to the Problems of International Relations.* Edited by FRANCIS J. BROWN, CHARLES HODGES, and JOSEPH S. ROUCEK. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1939. Pp. 717. \$4.00.

This latest textbook in the field of *Weltpolitik* possesses the defects and advantages of most symposiums. The three editors have enlisted the services of thirty-one other scholars to write the thirty-five sections into which the book is divided. Their essays are grouped into six divisions: "World Conflict," "Major Foreign Policies," "Regional Interests," "World Organization," "Making World Opinion," and "Roads to World Peace." Each division opens with an introduction and closes with a summary by the editors. Professor Hodge's "fact-pictures," i.e., picture-maps, also serve to give unity to the volume, though consistency of treatment has not been sought after. The resulting diversity will be found pleasant by some and confusing by others. The editors are not above making a virtue of necessity: "To be wholly consistent in a field so fraught with conflicting points of view would relegate the book to the level of propaganda rather than provide the reader with a broad and sympathetic understanding of current international politics." To comment upon the contributions of so many distinguished authorities is obviously impossible. Suffice it to say that the editors have, on the whole, chosen wisely; that teachers will find this a serviceable text; and, without making invidious distinctions, that special praise is due to Howard Becker, Edwin Borchard, Phillips Bradley, R. E. Dupuy, Carl Friedrich, John Harley, Bruce Hopper, Hans Kohn, DeWitt C. Poole, Frank M. Russell, Graham Stuart, Benjamin H. Williams, and Quincy Wright for their sections of the book.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

*Williams College*

*Five Cities: The Story of Their Youth and Old Age.* By GEORGE R. LEIGHTON. New York: Harper & Bros., 1939. Pp. x+370. \$3.50.

The five cities whose story is told in this volume are Shenandoah, Pennsylvania ("The Rise and Fall of an Anthracite Town"), Louisville, Kentucky ("An American Museum Piece"), Birmingham, Alabama ("The City of Perpetual Promise"), Omaha, Nebraska ("The Glory Has Departed"), and Seattle, Washington ("The Edge of the Last Frontier"). The picture presented is largely that of the men who wielded power, the tie-up of business and politics, greed for wealth, waste of natural resources, absentee landlordism, exploitation, labor troubles, and the shock of the recent depression. It is not so much a book in urban sociology as a social history, and it adds but little to that field. The only new feature is the organization around the city of the familiar story of the settlement of the country and its economic development. The book will not be of vital concern to sociologists or historians. The author is in the editorial department of *Harper's Magazine*.

MAURICE R. DAVIE

*Yale University*

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*Farming Hazards in the Drouth Area.* By R. S. KIFER and H. L. STEWART. ("Works Progress Administration Research Monograph," Vol. XVI.) Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938. Pp. xxviii+219.

This monograph is an excellent addition to the growing list of studies devoted to the social and economic significance of the mal-use of land and of climatic fluctuations. Primary emphasis is given to the problem of farm operation on the Great Plains during the drought years. After a careful description of conditions which farmers faced during the crisis of the drought years—well documented with effective photographs—the authors discuss the prospects for rehabilitation of farming on the Great Plains. Suitable measures are proposed for each of thirteen subareas. For the most part, these proposals include (a) the enlargement of the farm unit; (b) return of the lighter soils to the production of native grass; (c) increasing the number of livestock; (d) government loans for buildings, farm machinery, and for working capital as needed. The resettlement of families displaced by the enlargement of the farm units can be accomplished in large part within the general area itself through careful planning and effective utilization of all the land resources.

LOWRY NELSON

*University of Minnesota*

*Germans in the Cameroons, 1884-1914: A Case Study in Modern Imperialism.* By HARRY R. RUDIN. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938. Pp. 456. \$4.00.

This is a carefully documented and judicious account of German economic and imperial activities in the Cameroons of West Africa, beginning with German occupancy in 1884 and ending with the outbreak of the World War in 1914.

The volume is aptly characterized by the author as "a case study in modern imperialism." As such it has value for the sociologist and adds appreciably to our knowledge of the motivating interests of imperialism, the conflicts engendered by it, the inevitable controls associated with it, and its impact upon indigenous peoples and cultures. Among the sociologically pertinent materials presented, the following may be cited: the account of German occupancy as a result of the persistent pressure of German traders; the detailed story of the evolution of a colonial system incident to the exploitation of the resources and peoples of the region; the description of the clashes among traders, settlers, missionaries, and officials; and the discussion of native reactions to European contacts and conquest. Studies of this sort will make possible ultimately the basic analysis of imperialism as a dynamic phenomenon.

W. O. BROWN

*Howard University*

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*Seven Lean Years.* By T. J. WOOFER, JR., and ELLEN WINSTON. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1939. Pp. xi+187. \$1.50.

*Seven Lean Years* is the story of the rise of the New Deal, excluding the A.A.A. and most of its activities concerning commercial farmers on the richer lands, in relation to rural reconstruction in America. It gives the background and development of the problem as seen by both authors through their connection with rural research in the W.P.A. They probably know more about the development of this problem from the inside during this period than anyone else. All categories of agricultural, and hence national, insecurity from poverty through tenancy to the drought are discussed. Statistics and detailed analyses are omitted, having already been presented in the eighteen W.P.A. rural monographic studies published under Woofter's direction. The last chapter on "Reconstruction" is exceedingly challenging. America spent three and one-half billion on rural distress between 1931 and 1937, excluding the billions granted through the Department of Agriculture and the indirect costs of price-

fixing. But according to the authors these measures are but stopgaps. America is passing from the pioneering and exploitative stages to a new period in which problems of rural distress deserve to be taken up from the curative point of view. The new aims might well be the prevention of distress and the rehabilitation of those rural families now in need. America has the ability, the land, and the raw materials. A second New Deal is yet needed for the problems of erosion, tenancy, rural housing, education, health, and rural life generally. This applies particularly to the masses of poorer rural families, America's human resources. Here is a book which deserves careful study if American sociology is ever to grow out of its present largely useless scholastic quibbling over the meaning of four-syllable words.

CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN

*Harvard University*

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*Hereditary and Environmental Factors in the Causation of Manic-depressive Psychoses and Dementia Praecox.* By H. M. POLLOCK, B. MALZBERG, and R. G. FULLER. Utica, N.Y.: State Hospitals Press, 1939. Pp. 473. \$2.50.

The hereditary part of the study is based on a comparison of the adjusted incidence of psychoses among the relatives of the patients with the estimated incidence in the general population. The results are slight and the difficulties too numerous to state here, but the authors escape censure by putting their conclusions very cautiously. They believe the evidence favors a hypothesis of familial predisposition to psychoses. The fact that their technique involved a considerable compounding of guesses, however, and the insuperable difficulties of family-tree research make even this conclusion of little value.

The environmental part consists of simple tabulations of some external facts about the patients. Some suggestive results emerge, but it is clear that much is being missed that might be measurable if the more subtle processes were treated quantitatively. The chapters of brief life-histories give clear hints that there are significant recurrent situations which have escaped consideration in the statistical sections. The statisticians will have a better chance to show results when the conceptualization of abnormal behavior is adequately re-worked. There is good reason to hope that the possibility of this accomplishment is near.

ROBERT E. L. FARIS

*McGill University*

*The Japanese Canadians.* By CHARLES H. YOUNG and HELEN R. Y. REID. With a second part on "Oriental Standards of Living" by W. A. CARROTHERS. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1938. Pp. xxx+295. \$2.25.

This book is a report of a research sponsored by the National Committee for Mental Hygiene in Canada. The investigators have assumed the Park theory of the race-relations cycle and applied it to the Oriental "problem" in British Columbia. Although this is a welcome addition to the literature, the writers have not modified or clarified the Park hypothesis even though some data in this field appear to warrant it.

The usual information about immigration, settlement, and community organization is presented as well as the various problems of relations with white Canadians. The writers do, however, fail in not securing data relating to *tanamoshi*, a traditionally collective means of providing capital among the Japanese. Low wages, savings, and low standards of living combined with an expanding economy are not always the only factors involved in raising economic status. The problem of population instability is mentioned, but this crucial problem is given very little attention. It is suspected that the Japanese habit of amplifying minute details, this being derived from their cultural heritage, has made difficult the evaluation of the data, thus resulting in an imputation of more conflict between the two generations and the two civilizations than may be justified. Almost no mention is made of the conservative character of Oriental family and community life.

The section dealing with standards of living presents many statistical tables with some analysis. But the account incorporates so many different aspects of minority group life that one fails to find any specific problem studied carefully. It is, nevertheless, a beginning in an exceedingly difficult field.

F. LAVIOLETTE

*University of Washington*

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*Health Insurance with Medical Care: The British Experience.* By DOUGLASS W. and JEAN WALKER ORR. New York: Macmillan Co., 1938. Pp. xvi+271. \$2.50.

The authors of this revealing book had the wit to go direct to the producers and the consumers of medical services—rank-and-file British doctors and working men and their wives. Even the investigations of two royal commissions which have issued elaborate reports on health insurance during the twenty-five years of its existence never included this type of direct testimony.

British workers say: "Yes, and more" when asked what they want concerning medical care and health insurance. "Yes," they like what they get now, incomplete as it is. They want "more" care, a fuller service. British doctors also say: "Yes, and more" when asked what they think about health insurance. This testimony came from everyday doctors and is also the officially expressed opinion of the British Medical Association. Considering that the American Medical Association has for twenty years portrayed health insurance as a failure from the standpoint of the British physician as well as the public, this testimony is pertinent and overdue.

Official and other literature is drawn on for an account of the structure, history, and problems of British health insurance, tax-supported medical services, hospitals, clinics, and public health work; but the meat and spice of the book is what doctors and patients say. Dr. Orr, a young western physician, did the work on a fellowship from the National Federation of Settlements; his wife, an experienced social worker, shared his responsibilities for collecting information and for writing.

Their work is careful, although impressionistic. British health insurance is a very partial answer to the problems of medical care in Great Britain because it covers only the services of general practitioners, not specialist or hospital care, and only employed persons, not their families. Moreover, a network of tax-supported medical services, voluntary and governmental hospitals, school medical services, and public health work have also grown up under local and national auspices in Great Britain. The result cannot be called a system because neither is it organized as a whole nor are its parts co-ordinated with one another. The last chapter, summarizing the British experience and suggesting some applications to our own country, assumes too much and demands too little. It is not enough that we avoid Britain's mistakes. In the United States we can start from a higher level of facilities and resources toward a better goal than the "general medical service for the nation" now proposed by the British Medical Association.

MICHAEL M. DAVIS

*New York City*

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*Social Problems.* By RAYMOND W. MURRAY and FRANK T. FLYNN. New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1938. Pp. ix+612. \$3.50.

This volume exemplifies in a very interesting way the militant effort to perpetuate archaic beliefs and medieval patterns of thought. It has no other purpose and no other distinction.

E. B. REUTER

*University of Iowa*

*Our Generation, Its Gains and Losses.* By OSCAR D. SKELTON. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938. Pp. viii+116. \$1.50.

This little book is the Green Foundation Lectures delivered before Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, by a former professor of political science in Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, but since 1925 Canadian undersecretary of state. It sums up in a very readable way the paradoxes of our twentieth-century civilization—the opposing trends in international relations, in political organization, and in the economic and educational fields. No attempt is made to calculate the balance of profit and loss in these opposing trends. The attempt of the author is wholly descriptive and analytical, with some effort to point out the sources in nineteenth-century civilization of these opposing trends. The book is useful to give a bird's-eye view of our political, economic, educational, and international situation.

C. A. ELLWOOD

*Duke University*

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*Labor and Social Organization.* By DAVID ALOYSIUS MCCABE, RICHARD LESTER, and ALLEN LESTER. Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1938. Pp. 374. \$1.20.

This is the sixth and final volume of a series entitled "Economics and Social Institutions," intended to serve as an "up-to-date and flexible" text in economics. The general topics considered are "Labor Organization," "Labor Legislation," "Social Security," and "Social Reorganization." The method is that of simple exposition. The points are briefly and clearly made, as is proper in a book which the authors expect to be supplemented by case material. Although the title of the series includes the term "social institutions," the titles of the other volumes and the contents of this one refer only to what are ordinarily considered economic institutions.

EVERETT C. HUGHES

*University of Chicago*

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*Islam in the World.* By ZAKI ALI. Lahore, India: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf Kashmiri Bazar, 1938. Pp. xi+428. 12s 6d.

One of the most interesting, but generally little appreciated happenings of modern times has been the reawakening of the Islamic world. The author of this volume, himself a Moslem, has endeavored to present a picture of this occurrence and to combine a eulogy of the possibilities of the Islamic way of life with a plea for the fair treatment of Moslems. This gives the work a mixed scholarly and missionary character. Students will find its scholarly discussion to be of merit; they will also appreciate the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the sentiments and thinking of a modern intellectual Moslem who is concerned over the condition of his religious and cultural group.

HERBERT BLUMER

*University of Chicago*

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*The Conquest of Violence.* By BART DELIGHT. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1938. Pp. xi+306. \$2.00.

The author of this volume is well known for his pacifistic position involving reliance on nonviolent behavior. He has sought to view the contemporary international situation in terms of his position and, accordingly, makes a very strong



plea for the need of conquering violence as it prevails between nations and classes. The work therefore reflects a strong missionary zeal which reaches its apex in a detailed plan of nonviolent activity which the author proposes as a means of eliminating war and preparation for war. The work has merit as a document presenting lucidly the position of those who rely upon nonviolent coercion.

HERBERT BLUMER

*University of Chicago*

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*The Science of Human Behavior.* By WALLACE T. WAIT. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1938. Pp. xv+335. \$2.75.

Many textbooks on elementary psychology have been published recently. The present volume follows the conventional pattern. Its only distinction lies in the fact that it has endeavored to reorganize the discussion in accordance with types of interest which college students in psychology have shown themselves to possess. The book is simple, readable, but of no special theoretical import.

HERBERT BLUMER

*University of Chicago*

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*From Hoop Skirts to Nudity.* By CARRIE A. HALL. Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1938. Pp. 240. \$5.00.

This work is a lightly written history of fashions in women's clothing from the period 1866-1936. Many interesting items are touched on in the discussion. However, the author has not been very apt in utilizing the factual content of her discussion to throw light upon the character of fashion as a social mechanism. The work, consequently, will have only casual interest for the student of social life.

HERBERT BLUMER

*University of Chicago*

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*Social Pathology.* By JOHN LEWIS GILLIN. Rev. ed. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1939. Pp. 648. \$3.75.

Six years ago this reviewer had the privilege of paying tribute to the development of Professor Gillin's thinking about social problems (*American Journal of Sociology*, XXXVIII, 964). From the appearance of *Poverty and Dependency* in 1921 to the publication of *Social Pathology* in 1933 there were significant changes in Gillin's organization of material. The first book was written largely from the viewpoints of economics and social work. The second was more nearly sociological in terminology, outline, authors referred to, and space devoted to various subjects. But the revised edition of *Social Pathology* marks no such development. Most of the material is unchanged; the "framework has not been altered." This is unfortunate, because others in the field made headway toward greater unity and coherence based on the significance of "pathological conditions" for personal and group integrity. Gillin still presents a rather miscellaneous array of "problems." Much of his space is still devoted to the nature, incidence, causes, and treatment of various "handicaps." Their relations to personality traits and social organization are treated for the most part impression-

istically. Little evidence is presented and that is inadequately weighed. Let us hope that Gillin's next book may go as far beyond *Social Pathology* as it advanced beyond *Poverty and Dependency*.

STUART A. QUEEN

*Washington University*

*America and the Strife of Europe.* By J. FRED RIPPY. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938. Pp. xiii+264. \$2.00.

The effects of European unrest upon American history, from colonial times to the present, are traced in this book. There is a section devoted to the much-discussed policy of isolation and an excellent Bibliography.

*Bibliographies in American History.* By HENRY P. BEERS. New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1938. Pp. 339. \$3.50.

This volume serves as a general bibliographic guide for research in American history. Of particular utility to sociologists are such sections as: Public Opinion, Negro and Slavery, Social Reform, and Religious History.

*Study Aid to Harry Elmer Barnes's "History of Western Civilization,"* Vol. II. By KERNEY M. ADAMS. Louisville: Standard Printing Co., 1938. Pp. xiii+255. \$1.30.

The book systematizes for the beginning sociology student the great amount of material to be found in the parent-volume. This is done by arranging the various topics in outline form with pertinent questions and exercises.

*Educational Yearbook of the International Institute of Teachers College, Columbia University, 1938.* Edited by I. L. KANDEL. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1938. Pp. xvi+399. \$3.70.

This volume contains an analysis of the current problems of rural education and rural society in fourteen different countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, England, France, Germany, India, Mexico, Norway, and the United States.

*Handbook of American Institutions for Delinquent Juveniles, Vol. I: West North Central States, 1938.* Edited by WILLIAM B. COX and F. LOVELL BIXBY. New York: Osborne Assoc., 1938. Pp. xiii+431. \$ .75

Here is contained a survey of all the federal and state institutions established for the care of juvenile delinquents in the states of Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota. The survey centers around the institutions' legislative background, administration, personnel, plant and equipment, program of treatment and training, and release procedures. It also contains an excellent bibliography on juvenile delinquency.

*Problems of Child Welfare.* By GEORGE B. MANGOLD. New York: Macmillan, 1936. Pp. xvi+549. \$3.00.

This is the third and extensively revised edition of a well-known book that first appeared in 1914. It is a book of fact, rather than theory, and attempts to cover all problems of child welfare: infant mortality, health, physical and mental handicaps, child labor, delinquency, dependency, and social work applied to children.

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*Readings in Social Case Work: 1920-1938: Selected Reprints for the Case Work Practitioner.* Edited by FERN LOWRY. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939. Pp. xiv+818. \$3.50.

Miss Lowry's book—aside from the two-page Preface—contains no comment or interpretation of the points of view contained in these reprinted papers. Her chief contribution is the topical organization: basic philosophy, generic concepts in case-work practice; relation of practice to agency function and setting; functional interrelationships of case work and other social work fields; the relation of social work practice to its professional and social setting; and relation of case-work practice to community and socioeconomic and cultural setting.

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*Cruel and Unusual Punishments.* By JAMES J. WILSON. New York: Published by the author, 1938. Pp. 36. \$1.00.

This short memorandum, prepared by a member of the New York County Prosecutor's staff, deals with proposed changes in the law affecting the indeterminate sentence, parole commissions, and trial without jury.

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*A History of Europe.* By H. A. L. FISHER. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1939. Pp. xiv+1306. \$5.00.

This is a revised and enlarged edition of the author's previous 1935 work and is divided into three main sections: "Ancient and Medieval History"; "Renaissance, Reformation, Reason"; and "The Liberal Experiment."

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*Tomorrow in the Making.* Edited by JOHN N. ANDREWS and CARL A. MARSDEN. New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1939. Pp. xv+471. \$3.00.

This book is a compendium of twenty-six essays by leading protagonists of various points of view upon some of the vital problems confronting America today. The four sections—"Frames of Reference," "Patterns of Change," "Our Relations at Home," and "Our Relations Abroad"—are all discussed from markedly divergent viewpoints by such persons as Sokolsky and Browder, Dennis and Hook, Barnes and Sockman, etc.

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*Manual of Government in the United States.* By R. K. GOOCH. New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1939. Pp. xi+791. \$3.75.

This book constitutes a valuable aid to college students taking an introductory course in American government. Emphasis is placed on the primary source

materials in the form of national and state constitutional provisions, rules and regulations, statutory provisions, judicial decisions, etc. Under each major division discussing the structure and functions of government are grouped analyses of the nation, the state, and the local community as each is concerned with the particular aspect of the topic being considered.

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*The Development of American Nationality.* By CARL RUSSELL FISH. Rev. ed. New York: American Book Co., 1938. Pp. xii+584. \$3.25.

This volume is Part II (1783 to present) of *A Short History of the American People*. It is chiefly designed for use as a text in American history for beginning college students. Concise indented paragraph comments and bibliographical notes at the end of each chapter greatly facilitate its use as a reference text.

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*State Conservation of Resources.* By CLIFFORD J. HYNNING. Washington: National Resources Committee, United States Government Printing Office, 1939. Pp. x+116. \$0.15.

This survey deals with recent trends in the state management and planning of land, mineral, water, and human resources. Chapter v deals with trends in the conservation of such human resources as education, health, labor, and public welfare.

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*Drug Addicts Are Human Beings.* By HENRY SMITH WILLIAMS. Washington: Shaw Publishing Co., 1938. Pp. xxv+273. \$2.50.

This book is an exposé of the "billion dollar drug racket" in attempting to show how in spite of the United States Supreme Court's validation of the Harrison Drug Act (which permits physicians to prescribe narcotics when deemed necessary) the Federal Narcotics Bureau operates the illegal Narcotics Code in opposition to the Harrison Act.

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*Social Work Year Book, 1939.* Edited by RUSSELL H. KURTZ. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1939. Pp. 730. \$3.50.

This volume is really an encyclopedia of the current status of organized activities in social work and in related fields. Part I consists of some eighty signed articles by various authorities; Part II is a description of all the state public assistance programs; and Part III contains a directory of national and state public and voluntary agencies whose programs are related to the whole field of social work.

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*God's Valley: People and Power along the Tennessee River.* By WILLSON WHITMAN. New York: Viking Press, 1939. Pp. 320. \$3.00.

The review sections of the newspapers have already done justice to this book. In a sometimes biblical, sometimes colloquial style, the author presents the human side of the story of the country affected by the T.V.A.; the local beliefs, hopes, prejudices, and the problems they set for the planners furnish the main theme. It is regional literature, written in support of the T.V.A.

*Education within Prison Walls.* By WALTER M. WALLACK *et al.* New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1939. Pp. viii+187. \$2.25.

This volume, written by the director of education of the New York Department of Correction and two assistants, describes the principles and procedures utilized in the penal educational program of this department during the last five years. Great emphasis is placed upon the problem of an adequate educational program within penal institutions as an effective element in the treatment of prisoners in different types of institutions.

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*The Police Yearbook, 1938-39: Proceedings of the Forty-fifth Annual Conference of the International Chiefs of Police Held at Toronto, Canada, August 29-September 1, 1938.* Pp. vii+296. \$2.50.

This report of the police chiefs' annual conference contains sections on: police organization and administration, police practice, a very illuminating section on techniques for handling public disorders, criminal investigation and identification, police co-operation, traffic control and accident prevention, and juvenile delinquency.

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*A Study of Mechanism in Education.* By WILLIAM L. PATTY. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1938. Pp. 179. \$1.85.

This analysis of relativistic pragmatism in education includes a general historical analysis of traditional educational theories and a specific critical analysis of the work of Bobbitt, Charters, and Peters. Instrumental or scientific education which is based on methods such as those used in the physical sciences is found to be out of harmony with our civilization, leading to a formalized institutionalism such as goes with all mechanization of social affairs.

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*The Administration of an N.R.A. Code.* By ROBERT H. CONNERY. Chicago: Published for the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council by Public Administration Service, 1938. Pp. xix+203. \$3.00.

A complete analysis of the Men's Clothing Code and the N.R.A. is made in this study, including the making of the code; organization of the code authority; administering the code; the label as a control device; financing and legislative functions of the code authority; and a set of appendixes on reports, interpretations, and proposed amendments. It illustrates the problems of interpretation and administration and the handicaps of public administration.

# ABSTRACTS OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

The persons who have aided in the preparation of the material for this issue are: Hubert Bonner, John A. Clausen, Hugh D. Duncan, H. Warren Dunham, Donald E. V. Henderson, and Erich Rosenthal. The numerals and letters appearing after each abstract correspond to the items in the following scheme of classification:

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|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| I. THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY        | e) The State and Political Process   |
| a) Sociological Theory          | f) The School and Education          |
| b) History of Sociology         | g) Economic Institutions             |
| c) Methods of Research          | h) Voluntary Associations            |
| d) The Teaching of Sociology    | IV. POPULATION AND HUMAN ECOLOGY     |
| II. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY           | a) Demography                        |
| a) Human Nature and Personality | b) Ecology                           |
| b) Collective Behavior          | c) The Rural and the Urban Community |
| III. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION        | V. DISORGANIZATION                   |
| a) The Family                   | a) Personal Disorganization          |
| b) Ethnic and Racial Groups     | b) Social Disorganization            |
| c) Social Stratification        |                                      |
| d) The Church and Religion      |                                      |

217. Studien zur Soziologie der Kunst, erster Teil: Die Reihenfolge der Künste im kulturellen Lebensprozess [Studies in the Sociology of Art, Part I: The Rank of Arts in the Process of Cultural Life].—Concentrating mainly on the theories of Sir Flinders Petrie and Paul Ligeti, the author attempts to show that there is no uniform sequence of blossoming for various forms of art, science, and other cultural phenomena. Various cultures show different sequences; historical and social processes are more variable, more creative, and less uniform than these theories contend. P. Ligeti's psycho-social analysis of the social nature and properties and relationship to the whole culture of the arts is considered valuable.—P. A. Sorokin, *Sociologus*—*Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie*, IX (1933), 45–65. (IIb.) D. E. V. H.

218. Leadership and Domination among Children.—The processes of leadership and domination are different in origin and method. Domination appears earlier and is a will to power. The dominator depends upon external aid and appearance of authority. A leader has the capacity to direct and stimulate others' activity and is asked to use this power for the common good. He must make the interests of others his own and advance the common cause. Children resent a dominator's passing over their interests in favor of his own. Whether youthful dominators can be developed into adult leaders is one of the most significant questions in child psychology at the present time.—Paul Pigors, *Sociologus*—*Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie*, IX (1933), 140–56. (IIIa.) D. E. V. H.

219. Frontier Society: A Study in the Growth of Culture.—There are four main types of frontier: (1) the farm frontier, practically self-sufficient, where every type of social institution is built up; (2) the settlement plantation, maintaining a close connection with the older society, with most of its folkways taking their tone from the single

enterprise of the region; (3) the exploitative plantation, temporarily settled by males without their families, where the whole process of assimilation of race and culture traits can be studied in full; and (4) the camp and ranch frontier, settled by men alone, with a strong bond of unity because they are engaged in a single enterprise. The study of frontiers is essentially dynamic: it is an investigation of social phenomena in the actual process of becoming—a sound approach to the understanding of human adaptation.—James G. Leyburn, *Sociologus*—*Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie*, IX (1933), 174–81. (IVb.) D. E. V. H.

220. Die Verwandtschaft der sozialen und psychischen Bedingungen in England und Italien zur Zeit der Hochrenaissance [The Relationship of Social and Psychical Preconditions in England and Italy during the High Renaissance].—A psychic dualism characterizes the people of the Renaissance period in England and Italy, both having a powerful urge toward expansion and both being realists with cold and self-reliant natures. There are conspicuous similarities in the climate, landscape, and economic geography of the two countries. Both peoples have a mixture of Norman and Teutonic blood. Both are nations of discoverers, conquerors, and world-rulers. Finally, the common trait of both cultures may be recognized in the suppression of the noetic elements as compared with the voluntaristic and aesthetic elements.—Gerhard Schmidt, *Sociologus*—*Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie*, IX (1933), 276–98. (IIIc.) D. E. V. H.

221. The Community Chest in American Philanthropy.—In the field of social psychology the community chest offers a valuable opportunity for research, presenting among others problems of cultural diffusion, of prestige, domination, accommodation, and social control through use of force. The community chest is subject in a large degree to the play of public opinion, popular emotion, or prejudice. Its services help break down social segregation, isolation, and cliques, and help create greater social solidarity. It represents what may be thought of as an end form in a sequence of more than half a century of social experimentation and invention.—Arthur J. Todd, *Sociologus*—*Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie*, IX (1933), 418–26. (IIIh.) D. E. V. H.

222. Extent of Association of Some Principal Elements of Farm Family Living.—Data gathered from 900 Wisconsin families showed little difference between the mean cost of living figures for owner and tenant families—\$1,451 for the former and \$1,459 for the latter. Owner and tenant families were the same in size—4.3 persons each on the average. Cost consumption unit scales take into account the fact that the number, sex, and age of individuals composing the family make a difference in needs for food, clothing, rent, and other elements of the cost of living. Of the 900 families, 589 could be classified according to the number of children at home with regard to food and clothing. Costs of other goods, such as rent, remain relatively constant with the third or other additional member of the family. Points of saturation or “diminishing returns” are indicated with the third and fifth child per family. The cost of living was found not to be closely associated with family participation in certain selected community activities.—E. L. Kirkpatrick and Evelyn G. Tough, *Sociologus*—*Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie*, IX (1933), 439–49. (IVc.) D. E. V. H.

223. Vilfredo Pareto als Soziologe (Vilfredo Pareto as Sociologist).—Critical viewpoints on Pareto vary a great deal. To a large extent this must be explained on the basis that his sociological writings bear the impress of a dilettante. The opinion that the *Treatise* is based on mathematical method, as Pareto asserts, and as many people seem to believe, is erroneous. On the contrary, it is a highly subjective manifestation of vengeance taken on the dominating ideas of his father's generation. It cannot really be considered “sociology,” since the social coherence of men is wholly misconceived by this avowed enemy of individualism who yet thinks in a highly individualistic way. It really is a static theory of instincts in perhaps the beginnings of a general anthropology (a characterology?). Pareto's theory of élite circulation is his sole contribution to sociology, although even this is based on a false theory of instincts. He was the harbinger of a new era and of a new political orientation. His importance is based on the fact that his observations about human nature fall in with the revolutionary impulses of the

young generation. Also, his criticism of the literature concerning social philosophy shows the imperfections in method in this field.—Leopold v. Wiese, *Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie*, VII (1936), 433-46. (1a.) H. D. D.

224. Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936): Zur Würdigung seines sozialphilosophischen und soziologischen Schaffens [Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936): An Evaluation of His Work as a Social Philosopher and Sociologist].—Tönnies' famous dichotomy—*Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*—was rooted in a tradition both socialistic and romantic. Romantic organic theories supplied the basis for his *Gemeinschaft* concept while the academic socialists and the national trend in all socialistic thought supplied the background for *Gesellschaft*. Three specific authorities may also be indicated as forerunners or molders of Tönnies' thinking: Henry Sumner Maine, with his distinction between status and contract; Otto von Guericke's theories of co-operation; and Marx, Wundt, Rackfahl, Geiger, Vierkandt, Von Wiese, Spann, and Durkheim are the leading critics of Tönnies' concepts. In the main it may be said that Tönnies' dichotomy cannot be defended logically. *Gemeinschaft* is related to the will of the human subject. As a member of *Gemeinschaft* he acts voluntarily, in accordance with *Kürwille* and *Wesenswille*. As a member of *Gesellschaft* the individual is without will, at least in the sense implied above. A voluntaristic system must assume a willing subject, yet Tönnies rejects the latter when he uses the concept of *Gesellschaft*. Tönnies' own judgment of Schäffle as a thinker whose mistakes may be of great profit for those following him may also be said of Tönnies. From another point of view Tönnies may be considered a forerunner of modern German national socialism with its mixture of romanticism and rationality.—Peter Struve, *Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie*, VIII (1937), 47-60. (1a.) H. D. D.

225. Das Rätsel der Gesellschaft [The Riddle of Society].—Max Adler attempted (following Kant) to show that the form and content of human consciousness bore traces of its social setting. At the same time he asserts that consciousness alone is the real. Social reality, although experienced only by the individual, is yet supra-individual—"immanent und a priori Soziales." But if Adler finds the real "within" consciousness it may also be found "without" the individual consciousness as in the structure of a set of social relationships. Also, Adler confuses the epistemological problem of "inner" and "outer" with the sociological which accepts an "outer" element in social life as a given. Nor does it follow that, because there is a supra-individual element in social life that therefore the individual is denied, or that because an objective social reality (such as relationship) is described as beyond consciousness, that individual consciousness is nonexistent. There is, finally, no antithesis between "society" and "individual," since what is social must be lodged in the "individual" and vice versa.—Leopold von Wiese, *Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie*, VIII (1937), 168-78. (1a.) H. D. D.

226. La Prévision sociologique: les thèses présentées au XI<sup>e</sup> Congrès international de sociologie [Sociological Prevision: Articles Given at the Eleventh International Sociological Congress].—(Abstracts of the papers are combined in this abstract.) Every social thinker makes use of some kind of prediction in the sense that he has some theory regarding the future of the historical process around which he centers his social thinking. The oldest type of social prevision was the conception of destiny or providence. This received new emphasis in the minds of Bossuet, Condorcet, and others who developed the idea of a "natural" progress. In the works of Saint-Simon, Comte, and Condorcet intellectual and technical factors were stressed. Pecquer and Marx emphasized economic factors; Proudhon, the idea of justice; Hegel, the historical dialectic; while Spencer and Durkheim described integrating processes, which are accompanied by disintegrating processes. Proudhon and Durkheim rejected prevision based on so vague a concept as the "course of history." According to Durkheim, social change is slow and gradual and prediction is possible to a limited degree. Tarde and Pareto describe uniformities as a result of repetition. For Tarde innovations have a stable base of *répétitions imitatives* which can be foreseen. Pareto's scheme of periodical oscillations, in which a period of incoherence is followed by one of consolidation, stresses, like Tarde's view, nonlogical factors.

One can speak of three types of prevision: those founded on mechanistic determinism in which the initial conditions within which the phenomena occur are known and measurable and where all the conditions of passage, such as time, speed, etc., can be



stated beforehand; those based on "statistical" determinism in which predictions are made about large numbers or groups without reference to the future of any single individual; and those founded on the determinism of attitude or social disposition by which individuals are constrained to follow certain ideals, mores, etc., in their conduct. The latter type of prevision is expressed in probabilities which are not capable of mathematical statement. Professor Blaha points out that the human will, while free, is disciplined, for it is subject to social and physical laws. Conformity to these laws is conscious and tends toward a greater degree of rationality. The more rational social life becomes, the more predictable it will be. According to Professor Descamps, the individual subject of the social sciences is a more complex phenomenon than the individual object of the physical sciences. There can be no social prediction until we make an analysis of elementary influences which can be isolated. Professor Orgaz says that sociological prevision should not be confused with prevision of historical events which are unique. Social laws state probabilities; but, to foresee any event, we must bring disciplines and types of laws other than sociological to bear upon the problem. According to Professor J. L. Fischer, social functions may be viewed either as they are conserving or as they are evolutionary factors. Sociological prevision can deal only with tendencies in the social process and within narrow limits. Richard posits two possible types of sociological prevision. One will be deduced from the constancy of natural and psychological laws which condition the existence and duration of a society. The other will be deduced from the irreversibility of historical series. M. Rugarli describes psychic conceptions of history as more poetic than scientific. Conceptions like those of Marx which based prevision on knowledge of a group of factors related to technical evolution and demographic conditions may attain a high degree of probability. Ellwood describes two aspects of prevision—scientific socio-psychological descriptions and scientific interpretation of given historical cases. The factor of "inter-learning," which leads to intellectual solidarity, is the leading possibility for a new social order which can be foreseen when we analyze modern society. Paul Otlet asserts that the danger of subjective judgment can be avoided only by the use of statistical techniques. E. Dupréel relates the problem of prevision to his "theory of consolidation" according to which social structures are considered in regard to factors of crystallization. Once these factors are understood to be poles in institutional life and due regard is taken of the emergence of new factors and their effects, prediction is possible.

Sociological prevision is not, however, merely a theoretical affair, and much empirical work has been done. Ogburn predicts that future social change will be greater and more rapid; cities will lose their population to the country; machines will increase in numbers and variety; industrial concentration and rationalization will increase; birth control will become more widespread; and medical science will be revolutionized by endocrinology. Professor Amerigo Mamias depicts social progress and retardation. Cycle theories are discounted; but, even if we admit a general tendency to progress, we must take account of factors which retard progress. In the field of economic prevision Professor Carl Brinkmann points out that, while many economic analyses are based on statistical techniques, there are subjective factors as well as psychic social factors which prevent strictly scientific prevision. M. Eugène Derobert points out that most business predictions are based on cycle or rhythm theories which have an insufficient basis in fact to justify their widespread use. Only general tendencies can be brought to light, and even these must be analyzed carefully. M. Roger Mandit counsels against strict quantitative procedure in economic prevision. M. Karel Smejkal stresses the importance of transformations and impending changes in techniques. Dr. Herbert Sultan describes the role of prevision in public finance and asserts that quantitative bases must always be sought for this type of prevision. Professor Mamias predicts that, unless the problem of wealth distribution is solved, there can be little hope for the future. Professor J. K. Kochanawski asserts that, when we know the collective psychology of a people—such as that of pre-war Russia—we can predict its future. Professor Lasbax describes a historical rhythm in politics wherein the state passes from a monarchy to a republic, next to an empire, and finally repeats a similar cycle on another level. Greece, Rome, and France are used as concrete historical cases in support of this theory. Professor E. Chalupny declares that political elections in a democratic state can be predicted with a high degree of certainty but that we must know the nature and degree of stability, what interests are dominant, the social tendencies manifest in the state as a whole, and special political conditions becoming manifest in the various parties. Professor G. Andrassy predicts

that the League of Nations will reach some type of compromise between centralization and decentralization, provided that the world returns to a greater degree of coherence. H. E. Barnes describes the "vision of progress" as it is found in writers from Plato to Spengler. Professor G. Scelle describes the difficulties which occur when statute law and the mores are not harmonious. Legislative laws and "objective" laws of social conditions must be plastic enough to meet changing conditions.

In dealing with prevision in religious and educational spheres, M. Tazerout follows L. von Wiese's theories regarding social distance wherein a rational sociology is depicted as concerned with measurable social distances.

According to Dr. R. Mitkovitch, prevision of delinquency and criminality has depended too often on statistical descriptions when, as is often forgotten, statistical presentation varies from one state to another. Criminology must, therefore, be supplemented by sociological points of view which stress both the qualitative and the quantitative. Prevision of war can never be exact, but we can discern general tensions and point out typical ideological manipulations which weight public opinion in favor of war. Every social upheaval leads rapidly to the social "declassing" of individuals. This, Dr. E. Mitkovitch points out, becomes a significant factor in criminality. When "declassing" occurs, we may look for an increase in bankruptcies and similar problems followed by political reactions.

In relating social prevision to social action, the sociologist, as Professor G. Richard points out, is concerned, not with what ought to be done but with what, given a certain social situation, can be done. He must, as a scientist, rely on statistical or historical method. As a man of action he can say only what ends may be produced by what means.

Physical aspects of social environment must be considered too. Professor Camille Vallaux discusses human habitat in terms of equilibrium in the vegetal world, distribution of water, seasonal variation, and the effect of natural catastrophes. Professor Eugène Pittard stresses the necessity for co-operative activity which prehistoric human environments demanded. The fact that cultures have succeeded one another in the same physical environment emphasizes the importance of social factors in cultural survival. Descamps describes three reciprocal factors which determine savage habitats—the presence of enemies, nomadic or sedentary habits, and building materials. Social structure will determine the form and the limits of the organized habitat. Professor L. L. Bernard describes four superimposed milieus: (1) the modified physical aspects of a habitat; (2) the biological milieu; (3) the psychic milieu; and (4) social institutions. The human habitat is a fusion of two elements—prevision and invention. M. Ivo Pilar depicts specific characteristics of nomadic life, such as camping for defense or security, and asks if this type of life may not have developed the political acumen of nomads to a greater degree than social situations have made necessary among sedentary peoples. Also, may it not be possible that for nomadic tribes, such as the Arabs, art and luxury became a symbol of domination over the sedentary peoples whom they conquered? According to Professor Peutch, two different types of mentality—the urban, which seeks to modify its natural milieu, and the rural, which accepts a more passive role toward tradition and change—have been present in human evolution. Also, two distinct types of rural family, the communal and "simple," have played an important role. In his discussion of some aspects of the economic functions of human habitats Professor de Leener admits the importance of geographical factors in creating exchange centers but points out that such centers in turn affect the natural environment. Dr. R. Mitkovitch emphasizes the variation between habitats and the fact that in crises each environment will display specific elements which will determine types of possible criminal activity. So many problems of sanitation, etc., are arising in urban life which cannot be solved within the present limits of cities that much transplanting of populations will take place. The sedentary, immobile nature of urban life is rapidly vanishing. *L'artificialism* will tend to replace traditional ways of living.—G. L. Duprat, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XLV (1933), 341-75. (La.) H. D. D.

227. *Le Régime féodal et la propriété foncière dans la Chine antique* [The Feudal System and Land Tenure in Ancient China].—Feudalism in China arose not from the breakup of a centralized government but from a clan system. Between the eleventh and the eighth centuries B.C. a rudimentary agricultural economy with almost no industry and very little commerce prevailed in the south of the great plain. The country was

sparsely populated, and the people were poor and at the mercy of floods and droughts. The possession of land was the sole means of assuring the existence of a family. Land was acquired either from clan priority or as a gift from king or prince in return for the fulfilment of some commission. With landownership went control of the indigenous population—household servants, peasants, and slaves—as well as obligations to the king. The landowner seldom administered his domain himself but appointed an overseer who supervised land and labor and even administered justice in some cases. The chief functions of the slaves seem to have been to assist where their services were most needed and to work in the owner's private fields, while peasants and artisans merely supplied the owner with a share of the product of their labor. The lord who derived his title from clan priority was a much more absolute ruler than other private proprietors and was much less closely bound to the king. He derived power from his relationship to the god of the soil and the cult arising therefrom. The immensity of the territory and the weakness of the king prevented him from exercising great authority for any considerable period.—**Henri Maspero**, *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie*, XVI (1936), 37-70. (IIIg) J. A. C.

228. **Ibn Khaldoun: un précurseur arabe de la sociologie au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle [Ibn Khaldoun: An Arabian Forerunner of Sociology in the Fourteenth Century].**—**Ibn Khaldoun**, Arabian historian of the fourteenth century, has been known to occidental students only during the last century, but his works display a common sense and insight that put him far in advance of his contemporaries. He transformed Arabian history from a collection of literary legends to the study of peoples and epochs, seeking causes and general laws which governed the formation and development of human societies. His theories on the causes and conditions for the development of cities show remarkable insight as well as skilled observation. While Khaldoun could scarcely be called a scientific scholar, both history and sociology as known today have vital roots in his works.—**Georges Hostelet**, *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie*, XVI (1936), 151-56. (Ib.) J. A. C.

229. **De la méthode à suivre dans l'étude du rêve [Of the Method To Follow in the Study of the Dream].**—The question of the dream often borders upon bias and is not treated directly from the point of view and method of psychology. The dream, however, cannot be isolated from other psychological phenomena. The dream state must be distinguished from the waking state, for they cannot exist together and must be separated in the mind. The best chance one has to observe one's dreams is just before going to sleep or just before awakening. To recognize the dream at the waking point is a negation of the dream because it often becomes blended with the reality of the waking state. The dream may be defined as a state of incoherence which, in turn, may be defined as mental anarchy resulting from the lack of co-ordination of the faculties. In passing from waking to sleeping, one functions with the same faculties and does not acquire new ones but will call up memories. Memories which occur in dreams are either of the early infancy period or of the most recent period. The study of dreams can only reveal some curious, hidden individual elements of the personality; it cannot, however, furnish an explanation of the unity of personality.—**L. Dugas**, *Journal de psychologie*, XXX (1933), 955-63. (IIa.) H. W. D.

230. **L'Interprétation des données statistiques: étude sur la méthode des enquêtes sociales [The Interpretation of Statistical Data: A Study in the Method of Social Investigations].**—The purpose of this study is to place in evidence from researches in different countries and from the interpretations of various sociologists the principal methods used to convert the figures of statistics and research into interpretations of social phenomena. There are three types of interpretation: descriptive or static, interpretation by social types, and causal or dynamic. The investigation of the Lynds in *Middletown*, in which they asked 446 young girls in the secondary schools to state their choice of a profession, is a simple example of descriptive or static interpretation. Another study of the same type but more statistical in nature was conducted by the Oesterreichische wirtschaftspsychologische Forschungsstelle. Several hundred travelers were asked to indicate what attracted them toward this or that city. The answers were divided into three categories, and from them the conclusion was clear that organized travel was superior to individual travel and that it is more and more becoming a group phenomenon. Blondel's study of suicide, again, has shown that the frequency of suicide

increases with age and that the monthly rate increases from January to June but decreases from July to December. This simple form of proof is the basis of all social investigation, the first step in the interpretation of numbers. The establishment and the definition of social types do not require strict use of statistical methods. E. Dupréel, in his subtle descriptions of the harmonious family, has shown, without use of numerical data, that this family forms a distinct social type, characterized by strong unity, a certain isolation from the rest of society, and a tendency to perpetuate itself. Here we are concerned with finding the conditions which constitute a sufficient proof in order to make possible a type of interpretation. The ideal goal of all social investigation is the attainment of the knowledge of phenomena, of noting their dependence upon the structure of society, its political, economic, and other events, ideological factors, physical elements, etc. The essential procedure is the establishment of causal relationships between facts by the statistical method of correlation. ("Le procédé essentiel qui nous permet d'établir des relations de causalité entre des faits observés par la statistique est la méthode de la *covariation*." ) It is, above all, in the domain of suicide that this method has given excellent results. Halbwachs has established a close relationship between the rate of suicide and the "type of civilization" or "mode of life." Another form of causal explanation, more complicated than the method of correlation, is that in which the dynamism inherent in a phenomenon reveals itself by the intrusion of a temporal factor. The investigation of the Oesterreichische wirtschaftspsychologische Forschungsstelle on the life of the unemployed in an Austrian village discloses the types of reactions of the worker in enforced idleness: the revolt against the dismissal, the hopelessness of finding work, the need to begin life anew, the resignation, the adaptation to new circumstances, and finally the despair and collapse of the individual. By taking into consideration the time element in this process, the dynamism becomes apparent. It is not necessary to compare two series; the causal relation appears in the comparison of two attributes in the same individual. The general conclusion is that every sociological hypothesis is the result of an intelligent analysis of facts rather than of statistics.—Julius Klanfer, *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie*, XVIII (1938), 39-51. (Ic.) H. B.

231. *Analyse logique de la psychologie* [Logical Analysis of Psychology].—The method developed by the Cercle de Vienne, following the work of L. Wittgenstein, can be defined briefly as a logical analysis of scientific language. Psychology as viewed by the Cercle represents a definite antithesis to the current epistemological assertion that there is a deep-seated difference between the natural and the mental or "cultural" sciences. The chief difference between the objects of the physical sciences and those of psychology is that the latter are endowed with meaning. The adherents of this view declare that the proper aim of psychology is to understand meanings. This view is opposed to the strict behaviorism of Watson and Pavlov. Every psychological term, endowed with meaning and verifiable in principle, is reducible to some physical concept. The terms of psychology are then also physicalistic, and psychology becomes an integral part of the physical realm. The old problem of the relation between psychical and physical processes has its basis in the illogical arrangement of psychological concepts. From this standpoint it is seen that the psychophysical problem is a pseudo-problem and that all branches of science are, in principle, of the same nature.—Carl Gustave Hempel, *Revue de synthèse*, IX-X (1935), 27-42. (Ia.) H. W. D.

232. *Neuschaffung deutschen Bauerntums* [Re-creation of German Peasantry].—Interior colonization will stress the cultivation of the land, while the re-creation of agriculture must stress the development of the people on the land. With the re-creation of agriculture comes again the problem of interior colonization. Redistribution of land into smaller holdings and new types of commercial structures must be created in eastern Germany. The biology of race and the production of skills are the principles according to which future colonization will be sought. Farm laborers are taking advantage of the opportunities for colonization in ever increasing numbers.—Hans Jürgen Seraphim, *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, XCV (1935), 145-54. (IVc.) E. R. and H. D. D.

233. *Was bedeutet der Streit um den Rechtsstaat?* [What Is the Meaning of the Controversy over the Constitutional State?].—In Germany and Italy the problem of the constitutional state arose soon after the revolution. The Italians were much better prepared than the Germans to solve this problem. It is a mistake to conceive the constitu-

tional state as the antithesis of a nonconstitutional state in the sense that it is unconstitutional. The foregoing interpretation originated during the victory in the nineteenth century of the bourgeois individualistic society over the law and the state. The constitutional state combated two other conceptions which based the state either on religion or morals. The constitutional state of the nineteenth century was nothing more than the tool of the bourgeois individualistic society, which required a neutral state. At the same time the law was also formalized and became an instrument for the realization of any desired content. By the formalization and mechanization of the contemporary state it became convenient for the state ruling group to make use of this good machine, since the group in power has the authority of making the laws. One could reinterpret the concept of constitutional state and make it an attractive and effective slogan of the new Germany. Although thinkers of the nineteenth century like Lorenz von Stein and Gneist considered the term "constitutional state" as specifically German, it is grammatically and conceptually an artificial product. Schmitt recommends the use of the concept only until the victory of the state Weltanschauung over its enemies has been fully achieved, after which it would be buried forever.—Carl Schmitt, *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, XCV (1935), 189-202. (IIIe.) E. R. and H. B.

234. Der deutsche Osten als Aufgabe [The German East as a Problem].—To Friedrich List credit must be given for redirecting attention to German settlements in the east of Germany and those extending to the Black Sea. Until the advent of Hitler no one had recognized the danger and potentialities inherent in the Slav peoples. The result is that the concept of the "German east" is inseparably linked with the achievements of German *Volksstum* beyond the narrow confines of Germany proper. This is not to be confused with the idea of pan-Germanism. The Germany of today recognizes the struggle of the people for self-determination. This shows the folk characteristic rather than the imperialistic way of thinking about the problem. Internal migration of the Germans from the east to the highly industrialized west has created a new internal German east problem, the solution of which is the precondition of external German east problems. The German east has the task of liberating the peoples living in the east of Germany and freeing them from anti-German feelings.—Erwin Wiskemann, *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, XLV (1935), 365-82. (IVa.) E. R.

235. Über altnordische Gesellschaft- und Wirtschaftsauffassung [On the Interpretation of Old Nordic Society and Domestic Economy].—The attitude toward "property and possession" is characterized by the fact that enjoyment of property is not sufficient; on the other hand, the peasant lacks our modern exaggerated pleasure in property as such. Since the acquisition of property is associated with dangers, it is not property as such but the glory derived from the painful ways of acquiring it which gives esteem to a man. Therefore, the Viking never speaks of possession alone but always of "possession and manly deeds," "wealth and esteem," or "wealth and glory." Germanic economic thought centers around land purchase and landed property. The Teutons are at once warriors and peasants. Only peasants can become judges. The social organization of this society goes back to two original forms: the family and warrior communities. Despite these forms of community life economic individualism is very pronounced. A strict separation of freemen and slaves is the rule. It belongs to the function of the priest to set rigidly the prices of commodities. The law regarding interest on borrowed money is 10 per cent.—Horst Wagenführ, *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, XLV (1935), 473-39. (IIIe.) E. R. and H. B.

236. Zum Problem der Individualisierung der Strafe [The Problem of Individualizing Punishment].—The individualization of punishment is discussed in terms of its relation to the definition of crimes and the determination of penalties, to the interpretation of criminal statutes, and to methods of punishment. Punishment should be so administered as to allow a wide range of discretion between the severest and mildest penalties for different offenses. The effect of punishment upon the psychological make-up of the individual should always be taken into consideration. To this end a variety of methods of punishment is analyzed and their possible effects noted. The individualization of punishment is based upon the belief that the purpose of punishment is always the improvement and social reorientation of the individual offender.—G. Novelli, *Kriminalistik*, XII (1938), 11-14, 29-34, 54-58. (IIa, Va.) H. B.

**237. Reproductive Institutions and the Pressure for Population.**—The thesis here maintained will be that the declining birth-rate has resulted from a ripening incongruity between our reproductive system (the family) and the rest of modern social organization, and that this incongruity offers a comprehensive means of interpreting contemporary neo-Augustan measures. According to the theory of cultural lag, familial institutions are a part of nonmaterial culture, which changes more slowly than material culture. The lag manifests itself in the family's loss of functions, most of its functions, except the affectional, having been transferred to outside agencies. Most of the propositions of the cultural-lag theory regarding the family are open to criticism. Our criticism does not deny that, when culture moves in the direction that Western culture has taken, familial institutions change more slowly than most others. It simply means to suggest that the question is not so much one of slowness or rapidity of change as it is one of direction. The family is slow to change, but there is a certain direction in which it can no longer change—a certain point where there is no longer the family institution. This is the direction of modern European civilization. It is better, in trying to explain the declining birth-rate, to replace or supplement the theory of familial lag with the theory that the nature of the family is incompatible with the nature of modern society, irrespective of rates of change. Modern urbanized and industrialized society is by its very nature destructive of the family. Urbanism forces individuals to co-operate with countless persons who are not kinsmen and draws them out of the kin group. Industrialism destroys the system of complementary functions within the home by substituting for it a new division of labor integrated outside the home. Social mobility, with its doctrine of equal opportunity and its adulation of the self-made man, nullifies the inheritance of status and continues to kill the family. The motivation of the individual is focused outside the family. Most satisfactions are his in equal or greater abundance if he is free from kinship ties. Even marriage is becoming increasingly a means of private satisfaction independently of its social functions. Present birth-increasing policies manifest four tendencies. (1) Anti-urbanism consists in an attempt to establish a peasantry which will constitute a human seed-bed. Germany has made a serious attempt to put it into effect, but there are reasons to believe that it is difficult to maintain. (2) The appeal to moral duty in terms of national sentiment, religious prescription, and social welfare is a powerful instrument. (3) Forbidding by law and by police action the practice of abortion and the sale, transmission, and use of contraceptive apparatus or information is inept. (4) The appeal to pecuniary desire is inadequate if it intends to compensate people for bearing and rearing offspring. An exclusively pecuniary reward would have to be sufficiently great to overcome the inconveniences of procreation and child-rearing. In return for the rewards the government would require that persons who live by producing children must prove their fitness. This would probably produce a profession of child-rearing. With training there would come specialization. A new kind of reproductive organization compatible with modern society would have been substituted for the family. This would mean that child-bearing would once more be motivated, just as in a familistic system it was motivated.—Kingsley Davis, *Sociological Review*, XXIX (1937), 289-306. (IIIa.) H. B.

**238. Differential Fertility.**—Satisfactory data for population studies can only be collected by state action armed with compulsory powers over a whole population. Future progress in demography, therefore, depends on bringing pressure to bear on official departments. The first task in this problem will be to examine the objectives with which such studies may be undertaken. One of the principal aims of population studies is to provide material for a plan to control fertility. In so far as we can learn where the decline began, under what conditions it is spreading most rapidly, and among which types of people reproductive capacity is being best maintained, we may hope to prescribe the kind of environment most conducive to the maintenance of a stable population. What we first need to know is either the rate at which different groups are reproducing themselves at the moment or the rate at which they have done so in the past. It is now generally accepted that the best measure of current replacement is the net reproduction rate. Completed fertility could be determined by taking a cohort of women of a given type in a five-year age group and ascertaining the total number of births produced by this cohort during the whole of their reproductive life. These meas-

ures of total fertility do not take marriage into account. Usually occupation, income, and social position have been considered together in relation to differential fertility. It was early discovered that within the lower-income groups certain important occupations presented wide divergences in fertility rates. The history of economic differentials shows that we can have no certain knowledge of what the position was when the birth-rate began to decline. There is a considerable body of evidence to indicate that the decline began among the more well to do and among the professional classes, so that a large differential fertility rate existed in the period about 1890. There is some evidence that in regions of particularly low fertility economic differentials are tending to disappear. The actual disappearance or reversal of the usual trend has been reported in Stockholm, Berlin, Dresden, Rotterdam, and Glasgow. Work done on differential fertility serves to establish the existence of certain features in the past beyond any reasonable doubt. Still, no completely adequate account of human reproductive behavior exists for any region at any time. Even our knowledge of what is happening today is fragmentary in the extreme. Prosperity, education, leisure, low infant mortality, urban amenities—all have been found to be correlated with low fertility. What we most need to know is what type of living under present-day conditions is least incompatible with survival. The necessary data are current fertility rates associated with as many significant social variables as possible. Now that control of the birth-rate and of the death-rate is coming to be recognized as integral part of public policy, we may hope to learn as much about the circumstances attending the birth of a citizen as we now do about those which determine his age at death.—Enid Charles, *Sociological Review*, XXIX (1937), 243-57. (IVa.) H. B.

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## THE NAZI PARTY: ITS LEADERSHIP AND COMPOSITION<sup>1</sup>

HANS GERTH

### ABSTRACT

The National Socialist party can be explained as a fusion of two types of domination—charismatic and bureaucratic. The *charismatic* claim to leadership means that no status on the basis of specialized achievement can be accorded without the approval of the leader. He delegates powers to his faithful followers, the "inner circle," selected on the basis of his personal preference. There is no party democracy because all authority emanates from the leader. The *bureaucratic* nature of the organization attracts those with bureaucratic backgrounds, and hence there is a preponderance of teachers among the functionaries. The disadvantaged, with their great disparity between self-esteem and status, accept the charismatic leadership. Thus there is a heavy representation of the middle class. Youth is attracted by the charismatic aspect. The liquidation of existing bureaucracies leads to competition among the "inner circle" in organizing new bureaucracies and this leads to much duplication of agencies. No one can enter the civil service without the approval of the local party leader. The new bureaucracy is less rigid than the old Prussian bureaucracy because of the arbitrary conduct of police, judicial, and economic departments and because of the lower achievement level of the trained experts.

### CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP

The National Socialist party in Germany can be adequately described only as a fusion of two types of domination, namely, the charismatic and the bureaucratic types.<sup>2</sup> The charismatic aspect of

<sup>1</sup> The author is greatly indebted to Mr. Edward Shils, of the University of Chicago, for many valuable suggestions and the complete revision of the article.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen, 1925), Vol. I, chap. iii, §§ 3, 4, 5, 10; Vol. II, Part III, chaps. vi and ix. By charisma we refer to a personality characteristic which is regarded as extraordinary. In consequence of this, the person who possesses it is thought to have either divinely instilled or "exemplary leadership" powers or at least extraordinary qualities which most persons cannot acquire. It is entirely irrelevant conceptually whether the characteristic in question is "objectively" true from an ethical, aesthetic, or any other viewpoint. It is important rather that it should be so regarded by those who are charismatically dominated, i.e., the disciples (*ibid.*, p. 140).

National Socialism is represented in the position of the "Leader" in relation to the faithful believers in the leader's God-given gifts, in his infallibility and in his sanctity.<sup>3</sup> In his own eyes and in the eyes of his followers the "Leader" does not follow man-made rules or laws, nor is he bound by any hitherto valid customs, conventions, or laws.<sup>4</sup> In this respect he is similar to the great prophets who have protested against orthodoxy in ecclesiastical organization and in theological doctrines. He does not follow already existing rules; he creates new ones.<sup>5</sup> He is a revolutionary who does not accept the existing order but sets up instead an order of his own. His authority is not a delegated authority but one residing in himself. Hence formulas like "I decided . . ." are the final word.<sup>6</sup> His decisions

<sup>3</sup> "... We National Socialists believe . . . that for us the Leader is . . . simply infallible" (Hermann Göring, *Germany Reborn* [London, 1934], p. 79).

<sup>4</sup> "At such time, if anyone feels it his duty to take upon himself to be a leader of a *Volk*, such a man is not bound to follow the regulations of parliamentary customs, or to accept the obligation to act according to a particular democratic conception, but exclusively to carry out the mission intrusted to him" (Reichstag speech, February 20, 1938, *Der Angriff*, February 21, 1938).

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Hitler's justification of the party purge of July 13, 1934 (*New York Times*, July 14, 1934).

<sup>6</sup> Policies are not the result of majority votes of political councils. Neither the 16 members of the Cabinet nor the council of the 18 *Reichsleiter*, nor the 9 members of the Secret Cabinet council take votes. Hitler proclaims his decision after the discussions. The frequency of formulas like "I resolved . . ." and "I decided . . ." is symptomatic of the charismatic legitimation of his domination. Cf. "Germany will recognize Manchukuo. I have decided on this step. . . . I have decided to carry out such strengthening of the German military forces as will give us security . . ." (Reichstag speech, February 20, 1938, *Der Angriff*, March 21, 1938). "... I decided to bring about the conversation, known to you, with the former Chancellor Schuschnigg . . ." (Hitler on March 19, 1938, returning from Vienna, *Der Angriff*, March 20, 1938). "In January, 1938, I finally resolved that . . . I would fight for and win the right of self-determination for the 6½ million Germans in Austria. . . . I am resolved to complete the transformation of the Reichsbank . . ." (Reichstag speech, January 30, 1939, *Der Angriff*, January 31, 1939). "During the days of December, 1937, and January, 1938, I had resolved to solve the Austrian Question . . ." (article by Hitler, reprinted in *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 18, 1939).

It is difficult to determine how far such "decisions" are substantially personal decisions of Hitler's and how far the formula represents the legitimation of the decisions of experts and officials. The only occasion the author had to observe an overt deviation of Hitler's from the declared policy of the Foreign Office was when, in the summer of 1937, von Strepel, the spokesman of the Foreign Office, stated that the German answer to the British "questionnaire" concerning Germany's aims would be released immediately when Hitler would return the document from Berchtesgaden, where it had been sent for his signature. Hitler, however, decided to shelve the document in order to remain noncommittal, which actually is his favorite attitude (cf. Stephen H. Roberts, *The House That Hitler Built* [New York, 1938], p. 13).

are not justified by their consistency with standards other than those which he himself asserts.

There are situations, however, such as crises in international relations, in which a democratic legitimation is occasionally necessary. In such cases the dictator boasts of being the "son of the people," the "unknown soldier," who articulates and expresses the will of the party. The party in its turn performs the same functions for the people as a whole, by representing their "true" preferences and racial "instincts" in a way which they themselves are not capable of doing.<sup>7</sup>

It is not our task to decide whether the leader really has charismatic qualities. It is relevant only that the leader find sufficient followers who believe that he has those qualities and who acknowledge his claim for recognition. Charismatic domination exists as long as and in so far as the leader can successfully claim such acknowledgment by his followers.

This is the type of claim which is raised by Hitler in practically all spheres of life. Persons who according to conventional standards are "authorities" in music, painting, and military strategy carry no special weight alongside of him since they are in the last analysis "mere" specialists. He is *the* genius of every field of activity. Thus he is accepted as an artistic genius when he paints water-color sketches in the trenches and as an architectural genius when he designs plans for a party building or for the reconstruction of Berlin. It is consequently only consistent that his right to "lead" in all the arts should be universally acknowledged. He is accepted as a great thinker when he reveals the laws of universal history and race; he is a political genius when Schuschnigg and Chamberlain come to Berchtesgaden. He is an oratorial genius when he appears in whirlwind campaigns and at the party congresses in Nuremberg. He is a diplomatic genius at the Munich conference, a warlord of a future Germany when his troops occupy the Rhineland, the Saar, Austria, Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The charismatic claim to leadership which is totalitarian in nature means that no status on the basis of specialized and technical achievement can

<sup>7</sup> For the analysis of the "identities" of democratic thinking see Carl Schmitt, *Politische Romantik* (2d ed.; Munich and Leipzig, 1925); *Politische Theologie* (Leipzig, 1922); *Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus* (Leipzig, 1923).

be accorded unless it has the approval of the leader or those to whom he delegates his power.

An instance of the totalitarian character of charismatic domination can be witnessed in the dispute between the National Socialist party and the church.<sup>8</sup> The clergy cannot acknowledge the charisma of the leader as the ultimate source of value inasmuch as they legitimate their own claim for autonomy in the name of God. It is somewhat inexpedient for the party to dispute this legitimation too overtly without encountering the resistance of the traditional attitudes of the populace. Hence the occasional references of the leader to "Almighty God" and to "positive Christianity."

A central element in the definition of the charismatic group is that during its revolutionary, or genuinely charismatic, phase it despises routine pursuits—especially the uninspiring drudgery of institutionalized and stereotyped economic activities. As a charismatic party, the Nazis have used extraordinary means for financing their political activities. These range from house-to-house begging expeditions, anonymous street collections, and the solicitation of contributions and gifts from "friends of the party," to overt bribes and confiscations. When the party came into power, it was deeply in debt.

#### THE "INNER CIRCLE"

The charismatic leader delegates power to faithful followers whom he trusts. He does not primarily "appoint" them for specific offices which carry with them specific powers. Rather, he gives special commissions and tasks to the follower, leaving it to the latter's discretion to determine what range of authority is required for execution of the task. Territorial limits, the personal charisma of the follower, and the ability to secure the confidence and favor of the leader alone determine how much power he can wield through his administration. Göring's commission as chief forester of Germany or as head of the Four Year Plan and the unification of the Reich through eleven regents (*Statthalter*) are examples of this type of delegation of power. Party members who are commissioned personally by the leader constitute "members of the inner circle."

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Paul Tillich, "The Totalitarian State and the Claims of the Church," *Social Research*, I (1934), 405-33.

As the confidence and favor of the leader alone determine who belongs to the inner circle, each member competing for such appointments is in constant fear of the loss of the leader's confidence. But the members of the inner circle must act. Therefore, ever suspicious, and ever watchful, they feel compelled continually to demonstrate their unswerving belief in the leader's charisma. Even though they might not actually believe in Hitler's abilities, this necessity makes for the exuberant praise and eulogy of the leader's actual or imputed virtues and qualities. This situation has given use to a great body of religious, aesthetic, mythological, poetical, and historical verbiage. It was Hermann Esser who first used the term "leader";<sup>9</sup> it was allegedly Dr. Ley who employed the possessive formula "my leader"—to mention only two incidents in this process. The spread and enforcement of the "Heil Hitler" salute in physical and written form in the nation at large falls under the same heading.<sup>10</sup>

No objective criteria are utilized in the selection of members for specific tasks. They are intrusted with all sorts of tasks irrespective of their age, training, or social origin. Particular achievements in a "career" are not regarded as relevant in determining a member's eligibility for a given position. The composition of the inner circle, therefore, does not seem to be subject to any rule other than to the changing personality preferences of the leader and to the power which the individual member may secure through institutional entrenchment and factional support by powerful "friends." He is supposed to be worthy of being commissioned through his participation in the leader's charisma, through personal propinquity, long-standing friendship, and comradeship during the struggle for power. Hess's designation as "deputy leader" is the most conspicuous example. However, the past exercises no irresistible claims over the present, and the oldest friends may lose the leader's confidence, e.g., the Strassers, Röhm, Hanfstaengl, and Gottfried Feder (the author of the party program). The "purge" is the form in which such differences of opinion tend to be settled. The deviation of the defeated

<sup>9</sup> Albert Rivaud, *Le Relèvement de l'Allemagne, 1918-1938* (Paris, 1938), p. 228.

<sup>10</sup> It is not by accident that the escape formula, "Grüss Gott," spread from the Catholic South through the northern sections of the Protestant nobility, bourgeois-patrician, and professional classes which surrendered to the Hitler regime only with reservations.

faction is defined as indicative of a lack of faith in the leader. It was against such a charge that Karl Ernst, the commander of the Berlin Storm Troopers, shouted "Heil Hitler" when he faced the firing squad of the Elite Guard during the Röhm purge of June 30, 1934.

The charismatic leader refuses to be identified with any specific "office" no matter how many bodies of functionaries he may create. Hitler did not assume the title of "President" when he usurped the supreme command over the army and navy and proclaimed himself to be "Leader and Reichs-Chancellor" after von Hindenburg's death. The subsequent plebiscitarian acclamation of the nation has nothing to do with "democratic elections." In June, 1939, Hitler reduced his title to "Der Führer." The designation of "Aggrandizer of the Reich" is an official *epiteton ornans*, not a transferable title. It stresses the *personal* achievement and does not indicate a legally defined and delimited rank or position. Just as Cromwell refused to accept the title of "King," Hitler is unlikely to accept the title of "Kaiser"—titles which connote the hereditary character of institutionalized political charisma.<sup>11</sup>

#### THE PARTY AT LARGE

As each member of the inner circle can only legitimate his power by invoking the favor of the leader, his exclusion from the inner circle can only be interpreted by the party at large as a consequence of disobedience and unfaithfulness. The weaker his position actually becomes, the more ardently will he emphasize his belief in the righteousness of the leader. This is true of all positions in the party hierarchy: for the 33 *Gauleitern*, the 760 subdistrict leaders, the 21,354 leaders of local groups, about 70,000 leaders of party cells, and 400,000 leaders of party blocks. (Since the reorganization of the party in 1937, every German, whether party member or not, falls under the *Hoheitsgebiet* or legal control of the party official.)<sup>12</sup>

The derivation of all authority from the leader excludes any party-

<sup>11</sup> For a discussion of monocratic rulership see Georg Simmel, *Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung* (Leipzig, 1908), pp. 162-63; "Superiority and Subordination as Subject Matter of Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, II (1896), 167-89, 392-415; Weber, *op. cit.*, I, 141.

<sup>12</sup> *Berliner Tageblatt*, No. 152, April 1, 1937. The figures are conservative, as 8 *Gaue* (with Austria and the Sudetenland) have in the meantime been added to the party.

democracy. No local leader is elected; every leader is appointed by his superior, and he alone is responsible to his superior for whatever action he takes, for whatever happens in his district. He alone and not vote-taking deliberative bodies decides on policies. The rapid growth of the party in numbers and power made a rapid organization of a bureaucratic staff necessary. The centralization of power secured the swift execution of undisputable commands from above, minimized the spread of clashes of opinion and disputes through the hierarchy, and allowed for quick changes of slogans and policies (e.g., the sudden co-operation with the Communist party during the Berlin transport strike in 1932 and the National Socialist faction in many parliamentary battles.) However flagrantly actions may have contradicted words, nothing could disrupt the firmly disciplined organization. It is here that the charismatic aspect of the Hitler movement is fused with the bureaucratic organization in its most rationalized form into the monocratic administration.

Bureaucracy has been defined by Max Weber as a structure with the following characteristics: (1) the allocation of tasks in accordance with a hierarchical relationship; (2) a system of ranks and honors; (3) nonownership by officials of the instrumentalities and material goods involved in the execution of official duties; and (4) access to official positions usually regulated and controlled on the basis of examinations to test the special training and expert knowledge which the candidate has for the position.

In this sense the army officer is no different from an official in a governmental administrative body, a university professor, an engineer in the dye trust, or a conductor of a symphony orchestra. The life-plan of each is oriented with reference to expectations of, and demands for, a career in the given field; his ambition provides the motivation for his work, and he finds compensation in promotion within such a hierarchical scale. The indirect pressure of the institution works in such a way that the sense of duty and the personal interest in promotion will select out those thoughts and modes of conduct which are defined as respectable and reject those which are not.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Weber, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, chap. vi: "Bureaukratie"; Carl Joachim Friedrich and Taylor Cole, *Responsible Bureaucracy: Study of the Swiss Civil Service* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932); Karl Mannheim, "Über das Wesen des wirtschaftlichen

For the National Socialist, increasing power at home and abroad is a primary obligation. Every thought and action furthering that end is correct, while to miss an opportunity in the fight is unforgivable. This simple code reduces scruples. It can easily be followed by individuals of the most diversified backgrounds. The less rigid the moral, intellectual, and conduct patterns of the party member are, the less his personality is channelized by confined occupational, regional, and diversified social conventions and the greater are his chances to pursue the ends of the party with a minimum of inhibitions. Hence the ascent into so many leading positions of the party of those types who have been failures in other spheres of life.<sup>14</sup> Hence the contempt for bourgeois respectability.<sup>15</sup>

The charismatic character of the conquest of power and the legitimation of "heroic" actions in the name of the leader appeal to such personalities. They succeeded in the efficient diffusion of faith in the leader. The monocratic structure of the party minimizes the personal responsibility of the subleader, while it gives him the support of the organization. In critical situations he has the comforting assurance that he is merely executing "commands from above." In passing, it might be remarked that it is only in such situations, and especially when the leader stresses continuously his formal adherence to "legality," that the middle-class German seems to be able to act in a revolutionary way.

#### THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE PARTY

The bureaucratic aspect of the party appeals greatly to those potential recruits with a bureaucratic background. It attracts especially the teaching profession, the more so as the unpolitical hero worship and moralistic character of the propaganda allows for an

Erfolgstrebens," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik*, LXIII (1930), 458 et passim; E. C. Hughes, "Personality Types and the Division of Labor," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXIII (1928), 754-68; Hans Gerth, *Die sozialgeschichtliche Lage der bürgerlichen Intelligenz um die Wende des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin: V.D.I. Verlag, 1935), chap. iv: "Die Bureaukratie."

<sup>14</sup> Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 94. The erratic life-histories of men like Karl Ernst, Count Ernst Reventlow, Klaus Heim, Ernst Röhm, Gauleiter Lohse and Kaufmann, Alfred Rosenberg, and Prince August Wilhelm are representative.

<sup>15</sup> H. Mankiewicz, *Le National socialisme allemand: ses doctrines et leurs réalisations* (Paris, 1937), I, 175 ff.



interpretation which presents the conquest of power as the education of a misguided nation.<sup>16</sup>

The teachers—mostly elementary-school teachers—are the best represented of all professional groups composing the Nazi party—97 per cent of all German teachers are members of the party or its affiliates. Among the leading former schoolteachers are Reichsminister Bernhard Rust; the Jew-baiter, Julius Streicher; the leader of the Sudeten Germans, Konrad Henlein; the head of the secret police and the Elite Guard, Heinrich Himmler; the late district leader, Hans Schemm; state minister and district leader, Adolf Wagner; and the governor of the two Silesian provinces and district leader of Silesia and South Westphalia, Joseph Wagner. Seven district leaders or vice-district leaders out of the total of 33 are former teachers, 78 out of 760 subdistrict leaders are former teachers, and about 3,000 teachers are local leaders. Altogether there are 160,000 political functionaries, leaders, and subleaders recruited from the ranks of the teachers, mainly the elementary-school teachers.<sup>17</sup> They constituted 32.66 per cent of the total of 489,583 political leaders as reported in a party census of May, 1935, or 22.9 per cent of the total of 700,000 political leaders reported after the reorganization of the party in 1936-37.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Svend Ranulf, *Moral Indignation and Middle Class Psychology* (Copenhagen, 1937).

<sup>17</sup> *Berliner Tageblatt*, No. 210, May 5, 1937, "Erzieherschaft und Partei."

<sup>18</sup> *Der Schulungsbrief* 8. und 9. Folge, 1938, p. 305, and *Berliner Tageblatt*, No. 152, April 1, 1937. The strength of the teachers within the party leadership may partly explain the relentlessness of the fight between the party and the church. The teacher—especially the elementary-school teacher in the rural regions—had long resented the supervision of the Protestant ministers who were usually conservative politically, orthodox theologically, and connected socially with the Prussian *Junkers*, who were their church patrons, and with the Hohenzollern monarch, the head of their church. The schoolteachers, being recruited from a somewhat lower stratum than the clergy ever since the end of the eighteenth century, inclined more to a secularized "enlightened" or "historical" philosophy of life but were tied to the church which they had to serve as organists and preceptors. This duality of school and church office was fought by the teachers from the eighteenth century onward. Intricate fiscal and property claims of state and church were connected with this setup, and the political upheavals of 1848 and 1919 and their legislative aftermaths attempted to deal with this issue but stopped short of reaching a definitive solution. In 1928 there still existed in Prussia 11,000 positions uniting schoolteaching with obligatory minor church services like organ-playing. At the beginning of 1933 there were still 7,400 left. By a special decree of

Persons whose career expectations are frustrated or who suffer losses in status or income in the intensive vocational competition of modern capitalism should be especially likely to accept the belief in the charismatic leader. Those placed on the disadvantaged side of life always tend to be interested in some sort of salvation which breaks through the routines associated with their deprivation.<sup>19</sup> Such "unsuccessful" persons were to be found in every stratum of German society. Princes without thrones, indebted and subsidized landlords, indebted farmers, virtually bankrupt industrialists, impoverished shopkeepers and artisans, doctors without patients, lawyers without clients, writers without readers, unemployed teachers, and unemployed manual and white-collar worker joined the movement.<sup>20</sup> National Socialism as a salvatory movement exercised an especially strong attraction on the "old" and "new"<sup>21</sup> middle

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September 7, 1938, the Prussian government separated church and school offices for the remaining 6,000 positions (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, October 14, 1938). It is symptomatic that district leader Adolf Wagner of Bavaria, a former schoolteacher, in June, 1937, declared himself "to be compelled by the attitude of the churches ultimately to reduce the voluntary contributions in Bavaria during the course of the next three years. The sums saved should be used to build new schools in Bavaria. It could indeed not be the task of the State to support financially an organization which seeks only to fight against the State" (*Berliner Tageblatt*, July 1, 1937). This statement may be considered as a foreboding of Hitler's comments on church income and church property which led up to the conclusion that "the National Socialist State would be at any time prepared to make a clear separation between Church and State" (address to the Reichstag, January 30, 1939, *New York Times*, January 31, 1939).

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Weber, *op. cit.*, I, 267; E. Beynon, "The Voodoo Cult among Negro Migrants in Detroit," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIII (1938), 894-907. "Without hope and definitely ousted in the battle of life, he [Hitler] was saved by the war—'a redemption,' he calls it" (Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 5).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Hans Speier, "The Salaried Employee in Modern Society," *Social Research*, I (February, 1934), 111-33, for data on the position of the "new" middle classes in Republican Germany; C. Bresciani-Turroni, *The Economics of Inflation* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1927), for the effects of the inflation on the "old" middle classes. Cf. also Paul Sering, "Der Faschismus," *Zeitschrift für Sozialismus*, Nos. 24-25 (September-October, 1936), pp. 765-92, in which the author emphasizes the role of "classes demanding assistance" in the formation of fascism.

<sup>21</sup> A sociological analysis of the anti-Semitic Stöcker movement of the eighties—with the exception of the then nonexistent white-collar class and the unabsorbable unemployed—still holds true for National Socialism. "Instead of the often confiscated figures of former times the big Christian-Social mass meetings now are composed of different elements. There remained a kernel of the anti-Semitic public of the artisans

classes, especially in those strata where substantive rationality<sup>22</sup> is least developed, and will be the most highly represented among those seeking salvation by quasi-miraculous means—or at least by methods which break through the routines which account for their deprivation.

TABLE 1  
PERCENTAGE OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF NAZI  
PARTY MEMBERSHIP, 1933 AND 1935

OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION	PARTY MEMBERSHIP		TOTAL GAINFULLY EMPLOYED*	
	1933 (1)	1935 (2)	1933 (3)	1935 (4)
Manual workers.....	31.5	32.1	46.3	38.5
White-collar employees....	21.1	20.6	12.5	12.5
Independents†.....	17.6	20.2	9.6	9.6
Officials.....	6.7	13.0	4.6	4.6
Peasants.....	12.6	10.7	21.1	28.9
Others‡.....	10.5	3.4	5.9	5.9
Total.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

\* Column 4 is added as decisive evidence of the National Socialist failure to win the same following among the urban proletariat as they won among the middle classes. In column 4 the agricultural wage-workers who were included with "manual workers" in column 3 are classified with "peasants," leaving as manual workers only those employed in nonagricultural pursuits and therefore predominantly urban. Even if all those "manual workers" whom the Nazis had won as party members were entirely nonagricultural, which was undoubtedly not the case, the nonagricultural proletariat would still be considerably underrepresented in the Nazi party both in 1933 and in 1935 as compared with employers and independents.

† Skilled artisans, professional persons, merchants, etc., excluding independent peasants.

‡ Domestic servants and nonagricultural family helpers.

According to official party statistics in 1935, the occupational composition of the party membership before the conquest of power as compared with its composition in 1933 was as shown in Table 1.

and the numerous 'landlords' without estates residing in Berlin, who have been expelled from their home by their Manichaeans. The small civil servant had received a loan from Levi, he could not pay and was urged and threatened; the student fared similarly . . . the artisan takes the Jew for the embodied principle of free competition, which he fears because he cannot cope with the large enterprise. So nearly all tailors and shoemakers of Berlin hate the Jew because they either directly depend on the Jew or would undoubtedly succumb in competition to the 'Golden 110' or whatever else Jewish stores might be named" (Wilhelm Revel, *Der Wahrheit die Ehre: Ein Beitrag zur Judenfrage in Deutschland* [Nuremberg: Woerlein & Co., 1881], pp. 13-14).

<sup>22</sup> Karl Mannheim, *Mensch und Gesellschaft im Zeitalter des Umbaus* (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1935), chap. i.

The relatively heavy representation of the middle classes (58 per cent of the total) becomes even more evident if we compare the composition of the party with the composition of the total gainfully occupied. The manual workers were underrepresented in the party by 14.8 per cent, the white-collar employees overrepresented by 8.6 per cent, and the peasants underrepresented by 8.5 per cent. The party membership amounted at that time (January 1, 1933) to 849,009.<sup>23</sup>

The common element in the situations of all these different strata was their despair and lack of social and economic security, the wide differential between self-esteem and actual status, between ambition and accomplishment, between subjective claims for social status and the objective possibility of attaining these goals through competitive orientation toward "market chances," or opportunities for social ascent through bureaucratic careers. Through the transformation of the Republic into a totalitarian subsidy state, political power seemed to be the decisive instrument for the distribution of market chances and bureaucratic careers. It became possible to hold those in power responsible for every deprivation. The blackmailing of the "system" was a point on which all agreed. All interests converged in this supreme interest; hence the slogan: "Community interest ranks higher than self-interest," in which "self-interest" refers to a system characterized by the following features: individual or collectively organized orientation toward market chances, the stratification of society along class lines, and competition for pecuniary rewards and social status. The preference for "community interest" involves the devaluation of competitive modes of orientation and the subordination of all other aims to the one supreme aim—conquest of political power by concerted party action.

As all German parliamentary parties of the twenties (with the exception of the Catholic Center party) were recognized both by themselves and by others as organizations for the instrumentation of class interests, National Socialism in principle opposed them all, especially the proletarian parties, which, as the largest and most powerful mass organizations, represented most conspicuously the orientation toward market chances, and whose ascent implied the

<sup>23</sup> *Der Schulungsbrief*, 8. und 9. Folge, 1938, pp. 286, 287, 310.

degradation of the lower middle classes from which the National Socialists drew so many of their followers. Neither its patriotism during the war, its fight against communism, its merits in maintaining the unity of the Reich, nor its vote for naval rearmament made the Social Democratic party acceptable to the National Socialists. All the efforts of the party to eliminate Marxist concepts and slogans from its vocabulary, to substitute "national comrade" (*Volksgenosse*) and "working people" (*Werkstätige*) for "class comrade" (*Klassengenosse*) and "wage-worker" (*Lohnarbeiter*), proved to be futile. The party remained unmistakably a class party, and for this among other reasons the Nazis opposed it.

#### AGE COMPOSITION

A major factor facilitating affiliation with a charismatic movement in its revolutionary phase is youthfulness; and it is instructive, therefore, in this connection to examine the age structure of the National Socialist party. The percentage of party members between eighteen and thirty years of age rose from 37.6 of the party membership in 1931 to 42.2 just before the party came into power. But, after the conquest of power and the consequent stabilization and bureaucratization, youth no longer played the same role in the party; the percentage decreased to 35.4 in 1935, when "experienced" men in their forties and fifties began to join the party in great numbers. The decoration of Hjalmar Schacht, then the minister of economics, with the badge and title "Old Fighter of the Party" may be cited as an illustration. For the Social Democratic party only 19.3 per cent of the total membership was in the eighteen-to-thirty-year age group in 1931. In the population at large, according to the census of 1933, this age group amounted to 31.1 per cent. The National Socialist party could truthfully boast of being a "young party." Table 2 strikingly shows the differential representation of the various age groups.

The leader-follower relationship with its spontaneity is particularly conspicuous in the gang-formation process of the first terroristic groups (e.g., the spontaneous emergence of the terroristic techniques at the first mass meeting of the party in 1921 at Munich and the

coercion of the audience by violence).<sup>24</sup> These techniques of violence appeal to youth, especially to those who had been members of the private post-war armies. As long as the Hitler movement consisted of relatively spontaneous and dispersed groups in various regions of Germany, the hierarchical and bureaucratic aspect of these private armies was not overt. The hierarchical ranks which articulated career lines and channelized ambitions were easily forgotten in the years after the war, and what remained was a memory of heroism and

TABLE 2\*

AGE COMPOSITION OF THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY IN PERCENTAGES OF THE TOTAL IN THE YEARS 1931, 1932, AND 1935 AS COMPARED WITH AGE COMPOSITION OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN 1931 AND OF THE TOTAL POPULATION OVER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE IN 1933 (EXCLUDING THE SAAR, AUSTRIA, AND SUDETENLAND)

YEARS	NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY			SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 1931	TOTAL POPULATION 1933
	1931	1932	1935		
18-30.....	37.6	42.2	35.4	19.3	31.1
31-40.....	27.9	27.8	27.9	27.4	22.0
41-50.....	19.6	17.1	20.8	26.5	17.1
Over 50.....	14.9	12.9	15.9	26.8	29.8
Total....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

\* Data for the National Socialist party and for the population are from *Der Schulungsbrief*, 8. und 9. Folge, 1938, p. 315; data for the Social Democratic party, from *Berliner Tageblatt*, No. 27, January 16, 1937.

comradeship under the most dangerous conditions. A yearning for the comradeship of the trenches and the commonly experienced dangers of the war and of post-war battles of the private armies prompted many former soldiers and those who sought the soldierly life to join the National Socialist party as long as that party made itself the chief proponent of such values on the German political scene. This contention is supported by the following data: 48.6 per

<sup>24</sup> *Der Schulungsbrief*, 8. und 9. Folge, 1938, p. 293. Cf. Frederic M. Thrasher, *The Gang* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), pp. 41, 68, 74; Frederick L. Schumann, *The Nazi Dictatorship: A Study in Social Pathology and the Politics of Fascism* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1935), pp. 287 ff.; E. A. Mower, *Germany Puts the Clock Back* (New York: W. Morrow & Co., 1933); E. J. Gumbel, *Vier Jahre politischer Mord* (Berlin, 1923).

cent of all political leaders of the National Socialist party took active part in warfare during the period 1914-21. About 25 per cent of all party members who took part in the fighting which marked the war and post-war periods are in the leadership, while, of those party members who did not participate, only 20.2 per cent are leaders.<sup>25</sup> In an environment where military experience is highly esteemed as well as widespread such a movement will gain many members.

Youth and war experience both constitute a basis for a rigid distinction between in-group and out-group. This division is accompanied and strengthened by the development of a dual morality, i.e., one standard for the in-group and another standard (or minimum standard) for actions toward the out-group relationships. The refusal of loyalty to the leader and indifference toward his mission are in themselves sins.<sup>26</sup> Members of charismatic groups must seek to extirpate such sins and bring the sinners into the fold. For this purpose the National Socialists have devised a number of procedures which we shall describe in the following paragraphs.

The Hitler type of charismatic orator<sup>27</sup> does not so much woo his public as he urges, requests, and orders his audience to fall in line. Hence he does not mind insulting and provoking those who do not yet know him or his program. Whereas a democratic speaker would try to gain the sympathy of his audience by calling them "my friends," the fascist orator would seek to compel them not to appear hostile or indifferent by terroristic threats.<sup>28</sup> A completely cynical attitude obtains toward all who are outside the fold. This attitude finds no place for the code of tolerance. Truth is revealed and

<sup>25</sup> *Der Schulungsbrief*, 8. und 9. Folge, 1938, p. 305.

<sup>26</sup> "... Anyone who tries to interfere with this [the leader's] mission is an enemy of the *Volk*, whether he seeks to do this as Bolshevik, as Democrat, as revolutionary terrorist, or as a reactionary dreamer. In such a time of stress any German who only uses his time in carrying the teachings of the Bible through the country or spends his days in doing nothing, or in criticizing the actions that others carry out, does not act in God's name, but those do who give their prayers the highest form which unites humanity with God: that is work!" (Reichstag speech, February 20, 1938, *Der Angriff*, February 21, 1938).

<sup>27</sup> Sigmund Neumann, "The Rule of the Demagogue," *American Sociological Review*, III (1938), 478-98.

<sup>28</sup> *Der Schulungsbrief*, 8. und 9. Folge, 1938, p. 293 (speech by Hitler, February 24, 1928).

monopolized by the leader by virtue of his charisma. As long as the notion of the equal value of unequal individuals, and therewith the maintenance of tolerance, is firmly established, such types of demagogues have no chance.<sup>29</sup>

The downfall of the anti-Semitic court preacher Stöcker in the 1880's as well as the failure of Hitler until the beginning of the world-depression are evidences of the necessity of certain dissatisfactions, frustrations, and resentments as preconditions for the success of such movements as they founded. The opportunity for success comes when the pluralistic, automatically self-regulating, competitive structure of modern industrial society changes into a managed system and when politics and economics merge.

The decisive means of achieving the submissiveness of the non-party population—and of preserving it once it is obtained—is the interplay between propaganda and systematic terror. This mechanism achieves not only the submissiveness of the nonparty people but it guarantees the conformity of the party membership to the leader's demands whenever deviation is threatened. The more zealous elements in the party concentrate their attention on a particular situation, single out a particular enemy or a particular area, and do not yield until they dominate the situation. The "conquering" of Koburg<sup>30</sup> through the massed Storm Troopers in the early twenties merely systematized the experience of the first Munich mass meeting. The technique was then developed on a nation-wide scale and

<sup>29</sup> Stöcker, the anti-Semitic leader of the early eighties in Germany discovered this when he tried to establish that double morality for in-group and out-group relationships by using propaganda methods which are very up to date today. "He who contradicts is simply a scoundrel. Said he in his last convention: 'To me only my friends' opinions matter; those of my adversaries do not count at all. And I should like to recommend you to act as I do; label them rabble and riff-raff.' How far this infamy went cannot even be indicated publicly, a contemporary author stated. And it was due only to the still universally prevailing ethics that the spread of such methods was suppressed. Even the *Reichsbote*, the author continues, occasionally felt ashamed and did not carry it. Other papers however did and when Mr. Stöcker saw what mischief he had done, he as usual tried to get away with it by denials but was as usual convicted of double-dealing. This time even by a conservative paper" (Franz Mehring, *Herr Hofprediger Stöcker, der Sozialpolitiker: Eine Streitschrift* [Bremen: E. Schumanns Verlag, 1882], p. 11).

<sup>30</sup> Cf. the instructive description by Kurt G. W. Luedecke, *I Knew Hitler: The Story of a Nazi Who Escaped the Blood Purge* (New York: Scribner's, 1938).



it was successful. In 1932—before the great purge of the party—Hitler wrote: “Everyone who became unfaithful or broke discipline and obedience was a dead man politically.”<sup>31</sup>

The outside masses were forced into conformity with the party’s demands by a variety of pressure mechanisms. The Germans under National Socialism have become afraid of being stamped as “Jewish-influenced liberal intellectuals,” as “hidden Marxists,” or as “grumbling philistines who prefer butter to cannons and world-politics.” Through fear of possible legal or other disadvantages, they are induced to evince an extreme loyalty to the largest single group—the group in power. Three weapons of propaganda are of central importance in this process, namely, extortion, anonymous denunciation, and anonymous rumors. These result in boycott, isolation, and, ultimately, disrepute. And, if the case is an extreme one, direct means of physical force are brought into play, ranging from “house arrest” or concentration camp to secret trial and eventual execution.

National Socialism has had a standardizing and unifying effect on the numerous “styles of life” of the various class and regional groups. Every plebiscitary dictatorship tends to level all groups into a common mass of subjects, and in doing this National Socialism has often claimed to be “democratic.” It is indeed democratic in so far as the externals of a socially stratified society such as fashion, titles, and other means making social status and class position perceivable are devalued, minimized, and occasionally suppressed.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>31</sup> *Der Schulungsbrief*, 8. und 9. Folge, 1938, p. 283.

<sup>32</sup> The irrepressibility of the urge for ostentation of the parvenu is, however, well known, and its expression among the new élite is attested to by things like Göring’s opulence in general and the setting of his wedding in the Berlin Opera in particular, Goebbels’ style of life, Hitler’s unforgettable decree against the lavish festivities and luxury of the Berlin Storm Troop commanders after the Röhm purge and his craving for immortalization through lavish and ostentatious buildings (cf. the new Chancellery in Berlin; Berchtesgaden, Hitler’s mountain retreat; the Olympic stadium at Berlin; the House of German Art at Munich; and numerous similar constructions), and the futility of Mrs. Magda Goebbels’ attempts to replace fashion by a national costume. The undemocratic aspect of the effort to suppress the ostentation of social position lies in the fact that those who have actually increased their economic and political power and social status indulge themselves less visibly. In consequence of their greater invisibility, however, they are able to do so more freely than would be possible in the limelight of publicity.

## MONOPOLY OF POWER AND BUREAUCRATIZATION

When the party came into power, it had to deal with the still existing governmental bureaucracies, on the one hand, and the party and trade-union bureaucracies, on the other hand. The liquidation of the latter assured the Nazi party of its monopoly, and the masses who were thereby atomized provided an enormous field for the organizational zeal of the inner circle. Since in any highly bureaucratized society, the administrative skill and the jurisdiction of bureaucratic bodies largely determine the amount of control at the disposal of the commissioned subleaders, a competitive and unplanned race for organizing bureaucracies set in among the members of the inner circle.

The zeal to control as many spheres as possible made for a duplication of organizations immediately upon the accession to political power. Von Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, and Göring all tried to direct Germany's foreign affairs while von Neurath was still in office. Göring as Reichsforstmeister dines at hunting parties with the Prussian *Junkers*, opens the annual agricultural exposition, and has a strong hand in agricultural politics. Ley, as the head of the Labor Front, succeeded in incorporating the Reich Agricultural Estate and therewith encroached on Darré, the minister of agriculture, at the same time that he made Seldte, the minister of labor, almost superfluous.

The party archives at Munich and the Institute for the History of Modern Germany under Frank compete with the *Reichs archiv*—they collect largely the same historical and contemporary material for the re-writing of history along the line of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and Rosenberg's *Mythos*. Amann, who controls the enormous holdings of the Eher publishing house, and Dr. Dietrich, the Reich's press chief, encroach on the propaganda ministry. When Göring was commissioned to carry out the Four Year Plan he quickly set up a public relations office of his own and monopolized the news-coverage of economic life. It is due only to the lack of journalistic skill that the army's press bureau has no greater stake in propaganda management. The control of the best stages in Berlin was secured by Göring. His courtship of the opera star, Emmi

Sonnemann, his present wife, and his well-known sense of the spectacular may have focused his ambition in this direction.

The commissioner for the construction of highways and fortifications, Dr. Fritz Todt, is an important man for building contractors to know. Hitler's economic adviser, Wilhelm Kepler, member of the Reich party directorate, wields tremendous and uncontrollable power in the awarding of state contracts in the totalitarian armament business. Likewise Dr. Funk's zigzag career from the commercial pages of the *Berliner Börsenzeitung* through the propaganda ministry, into Hjalmar Schacht's office reveals the importance of being close to the leader. During his service under Minister Goebbels, Dr. Funk gave the leader a daily press report. And again, the commissioner for the execution of the Four Year Plan, Göring, who controls the Prussian budget and, through his position in the air force, rich contracts for the building, chemical, and aircraft industries, should be mentioned as a mighty competitor in the race to dominate the economic life of Germany. Thus in every field of politics and all spheres of life an unchecked struggle for power is being waged among the members of the inner circle who immediately tend to fortify their positions through bureaucratic organizations, duplicating and encroaching on one another's functions. Behind the precisely organized façades the cliquish struggle for power remains relatively invisible to the public at large. The motives of those who join the party range from ardent belief and more or less rationalized conviction to an opportunistic adjustment to new "facts," acquiescence, grumbling concession, and, finally, mute adaptation for fear of legal and other disadvantages.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>33</sup> There existed in 1937 about 767,000 functionaries of the Labor Front; about 600,000 functionaries of the National Socialist welfare work; about 88,000 functionaries of the food estate (*Nährstand*); about 77,000 functionaries of the National Socialist veterans' service; about 67,000 functionaries of the Reich's organization of officials and teachers; about 95,000 functionaries of the Nazi women's leagues. On Hitler's birthday on April 20, 1937, 824,000 new functionaries of the party took an oath to Hitler. Some figures of the National Socialist Winter Aid (*Winterhilfswerk*) may illustrate the quick formation of a paid body of functionaries. Whereas out of a total of 1.5 million functionaries and helpers only 4,100 were paid during the 1933-34 campaign, out of the total of 1,030,000 functionaries 10,000 were paid in 1937. The increased efficiency of the more rationalized and bureaucratized body is evident in the better results of the Reich's street collections, district street collections, collections on the "Day of National Solidarity," one-dish Sundays, Winter Aid lotteries, collections during concerts and shows of the district party organizations, donations of business firms and other organi-

These numerous organizations with their ill-defined and overlapping functions and jurisdictions make the process of "co-ordination" very difficult for the traditional state bureaucracies. It was under the pretext that this difficulty would be eliminated that the fusion of the party and the state bureaucracies was carried out.

The extent of the replacement of civil servants by party members invalidates Max Weber's statement about the relationship between revolution and the stability of the personnel of governmental bureaucracies in modern society. Weber thought that the officials at the very top would be replaced, the bureaucratic machine with its necessity for special training and knowledge remaining intact and serving the new political master as it had the old.<sup>34</sup> National Socialism, however, replaced officials of all ranks and stations from top to bottom.<sup>35</sup>

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zations, and deductions from wage and salary income. The total income increased from about 360 million reichsmarks in the winter of 1933-34 to about 420 million reichsmarks in the winter of 1937-38. The clients of the charity organizations who in 1935-36 amounted to about 13 million people decreased to about 9 million in 1937-38. (*Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1938 [Berlin, 1938], pp. 596 and 597).

One has to add to the above-mentioned numbers of functionaries millions and millions of *Volksgenossen* in the Hitler youth, Storm Troops, Elite Guard, and National Socialist Motor Corps who are active in the "education" of the masses. If we conceive of these party positions in terms of households or families, we have some indication for the extent in which hopes for political and social ascent are channelized (*Berliner Tageblatt*, No. 152, April 1, 1937).

<sup>34</sup> *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, chap. vi, p. 669.

<sup>35</sup> By March, 1937, in Prussia the 12 heads of the provincial administration were replaced by party members, 11 of whom belonged to the party before 1933. Out of 34 *Regierungspräsidenten*, only 3 were left in office, all the newcomers being members of the party; 19 of them were members of the party before 1933. Out of 361 *Landräte*, the key position in rural administration, 97 were left in office. With the exception of 17, all *Landräte* are members of the party; 171, or more than 50 per cent, were party members before 1933. Out of 438 so-called "political positions" in the administration of Prussia, 356 are held by National Socialists. Eighty-one per cent are in the hands of Nazi men and 48 per cent are filled by "old fighters." In other parts of the Reich the same procedure was followed (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, March 28, 1937). In fact, the "liquidation" of Republican officialdom had already started months before National Socialism came into power. The rush of anti-Republican nationalists to the antechambers of Bracht, the Prussian minister of the interior, had grown so much by November, 1932, that he had to forbid all personal presentations in December. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* of January 8, 1933, remarked: "The applicants literally must have queued up."

The policy of selection has two aspects. It is not merely oriented toward those who are in office and may or may not be replaced, but at the same time it confers differential privileges upon different types of office-seekers. From 1933 to 1936, out of the 300 *Referendare* (graduates in law serving their first probationary period in the civil service), 99 per cent belonged to the party, SA or SS (Storm Troop or Elite Guard). Of these new civil servants, 66 per cent were party members before 1932.<sup>36</sup> No candidate can enter the civil service without the consent of the party district leader. This policy of selection may partly be responsible for the decreasing percentage of military officer's sons studying law. Out of the total of 821 military officer's sons studying at German universities in 1928, 51 per cent were enrolled in the faculty of law. Out of the total 900 during the winter semester, 1934-35, only 21.1 per cent were enrolled in that field.<sup>37</sup>

It is clear that the fusion of the party with the bureaucracy had its effect on the social structure of the party. We saw that before the conquest of power the percentage of officials amounted to 6.7 of the total membership. By 1935 they represented more than 13 per cent. According to Ministerialrat Sommer, their percentage had risen to 28 per cent by April, 1937.<sup>38</sup> What this means in absolute figures is obvious when one takes into account the striking growth of the party to the total of 2,493,890 members in 1935, when it was closed to new applicants, and the youth organizations were declared the only channel for entry into the party.<sup>39</sup>

Whereas the party became a cumbersome bureaucracy, the governmental bureaucracies through the influx of party members lost much of the formal rigidity of the classical Prussian civil service. Arbitrary actions in all administrations increased. The arbitrary conduct of the police, judicial, and economic departments provide the more conspicuous cases. The general achievement level for the

<sup>36</sup> Dr. Wilhelm Schuetze, "Beamtenpolitik im Dritten Reich," ed. H. Pfundtner, *Dr. Wilhelm Frick und sein Ministerium: Festgabe zum 60. Geburtstag des Ministers Dr. Frick* (Stuttgart-Leipzig: F. Eher N.F., 1937).

<sup>37</sup> *Deutsche Hochschulstatistik* (Berlin: Struppe und Winkler, 1928), Vol. XIV, p. 26.

<sup>38</sup> "Beamter und Partei," *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 4, 1937.

<sup>39</sup> In May, 1937, the party was reopened (*Der Schulungsbrief*, 8. und 9. Folge, 1938; *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte*, 1937, p. 554).

trained expert was lowered, which the party officialdom interpreted as necessitating special training sessions in camps for officials.<sup>40</sup> The element of arbitrary judgment attained predominance over what the National Socialist resents in the formal, rational, and therewith predictable conduct of affairs in the bureaucratic office.

That it is the circumscribed authority of any given office within the jurisdiction of rank and department rather than the "red tape" of bureaucratic administrations which the National Socialists resent is only too obvious when one considers the charismatic efforts of party organizers in building up machines.

There is more elaborate control of visitors in party buildings than there is in ordinary government offices. The stratification of the party according to seniority of membership is carefully documented and filed. Other things being equal, the "old fighter" successfully claims legal privileges and social honors which are inaccessible to younger party members, to say nothing of nonparty members.<sup>41</sup> The stormtroopers indicate seniority status by special silver stripes, while the party badge of the "old fighter" is a golden circle. The designation of rank and membership in the many party affiliations through innumerable symbols of the uniformed staffs fills many pages of the *Handbook of Party Organization*, the manual edited for the exclusive use of the party bureaucracies. Every organizer has available com-

<sup>40</sup> Dr. Ley is in charge of the Hauptschulungsamt der NSDAP. The editing of the often-quoted *Schulungsbrief* betrays a serious lack of statistical skill where it is essential for the management of the party. Since May, 1937, Friedrich Schmidt, formerly vice-*Gauleiter* of Württemberg-Hohenzollern, was intrusted by Dr. Ley with the executive office (cf. *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte*, May, 1937, p. 450). Dr. Ley's office tends to replace Alfred Rosenberg's office, for "the total intellectual and *weltanschauliche* education of the NSDAP." However, Rosenberg tries to establish new divisions and to expand his functions. The replacement of about 45 per cent of the university staff during six years of the regime, the shortening of studies, the laxity of examinations, and the party patronage made for an all-round shortage of trained experts (cf. Roland Freisler's demand for a thorough training of lawyers). At the same time Dr. Frank demands that a new type of *Rechtspfleger* without academic training be appointed for offices in the legal administration, just as practitioners without academic training are accepted in the medical profession (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 255, May 21, 1939).

<sup>41</sup> Cf., e.g., a decision in the minor case of an "old fighter" and Storm Troop commander who had failed to pay his motorcar tax. The court of appeals justified a "milder interpretation" on behalf of "honorable war services and personal merits for the National Socialist movement during its fight for power" (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, January 6, 1938).

prehensive membership files with personal records of ancestry, educational, vocational, and political background.

It is through magical and awe-inspiring performances that social distance against the outside world is secured. All the various organizations compete in creating "traditions." The Nazi salute is declared to be of "Teutonic" derivation. A conspicuous example are the guards, keeping "eternal watch" before all the major party buildings, where they stand immobile, with spread legs, perpetually at attention, with the stiff aimless look of the drilled soldier—the symbol of depersonalized bureaucratized force.<sup>42</sup>

#### ULTIMA RATIO

We have seen how the charismatic movement with its spontaneity and flexibility has been compelled, in the course of its conflict with its bureaucratized political rivals and the state bureaucracies, to yield to the necessities of far-reaching bureaucratization. The structure of the "inner circle" and the rapidity of the conquest of power made for the unplanned and substantially irrational character of the cumbersome bodies engulfing all phases of life. Competitive frictions among the inner circle are likely to turn into clashes between powerful organizations. In an autocratic regime negotiated compromises and ballots are impossible. Commands of leaders and obedience of followers determine the problems of social interaction. Co-ordination has to be secured by ultimate decisions, i.e., the commands of the leader, backed by force. Hitler, like every other dictator, has been compelled to organize special forces for this purpose.<sup>43</sup> Whereas during the first period of the movement terroristic actions had the spontaneous character of gang initiative, after the conquest of power the use of force was rationalized. The spying services and the terror campaigns were systematized, and the "irre-

<sup>42</sup> The elaborate party paraphernalia, the blood flag, the standards and banners, the *Mahnmal*, pagan rituals, cultistic party ceremonies at the Nuremberg Congress, the new vocabulary of the exegesis of the belief in "blood and soil" all fall under the same heading.

<sup>43</sup> The party tribunal, the *Uchla*, is one of the most powerful institutions of the party before which no party official can refuse to appear. Its control area is not even limited by the German frontiers.

sponsible actions of subordinate organs" were controlled.<sup>44</sup> This process made for the rapid ascent of the secret police (Gestapo) and the Elite Guard, under the command of Heinrich Himmler, chief of all police forces.

The spontaneous denunciations of former or present alleged or actual enemies of the party and state, of "critics and grumblers," has been replaced by systematic spy organizations. The secretary of the Reich's press chamber in 1936 fixed a large notice on his office door: "Denouncers will be smacked in the face!" ("Denunzianten erhalten Ohrfeigen!"). The formerly officially encouraged wave of private denunciations has been replaced by more efficient control patterns. The inaccuracy and unreliability of denunciations emerging from the rumors which always thrive under dictatorships and the competition for favors of officials had by then become a public nuisance. The spy services under Himmler co-operate closely with the staff of *Das schwarze Korps*, the official organ of the Elite Guard, whose editor-in-chief, Gunter d'Alquen, is at the same time responsible for the home affairs section of the *Völkischer Beobachter*. The medieval pillory has been replaced by the weekly police gazette of a dictator's bodyguard, whose arbitrary actions spread terror indeed. Every issue of *Das schwarze Korps* contains numerous exposures, denunciations, and vilifications of individuals whose conformity still leaves something to be desired. These features account for the astonishing rise of its circulation figures to over 500,000 copies (beginning of 1939). It is perhaps the only Nazi paper which can occasionally allow itself to expose ruthless employers, even if they are party members. Gauleiter Streicher's notorious anti-Semitic *Stürmer* follows closely with about 475,000 copies. It frequently carries lists of names and addresses of individuals who fail to shun the Jews, or who still greet or speak to Jews, to say nothing of

<sup>44</sup> "I have 100,000 eyes in my territory to see that everything goes alright. I have 100,000 ears close to the bosom of the people. They report in the shortest time where disturbances and economic difficulties emerge, where food prices are unjust, where there is a shortage of food—in short where the people feel thwarted. With such an excellently functioning news service I am as *Gauleiter* in a position to provide for immediate adjustments" (Alfred Meyer, one of the eleven regents, on April 15, 1937, before the diplomatic corps and Rosenberg's foreign political club, *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte*, May, 1937, p. 450).



commercium and worse contaminations. The anti-Jewish riots of November, 1938, the swift efficiency in raiding synagogues, offices, business establishments, and homes of Jews revealed the increased rationalization of the terror as compared with the *Kurfürstendamm* raid in the summer of 1935.

In the preparation of such large-scale enterprises secrecy can be secured through the broadening of the definition of the "official secret" and the totalitarian control of all communication processes. The trend of this process of bureaucratization is ultimately determined by the necessity of the totalitarian preparation for war—especially in its economic aspect.<sup>45</sup> The direction of its expansion depends rather on considerations of economic and military strategy than on the Nazi ideology. The fusion of charismatic domination and totalitarian bureaucratization allows for surprise moves which are either enthusiastically hailed or grumblingly accepted as *faits accomplis* by the unaware inside and outside Germany. It has allowed for the peaceful conquest of Austria, the Sudetenland, Bohemia-Moravia, and Memelland. As long as the leader is successful, the belief of broad masses of followers in his charisma is not likely to be shattered. They will continue to act in accordance with the slogan: "Leader, command; we follow."

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<sup>45</sup> "Die Veralltäglicung des Charisma ist in sehr wesentlicher Hinsicht identisch mit Anpassung an die Bedingungen der Wirtschaft als der kontinuierlich wirkenden Alltagsmacht. Die Wirtschaft ist dabei führend, nicht gefuehrt" (Weber, *op. cit.*, I, 148).

## SOCIAL ROLE AND PERSONAL SECURITY IN MORMON POLYGAMY<sup>1</sup>

J. E. HULETT, JR.

### ABSTRACT

Mormonism drew the bulk of its adult members in the early days from monogamous societies as proselytes. Those who married into polygamy were presented with no well-defined role to fill. Because of this and their monogamous backgrounds they found it difficult to achieve satisfactory marriage adjustment in the polygamous family and consequently experienced thwarting and insecurity. By analyzing the role of plural wife it is shown that Mormon society contained devices both within and outside the family organization that mitigated this insecurity: the chance of attaining celestial security, economic and social prestige in the community, control of her own house and children, and the attention of the husband. Insecurity was produced by the counterparts of these devices: the patriarchal family system, loss or threatened loss of economic security, the advent of a younger wife into the family, and loss of the husband's attention for other reasons.

The members of the Mormon group during the period of polygamy were born into and usually matured in societies where the monogamous pattern of marriage was insisted upon or tended to acquire much of the culture of these societies from their parents, neighbors, "gentile" missionaries, and others. Those who married in polygamy generally found their original monogamous pattern of marriage roles unsatisfactory in the new polygamous milieu and thus were constantly thwarted in their efforts to achieve a satisfactory functional relationship, or role, with respect to the members of the new type of family group.

Polygamy reached its peak and began to decline within a space of fifty years after its origin.<sup>2</sup> It was never adopted by all Mormons who were eligible. Moreover, it was heartily condemned outside Utah and was also opposed by all non-Mormons and a few Mormons inside. Because of these and some other factors there is reason for

<sup>1</sup> This research was made possible by the author's appointment from 1936 to 1938 as research assistant to Professor Kimball Young at the University of Wisconsin.

<sup>2</sup> The Revelation establishing polygamy was received by the prophet Joseph Smith in 1843. It remained the only official pronouncement from God on the subject, and the members of the church were more or less left to work out the details for themselves. For the text of the Revelation see *The Doctrine and Covenants of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints* (Salt Lake City, 1883), sec. 132.

saying that it never became a well-integrated culture pattern of marriage. Consequently, the roles and statuses of the members of the polygamous family were never established as definitely as they were for monogamy. The practice of polygamy was unstandardized in nearly all its aspects, and it is very difficult to set up an ideal pattern even for methodological purposes, because nearly every case varied widely from every other case, in physical equipment and management as well as in behavior. It is possible, however, to present in outline some elements of the role of the polygamous wife.

#### I. SECURITY-GIVING ELEMENTS IN POLYGAMOUS SOCIETY

The conventional role of wife which a woman expected to fill in the monogamous patriarchal family pattern of the period was of course considerably modified when she entered Mormon society. In monogamy or polygamy among the Mormons the female was subject to the more or less arbitrary rule of her husband who was the priest of the family as well as the patriarch. The Mormon fundamentalist emphasis upon the necessity for salvation and the acceptance of this view by the convert more or less fixed the ultimate basis of the woman's status in the society. Since it was only through her husband that she could achieve this superior value of salvation, in a sense she had no security at all unless she fitted into the patriarchal ecclesiastical pattern.

The security afforded her within this pattern was considerable, however, and timeless, because of the Mormon system of celestial marriage. While it was true that a woman went to hell with her husband, she also went with him to whatever heights of glory he might attain in heaven. The measure of glory to be meted out to him was determined by his good works on earth and also by the number of his descendants. He became a god in the celestial world, ruler over a kingdom which had as subjects his wives, his children, and his children's children. To be a wife in a large family assured a larger measure of post-mortem glory and to produce many children added to that glory. There were thus many satisfactions afforded the wife in consequence of her husband's prestige in this world and the number of children she bore.

A number of devices were utilized both inside and outside the

polygamous family to compensate for frustrations arising in consequence of the wife's inability to assume her monogamously oriented role. Outside the family the Mormon woman had a greater opportunity for compensation for insecurity and frustration than did her "gentile" sister in the eastern states. Although she could never aspire to the power of the priesthood, the dominant religious association had a definite niche for her in its auxiliary organizations, such as the relief society, the primary, and the Sunday school. These organizations furnished opportunities for public service of a very satisfying sort to several of the polygamous wives concerned in this study. There is the case of a first wife whose son reported that she was a very public-spirited woman, the first president of the local relief society, and used to ride horseback all over the valley in this work. She received thereby the approbation of the whole community. Another first wife found her security threatened by her husband's marriage to a much younger woman and became intensely jealous. There is an almost certain connection between this event and the report of one of the children that she later began to spend too much time in social work and public affairs to give any attention to the family or the home.

In addition to the status afforded a woman in the church organization, some importance accrued to her in the wider community because of the suffrage, granted by the territorial legislature in 1870, the ability of a married woman to own and control separate property (since 1872), and a wide range of economic activities approved for her, such as dressmaking, teaching, telegraphy, clerking in stores, and independent farming. Each of these devices had its usefulness in making a wife less dependent upon her husband; whether she became involved in outside activity or not, there was always the opportunity to do so.<sup>3</sup> Polygamous wives occasionally completed their rejection of their husbands by achieving independence; the much younger wife mentioned above never attained any real security in the attentions of her husband, because of the first wife's jealousy, but she was able to support herself and her children by teaching, sewing, and operating the telegraph for the railroad; finally, after fifteen years of marriage, she left the community and with the help of her brothers

<sup>3</sup> See Susa Young Gates, *The Life Story of Brigham Young* (New York, 1930), chap. xxv, for the leader's radical views on the independence of women.

bought a dairy farm which made her a good living. In a similar situation another woman, whose generally ineffectual husband married a second wife, worked as clerk in the store and owned her farm which she operated with the help of her sons. Although the second wife in this case received all the husband's attention, the first wife got satisfaction out of helping to support her, thus emphasizing her dependence.

In the more usual situation the wife could follow some economic pursuit without detaching herself from the family. The fourth wife of a bishop had only two children but occupied a higher status in the family because her husband gave her a millinery shop. Her sister was the third wife and still resents this favoritism so much that she forgot to include her name in a list of the wives she gave to the writer, and later said of her: "She didn't have to milk cows like we did."

Control of certain parts of the family property was an important source of security for polygamous wives. Almost invariably one or more of the wives owned the home in which she and her children lived—a gift from her husband. The preferred situation was for all the wives in the family to own their homes, and failure of the husband to convey title was the occasion for notable conflicts in some cases. Husbands seemed to be aware of a certain risk in furthering their wives' independence in this manner, however, and some resisted the efforts of their wives and children to secure title. The resentful wife of the bishop mentioned above finally succeeded in acquiring title, but only after she enlisted the services of a business friend of her husband and asked him to make a "casual" inquiry into the status of the property. The husband answered the friend's question by saying that his wives had homes all right, but they weren't going to know about it as long as he lived. "They weren't going to be able to tell him to git." It was unusual for a wife actually to invoke her ownership of the house to control her husband's behavior, however. Ownership was a reserve of power to be used only in extreme emergency. The third wife of another bishop felt that she deserved considerable credit for her restraint in not putting her aging and unreasonable husband out of the house. She said:

When he was getting old and about to die he began to get a lot of radical ideas about how children should act and when they should go to bed and a lot of other unreasonable things. I have known women who, when their husbands

would get cross and unreasonable, would say "You get out of this house. This is my house." But I didn't. He got unreasonable enough for me to talk up to him the first time a year or so before he died. But that was the only time I ever did.

There were various security-giving devices and practices operating within the various households of the family. In the first place, the plural wife's children and household affairs were under her own control in a way that was almost unique with polygamy. The father in such a family was required to divide his time among his wives and to devote much time to business or farming, and church activities, leaving the inner domestic affairs of the household, especially control of the children, largely under the direction of the wife. This is one of the influences which secured for a wife the almost exclusive allegiance of her children. Children's loyalty to their own mothers often transcended loyalty to father, "aunts," or the family group as such. Discipline, at least of the younger children, was often in the hands of the mothers, resulting occasionally in the father's abdication of his patriarchal authority. In one case, for example, the father produced a curious rationalization of his failure to retain control of the children:

He believed in the wives' doing what chastizing had to be done. If the wives did it, the children were around them all the time and they could be comforted and caressed afterwards by the one who had chastized them. But if he chastized the children and then was gone most of the time, the children would begin to brood over the punishment by the absent father and would grow to resent it.

A wife in another case described a similar situation as follows:

Brother Higgins was rarely home. He would come in at any hour and so we always kept something to eat handy. We were what they should have called "Minute Women." There was always something to take him away from home. I guess Mr. Higgins was home really only during the year and a half just before he died. That was the most I ever saw of him. The children never did feel at home around their father. They weren't really acquainted with him.

Another wife said of her husband: "He had no routine for staying with his wives. He just stayed where night overtook him. We learned to expect him when he showed up, and we never worried about him."

In the more usual case the husband was able to spend his time at home. He visited his wives in rotation, dividing his time into approximately equal intervals. In this situation there were a number

of highly approved means whereby a wife might attract his attention and gain greater security. One of these was the device of superior housekeeping and efficient personal service to him. The numerous instances of rivalry in housekeeping among polygamous wives suggests the importance of favorably impressing one's husband in this respect. In the most striking case of this sort the first wife set a fast pace by keeping everything in shining order and doing a great amount of work in the garden, dairy, and laundry. The second wife accepted the challenge but was unable to accomplish as much as her competitor. She was continually defeated and rationalized her failure by believing the first wife kept her house in unnecessarily good order and by convincing herself that she was an "artistic" and weaker individual while her adversary was a more "physical" type. The nature of this rivalry in housekeeping was given expression by the daughter of a third wife in another family who, after making the conventional statement that her father showed no partiality for any wife, said:

I believe father was a little prouder of mother because she was a better dresser than the others. Father liked to come to our place because of its homey atmosphere. If father wanted to get away from his worries he came to our house. If he wanted a good meal he came. I have seen him sit for hours in his chair at home leaning his head on his hand and not saying a word. And I guess he liked to come over for an evening with us girls.

It is undeniable that there was relatively intense status-seeking behavior among the wives in most of these families. For example, the wife's role of "helpmeet" in both monogamy and polygamy entails numerous acts of personal service for the husband such as sewing and laundering. In polygamy these duties were regarded as prerogatives symbolic of status about as often as they were regarded as onerous and thankless tasks, and often were cherished as such. To lose the privilege of serving the husband was a hard blow. In one case this privilege was about the only evidence of status possessed by the second wife, for various reasons that must be omitted here. Her daughter reported that her mother "was a very fine seamstress and always made father's shirts."

Father divided his time between the wives by two-week intervals. During his stay the wife he was staying with did all his washing and other services. I have seen my mother in tears because father didn't bring his laundry for her to do. She was so afraid she hadn't done it right last time.

Perhaps the most unusual technique for gaining status was found in the family of a prominent Saint who lived in Canada. In 1896 he married his fifth wife, an entrancing widow who had considerable money and who furnished her new husband with materials to use in building a modern house for her with inside plumbing and other conveniences. This fifth marriage was a blow to the first wife because among other things the husband took his Sunday clothes away from her place and began to take his baths in the new bathtub at the fifth wife's house and do his changing there.

In addition to the security-getting practices the use of which was approved by the society, there were, of course, a number of disapproved but widely used substitutive responses in the culture pattern as well. One of these was the use of sex and more intimate personal appeals for the attention of the husband. This secured for the wife more of the husband's time, more property, and better houses. The device with which the neglected wife might combat this behavior on the part of others was, of course, jealous behavior, which was highly disapproved in polygamy. This disapproval was diametrically opposed to her monogamously oriented role wherein she was freely permitted jealous behavior as a compensatory device. Jealousy was disruptive of plural marriage, one of the highest values in the culture, so the neglected wife was forced to suppress it under pain of incurring God's, or at least her husband's and the community's, displeasure. This valuable device for meeting threats to her ego had to be inhibited, if possible. In a great many cases, however, jealous behavior was the only status-protective device the wife knew, so it was often used in spite of the cultural prohibition. Two representative instances will show the technique.

In the first case the jealous wife was able to prevent her husband from giving attention to the other; she was also able publicly to humiliate the other on occasion. A daughter reported:

During the first ten years of the second marriage Isabel, the first wife, subjected Luella to "all sorts of humiliation. It got so that mother finally went into seclusion and stayed away from parties."

The two women were occasionally at parties together. If Luella appeared in a new dress, Isabel's comment would be along the line of how nice it was for Luella to have a husband who could buy new clothes for her.

One night there was a party in the community. It was father's night with



mother, and he told her he would take her to the party since she hadn't been out in about six weeks. So he got the sleigh and took her. Isabel found out about it, followed them to the party, and caused a scene and then took father home, leaving mother to get home the best way she could.

The second case illustrates another of these disapproved devices, namely, interference by an outsider in behalf of a wife. The jealousy thus aroused was suppressed in a way that indicates the wide disapproval of it. It is useful to note also the use of children and prospective children as a status-getting device.

Apparently Annie was quite secure in her status as first wife until Catherine's mother started her short-lived intrigue. Catherine was the second wife. Her mother was an ambitious woman and cherished the hope that Catherine would "come first" in her husband's affections. The hopes lay in the fact that Catherine was the youngest of the wives by a few years and so would possibly continue to bear children for a few years longer. In such a case the husband might have been expected to have a higher regard for her than for his other wives who had stopped having children.

But Catherine had only two children and then stopped, while Annie, the first wife, became pregnant again. Catherine's mother then tried to keep the husband away from Annie by giving big dinners during the times he was supposed to be spending with Annie, and having Catherine invite him over. The husband quite innocently accepted these invitations, and so was spending less time with Annie.

Annie began to grow jealous and "became fearful of marking the baby she was carrying" by her jealousy. She had no jealous outbreaks, but the husband noticed she was unhappy and asked her why, whereupon she told him what Catherine and her mother were doing. He then put a stop to these activities by asking Catherine to postpone her dinners until his regular times to stay with her.

These illustrations of course by no means exhaust the list of devices and techniques used by plural wives to protect their status, but may serve to indicate a few of those more generally used.

## II. ELEMENTS PRODUCING INSECURITY

In spite of the devices whereby the plural wife might gain and protect her status in the family, the family organization itself was such that she was rarely afforded unquestioned and unthreatened security. While the most potent threat came from other wives, there were yet other dangers. For example, there was a certain element of insecurity in her future after death, since, as noted above, her status in

the celestial kingdom depended upon that of her husband and she went to hell if he did. The church authorities occasionally put this danger into words to the effect that no wife should feel too secure but must bend her efforts to keep her husband in good standing with the church lest he apostatize, dragging his whole family down with him.

Moreover, the control achieved by various wives over their own affairs was mainly by sufferance and was liable to collapse in a crisis. In particular, the husband's authority in polygamy as well as in monogamy was bolstered by his control over the finances of the family, and the subservience of the wives was often proportional to their dependence upon him.<sup>4</sup> It was this dependence that produced the insecurity which inspired a surviving third wife to say:

As to my married life I just took it as it came. If somebody got something and I didn't get something as good, I didn't rave about it; I just took what my husband handed me. He did just that, too—just handed me orders to do things, and what money he wanted me to have. When a wife wanted money she had to go to him and talk plenty to get it. He provided pretty well, after the first six years. But up to that time he had put us on the farm with nothing. The other wives were the acknowledged wives, and I wasn't known at all.

Other wives made similar statements, such as "I always had to take what he gave me and shut up. Anyhow, she was the first wife and his first duty was to her. My husband had quite a responsibility. He done pretty good anyhow."

This economic dependence upon the husband was a potent source of frustration. Added to the immediate danger of financial distress there was a very real danger that the plural wife would be refused a share in the husband's estate because of the inheritance laws of the territory. Curiously, the territorial legislature never made specific provision for plural wives in the laws relating to wills, so that they depended upon gifts of property before their husbands died or upon provisions made by will. Obviously the most reliable way of achieving security was by a gift of property, and the plural wife who did not own her home was in an unenviable position of insecurity. This problem was expressed by a second wife who said:

<sup>4</sup> On the question of the relation of authority and dependence see Abraham Kardiner, "Cultural Restraints, Intrasocial Dependencies, and Hostilities," *Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work* (Chicago, 1937), pp. 98 ff.



I have no property whatever. This house I'm living in belonged to Annie, the first wife, and her daughters have fixed it so I can live here until I die. But it needs all kinds of repairing and I can't get around to do anything.

Yes, the first family got everything. When Annie died and I moved here to live with McGregor the property had already been all deeded away, and there wasn't anything left. No, we couldn't go to court for anything. We plural wives wasn't legal. Well, I could have gone to court to get something for my children, but there wasn't anything left to get. When McGregor died the first family had got everything fixed up.

Although the insecurity arising from economic practices was important, the wife's problems were not solved when she became financially independent. The role she expected to fill in marriage was a monogamous one, based on receiving the exclusive care and attention of her husband. If she was able to effect the compromise required in polygamy and share her husband, she still had not removed herself from the pattern of continual rivalry with other wives. The only device available for removing herself from this rivalry was to admit defeat and retreat from the contest—a thing few wives were willing to do.

Apparently many of the intrafamily devices, such as efficient housekeeping, services to the husband, and jealous behavior, which gained higher status for one wife might produce a correspondingly lower status for others.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, wives were threatened in other ways. Some were never able to gain security, while others found themselves displaced from their previous high status.

A young wife often had an obvious advantage, although her youth in itself was no guaranty of success. In one case the husband at the age of fifty took a seventeen-year-old girl as his second wife. This was in 1885; his first marriage had occurred thirty years before. The girl was considered an interloper by the first family, and she achieved no genuine status as a wife for fifteen years. Her youth was regarded as a definite threat to the security of the first wife, who made occasional verbal protests about the situation by saying to neighbors and to her children: "The very *idea* of an old man marrying such a young girl."

<sup>5</sup> The leaders adjured husbands to be "impartial," and many were; but for others a good case could be made for the statement that they too were filling monogamously oriented roles as husbands.

She often reminded herself that her husband "was 50 years old when his second wife was 17" and also made remarks to the effect that "it was too bad that an old man should be surrounded by a lot of young children." Agnes [the first wife] was in a situation that required a difficult ambivalent response. Jealousy had to be suppressed in order to protect the polygamous relation, but the security of her own role demanded jealous behavior. The result was a gradual rejection of her husband, and in later years he began to live entirely with the second wife, Cecelia, because (quoting Agnes' son) "he got along better with her children, and there were definite signs of an increasing incompatibility with Agnes that made things more pleasant for him at Cecelia's house."

The second wife's subservient position was made worse in the early years by her husband's behavior. While there seems to have been no especial need for it in this small Mormon community, in his public life he tried to give the appearance of having only one wife. The second found herself forced almost to retire from the competition during this time, but in a way she achieved final victory in that her husband lived entirely with her in the later period. Her daughter reported that "Mother right today says the greatest trial she was called upon to endure was that of not being publicly recognized as Mrs. Asa Jenson." When her husband went to church and to parties he and his first wife went in the buggy and if Cecelia went she walked. "But she possesses to this good day an abiding conviction of the sanctity of the Principle of Plural Marriage."

In another case the husband married a young woman because he wanted children. After twelve years, during which his wife had produced none, a stillborn child was born. Expecting her to have no more, he married again, after which his first wife produced four children, as did the second also.

As far as informant knew, his father never spent a night with the second wife, although he occasionally ate meals there. Here was a monogamous household with the second and younger wife as a sort of appendage. She was never able to achieve the status of wife in the family, and responded to her insecurity by mild retrogressive behavior. She was "a very frail woman, and lacked initiative." The informant reported that she "seemed to have an inferiority complex in some ways. Things were sometimes too big for her, like entertaining visitors, and going out in society."

The advent of a new wife thus had varying effects. Certainly it disturbed the pre-existing pattern of relationships, but the severity of the disturbance depended upon several factors. Some wives met the threat as did one first wife whose daughter reported that her father's second marriage

nearly killed mother. But she got over it in a fairly short time because of the Principle, and after that she didn't care how many women he married. In later years mother just closed right up. Father was a home missionary and could get acquainted with the girls in that way. He never consulted mother about marrying Julia or Effie, either. Mother knew he was doing a lot of sparking around, but she never said anything. I guess she had a broken heart, but it was suppressed.

In some families the wives effected a working arrangement that barred others that the husband might marry. This clique was of course calculated to preserve the *status quo*, to the discomfort of newcomers. An informant described such a situation in her father's family, saying:

I guess Emily, father's fourth wife, was disliked a little by all the others, especially mother. Emily got off on the wrong foot when she was first married by pretending to father that she had done a great deal of work around the house when she hadn't done so much. The other wives regarded her as naïve, and awfully young and simple. They also were a little sorry for Aunt Helen, father's fifth wife, because her children came along pretty fast and she was kept worn out by her work. Father imposed on her too. She had a son who had heart trouble, and she worked very hard caring for him.

The foregoing illustrations of ego-security problems in polygamy can be taken as representative, although in somewhat exaggerated form, of the types of adjustment difficulties met by polygamous wives. There is no intention to suggest that all polygamous wives were involved in conflict situations; for every case of conflict there were parallel cases where conflict was either absent or directed into less divergent channels.

The behavior described in the instances cited may be viewed as the responses to polygamy of women whose conceptions of their role as wife were built up in a monogamous pattern. Although our attention has been restricted to the role of wife, the roles of husband and child in the polygamous pattern could be treated similarly, with analogous results.

## EXTREME SOCIAL ISOLATION OF A CHILD<sup>1</sup>

KINGSLEY DAVIS

### ABSTRACT

A girl of more than five years was discovered incarcerated in an upstairs room. She had apparently been there since babyhood and was physically malnourished and apathetic as well as mentally blank. Taken first to a county home, then to a foster-home, and finally to a school for defective children, she improved very slowly. She is still a virtually unsocialized creature, manifesting many parallels with other cases of isolated children and bearing out the Cooley-Mead-Dewey-Faris theory of socialization.

The present paper, dealing with an incarcerated child, is of the nature of a progress report. The girl it describes is still under observation and is likely to remain so for many years. Hence the present results are necessarily inconclusive.

According to the *New York Times* for February 6, 1938, a girl of more than five years had been found "tied to an old chair in a storage room on the second floor" of a farm home seventeen miles from a small Pennsylvania city. The child, said the report, was wedged into the chair, which was tilted backwards to rest on a coal bucket, her spindly arms tied above her head. She was unable to talk or move. . . . "The child was dressed in a dirty shirt and napkin," the officer said. "Her hands, arms and legs were just bones, with skin drawn over them, so frail she couldn't use them. She never had enough nourishment. She never grew normally, and the chair on which she lay, half reclining and half sitting, was so small the child had to double her legs partly under her."

The reason for this situation was that the child, Anna,<sup>2</sup> was illegitimate. She was the second illegitimate child the mother had borne, and since the mother resided with her father and other relatives in the paternal homestead, she found her father so angry that he was averse even to seeing this second child. Hence she kept it in an out-of-the-way room.

Upon reading this report the writer and a student assistant, Richard G. Davis, went to see the child. Later, subsequent trips

<sup>1</sup> Condensed from a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society in Detroit, 1938.

<sup>2</sup> Out of regard for the parties concerned, correct names of persons and places are not given.

were made, and between visits reports from various persons connected with the child were received by mail. Our records now seem reasonably complete and confirm the salient facts in the *Times* account.<sup>3</sup>

By the time we arrived on the scene, February 7, Anna had been in her new abode, the county home,<sup>4</sup> for only three days. But she was already beginning to change. When first brought to the county home she had been completely apathetic—had lain in a limp, supine position, immobile, expressionless, indifferent to everything. Her flaccid feet had fallen forward, making almost a straight line with the skeleton-like legs, indicating that the child had long lain on her back to the point of exhaustion and atrophy of her foot muscles. She was believed to be deaf and possibly blind. Her urine, according to the nurse, had been extremely concentrated and her stomach exceedingly bloated. It was thought that she had suffered at one time from rickets, though later medical opinion changed the diagnosis to simple malnutrition. Her blood count had been very low in haemoglobin. No sign of disease had been discovered.

Upon our arrival, three days after she was brought to the county home, most of these conditions still prevailed. But her stomach had retracted a little and she had become fairly active, being able to sit up (if placed in a sitting position) and to move her hands, arms, head, eyes, and mouth quite freely. These changes had resulted from a high vitamin diet, massage, and attention. In spite of her physical condition she had an attractive facial appearance, with no discernible stigmata. Her complexion, features, large blue eyes, and even teeth (in good shape though not quite normal in size) gave her a favorable appearance.

Since Anna turned her head slowly toward a loud-ticking clock held near her, we concluded that she could hear. Other attempts to

<sup>3</sup> It is doubtful that the child's hands at the time of discovery were tied. It is more likely that she was confined to her crib in the first period of life and at all times kept locked in her room to keep her from falling down the steep stairs leading immediately from the door and to keep the grandfather from seeing her. It is doubtful if the child was ever kept in the attic, as the report also stated.

<sup>4</sup> She remained in the home more than nine months, being removed on November 11 to a foster-home. The institution is primarily for the aged and infirm in the county where Anna lived, but contains cases of nearly all types.

make her notice sounds, such as clapping hands or speaking to her, elicited no response; yet when the door was opened suddenly she tended to look in that direction. Her feet were sensitive to touch. She exhibited the plantar, patellar, and pupillary reflexes. When sitting up she jounced rhythmically up and down on the bed—a recent habit of which she was very fond. Though her eyes surveyed the room, especially the ceiling, it was difficult to tell if she was looking at anything in particular. She neither smiled nor cried in our presence, and the only sound she made—a slight sucking intake of breath with the lips—occurred rarely. She did frown or scowl occasionally in response to no observable stimulus; otherwise she remained expressionless.

Next morning the child seemed more alert. She liked food and lay on her back to take it. She could not chew or drink from a cup but had to be fed from a bottle or spoon—this in spite of the fact that she could grasp and manipulate objects with her hands. Toward numerous toys given her by well-wishers all over the country she showed no reaction. They were simply objects to be handled in a distracted manner; there was no element of play. She liked having her hair combed. When physically restrained she exhibited considerable temper. She did not smile except when coaxed and did not cry.

She had thus made some progress during her three days in the county home. Subsequently her progress in the home was slower. But before dealing with her later history, let us first review more completely the background facts in the case.

Anna was born March 6, 1932, in a private nurse's home. Shortly thereafter she was taken to a children's home. For a time she was boarded with a practical nurse. To those who saw and cared for her, she seemed an entirely normal baby—indeed, a beautiful child, as more than one witness has asserted. At the age of six to ten months she was taken back to her mother's home because no outside agency wished the financial responsibility of caring for her. In her mother's home she was perpetually confined in one room, and here she soon began to suffer from malnutrition, living solely on a diet of milk and getting no sunshine. She developed impetigo. The doctor, according to the mother, prescribed some external medicine which made the



child "look like a nigger," and which the mother ceased to use for that reason. The mother,<sup>5</sup> a large woman of twenty-seven, alleges that she tried to get the child welfare agency to take Anna, but that she was refused for financial reasons. The mother, resenting the trouble which Anna's presence caused her and wanting to get rid of the girl, paid little attention to her. She apparently did nothing but feed the child, not taking the trouble to bathe, train, supervise, or caress her. Though she denies tying the child at any time, it is perhaps true that the child was restrained in some way (by tying, confining in a crib, or otherwise) and gradually, as her physical condition became worse, due to confinement and poor diet, became so apathetic that she could be safely left unrestrained without danger of moving from her chair. Anna's brother, the first illegitimate child, seems to have ignored her except to mistreat her occasionally.

The bedroom in which Anna was confined was reported to have been extraordinarily dirty and contained a double bed on which the mother and son slept while Anna reclined in a broken chair. The mother carried up and fed to Anna huge quantities of milk. Toward Anna's fifth birthday the mother, apparently on advice, began feeding her thin oatmeal with a spoon, but Anna never learned to eat solid food.

Anna's social contacts with others were then at a minimum. What few she did have were of a perfunctory or openly antagonistic kind, allowing no opportunity for *Gemeinschaft* to develop. She affords therefore an excellent subject for studying the effects of extreme social isolation.

Ten days after our first visit Anna showed some improvement. She was more alert, had more ability to fix her attention, had more expression, handled herself better, looked healthier. Moreover, she

<sup>5</sup> The mother was reported to have the mentality of a child of ten. We did not interview the persons who gave the intelligence test but did interview the mother herself. She seems probably subnormal, and this is the opinion of most people who know her. But it is doubtful if her status is any lower than that of a high-grade moron, and she may be merely a dull normal.

Anna's father, according to one story, is a wealthy farmer living in the same rural section as the mother, distantly kin to her. Another story has it, however, that a syphilitic married man in the near-by town is the father.

had found her tongue—in a physical sense. Whereas it had formerly lain inactive back in her mouth, she now stuck it out frequently and with enjoyment. She showed taste discrimination, for she now resisted taking cod-liver oil, which she had previously not distinguished from milk. She was beginning, in fact, to dislike any new type of food. Visual discrimination was attested by the fact that she apparently preferred a green pencil to a yellow one. She smiled more often, regularly followed with her eye the movements of the two other small children temporarily quartered in her room, and handled her toys in a more definite fashion. She could sit up better and, while lying down, could raise her head from the pillow. She liked now to sit on the edge of the bed and dangle her feet. The doctor claimed that she had a new trick every day.

She had not, however, learned any way to seek attention, to manifest wants, to chew, or to control her elimination. Only one sociable stunt had she begun to learn—rubbing foreheads with the nurse, a sport of which she later became very fond. On the other hand, her ritualistic hand play, a noticeable trait at this time, was entirely asocial.<sup>6</sup>

On this second visit we took along a clinical psychologist, Edward Carr. He began by checking the reflexes, finding none that were defective. He then gave Anna a three-figure form board test used in the Form L Revision of the Stanford-Binet. Anna was unable to place the blocks in the appropriately shaped holes, though apparently by chance she did once place the round piece satisfactorily. She more readily removed the blocks from the board and played with them idly for a time. When Mr. Carr first attempted by pantomime to get her to place the blocks, she seemed to concentrate, but only momentarily; and this concentration, so limited in results, apparently tired her too greatly for further efforts.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> She would hold one hand in front of her with the little finger pressed against the palm, the other three fingers close together and straight out, and would then manipulate the hand shaped in this way close to her eyes. Often when doing this she would hold a finger of her other hand in her ear. These actions gave her an idiotic appearance. She showed more skill in bending the fingers than any of us could exhibit.

<sup>7</sup> Mr. Carr, who represented the Psycho-educational Clinic at Pennsylvania State College, found that Anna showed accommodation for both light and distance, that she winked when a pencil was suddenly shoved toward her eyes and when a tumbler

The next visit, on March 22, revealed little change, except for slight physical improvement. She could lift her hips from the bed; the nurse had induced her to laugh outright by tickling her and laughing uproariously herself; and the nurse believed that Anna recognized her. The doctor had changed his early optimistic opinion; he now believed the child was congenitally deficient.

After another month Anna was five pounds heavier, more energetic, given to laughing a good deal, and credited with having made a sound like "da." But that was all.

On June 9, another month later, she had scarcely improved in any respect. When tested by the writer according to the items of the Gesell schedule, she seemed to rank with a one-year-old or better in motor activities involving hands and eyes. But with regard to linguistic and purposive behavior, she lagged behind. If any estimate were made, it could be said that she definitely ranked below the one-year-old child.

By August 12 she was still improving physically. Her legs had calves in them, and she liked to exhibit her strength in roughhousing. She would laugh heartily, often make a "tsha-tsha-tsha" sound with her lips, once or twice making a verbal type of sound, though meaningless. When held by someone, she could "walk" by putting one foot in front of the other in ostentatious steps. Her interest in other persons had become more obvious, her responses more definite and discriminating.<sup>8</sup>

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was struck with a spoon just behind her ear, and that the patellar and plantar reflexes were present. It being impossible to administer any standardized tests involving language, he examined her with reference to the motor-behavior items in Gesell's developmental scale. The items passed included the following: resisting head pressure (appears normally at four months), lifting head while in prone position (six months), sitting up (nine months), clasping cubes (six months), picking up cube (six months), scribbling (eighteen months—but this "scribbling" appeared to us to be an accident).

<sup>8</sup> Anna had for weeks been without any playmates in her room. As a test a little boy (age five) was brought in. We all left the room and peered back. Anna took a definite interest in him. She tried her trick of looking hard into his eyes and moving her head near his to rub foreheads. She clapped her hands, manifesting more interest in him than he in her.

The nurse said that Anna had played with kittens a few days previously by swinging them by their tails. We secured two kittens and put them on her bed. This time she

Until removed from the county home on November 11, there were few additional changes. By this time she could barely stand while holding to something. When put on a carpet she could scoot but not crawl. She visibly liked people, as manifested by smiling, rough-housing, and hair-pulling. But she was still an unsocialized individual, for she had learned practically nothing.

If we ask why she had learned so little—not even to chew or drink from a glass—in nine months, the answer probably lies in the long previous isolation and in the conditions at the county home. At the latter institution she was early deprived of her two little roommates and was left alone. In the entire establishment there was only one nurse, who had three hundred and twenty-four other inmates to look after. Most of Anna's care was turned over to adult inmates, many of whom were mentally deficient and scarcely able to speak themselves. Part of the time Anna's door was shut. In addition to this continued isolation, Anna was given no stimulus to learning. She was fed, clothed, and cleaned without having to turn a hand in her own behalf. She was never disciplined or rewarded, because nobody had the time for the tedious task. All benefits were for her in the nature of things and therefore not rewards. Thus she remained in much the same animal-like stage, except that she did not have the animal's inherently organized structure, and hence remained in a more passive, inadequate state.

On our visit of December 6 a surprise awaited us, for Anna had undergone what was for her a remarkable transformation—she had begun to learn. Not that she could speak, but she could do several things formerly considered impossible. She could descend the stairs (by sitting successively on each one), could hold a doughnut in her

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became paralyzed with fright. She made little noise, except a stifled yell once or twice, and she made no effort to get away or push the kittens off.

This paralyzed type of reaction was characteristic. Initiative seemed virtually impossible for her. A temper tantrum previously exhibited had this character. She waved her head from side to side and flipped her hands up and down—a nervous, futile sort of tantrum behavior. It was as if she had no channels of expression or action, no mode of dealing with the environment.

As soon as the kittens were out of sight she forgot about them, but the fright returned whenever they were placed in her presence. During her fright she broke into the first crying spell the writer had witnessed. It was a real child's cry.

hand and eat it (munching like a normal child), could grasp a glass of tomato juice and drink it by herself, could take a step or two while holding to something, and could feed herself with a spoon. These accomplishments, small indeed for a child of seven, represented a transformation explainable, no doubt, by her transference from the county home to a private family where she was the sole object of one woman's assiduous care.

Anna had been in the foster-home less than a month, but the results were plain to see. Her new guardian was using the same common-sense methods by which mothers from time immemorial have socialized their infants—unremitting attention, repetitive correction, and countless small rewards and punishments, mixed always with sympathetic interest and hovering physical presence. These Anna was getting for the first time in her life.

One thing seemed noticeable. Anna was more like a one-year-old baby than she had been before. She was responsive in the untutored, random, energetic way of a baby. When one beckoned and called her, she would make an effort to come, smiling and going through excited extra motions.

A month later more improvement along the same lines was noted. Though grave limitations remained, Anna was definitely becoming more of a human being.

Still later, on March 19, 1939, her accomplishments were the following: she was able to walk alone for a few steps without falling; she was responsive to the verbal commands of her foster-mother, seeming to understand in a vague sort of way what the latter wanted her to do; she definitely recognized the social worker who took her weekly to the doctor and who therefore symbolized to her the pleasure of an automobile ride; she expressed by anxious bodily movements her desire to go out for a ride; she seemed unmistakably to seek and to like attention, though she did not sulk when left alone; she was able to push a doll carriage in front of her and to show some skill in manipulating it. She was, furthermore, much improved physically, being almost fat, with chubby arms and legs and having more energy and alertness. On the visit prior to this one she had shown that she could quickly find and eat candy which she saw placed behind a pillow, could perform a knee-bending exercise, could use ordinary

utensils in eating (e.g., could convey liquid to her mouth in a spoon), could manifest a sense of neatness (by putting bread back on a plate after taking a bite from it). Limitations still remaining, however, were as follows: she said nothing—could not even be taught to say “bye-bye”; she had to be watched to tell when elimination was imminent; she hardly played when alone; she had little curiosity, little initiative; it seemed still impossible to establish any communicative contact with her.

On August 30, 1939, Anna was taken from the foster-home and moved to a small school for defective children. Observations made at this time showed her to have become a fat girl twenty pounds overweight for her age. Yet she could walk better and could almost run. Her toilet habits showed that she understood the whole procedure. She manifested an obvious comprehension of many verbal instructions, though she could not speak.

Comparison of Anna with other cases of isolated children reveals several interesting parallels, both in their histories and in the interpretation of them. First of all, we note the almost universal failure to learn to talk with any facility, and hence the failure to master much of the cultural heritage. Second, we note the nearly universal presence of sensory abnormalities. Finally, we note, and also question, the usual interpretation of these recurrent facts—namely, that they are due to congenital feeble-mindedness.

Though Anna at present cannot speak, she is not an unusual member of her peculiar class. The feral child, Kamala, found at the age of eight, was able to utter only forty words after six years of tutoring,<sup>9</sup> and somewhat similar slowness is encountered in other cases.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> P. C. Squires, “‘Wolf Children’ of India,” *American Journal of Psychology*, XXXVIII (1927), 313-15.

<sup>10</sup> Sanichar, found at about the age of seven, could not speak even as a grown man. He merely uttered incomprehensible sounds (G. C. Ferris, *Sanichar, the Wolf-Boy of India* [New York: Published by the Author, 1902], pp. 31-33). The girl of Songi, discovered at about ten years of age, learned after several years to speak, but apparently not very well (Madam Hecquet, *The History of a Savage Girl* [London: Dursley, Davison, Mauser, Bland, & Jones], pp. 23, 34-35, and 61-63). Caspar Hauser, who might seem an exception to the rule, actually remained, to the last, awkward in language (Anselm von Feuerbach, *Caspar Hauser*, trans. from German [2d ed.; Boston: Allen & Ticknor, 1833], I, 54). His case is not clear, however, for it appears he could pronounce some words when first discovered (*ibid.*, pp. 4-5). Other instances of speech difficulties seem as numerous as the cases of isolated children, though the evidence is scanty and dubious.

Inability to walk or run and pronounced peculiarities of gait are also exceedingly characteristic; and some sort of abnormality of the senses, either as acuteness or dulness, appears in nearly every instance.<sup>11</sup>

In view of these similarities it is not surprising that a standard interpretation has been applied to practically every case—namely, that the child was innately feeble-minded. Pinel declared the Wild Boy of Aveyron to be a fake as to wildness and an incurable idiot as to mentality, and Itard, after five years of exasperating effort, ultimately admitted that the boy may have been mentally deficient from the start, though he still attributed great importance to his long isolation.<sup>12</sup> Popular interest in feeble-mindedness and in biological determinism led to general agreement with Pinel's verdict. But recently scientific opinion has been changing. F. S. Freeman, an authority on individual differences, believes that the Aveyron boy's stupidity was due to his long period of social isolation.

Even if it is granted that the boy was quite dull to begin with, it should have been possible to achieve much more with him than was the case, unless one allows for the peculiar conditions under which he lived, and for the "fixing" process resulting from these conditions. . . . Itard's reports present the case of an individual whose early life so shaped his behavior and fixed his abilities that even five years of painstaking, devoted, and intelligent instruction were inadequate to produce the mental manifestations of even a low-grade moron.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Kamala possessed extremely acute hearing when discovered and an animal-like sense of smell. She could smell meat at a great distance. After six years in civilization she could still see better at night than in the daytime (Squires, *op. cit.*). Sanichar's sense of hearing seemed practically destroyed (Ferris, *op. cit.*, p. 28). The senses of the boy of Aveyron "were extraordinarily apathetic. His nostrils were filled with snuff without making him sneeze. He picked up potatoes from boiling water. A pistol fired near him provoked hardly any response though the sound of cracking a walnut caused him to turn round" (J. M. G. Itard, *The Wild Boy of Aveyron*, trans. with Introd. by George Humphrey [New York and London, 1932]). The resemblance to Anna is obvious. Months after Anna had been in the county home we blew up a paper bag, exploded it suddenly behind her head, and found that she winced a bit, but did not really mind a loud sound next to her ear. This in spite of the fact that nothing seemed wrong with her hearing apparatus. Like many isolated children, she was fond of music. The conclusion seems inescapable that her deafness was functional, not organic, just as that of the boy of Aveyron. Caspar Hauser's senses "appeared at first to be in a state of torpor, and only gradually to open to the perception of external objects." Yet he had an extraordinary ability to see in the dark (Feuerbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 26 and 166-67).

<sup>12</sup> Itard, *op. cit.*, pp. vii and 99-101.

<sup>13</sup> *Individual Differences* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1934), p. 117.

Similarly, W. N. Kellog argues for the innate normality of this and other feral children. He assumes that they probably possessed an entirely normal equipment—otherwise survival in a harsh environment would have been impossible. They developed responses suitable to their surroundings. Hence their subsequent inability to learn is attributable to the difficulty of uprooting fundamental, basically entrenched habits formed by earlier experience.<sup>14</sup>

There is one actual case in which the hypothesis was disproved. This was the case of Edith Riley, who, after incarceration in a closet for some years, was said at twelve to be feeble-minded. She recovered complete normality within two years.<sup>15</sup>

#### CONCLUSIONS

1. Comparing Anna with other isolated children, bearing in mind that she seemed normal in infancy, and noting her progress to date, one can maintain that though she is still at the idiot level in mentality this fact is largely the result of social isolation.

2. But if the striking parallel with other known cases diminishes the probability of congenital deficiency, it also diminishes the chance of a favorable outcome, for it seems almost impossible for any child to learn to speak, think, and act like a normal person after a long period of early isolation. Yet Anna is in one respect a marginal case: she was discovered before she had reached six years of age. This is young enough to allow for some plasticity. In fact, she has made a good many adjustments.

<sup>14</sup> This agrees with the general opinion concerning the importance of the early years in development. "A large percentage of children previously diagnosed as feeble-minded have been proven to be sound in all respects except in . . . acquired reactions. If discovered at an early age the 'inherited' deficiencies of these individuals have been satisfactorily corrected through specialized education, although this has not been possible if they have persisted too long in their original habits" ("Humanizing the Ape," *Psychological Review*, XXXVIII [1931], 160-76). Similar arguments are contained in Humphrey's Introduction to Itard's work (*op. cit.*), pp. x-xi.

<sup>15</sup> *New York Times*, November 17, 1931, sec. 4, p. 6, and December 24, 1931, sec. 12, p. 1; *New York Daily Mirror*, magazine section, March 27, 1938, p. 6. This is an interesting case, differing from most of the others in that the child was incarcerated at the late age of eight. She lost the capacity for speech and vision. But since she had once acquired these abilities, she recovered them again fairly rapidly.



3. The comparative facts seem to indicate that the stages of socialization are to some extent necessarily related to the stages of organic development. If the delicate, complex, and logically prior stages of socialization are not acquired when the organism is plastic, they will never be acquired and the later stages never achieved (except crudely).

4. Anna's history, like others, seems to demonstrate the Cooley-Mead-Dewey-Faris theory of personality—namely, that human nature is determined by the child's communicative social contacts as much as by his organic equipment and that the system of communicative symbols is a highly complex business acquired early in life as the result of long and intimate training. It is not enough that other persons be merely present; these others must have an intimate, primary-group relationship with the child.

5. Other than this, however, the theories of socialization are generally neither wrong nor right with respect to Anna, but simply inapplicable. The psychoanalytic theory, in so far as it assumes certain wishes as given inherently in the organism and responsible for a series of subsequent developmental states, seems wrong; but in so far as it talks in terms of dynamic mechanisms, such as conflict and anxiety, it simply does not apply—because such mechanisms assume that socialization has already begun; that the initial stages have been traversed. The latter characteristic seems indeed true of most theories of socialization. The central problem of how the organism first acquires a self, first begins the communicative process, is skipped and taken for granted, the theory going on from this point.

## A RESEARCH NOTE ON INCEST

SVEND RIEMER

### ABSTRACT

Incest occurs not infrequently in Sweden among agricultural laborers of low cultural standard and within a similarly disorganized group of industrial laborers. A sociological investigation into the causes of violation of the usually very stringent incest taboo reveals the importance of the typical life-history in these social strata, showing a unique configuration of circumstances. Home is usually left at a very early age; broken homes, psychological tension between the parents, and frequency of child labor tend to minimize the educational influences. The occupational life shows a frequency of change of jobs and even occupations. A declining trend in the occupational career will be observed at the inception of incestuous behavior. Sometime before the beginning of the incestuous relationship between father and daughter the routine of everyday life suffers an interruption from such a cause as accident, economic trouble, or disease. In almost all cases of father-daughter-incest—by far the most frequent type—the father suffers extreme sexual frustration, having been refused sexual intercourse with his wife. These different instances of the life-history have to be integrated into a comprehensive conception of the social attitudes of the patient. Thus, incest is regarded as due to indifference toward social responsibilities and coinciding with an extreme frustration of the sexual drive.

In Sweden every year about thirty cases of incest come to the attention of and are dealt with by the criminal courts. This is a surprisingly low number in proportion to the total population of the country (some six millions). Obviously, however, incest must be assumed to occur much more frequently than the statistics indicate. There is a great likelihood that the crime might be concealed even from the closest relatives. In fact, usually only the persons involved—father and daughter, brother and sister, etc.—would be likely to know anything about the incestuous relationship. The authorities are informed only when childbirth rouses suspicion, in cases of accidental discovery, or when antagonisms within the family go so far as to break down its protective solidarity against interference from outside institutions (Table 1). There is no doubt that incest, especially father-daughter incest, is very widespread within certain strata of Swedish society, namely, among agricultural laborers of a low cultural standard in districts of large estate farming and within a similarly disorganized group of industrial laborers.

An investigation was carried out in Sweden both from the sociological and from the psychiatric point of view, with an end to discover and analyze the causes for breach of the usually very stringent incest taboo.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The research was carried out in "Rättspsykiatriska Kliniken," Långholmen, head doctor, Professor Olof Kinberg. Professor Kinberg is investigating this problem from the psychiatric point of view.

The social aspects of this research are to be presented here. The basic material was obtained from one hundred intensive case studies. Practically every case of incest in Sweden is, before trial, sent to a psychiatric hospital for a two months' observation and careful investigation. The resulting case studies furnish research material which is particularly useful because the psychiatric interviews reveal significant details about the social environment in which this crime most frequently occurs.

Although the occupational and social backgrounds of incest in Sweden definitely point toward a very limited milieu, it would be misleading to

TABLE 1\*  
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO KNOWLEDGE OF INCEST AND  
SUBSEQUENT COMMITMENT IN 98 CASES OF  
FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST

	No. of Cases
Daughter pregnant . . . . .	12
Rumor among the neighbors . . . . .	10
Interference of mother . . . . .	14
Interference of daughter . . . . .	2
Interference of other members of the family . . . . .	2
Interference of the daughter's fiancé . . . . .	1
Interference of the sister . . . . .	3
At a police hearing . . . . .	4
At a medical investigation . . . . .	4
At the occasion of wife-beating in the family . . . . .	1
Circumstances unknown . . . . .	5

\* Only those circumstances have been accounted for that have been explicitly mentioned in connection with the commitment. The daughter is pregnant in many more cases than mentioned above.

look for a direct connection between agricultural labor and incest. In Denmark incest occurs more frequently among the urban proletariat of Copenhagen, while a German investigation on the same crime contains many records of craftsmen in the small provincial towns of southern Germany.<sup>2</sup>

Dealing primarily with the most frequent type of incest (father-daughter), we have found that the life careers of the fathers involved reveal striking similarities. Moreover the life-careers contain peculiar features which definitely exclude the possibility that it might be the "normal" life-career in this environment which leads to incest in some cases and not in others. We are faced with a unique configuration of circum-

<sup>2</sup> Hans v. Hentig and Theodor Viernstein, *Untersuchungen über den Inzest* (Heidelberg: Karl Winter [Verl.], 1925).

stances, repeated monotonously from case to case and which integrate into every life-history. There can be no doubt as to the influence of this configuration upon the social attitudes of the individuals in question. Hence we may expect to derive an answer from the analysis of the life-career of the individuals involved (58 cases) to the question: What social circumstances allow disregard of the incest taboo?

TABLE 2\*

OCCUPATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN CHILDHOOD OF MEN SUBSEQUENTLY  
PARTICIPATING IN FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST

1. At age of nine years shepherd
2. At age of twelve years agricultural laborer
3. At age of nine years day laborer
4. Occupational work besides school work\*
5. At age of ten years help with agricultural labor
6. At age of ten years unskilled laborer
7. Help at father's farm; school neglected
8. At age of ten years farmhand
9. At age of eleven years work in printing industry
10. Works for living on a farm during school age
11. At age of twelve years self-sustaining
12. Contributes early to family income
13. Messenger boy in early childhood
14. At age of eleven years self-sustaining
15. At age of ten years working for a baker; later on in glass factory
16. At age of ten years farmhand with several peasants
17. At age of thirteen years lumberjack
18. At age of twelve years lumberjack
19. Shepherd in summertime during childhood
20. At age of twelve years self-sustaining as agricultural laborer
21. At age of eight years shepherd and agricultural laborer
22. Occupational work beside the school causes educational difficulties
23. Lumberjack at school age

\* Showing 23 out of 58 cases of occupational activities in early childhood.

The typical life-career of fathers who commit incest will be summarily described.

1. *Upbringing and education.*—Patients usually left home at a very early age (generally between ten and fifteen years) in order to make their own living. Parental influences are thus very slight, especially since home conditions are very unfavorable to close contacts with the parents. Some of the patients—illegitimate children—are brought up by the mother's parents until she marries, at which time she takes her offspring to live

with her husband. Divorce and separation occur. The home situation is, moreover, influenced by very unstable employment conditions in this environment, which might necessitate rearrangements of the educational background. Thus, very few of the patients are living at their parents' homes all the time before they start out for occupational life.

Primary school, in many cases a country school with children of all ages gathered in a single classroom, is attended by nearly all the patients; they frequently finish their formal schooling after but a few years of not too intensive education. The rigorous winters, the long distances from schools, combined with heavy farm work in the summer, often necessitate absence from school for days or even weeks.

The home atmosphere, moreover, is often characterized by alcoholism of the father and frequent quarreling between both parents.

2. *Occupational life.*—Occupations are almost exclusively restricted to the unskilled, heavy-labor class in agriculture and industry (Table 3). Characteristic is a very frequent change of jobs and even changes to different kinds of occupations. Many of these people change their jobs almost every year.

In the long run, the occupational career in this environment tends, at the time of best physical development, to lead up to relatively well-paid positions in industries that are widely scattered throughout the rural districts of Sweden. Sooner or later, however, when physical strength wanes, the individual will often return to agricultural pursuits. He has thus reached the stage in life where his career is definitely turning for the worse. Wages decline, and finally he has to sign a "statare" contract, which includes the labor of his wife (milking) and perhaps that of some of his children as well. This action promises wages in kind and thus reduces the free choice of consumption, to say nothing of the extremely low consumption standard, i.e., the actual poverty under which he is forced to live. There are no prospects. Living on the dole or being kept in the community's old people's homes is what he may expect.

The occupational career is, of course, not identical for all men who have forced their daughters into sexual relationship. Even an engineer (of the craftsman type), some industrial laborers, small independent farmers, and others are also included in our data. The frequent change of jobs and occupations, however, and the declining trend of the occupational career at a time when the incestuous relationship begins are in all cases extremely characteristic.

3. *Accidents and troubles disturbing everyday-life routine.*—It is remarkable that, several years before the beginning of the incestuous relationship, in nearly all life-careers the routine of everyday life seems to have

been interrupted, although this might have happened in very different ways. If we take into account accidents, diseases, and economic difficulties, there are very few cases which do not reveal one or the other of these interruptions, in most cases some years before the patient begins to make sexual advances toward his daughter (Table 4). The life-history shows, moreover, that these interruptions have been of considerable importance for the future career. Readjustment to the demands of everyday life seems to be difficult or impossible thereafter.

TABLE 3

OCCUPATION AT COMMITMENT OF MEN PARTICIPATING  
IN FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST

(Agricultural occupations; total, 20 cases)

4	farmhands	1	groom
5	agricultural laborers	7	farmers
3	tenant farmers		

(Nonagricultural occupations; total, 23 cases)

3	unskilled laborers	1	railway laborer
1	lumberjack	2	carpenters
1	unskilled forest patrol-	1	truck driver
	man	2	watchmen
2	mechanics	1	chimneysweep
1	electrician	1	tailor
1	stage hand	1	shoemaker
3	storage workers	1	fish merchant
1	blacksmith		

(Unemployed and disabled; total, 15 cases, of these  
most formerly employed in agriculture)

8	disabled	7	unemployed
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4. *Sexual experiences*.—Before marriage the young people of the social strata involved in our investigation live almost in a state of general promiscuity. They have sexual intercourse with one or more of the girls who are staying at the same farm or whom they get to know at dances or other entertainments. Relations of this kind may cease after the immediate desire has been satisfied, or they may continue until the individuals are separated by change of residence or by the choice of another partner. Marriage changes this pattern of sexual behavior radically. Sexual relations with others than husband or wife are very infrequent. The reason seems, however, not to be because of a strong attachment to a cer-

tain individual of the opposite sex. There are very few signs indicating experiences of romantic love. Rather, sexual intercourse as such seems to be of overwhelming importance, and the change from promiscuous to monogamous relations is better understood if marriage is looked upon

TABLE 4\*  
INTERRUPTION OF LIFE-CAREER OF FATHER BY  
DISEASE, ACCIDENTS, ETC.

	No. of Cases
Disease .....	13
Alcoholism interrupts the occupational career.....	7
Economic troubles.....	37
Nervous troubles and insanity.....	5
Periods of unemployment.....	13
Diminished occupational efficiency (physical or emotional deficiencies) .....	20
Accidents (of these more than one accident: 11 cases)	31

\* Only 6 of 58 cases show no symptoms of the above-mentioned kind. The symptoms, mentioned above, are overlapping in the individual cases.

more as a practical arrangement providing—besides other conveniences—the presence of one sexual partner (Table 5).

With almost no exceptions the patient, shortly before the incestuous relationship begins, finds himself barred from sexual intercourse with his

TABLE 5\*  
PREMARITAL CHILDBIRTH AND PREGNANCY

	No. of Cases
Child born before marriage.....	12
Child born, and pregnant with second child.....	3
More than one child born before marriage.....	3
Pregnant before marriage.....	16
Children under common housekeeping before marriage.....	2
No irregularities (explicitly stated).....	11

\* Illegitimate children have not been accounted for.

own wife. She may be temporarily absent from home (in hospital) or she may be incapacitated by numerous childbirths and from hard work on the farm and in the household. In connection with this a high-strung psychological tension arises among the members of the family. The man—if he has not been so before—develops into a wife-beater, who holds the ter-

rorized family under the influence of his unbalanced outbursts of temper; the wife nags the husband and thus hinders him from feeling at home with his own family circle. It is impossible to say whether the deterioration of the psychological relationship or that of the sexual relationship should be looked upon as the primary cause.

In this situation of extreme sexual frustration there seems to be no available outlet by choosing another sexual partner outside the family. The country population of Sweden lives a very isolated existence and there is usually very little social activity going on even between members of the same community. The dances function as a meeting place for

TABLE 6  
THE IMMEDIATE IMPULSE

	No. of Cases
Meeting in the open air . . . . .	9
Drunkenness . . . . .	6
Mother absent; together in bedroom . . . . .	15
Sudden impulse at night . . . . .	10
Father and daughter in the same bed for special reasons . . . . .	9
Accidental denudation . . . . .	4
Alone at home . . . . .	8
Father ill in bed . . . . .	2
Daughter comes with food to isolated work place . . .	4
Playing in bed . . . . .	1
Daughter comes home late . . . . .	1
Belief in its therapeutic effect upon father's disease . .	2

adolescent boys and girls, and a married man would scarcely dare enter sexual relations through that channel. A long period of monogamous living, moreover, seems to have destroyed the patterns of approaching the opposite sex (shyness).

5. *The final impulse*.—Linked up with the situation immediately leading up to sexual relations with a daughter are circumstances such as alcoholism, overcrowding of rooms, and the sharing of the same bed by persons of the opposite sex, which sometimes have been regarded as the deciding causes of incest (Table 6). These circumstances certainly give the final impulse which, however, comes into play only given the background of the preceding life-history. In more detail different situations could be mentioned which have a seducing influence: accidental sight or touch of the naked body, the daughter carrying food to the father who is working alone out in the woods, etc. Obviously it would be wrong to look upon these circumstances as "causes" or "motives" in themselves.



In the individual career, of course, deviations from the foregoing outline appear in one or another respect. As already mentioned, some occupations other than agricultural laborers are represented, but, on the whole, the lower occupational categories predominate.

As to the deviations from the typical life-career it might be noted that the lack of one of the foregoing instances sometimes is compensated for by a particularly extreme situation with respect to one of the other instances. A village shoemaker, crippled from birth, might be obliged to live an absolutely sedentary life, and the frequent exchange of jobs and of places of residence might be missing in his career. But a life-career without any prospects seems to be given here from the very beginning, since the occupation of a village shoemaker scarcely provides a living and it might only be intended to keep the individual busy and make it possible for him to add now and then a small amount to the wages of his wife or to the benefits paid by the community. It might be mentioned also that mental deficiencies can substitute for certain adverse environmental conditions. The son of a city craftsman might be induced to live an unstable life as a consequence of emotional adjustment difficulties, even though the educating forces of his home environment might work for a reverse attitude.

The life-career, of course, is not a social "cause" necessarily leading up to an incestuous relationship between father and daughter. Only the probability may be assumed that, given the foregoing configuration of events in a life-career, incest will be the consequence.

To furnish a full insight into the situation leading up to sexual approaches toward the daughter it is not enough to call attention only to the isolated instances so far considered in the individual life-career as such. They must also be integrated into a comprehensive conception of the social attitudes of the individual concerned.

No attitude has been revealed in any of the case studies which would indicate a special interest on the part of the father to have intercourse specifically with his own daughter. There is no special tension pointing in this direction. The daughter simply replaces the mother, and this becomes possible only under the strain of intense sexual desire combined with a number of environmental circumstances which tend to destroy social responsibility. Thus, the incestuous relationship must be looked upon primarily as a negative phenomenon.

The incest taboo is rooted in a system of complicated social restrictions. It had definite economic implications as far as the patriarchal family and the village organizations were concerned,<sup>3</sup> and in modern soci-

<sup>3</sup> See Lord Raglan, *Jocasta's Crime* (London: Methuen & Co., 1933), for a study of incest in primitive society.

ety it is supported also by insight into the importance of free and unhampered development of the child's personality. In the disorganized social groups within which incestuous relations arise in Sweden, the values mentioned above are disregarded as a consequence of the life-career. The family relationship does not seem to imply very much more than a relatively convenient arrangement to meet the most elementary demands of everyday life. Children are kept at home only until—at a very early age—they can make their own living. Thereafter the parents may not see them again. At the age of somewhat over forty years, when, on the average, sexual relations with the daughter begin, all social ambitions have been abandoned. The father is psychologically isolated at home. He lacks any privacy that might give him an opportunity to reorganize his life or at least to settle down to the given situation. Although occupational life is quite free from friction, the social contacts established with fellow-laborers are for the most part of a very superficial character and scarcely of constructive influence. As an outcome of these complex experiences the attitude toward social restrictions, especially as far as the family relations are concerned, is one of extreme indifference. The individuals do not care whether they commit a crime; they are even not aware of the fact that they do so when they approach their own daughter. Social obligations seem to be left outside the sphere of intimate family relationship.

The verbal rationalization of their behavior as furnished by the individuals themselves, of course, does not always immediately reflect the foregoing attitude. The subjective experience of "motivation" can be very different, ranging from "protest against society" to "romantic love." Some of them state: "After all I have been through, I just don't give a damn!"

Brought back to some kind of an organized social life, however, by the very imprisonment itself, in many cases it is not too difficult to re-establish the values which have been disturbed. The individual then might have great difficulty in understanding how he could have brought himself to have sexual relations with his own daughter. Where, however, an attempt is made to defend the action, an absurd mixture of surviving values of family solidarity and lack of responsibility is revealed. Sexual intercourse with one's own daughter is justified as being better than "frivolous relations with outsiders." It is mentioned that the daughter in any case would be pregnant very soon at her age; since the father would be the one to take care of her child, it might just as well be his own. There are some attempts to fight the father's "disease" by sexual intercourse with

the daughter, and all members of the family agree with this arrangement.<sup>4</sup>

The initiative in this type of incest is nearly always on the side of the father. The daughter is perhaps interested as long as she is not aware of the father's final intentions, but when he attempts to force her, she resists. By and large, however, she is too afraid of the father to scream or to ask her mother for protection. After the first coitus the relationship may develop in different ways. Tendencies on the part of the daughter to free herself and to find a sexual partner of her own age are the normal reactions. For some time, however, she may be prevented from this by all kinds of protective arrangements of the jealous father. There are several cases in which sexual relations between father and daughter developed into a marriage-like state, which lasted for a long time after the daughter's adolescence. She might even take the mother's place with respect to household duties and child care and thus stabilize her position.

The mother does not always fight the father-daughter relationship efficiently. She prefers to be left alone, but she is jealous. Very often, of course, she does not know what is going on. But sometimes she seems even to conceal facts from herself. In other cases it is the mother herself who communicates with the authorities when she finds out about the relationship.

A few words may be added about other types of incestuous relationships. Rather frequent is the incest between brother and sister. This relation, however, is of intermediate character only, arising from sexual experimentation in childhood or adolescence. It does not imply the dominance of one of the partners as in the father-daughter incest, and it is thus very often dissolved without serious damage to either partner. All other possible combinations of incestuous relationship are, however, extremely rare. It is of interest to mention the extremely rare occurrence of sexual relations between mother and son. The mother does not have the same domineering position in the family as the father. He is the one who makes the living and threatens the family by his superior strength. It may be of importance also that the mother even in this disorganized social environment establishes a close relationship with the individual child. This is one of the most important prerequisites for the development of an incest taboo.

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<sup>4</sup> A folk belief of indefinite origin is that sexual intercourse with a virgin has a therapeutic effect upon venereal disease in a male. Sometimes the belief is less specific; so that sexual intercourse with a young girl, not necessarily a virgin, is believed to be beneficial to "disease," not necessarily venereal.

# MEASUREMENT OF SOCIAL STATUS

LESLIE DAY ZELENY

## ABSTRACT

Social status, when defined as the degree of acceptance of a person by his associates in a particular group, exists in different amounts for different persons, and can be measured. To this end mathematical formulas for a social-status ratio and a social-status score are developed.

## I. SOCIAL-STATUS RATIO

Social status, when defined as the degree of acceptance of a person by his associates in a particular group, exists in different amounts for different persons, and can be measured. In the investigation here reported acceptance or rejection of individuals is dealt with only in relation to the roles of these individuals as classmates. If, therefore, the procedure followed in this paper were to be adapted to a different society in which individuals are accepted or rejected by one another in a variety of roles, a more elaborate technique would have to be devised.

To arrive at an equation for a social-status ratio let  $N$  equal the number of acceptances received by a person from the other members of a particular group;  $I$  stand for the average intensity<sup>1</sup> of the acceptances; and  $T$  equal the total possible number of acceptances which might be received; then:

$$\frac{N \times I}{T} = SR \text{ (social-status ratio).}^2 \quad (1)$$

<sup>1</sup> Intensity is computed as follows: one unit of intensity is counted for each acceptance and a second unit is counted for each choice. (See the Group Preference Record in Part III for usage in this study of the words "acceptance" and "choice.") Since each person in a community of groups is allowed only a few choices, one who receives a choice has a greater intensity of acceptance from that person than he has from one who does not give him a choice. Acceptances and choices are added and divided by the number of persons giving them; e.g., if four members of a group of five persons give the fifth person four acceptances and also four choices, the average intensity equals  $8/4$ , or 2.

It is possible to rank choices from 1 to 5; and with the use of a social distance test to find acceptance intensities from 1 to 5 and rejection intensities from (-1) to (-5). In the absence of any procedure for substantiating the reliability and validity of choice ranks, all five choices are given an equal weight. This represents a problem for further research.

<sup>2</sup> See Stuart C. Dodd, "A Tension Theory of Societal Action," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, IV (February, 1939), 56-77; J. L. Moreno, *Who Shall Survive?* (Washington: Nervous and Mental Diseases Publishing Co., 1934), p. 101; W. I. Newstetter and Others, *Group Adjustment: A Study in Experimental Sociology* (Cleveland: Western Reserve University, 1938).

The social-status ratio is the ratio of acceptances received (modified by intensity of acceptances) to the total possible acceptances which might be received. For example, when  $N = 4$ ,  $I = 2$ , and  $T = 4$ , the equation may be solved as follows:

$$\frac{4 \times 2}{4} = 2.0 \text{ (social-status ratio) .} \quad (1a)$$

Again, when  $N = 1$ ,  $I = 0.25$ , and  $T = 4$ , the equation is solved as follows:

$$\frac{1 \times .25}{4} = .0625 \text{ (social-status ratio) .} \quad (1b)$$

By including  $I$  (average intensity of acceptance) in the formula the writer believes allowance is made for varying degrees of acceptance such as a high rating given by a small number in the group or a low rating given by many, etc. At least, the degree of universality of acceptance is accounted for. Furthermore, the rating is always made with reference to a definite criterion or group. For example, in this study all ratings are made with reference to the role played in a class learning group (see Group Preference Record in Part III). In this manner a mathematical equation is used to indicate the degree of status attained by a person in a clearly defined group.

Experimental studies with many kinds of small groups can show the possible variabilities in social-status ratios.

## II. SOCIAL-STATUS SCORE

It is also possible to show the social position of a person in a community of groups by means of the social-status score. When  $A$  equals the algebraic sum of acceptances and rejections received by a person and  $C$  equals the number of choices received, then

$$A + C = SS \text{ (social-status score) .} \quad (2)$$

For example, person No. 1 (see Table 1) received seven acceptances, six rejections, and six choices; applying the formula, we have

$$1 + 6 = 7 \text{ (social-status score) .} \quad (2a)$$

In this manner the social-status scores of each member in a community of groups may be computed, tabulated (Table 1), and compared (Table 2).

The tabulation in Table 1 is for a community of six groups. Choices are

## SOCIAL-STATUS TABLE

\* Since this table is based on an actual survey, the report is slightly incomplete due to absences; the table shows how the situation can be handled under everyday conditions.

TABLE 2

ARRAY OF SOCIAL-STATUS SCORES IN A COMMUNITY  
OF 29 PERSONS IN 6 GROUPS

Persons*	Social-Status Scores		
18.....	24	} High social status	
19.....	23		
17.....	23		
20.....	22		
		← 1SD (+6.98)	
4.....	21	} "Normal" social status	
3.....	20		
7.....	19		
5.....	18		
23.....	18		
27.....	17		
13.....	17		
11.....	17		
8.....	17		
9.....	17		
10.....	17		
21.....	16		
16.....	15		
		← M = 14.3	
22.....	14	} "Normal" social status	
15.....	13		
12.....	13		
2.....	13		
6.....	12		
29.....	12		
1.....	7	} Low-social status*	
			← 1SD (-6.98)
14.....	6		
26.....	4		
24.....	3		
28.....	1		
25.....	-5		

\* Persons are same as on Table 1.

indicated by  $\dagger$ , acceptances by 1, rejections by  $-1$ , and attitudes of indifference by 0. This tabulation makes easy the counting of acceptances and choices for use in computing the social-status ratio and the social-status score.

Social-status scores may be arranged from high to low and a mean and standard deviation computed (see Table 2). Persons  $\pm 1SD$  from the mean may be considered to have "normal" social status; those more than 1SD above the mean relatively high social status; and, those more than 1SD below the mean relatively low social status.

### III. MEASURE OF SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE

The successful determination of social-status ratios and social-status scores is dependent upon a reliable and valid measure of acceptances and choices within a community of groups. This is to be found in an adaptation of the sociometric test, as follows:

#### GROUP PREFERENCE RECORD<sup>3</sup>

NAME.....GROUP NO.....DATE.....

On this sheet is a list of the names of all the members of the class. Will you please indicate how you feel about working with them in a class learning group. Those you choose may be assigned to your group later. The information you give will be treated confidentially and used only for the improvement of class groups and for scientific study.

*Instruction 1.*—Put a figure "1" to the left of the name of the person who is your first choice for membership in a class learning group of which you may be a member. Continue until you have made *five* choices in order from first choice to fifth choice. Put all answers to the *left* of the names.

*Instruction 2.*—To the right of each name indicate how you feel about having this person as a member of your class learning group. If you would like the person in your group encircle *L* for "like"; if you would dislike the person in your group encircle *D* for "dislike"; if you have no feeling one way or the other toward the person encircle *I* for "indifferent."

Remember, those you choose now may later be assigned to your class learning group.

Names	<sup>1</sup>	<sup>2</sup>
	First Five Choices	Feeling toward Each
JOHN DOE	.....	<i>L D I</i>
RAY ROE,	.....	<i>L D I</i>
ETC.		

<sup>3</sup> See Newstetter, *op. cit.*, p. 137.



Available data indicate that the Group Preference Record is a reliable and valid instrument for determining "acceptances" and "choices" that are the basis for determining social-status ratios and social-status scores. Further studies are needed to corroborate these findings.

High reliability for the "choices" part of the Group Preference Record is consistently found, as shown in the accompanying tabulation. These correlations between successive administrations of the Record indicate a high reliability.<sup>4</sup>

Trial	N	r	PE <sub>r</sub>
1.....	15	.950	.033
2.....	35	.938	.024
3.....	34	.940	.024

Also, correlations between arrays of "acceptances" received are consistently reliable. Three successive determinations of "acceptances" gave the results shown in the second accompanying tabulation. Thus the Group Preference Record may be considered a highly reliable measure.<sup>5</sup>

Trial	N	r	PE <sub>r</sub>
1.....	15	.910	.029
2.....	34	.916	.019
3.....	35	.947	.011

Validity of the Group Preference Record as an instrument for measuring social status is not easy to determine. As the Record is constructed (asking persons to select members of a community of groups for membership in their own group) there is reason to believe the choices and acceptances indicated are genuine. Both Moreno and Newstetter have presented some evidence of the validity of the sociometric technique.<sup>6</sup>

Our studies show a correlation of  $.874 \pm .027$  ( $N = 35$ ) between choices and ratings in leadership determined by the administration of the five-man-to-man leadership rating technique—a highly reliable and valid method of choosing leaders.<sup>7</sup> For acceptances the correlation was

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, in which data corroborate these findings. Newstetter reports  $r = .936$  for a similar study.

<sup>5</sup> These findings are corroborated by the studies of Moreno, *op. cit.*

<sup>6</sup> Moreno, *op. cit.*, and Newstetter, *op. cit.* E.g., Newstetter showed a correlation of .727 between personal preference and compresence. See also J. L. Moreno and H. H. Jennings, "Statistics of Social Configurations," *Sociometry*, I (1938), 342-74.

<sup>7</sup> E. de Alton Partridge, *Leadership among Adolescent Boys* ("Teachers College Contributions to Education," No. 608 [New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1934]).

.538 $\pm$ .082 ( $N = 35$ ) with the same criterion; and .701 and .750 when used in the morale quotient and correlated with an outside criterion called a "morale ratio."<sup>8</sup>

These preliminary evidences of reliability and validity show the need for further studies but at the same time suggest that the measures of social status here reported may be given serious consideration for acceptance as mathematical expressions of social position.

We may conclude by suggesting that the social-status ratios and the social-status scores may be used in a practical way as a preguidance technique in the field of education. Without the expense of using complex batteries of tests, one may in a short time locate the social leaders, the social "normals," and the social isolates. Furthermore, the old-type tests are measures of traits, but the social-status ratios and scores are mathematical expressions of one's position in a social configuration.

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<sup>8</sup> For an explanation of the morale quotient and ratio see Leslie Day Zeleny, "Sociometry of Morale," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, December, 1939.

## NEWS AND NOTES

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### RESEARCH NEWS

*Advisory Committee on Education.*—The twelfth of the staff studies, *Special Problems of Negro Education*, by Doxey A. Wilkerson, Howard University, has been published by the Government Printing Office.

*University of Cincinnati.*—The Work Projects Administration has granted an appropriation of \$30,000 for the continuation of census tract analysis in Cincinnati. James A. Quinn is chairman of the sponsoring committee.

*Osborne Association.*—Continuation of the nation-wide survey of institutions for juvenile delinquents will be under the direction of Joseph Shelly, recently appointed field and research secretary, who was recently affiliated with the psychiatric department of the Institution for Male Defective Delinquents, Napanock, New York.

*Social Science Research Council.*—The Council has published a revised list of its bulletins, now numbering forty-four, which may be obtained by writing the Council, 230 Park Avenue, New York City. The latest publication of the Council is *Old-Age Security: Social and Financial Trends* by Margaret Grant, which describes methods and devices of especial interest for the United States in terms of specific problems encountered in Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, New Zealand, Australia, Czechoslovakia, and Sweden.

*United States Office of Education.*—A two-year study of higher education of Negroes has been launched under the direction of Fred J. Kelly, chief of the division of higher education, by Ambrose Caliver, specialist in the education of Negroes. Congress has appropriated \$40,000 for the study which has an advisory committee of distinguished white and Negro educators and sociologists.

*Work Projects Administration.*—Research on sampling procedures applicable to nation-wide studies of unemployment, relief, migration, and allied subjects has been carried on for the last three years by the division

of research under the direction of John N. Webb. Two fundamental problems confronting the research worker have been attacked: (1) the selection of samples of civil divisions, i.e., cities, villages, and counties, that are consistent with sound sampling procedures and at the same time achieve an optimum efficiency from the point of view of administrative limitations, financial costs, and timeliness; and (2) the selection of a representative cross-section of the population within the civil divisions chosen, again with a view to maximum efficiency and minimum cost. In selecting samples of civil divisions, use has been made of national compilations of population characteristics, while within the civil divisions experiments have been conducted in the use of city directories, school records, public utility and tax records, blocks and block segments, and a randomized selector mask.

#### NOTES

*American Sociological Society.*—The Committee on Organization is presenting a plan for the reorganization of the American Sociological Society at the Philadelphia meeting, December 27–29. The proposal is to divide the membership into two classes: (1) members, “persons who are engaged primarily in the advancement of sociology as a science,” and (2) associates, “persons who are interested in the advancement of sociology as a science.” Recommended qualifications for members are (a) possession of a Ph.D. degree granted by an accredited institution of higher learning, or its equivalent; (b) publication of an acceptable research monograph or report (other than thesis) or a meritorious volume in sociology; and (c) position as assistant professor or above in an accredited institution of higher learning, or its equivalent in governmental or private affairs. The machinery is also set up in the report for effecting the reclassification of the present membership. The relation to the national organization of regional and other specialized societies is defined as that of independence in matters of finance and membership. Provision is made for regional representation on the executive committee of the Society.

*Mid-West Sociological Society.*—Preliminary program of the annual meeting of the Society (to be held at Des Moines, Iowa, April 18–20, 1940) has been announced by President Leslie D. Zeleny, Minnesota State College. The topics and chairmen of the sessions are: the study of the group, Louis Wirth, University of Chicago; criminology, Sister Ann, O.S.B., St. Benedict's College; social psychology, J. M. Reinhardt, University of Nebraska, with paper by Clyde Hart, University of Iowa and

Mapheus Smith, University of Kansas; county planning, Ray E. Wakely, Iowa State College; sociometry, Lowry Nelson, University of Minnesota, with paper by F. Stuart Chapin, University of Minnesota; family relations conference, L. E. Garwood, Coe College; sociology and social work, F. J. Bruno, Washington University, with discussions by C. E. Lively, University of Missouri, T. D. Eliot, Northwestern University, and Benjamin E. Youngdahl, Washington University; regional research, Stuart A. Queen, Washington University; rural-urban research, E. T. Hiller, University of Illinois; educational sociology, L. O. Lantis, North Dakota State Teachers College; sociology of recreation, Arthur J. Todd, Northwestern University, with paper by Clifford R. Shaw, Chicago Area Project.

At the joint dinner with the Mid-West Economics Association, W. F. Ogburn, University of Chicago, will speak on "The Society of the Future."

The Research Committee is carrying forward the co-operative project on the distribution of mental diseases and expects to have a final report on six cities for the April meeting. The Committee is initiating a new co-operative research project on the socioeconomic status of farm families. Use will be made of a scale prepared by W. H. Sewell, Oklahoma A. and M. College. Those interested in participating are asked to write to the chairman of the committee, Stuart A. Queen, Washington University, St. Louis.

*American Council on Education.*—The Motion Picture Project has published *Films on War and American Neutrality*, a 48-page annotated bibliography of twelve selected 16-mm. sound motion pictures dealing with the present war situation and American neutrality. This bibliography may be obtained in mimeographed form for twenty-five cents from the Council, 744 Jackson Place, Washington, D.C.

*American Parole Association.*—John Landesco, member of the Illinois Board of Pardons and Parole and executive director of the Middle West Parole Association, has been elected president of the national organization.

*Conference on "Tomorrow's Children."*—About two hundred and fifty persons attended the conference held November 9-11 at Atlanta, with addresses on human resources and population by Rupert Vance, University of North Carolina; Donald Klaiss, University of North Carolina; Alva Myrdal, Swedish Federation of Business and Professional Women, for research in population problems, and the panel discussion on "To-

morrows Children" participated in by W. B. Jones, Jr., University of Tennessee; W. E. Garnett, Virginia Agricultural Experiment Station; L. M. Bristol, University of Florida; E. T. Krueger, Vanderbilt University; and P. K. Whelpton, Scripps Foundation. It is planned to continue the conferences and to stimulate the discussion of the improvement of population in different states and local communities in the region. Proceedings of the conference are to be printed and may be obtained at a cost not to exceed \$1.00 per copy from W. E. Cole, University of Tennessee, Knoxville.


*Giannini Foundation.*—Dorothy S. Thomas has been appointed to the staff of the Foundation for research in the population factor in economic development.

*Inter-American Exchange Professorships and Fellowships.*—The provisions of the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations, signed at Buenos Aires on December 23, 1936, by the representatives of the United States of America and the twenty other republics at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, called for the exchange of one professor and two graduate students or teachers between each of the ratifying states. The nations which had formally accepted this arrangement on July 1, 1939, were: Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, the United States, and Venezuela. The fields of teaching and study include the humanities, natural sciences, social sciences, law, medicine, pharmacy, journalism, technology, engineering, and any other legitimate field of investigation or study. Complete information regarding these exchanges may be secured from the United States Office of Education, Federal Security Agency, Washington, D.C.

*International Statistical Institute and American Scientific Congress.*—The twenty-fifth session of the International Statistical Institute, which has been scheduled to meet in Washington on May 10-18, 1940, may be postponed indefinitely because of the outbreak of war in Europe. The history of the plans for this significant occasion illustrates many of the difficulties which are encountered in bringing about international intellectual co-operation in the modern world.

The invitation to meet in the United States for the first time since 1893 was extended to the Institute in 1936 by the government of the United States under the authority of a joint resolution of Congress in 1935. Under the terms of the resolution, the session was to be held in 1939, in

## NEWS AND NOTES



order to coincide with the centenary of the American Statistical Association. Because of a technicality it was deemed necessary to renew the invitation at the Prague session of the Institute in September, 1938, but because of international developments, the Prague session adjourned prematurely without taking action. The meeting was then deferred until 1940, and suitable amendments to the original joint resolution were adopted by Congress last spring. Meanwhile arrangements had been worked out with the Pan American Union, the Department of State, and the American Statistical Association for concurrent sessions with the Eighth American Scientific Congress, celebrating in Washington the semi-centennial of the formation of the Pan American Union.

The following cablegram has now been sent by the American Committee on Arrangements to the permanent office of the Institute at the Hague:

Recognizing extreme importance of continued international scientific collaboration Arrangements Committee requests decision by Bureau relative to holding or postponing Twenty-fifth Session of Institute in Washington. Committee pledges best efforts to surmount difficulties if Bureau wishes meeting.

Because of disturbed communications delay is expected in obtaining the answer of the Bureau of the Institute, several members of which are residents in warring nations.

Plans for the Scientific Congress are, however, continuing. It is expected that a statistical section will be added to the Congress in order to provide a medium for the discussion of international statistical questions of common interest to the nations of the Western Hemisphere. Should a 1940 session of the Institute prove to be impracticable, the Arrangements Committee for the Washington session plans to continue its existence for two purposes: (1) To bring to completion the compendium of American statistics, now in preparation, dealing with statistical organization, activities, and personnel in each of the twenty-one American republics. (2) To renew preparations for an Institute meeting in the United States at the earliest practicable date following the cessation of hostilities. The Arrangements Committee is composed of Stuart A. Rice, chairman; Walter F. Willcox, Raymond Pearl, and Halbert L. Dunn, secretary-general.

*Jane Addams Peace School.*—This school, dedicated to the founder of Hull-House and devoted to the training of "peace workers," began its first semester on October 24 under the direction of George W. Hartmann, of Columbia University. For the present, classes are being held in the Presbyterian Labor Temple, 242 East Fourteenth Street, New York City.

*Journal of Criminal Psychopathology.*—The *Journal* has recently received the first number of this new periodical which is published by the Woodbourne Institution for Defective Delinquents, New York State Department of Correction. This periodical, which is devoted to research articles, reviews of current literature, and book reviews, will be issued quarterly and distributed free of charge as a project of the Institution's class of journalism.

*National Conference on Family Relations.*—*The Proceedings of the First Southern Regional Conference and Louisiana State Conference on Family Relations*, which was held at the Louisiana State University, February 24–25, 1939, has been published under the editorship of Harriet S. Daggett, president of the Southern Regional Conference. Copies of the *Proceedings* may be obtained from Professor Daggett, Louisiana State University, University, Louisiana.

The second annual meeting of the National Conference is being held, as the *Journal* goes to press, in Philadelphia December 25–26 on the general subject "The Role and Functions of the Family in a Democracy," with papers by Adolf Meyer, president, L. K. Frank, Sidney E. Goldstein, Carl G. Hartman, Karen Horney, Katherine Lenroot, Max Rheinstein, Una B. Sait, and C. C. Zimmerman.

*Society for Social Research.*—Among the papers presented at the autumn quarter were "The Racial Situation in Hawaii, with Reflections Concerning Methods of Research," Herbert Blumer; "A Comparison of Methods and Results of Marriage Prediction Studies by Terman and Burgess and Cottrell," E. W. Burgess; "Hypothesis and Proof in the Study of a Society," Robert Redfield, University of Chicago; and "Needed Sociological Research in Occupations," by Lyle M. Spencer, director, Science Research Associates.

*Social Science Research Council.*—The conference of representatives of university social science research organizations met at the University of Chicago November 29 and 30. Papers delivered at the conference included "University Social Science Research in Relation to Private Commercial Research Enterprises," Arthur W. Kornhauser, University of Chicago; "University Social Science Research in Relation to Research in Commerce and Industry," Rensis Likert, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, United States Department of Agriculture; "The Effects of the Present International Situation upon Research Programs in the Social



Sciences," Robert S. Lynd, Columbia University; and "University Social Science Research in Relation to Government Research," S. A. Stouffer, University of Chicago.

*United States Department of Agriculture.*—Recent appointments to the staff of the Division of Farm Population and Rural Welfare together with their former connections include: James O. Babcock, Farm Security Administration; W. T. Ham, Agricultural Adjustment Administration; E. J. Holcomb, Agricultural Adjustment Administration; W. C. Holley, Works Projects Administration; Homer Hitt, graduate work at Louisiana State University; Douglas Ensminger, graduate work at Cornell University; John Page, graduate work at Syracuse University; C. H. Hamilton, Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College; Kimball Young, on leave from University of Wisconsin; John Provinse, Soil Conservation Service; Ralph H. Danhof, University of Michigan; Walter Kollmorgen, Division of Land Economics; Horace Miner, Wayne University; and Kenneth MacLeish, graduate work at Harvard University.

*Bates College.*—John A. Rademaker has been appointed instructor in sociology. A. M. Myhrman has been re-elected president of the Maine State Conference of Social Welfare.

*Beloit College.*—Lloyd V. Ballard has been appointed to the newly created Wisconsin Board of Public Welfare which supervises all state welfare services.

*University of Chicago.*—The tenth anniversary of the dedication of Social Science Research Building was celebrated by a program of meetings. Among the papers presented were: "Urbanism," Charles E. Merriam, "The Folk Society and Culture," Robert Redfield, "The Urban Society and Civilization," Louis Wirth, "Social Trends," William F. Ogburn, and "Factor Analysis as a Scientific Method," L. L. Thurstone, all of the University of Chicago. Other addresses and discussions were given by Henry Breure, Bowery Savings Bank, New York City; Ray Lyman Wilbur, Stanford University; Edward L. Thorndike, Columbia University; and Beardsley Ruml, R. H. Macy & Co., Inc., New York City. Another feature of the program was a series of round tables whose subjects and chairmen were as follows: "The Social Sciences, One or Many," Wesley C. Mitchell, Columbia University; "Quantification: The Quest for Precision," Frederick C. Mills, Columbia University; "Training for Social Science Research," Carl C. Brigham, Princeton University; "Gen-

eralization in the Social Sciences," Morris R. Cohen, University of Chicago; and "Social Science and Social Action," John H. Williams, Harvard University.

A dinner was held October 28 in honor of Professor Ellsworth Faris, who retired from active service as professor and chairman of the Department of Sociology at the end of the summer quarter. Addresses in honor of Professor Faris were made by his colleagues Edward S. Ames, Herbert Blumer, Harvey Carr, Robert E. Park, Louis Wirth, and by Grace Chaffee, University of Iowa.

Houghton Mifflin Company has announced for publication in the spring *Sociology* by William F. Ogburn and Meyer F. Nimkoff, Bucknell University.

During the winter and spring quarters Hubert Bonner will give courses in sociology at the University College.

*Columbia University.*—Florian Znaniecki, visiting professor of sociology during the summer and autumn, will give the Julius Beer lectures. After his courses in the summer session, he sailed for Poland, but at the outbreak of the war the boat took refuge in an English port. After remaining in London, he returned to New York early in November.

Robert S. Lynd delivered an address on "The Place of the University in 1940" at the opening exercises.

Columbia University Press has published *The Individual and His Society: The Psychodynamics of Primitive Social Organization* by Abram Kardiner, containing a foreword and two ethnological reports by Ralph Linton.

Barnard College has announced the availability of "The Public Service Fellowship," amounting to \$1,300, offered by the Women's Organization for National Prohibition Reform to a woman graduate of any approved college or university for a year of graduate study in one or more of the fields of social science. Applications to be submitted not later than March 1, and additional information may be obtained from Professor Maude A. Huttman, Barnard College, Columbia University, New York City.

*Fisk University.*—New appointments in the department of social sciences include Lewis C. Copeland, Ph.D., Duke University, and Bingham Dai, Ph.D., University of Chicago. Dr. Copeland studied at the University of Chicago from 1931 to 1937 and was a Julius Rosenwald Fellow from 1937 to 1939, studying race relations in a southern city. Dr. Dai is conducting a seminar on "Personality and Culture" and is continuing the

analysis of his material on Chinese psychiatric cases "Personality in a Changing Culture." For the last four years he has been assistant professor of medical psychology, Peiping Union Medical College, Peiping, China.

Lewis W. Jones has returned after a year's leave. Giles A. Hubert, who is on a leave of absence, is serving as advisor on special resettlement projects to the Farm Security Administration.

The department has been able to provide, through a special grant, seven research fellowships for students advanced in graduate study who desire guided field experience in southern communities.

Mrs. Ella Washington Griffin has been appointed head resident of the social settlement which is one of the laboratories of the department.

*Fort Hays State College (Fort Hays, Kan.).*—Arthur Katona has been appointed assistant professor of sociology.

*Hofstra College.*—Joseph S. Roucek has been promoted to the rank of associate professor.

*University of Illinois.*—Maurice T. Price, recently with the United States Soil Conservation Service, is visiting lecturer in sociology. A curriculum in social service administration has been inaugurated during the current academic year under the direction of B. F. Timmons. New appointments for the curriculum include E. E. Klein, University of Iowa, and Lecie Gordon, St. Louis Provident Association. The University of Illinois Press recently published *Houseboat and River-Bottoms People* by E. T. Hiller.

*University of Kiel.*—Bernhard Harms, formerly director of the Institut für Weltwirtschaft at the university, died in Berlin, September 21, 1939. Although not a sociologist, Professor Harms had an active part in the development of sociology in the German universities. He was a member of the Council of the German Sociological Society which (though now defunct) for many years was the important sociological center in that country. The Institut für Weltwirtschaft at Kiel was his own personal creation which in the course of years increasingly broadened its field of activity until it became one of the best-equipped social science institutes on the Continent. He was the founder of the *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* containing many contributions by outstanding sociologists, and he was responsible for the Kieler Vorträge, a series of public lectures delivered at the Institute over a period of twenty years, including many papers on

sociological subjects. His institutionalistic approach is revealed in the long series of studies by his students, published in *Probleme der Weltwirtschaft*, many of which show a strong sociological touch.

*Linfield College*.—D. Appleton-Century Company has announced the publication of *Americans in the Making*, a social psychological study of the immigration process, by William C. Smith.

*University of Maine*.—H. B. Kirshen has been appointed head of the department of economics and sociology, and Herbert D. Lamson has been promoted from assistant professor to associate professor of sociology.

*Marietta College*.—Laile Eubank, who has had graduate work at American University, and who formerly taught at Hiram College, has been appointed instructor in sociology.

*University of Nebraska*.—Frank Z. Glick, formerly assistant director of the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission and lecturer at the University of Chicago School of Social Service Administration, has been appointed director of the Graduate School of Social Work.

*Northwestern University*.—Eduard C. Lindeman, professor of social philosophy, New York School of Social Work, will offer three courses, including two on social planning, at the university college, January 22–March 10.

*Oberlin College*.—F. M. Zorbaugh has returned after a year's leave of absence at New York University, where he received the Ph.D. degree.

*Otterbein College*.—E. M. Hursh has returned after a year's leave of absence which was spent in study at Duke University, University of North Carolina, and the Library of Congress.

*College of the Ozarks*.—Howard W. Wissner, who has had graduate work at the University of Pittsburgh, has been appointed associate professor of sociology.

*Peabody College*.—H. C. Brearley, formerly on the faculty of Clemson Agricultural and Mechanical College, has been appointed professor in charge of the newly created department of sociology.

*University of North Carolina.*—In commemoration of Howard W. Odum's twenty years of service, a group of his former graduate students commissioned Stanislaw Rembski to paint his portrait, which was recently completed and will be hung in the Alumni Building. This building, after complete remodeling, will be used exclusively by departments and projects initiated by Professor Odum, including *Social Forces*, the Institute for Research in Social Science, and the Division of Public Welfare and Social Work.

*University of Rochester.*—Harry D. Sheldon, Jr., who recently received the doctorate degree from the University of Wisconsin has been appointed instructor in sociology.

*San Diego State College.*—Kenneth Barnhart has been appointed assistant professor in social economics and is teaching courses in sociology and social work.

*Temple University.*—G. Gordon Brown has been appointed assistant professor of sociology. For several years Professor Brown was engaged in anthropological field studies in Samoa and East Africa and during the past academic year was on the staff of the University of Connecticut.

*University of Texas.*—The installation of Homer P. Rainey as president was the occasion for a series of conferences on "The State and Public Education." These conferences, held December 7-9 at Austin, considered educational problems in Texas, the purpose of state-supported education, cultural relations with Latin America, and the function of the natural resources of Texas as related to the well-being of the state.

*Vanderbilt University.*—H. Warren Dunham, joint author of *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas*, has been appointed instructor in sociology for the second semester during the leave of absence of Walter C. Reckless.

*Vassar College.*—Among the speakers who addressed the Vassar College Political Association on the Place of the South in the Nation which met November 2-4 were Wilson Gee, University of Virginia, and Otto Klineberg, Columbia University.

*State College of Washington.*—Paul H. Landis has been promoted to professor of rural sociology and dean of the graduate school. H. Ashley Weeks, who received the Ph.D. degree at the University of Wisconsin last

summer, has been promoted from instructor to assistant professor in sociology. Henry J. Meyer, University of Michigan, has been appointed instructor in sociology.

*Williams College.*—The Viking Press has published *Ideas Are Weapons* by Max Lerner.

*Wisconsin Department of Public Welfare.*—On December 1, M. G. Caldwell, recently of the University of Kentucky, began his duties as director of the division of corrections of the Department of Public Welfare.

#### PERSONAL

An address recently delivered by Robert E. Park, University of Chicago, at the School of Engineering, University of Iowa, has been published in the *American Physics Teacher* (October, 1939) under the title "Social Contributions of Physics."

Otto Rank, an internationally known psychologist, died Tuesday, October 31, in New York at the age of fifty-five. In 1905 Dr. Rank began a period of association with the late Sigmund Freud and from 1912 to 1924 edited *Imago* and *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*. Having arrived at an interpretation of human behavior divergent from that of Freud, Dr. Rank left Freud about 1925 to practice and formulate his own revision of psychoanalysis in terms of will therapy. Among Rank's important publications are: *Trauma of Birth*, (1929), *Die Don Juan-Gestalt* (1924), *Art and Artists* (1932), *Truth and Reality* (1936), and *Will Therapy* (1936).

The Dryden Press has published a symposium on *War in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Willard Waller, Columbia University, and containing contributions by Harry Elmer Barnes; Clifford Kirkpatrick, University of Minnesota; Max Lerner; Williams College; and Ralph Linton, Columbia University.

## BOOK REVIEWS

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*Frustration and Aggression.* By JOHN DOLLARD, LEONARD W. DOOB, NEAL E. MILLER, O. H. MOWRER, and ROBERT W. SEARS. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939. Pp. ix+209. \$2.00.

This little book by five members of the staff of the Institute of Human Relations at Yale University with the collaboration of three others is devoted to a defense of the statement that aggression is always a consequence of frustration and that frustration is always followed by aggression. The doctrine is accepted from a pronouncement of Freud which was later repudiated by him. The authors have chosen to defend his earlier statement and therefore reject Freud's retraction. The book is a product of what the authors call co-operative research. A number of illustrative instances are cited, but the authors insist that these illustrations are "in no sense intended to constitute proof of the propositions thus elucidated." The reader is asked to accept an unproved assumption, propounded by an author who has abandoned it, and supported by illustrations not intended as proof.

The method of dogmatically asserting a priori propositions and of reasoning deductively from them was the universal custom in the pre-scientific era. It was common in the earlier stages of all the sciences, most recently in the social sciences, but the disappointing results of this procedure have been so many and the fallacy has been so often demonstrated that its revival by contemporary students occasions a certain regret.

The arguments of the authors are reminiscent of the reasoning of the medieval advocates of the reality of witchcraft. Indeed, they differ hardly at all from the procedure employed by the preliterate shamans whose theory of disease starts with the postulate that no man dies unless some enemy has killed him with black magic. There is the authority of wise men for the statement and many illustrations are cited, for confessions have been repeatedly obtained, and even European observers have reported authentic instances of the success of efforts to kill by magic.

It is not in this manner that social science will be advanced. The question is important, for aggression is a constant threat to our peace, and frustration is an all but universal experience. But before we accept the statement that a desire to injure someone is the invariable sequel of a

failure to reach a desired end, we should insist on more than mere assertion and illustration. A sound empirical method demands a less biased examination of the many and varied effects of frustration and failure.

Some form of frustration, real or imagined, would seem to be the occasion of all reasoning or purposive thinking. When there is no obstacle to overcome, desire follows fulfilment, for we do not reason when there is no need to do so. Thinking and contriving are essentially the effort to overcome frustration. When the consummation of an act is delayed beyond the expected time, there follows one or the other of a familiar number of emotional experiences which assume a wide variety. Sometimes there is a feeling of assurance and confidence that success will come, though long delayed. Less certain conditions give rise to the experience we call hope; while still farther down in the scale of uncertainty lie such feelings as anxiety, despondency, and despair. Only under specific conditions is it clear that aggression is the outcome of frustration. Opposition and thwarting may give rise to fear or disgust or even boredom, in which anger may be wholly absent.

A catalogue of the various effects of frustration could be made and might have been made by the authors. A complete knowledge of all these would require much time and effort, but even a superficial survey will yield a variety of results of frustration sufficient to negate the dogmatic assertion that there is only one. Avowedly, imagining or daydreaming is clearly one of these, for the daydreamer often builds his castles with no trace of aggression. Another is substitution or sublimation, and it may come to pass that the substituted object is more desired than the original one. Cases of sublimation could be cited in numbers in which aggression would only be asserted by a partisan with an obsession. The confusion of imagination with reality which we call delusion is a third differential outcome of frustration, and, while delusions of persecution do occur, there are many more in which a trace of aggression would seem impossible of discovery. A fourth outcome of frustration may be called devaluation, as when the fox in the fable called the grapes sour. The ensuing rationalization may involve anger and aggression, but in many cases it most assuredly does not. In the fifth place, there is detachment, when it becomes possible to look at the experience from a larger perspective. Here is included what is called a sense of humor. Freuchen tells of an Eskimo tribe who were rejoicing at the prospect of food for the whole winter because a whale had been stranded on their beach. When an unexpected storm swept the whale away to sea, the people laughed, said it was a good joke on them, and set out to hunt seals. Still another instance is resignation, on which



whole philosophies have been built, even whole religions. Remember Marcus Aurelius: All is meat to me, O world, which thy seasons bring. A complete list need not be given here, even if it were available, but there are more than a dozen clearly identifiable sequels of frustration that could be listed besides, of course, aggression, which admittedly, is one of the many.

The attempt to ascribe a unique result to frustration leads to some feats of interpretations which are amusing. They cite the Ashanti warrior who, forbidden to surrender, does sometimes yield to the enemy when escape looks impossible. It would be inadmissible to interpret this as aggression against the enemy, so we are asked to believe that the surrender is due to the feeling of aggression against the man who prohibited surrender. Most readers will consider this reasoning a trifle far-fetched.

It is in the discussion of race prejudice that the authors think to have made their most illuminating interpretation, and here the theory seems least tenable. Discrimination is ascribed to frustrations experienced by the dominant group. But does not the argument limp? Surely Negroes in the South are frustrated. They may not live where they choose, may not stay at the best hotels even if they have the price, may not eat at the best restaurants, and must endure segregation in waiting-rooms, trains, street-cars, schools, and churches. For every frustration suffered by the whites, a hundred are experienced by the Negroes. The theory would demand that the Negroes be a hundred times more aggressive than the whites—but not even the authors think that.

One regrettable feature of the discussion is the creation of an idiosyncratic terminology, due probably to lack of familiarity with our current concepts. The result is a certain obscurity which can only be regretted. This can be made clear by characterizing the work of the authors in words taken from their own exposition. Using, then, their terms in meanings assigned in the book, we may say that the authors were instigated by an instigator but did not fully achieve a goal-response. Their substitute response reduced the instigation to the original (frustrated) goal-response so that the removal of the interference which caused the frustration was followed by a reduced goal-response. Aggressive action would have reduced only the secondary instigation to aggression set up by the frustration and would not have had any effect on the strength of the original instigation. All this is set forth with comparable clarity on page 9 of the book, in a footnote intended to make the argument more lucid.

Now that Freud's work is done it is to be hoped that social scientists will come to estimate accurately his value. He was a literary psychologist,

not a scientist. His gifted mind saw connections where more prosaic people see nothing. Many have tried and many more will continue to try to turn the poetic insights of Freud into science. It detracts nothing from the reputation of Freud when we say that the effect of trying to make dogmatic formulations out of his startling intuitions is a service neither to Freud nor to science.

ELLSWORTH FARIS

*University of Chicago*

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*Readings in Jurisprudence.* By JEROME HALL. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1938. Pp. xix+1183. \$7.50.

There are two ways of looking at law—that of the lawyer and that of the jurist. For the lawyer the law is a set of rules for the decision of cases. In order to be able to decide cases “according to law” and to advise clients, the lawyer, both as judge and as attorney, has to know the rules of law of his country or state. Legal science in the lawyer’s sense is a classificatory science, which, for the sake of ready reference, classifies the mass of legal rules in a systematic order. In addition to classification, the lawyer’s legal science provides him with those rules of art which he needs in order to apply the abstract rules of law to the infinite variety of concrete conflicts which are presented by life. The jurist, on the other hand, is interested in law as a social phenomenon. He asks such questions as why we have any law at all; what law does for, in, and to society; how law originates and grows; how it is affected by such physical or social factors as climate, topography, economic conditions, religious beliefs, ethical ideals, or political power; and how, in turn, law affects the other social factors. The jurist, furthermore, is intent upon knowing why a given legal system is as it is and, finally, whether a given legal system or rule is good or bad. Such a science of jurisprudence partakes of the fields of anthropology, ethnology, history, sociology, economics, and philosophy.

In the contented decades of the pre-war era jurisprudence was much neglected. Both in this country and in Europe the lawyers of that period were little inclined to ask the often embarrassing questions which jurisprudence presents, especially in its philosophical branch. The only part of jurisprudence which showed some life and activity was legal history. In addition, under the name of analytical jurisprudence, endeavors were pursued to refine the analysis and the system of classification of the existing rules of law. The upheavals of the war and post-war period have made it impossible for us any longer to take for granted any existing social institu-

tion. The questions of jurisprudence have become burning issues of the day. No longer can lawyers avoid their discussion, no longer can they be neglected in legal education. Yet, how to approach these problems in the law curriculum is a difficult problem for a generation of law teachers whose own training was primarily concerned with the technical science of law in the lawyer's sense.

Professor Hall's timely book is intended to serve as a tool in those new endeavors. Constructed on the pattern of the presently accepted general tool of legal education, the casebook, it is a collection of "source materials," i.e., of passages from numerous books and articles on the problems of jurisprudence. Its first part is devoted to philosophy of law, its second part to analytical jurisprudence, and its third part to the relations between law and social science.

One may doubt the wisdom of presenting to students the problems of these fields, especially of the philosophy of law, in the form of fragmentary passages from different and often differing authors. Undoubtedly, a passage from Plato or Hobbes or Kant or Mill does not reveal its full content unless it is presented in its complete context. However, in a law school where only a limited amount of time can be devoted to the formal teaching of jurisprudence, the only alternative would be a complete treatise on the philosophy of law or even on the entire field of jurisprudence by one single author. Quite apart from the fact that no contemporary jurist has yet produced such a work in English, it would also, by necessity, present a one-sided approach. Professor Hall's technique, on the other hand, presents to the students the rich variety of philosophical attitudes and, granted that the various passages are fragmentary, they are so skilfully arranged that, when handled by a competent teacher, they are likely to open the students' eyes to the fact that all the different "philosophies" are attempts to solve the one great problem of justice in that form in which it has presented itself to the great thinkers of successive historical periods.

That part of the book which deals with law and social science is concerned primarily with the problem of rational social control, i.e., with the problem of whether or not law should and could be so molded as to achieve the rational solution of social problems. Starting with instructive materials on the nature of science and scientific method in general and of social science in particular, the author proceeds to discussions of the general possibility and theory of an empirical science of law, of the role of the irrational element of custom in legal development, of the rational solution of social problems through legislation, and, finally, of the judicial process. In this latter chapter one misses an adequate reference to the searching

investigations of Géný, Heck, and other French and German scholars who have probably, so far, made the most searching contributions to the clarification of the judge's role in the process of creation of law. The neglect of these important writings is indicative of the author's general neglect of works which are not readily available in English. Yet, its international character is one of the most significant elements of the science of jurisprudence as contrasted to the lawyer's science of law, of which there are as many as there are different legal systems. The author's concentration on the possible role which social science may play in the rational creation of law has also caused him to neglect the wide field of general sociology of law, i.e., the entirety of problems of interrelations between law and other factors of social life.

On the other hand, it may be doubted whether it was necessary to devote a full third of the book to materials on analytical jurisprudence. However, these materials are well selected and well arranged, and they will certainly help students to understand the needs for conceptual clarity, formal analysis, and classification—techniques whose continuous refinement has transformed the lawyer's legal knowledge from crude beginnings of formulation and memorizing into a highly developed science.

MAX RHEINSTEIN

*University of Chicago*

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*Report on the British Press: A Survey of Its Current Operations and Problems with Special Reference to National Newspapers and Their Part in Public Affairs.* By the PRESS GROUP OF PEP (POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PLANNING). London: PEP, 16 Queen Anne's Gate, 1938. Pp. 333. 10s. 6d.

The vital role of mass communicational agencies in modern society and the need for systematic investigation of their characteristics, functions, and effects are increasingly recognized by students of social relations. A voluminous literature has appeared treating certain of their aspects, particularly their political significance, use for propaganda purposes, implications for the struggle between democracy and dictatorship, etc. But most of these studies have been only obliquely sociological and few have employed scientific methods. This may be at least in part owing to the fact that the individual sociologist who assigns himself research problems bearing on mass behavior confronts more than ordinary difficulties, some arising from the vagueness and intangibility of the interactions, some from the paucity of data in accessible form, some from the considerable expense of studies of more than local scope, and some from a variety of other

reasons. At all events, an increasing proportion of the scientific work in this field is coming to be undertaken by co-operative research agencies or groups of collaborators. Like the Press Institute at the University of Paris, the Institut für Zeitungskunde at the University of Berlin, and the School of Public Affairs at Princeton University, the Press Group of the PEP represents a collaboration of students interested in the newspaper and public opinion. The volume under review is a product of their co-operative study.

The scope of this study embraces, first, the economics of journalism, or examination of the press as an industry; second, the processing of news, or the *modus operandi* of journalism in action; and, third, the social functions of the press and its relation to the public. The first two phases are dealt with more exhaustively and with more definitive results than is the third, as will be made clear below.

The *Report* shows the press to be one of the major British industries, ranking twelfth and ahead of such great industries as shipbuilding and steel. Moreover, as measured either by circulation statistics or by value of total product, the press continues to grow. Outstanding economic trends, including trustification both of the horizontal and of the vertical types, changes in methods of distribution, growth of capitalization and the "entrance fee" exacted of a new competitor, and tendencies toward co-operation, are treated in detail. Considerable attention is given to labor conditions and to the relationships of newspaper workers to their employers. Whereas the remuneration of workers on the production side ranks near the top among artisan occupations, that on the distribution side, where labor is less skilled and poorly organized, ranks low.

The recruitment of workers to journalistic posts, even to the higher-paid executive positions of Fleet Street, is principally by apprenticeship and a slow climb up the occupational ladder. University graduates play a comparatively small part, and only one bona fide professional school exists. In this and other ways it appears either that British journalism is less professionalized than that of this country or else that it sees fit to make fewer pretensions to professional status.

The interaction of economic factors, especially advertising and circulation, with such journalistic factors as newspaper content and editorial policy is examined with notable perspicacity. As in most other parts of the study quantitative data are freely used but combined with an analysis based on identified cases. The analysis of costs, instead of proving a bore, turns out to be one of the most interesting contributions of the study, for it throws light on some of the underlying causes of tendencies most severely criticized in the press—sensationalism, excess of trivia, stunts, and cir-

culatation bait such as gifts and prizes. Costs have compelled newspapers to be small and to restrict their influence to a class except where they have been able to hold out some sort of effective inducement to what Professor Park has called the "dull-minded and reluctant public."

The study of the processing of news to the form in which it reaches the eyes of readers is admirably done from a journalistic standpoint. The various pressures and bias-working factors brought to bear on the news throughout the process, both those working within and those working without the press organization, receive thorough treatment, as do legal restrictions and their effect.

But it is in connection with the latter phases of the study that its limitations and inadequacies begin to appear. When social aspects are examined, the approach continues to be within a journalistic rather than a sociological frame of reference. Against this no complaint could be raised were it not for the fact that the investigation aims at sociological objectives—the function of news in its social dimensions, the interaction of press and public. Tendencies of the popular press are discussed with little indication of what their sociopsychological explanation may be, except for some brief reference to the "escape" function of entertainment material. The relation of sensational matter to the chaotic moral order of modern urban society is nowhere suggested. On the other hand, useful data are presented showing the coverage of the principal national dailies by geographic regions, sex, and income groups. No similar data on as comprehensive a scale have thus far been published for the American press.

The deficiencies mentioned are not to be taken as seriously detracting from the value of the study. Even where a needed sociological orientation is lacking, there will be found much significant material that sociologists should use. The final chapter lists recommendations addressed to the British press and its public. The most novel item is a proposal for a press tribunal to redress grievances arising from unwarranted intrusions by journalists into private lives.

CARROLL D. CLARK

*University of Kansas*

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*Cityward Migration.* By JANE MOORE. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938. Pp. xix+140. \$2.00.

This volume is a contribution to our knowledge of rural to urban migration, undoubtedly the most important component of internal migration regarded either on a quantitative basis or with reference to its sociological

significance. In content, it is a report of an investigation of the community origins and the accomplishment subsequent to migration of those residents of the city of Stockholm, Sweden, in 1930 who were born in Västmanland County. In form, it is an application of statistical data on some sixteen thousand migrants for the empirical verification of two trial hypotheses concerning the nature of rural to urban migration.

The first hypothesis, derived from the observation of Dorothy Thomas that the bulk of internal migration is between communities of the same type, is that the strength of the stream of migration from the various communities to Stockholm is related to their degree of urbanization. This hypothesis is substantiated by the demonstration that the Västmanland County to Stockholm migration drew most heavily from the towns, least from the rural communities, and that for those rural-born who eventually came to Stockholm the typical pattern of migration was not direct from birthplace to city but by intermediate stages. The direct move to Stockholm was more typical of the urban-born. The conclusion here is that "the type of community of birth . . . seemed to determine the process of migration to Stockholm as well as the chances of residence in Stockholm in 1930."

The second hypothesis is that "the immigrant population as found in Stockholm classified according to type of birthplace should continue to reveal differences in the distribution of certain types of behavior." Here it is shown that the level of education is higher for those migrants coming from towns; that those in-migrant residents of Stockholm who were classified as skilled laborers came relatively most frequently from industrial communities, less frequently from towns and least often from rural communities; and that clerical workers were predominantly of urban origin. No significant income differentials appeared.

While it would, of course, be desirable to have the above observations checked by further studies, it does appear that the basic material of this study was reliable and that it should have constituted a representative sample of the in-migrant population of Stockholm. It is, however, the direction of investigation which especially deserves commendation, for it would appear that the most significant aspects of migration are the antecedents of the actual transfer and the consequences of the move, and it is precisely with these aspects of migration that *Cityward Migration* is concerned.

E. P. HUTCHINSON

*Harvard University*

*Brothers in Crime.* By CLIFFORD R. SHAW, with the assistance of HENRY D. MCKAY and JAMES F. McDONALD and special chapters by HAROLD B. HANSON and ERNEST W. BURGESS. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938. Pp. xvi+364. \$3.00.

*Brothers in Crime* continues the admirable series of case studies to which Shaw has devoted so many years of painstaking effort. It is the story of five brothers born in a maladjusted immigrant family and brought up in Chicago's gangland. All these brothers became criminals. Fifty-five of the one hundred and fifty years of their combined lives were spent in penal institutions. They began young; some of them were thieves before they could talk plainly and accomplished burglars before they graduated from the tricycle stage. Their crimes ranged from the pettiest of petty thefts to robbery with a gun. At the end of the story all have apparently reformed.

The basic documents of the book are five life-histories prepared by these brothers. In inducing these persons to tell their stories, Shaw has once more demonstrated his gift of gaining and keeping rapport with delinquents. It is a very great gift, and one which puts us all in Shaw's debt.

The documents and their interpretation tell a story which is already fairly familiar to sociologists. There was a conflict of moralities between the Old World family and the New World community. The parents were confused by city life in America; they were economically unsuccessful; and they completely failed to impose their standards upon their children. There was a tradition of crime in the slum area where the Martin boys grew up; the community taught crime with insistent rigor. The brothers were almost completely isolated from the influence of such conforming agencies as the school and the church; these agencies simply failed to reach them. The play groups of boys engaged in crime as a natural and stimulating form of sport; these play groups gradually became conflict groups opposed to the law-enforcing agencies; as this went on, the boys themselves slowly crystallized and hardened in the criminal pattern. Formal agencies of social control, such as the juvenile court and institutions for juvenile delinquents, not only failed to arrest this process but seem actually to have hastened it.

This specifically sociological interpretation apparently explains quite well why the boys became delinquent, that is, why they assimilated the morality of the criminal subgroup rather than that of the larger society. It leaves unanswered, as perhaps it should, a great many questions concerning the inner structure of these five personalities. After reading the



book we understand very well why these boys became criminals, but we do not know what makes them "tick." The contribution of the book is that it gives us a vivid and well-documented picture of gangland culture as seen by the participant-observer. This is said not by way of criticism but in order to indicate the focus of the book.

*Brothers in Crime* will give those who are interested in our methods of handling juvenile delinquents much to ponder over. Here was a family upon which officers of the juvenile court, probation workers, case workers, police, and the keepers of institutions expended their efforts for years without results. What is the answer to such a family? Foster-homes? Improved institutional care? Family case work? How were these boys at length reformed? It seems very likely that Shaw can make a further contribution by subjecting the reformatory techniques which he employs to sociological analysis. There are other morals, if one care to point them. Like *Nana*, this book is a study in the relations of the social classes, for these slum-bred youngsters preyed on the upper-income groups when they went forth to prowl. A minor criticism of the book is that identifying marks have been removed with unnecessary thoroughness, to the detriment of the life-histories.

WILLARD WALLER

*Columbia University*

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*Bevölkerungswellen und Wechsellagen.* By AUGUST LÖSCH. ("Beiträge zur Erforschung des wirtschaftlichen Wechsellagen," Vol. XIII.) Jena: Verlag G. Fischer, 1936. Pp. x+124. Rm. 6.00.

The purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis that business cycles are, at least to some degree, caused by changes in the rate of population growth. Starting from the observation that waves in the birth-rate (a decline followed by a steep increase and subsequent return to a "normal" level) are caused by wars, famines, and epidemics, the author proceeds to show, theoretically and by analysis of the population data for Sweden, Prussia, and Germany, how such a wave, caused by a certain extraneous factor, tends to be reflected after fifteen years in an increase of employable persons, after twenty-five years in the marriage rate, and after approximately thirty-three years again in the birth-rate, etc. These secondary waves will show decreasing intensity since other factors and even "new waves" started by other wars, etc., contribute to delete the first cycle. Of these primary and secondary waves, the cyclical changes in the number of persons entering occupations or the sudden increases in the number of employable persons resulting from them are likely to have most direct

influence on economic activity. It is on this phenomenon of cyclical changes in the increase of employable persons that the statistical analysis is concentrated. For this purpose the numbers of employables by sex, family status, and age, for Germany, for each year of the period 1871-1910 were computed. The tables which will be useful in many ways are given in the Appendix.

The author believes that an increase in the number of employables, in connection with an increase in marriages and births, unless it exceeds the absorption capacity of the industries, can have a stimulating effect on economic life. He claims that this has been proved by his study at least for the preindustrial era.

For the business cycles in an industrial economy a causal relation could not be established. Lösch thinks, however, that an increase in the number of workers who are also customers, as aftermath of a birth wave, may be at least a favorable condition for an industrial boom; whereas, a decrease may help to initiate a depression. While the theoretical and empirical evidence offered in support of a factual correspondence of population waves and industrial cycles appears to be sound, the explanation of the conditioning or causal relationship is not free from certain vague psychological assumptions and consequently not very convincing. This criticism applies also to the discussion of relations between population waves, revolutions, and other political and cultural "cyclical" phenomena.

RUDOLF HEBERLE

*Louisiana State University*

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*Roots of Change.* By JOSEPH H. FICHTER. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1939. Pp. xv+319. \$2.50.

A generation ago liberals among Roman Catholic social thinkers and liberals among Protestants seemed to be drawing together; but this book seems to indicate a contrary trend. For the author tells us that "the fall and the incarnation are the pivotal points of all history." He cites with approval the statement of Nicolas Berdyaev that "a sociological theory of morality ought, if it is to be consistent, to recognize society as God," a statement which betrays most woeful ignorance of sociological theories of morality, or at least a misunderstanding of the trend to find all moralities and religions essentially interpersonal in their outlook. In brief, the book before us would criticize any social thinking as unsound which does not rest upon the theological postulates just mentioned.

Father James M. Gillis, the editor of the *Catholic World*, in introducing the book to the reader, says that the author "has grouped in and around their biographies virtually all that is essential to [the understanding of] the social problems of the last three hundred years." The biographies cover, however, only fourteen thinkers in those three centuries: Vincent de Paul, Bernard Mandeville, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Paine, Robert Owen, Antoine Frederic Ozanam, Charles Kingsley, Wilhelm von Ketteler, Karl Marx, Henry Edward Manning, Pope Leo XIII, Carl Schurz, Leo Tolstoy, and Sidney and Beatrice Webb. It is doubtful if this is a "fair sample" of the thinkers who have molded the social philosophies of Western civilization during the last three centuries. The judgment of the writer of this review would be that only two of them, Jean Jacques Rousseau and Karl Marx, have greatly influenced the social philosophies of our modern world. It must be admitted, however, that the author makes out a good case for Bernard Mandeville, who, though today largely forgotten, did have very considerable influence through such writers as Adam Smith, Bentham, and Malthus.

There is, however, much to interest the general reader in this book, and Protestants who are not familiar with the writings of such thinkers as Vincent de Paul, Frederic Ozanam, Wilhelm von Ketteler, Henry Edward Manning, and Pope Leo XIII will find here readable sketches of the work and philosophies of these men. The book will find a useful place in any sociological reference library, whether in a Protestant or a Roman Catholic institution.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

*Duke University*

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*The Adolescent in the Family: A Study of Personality Development in the Home Environment.* ("Publication of the White House Conference on Child Health and Protection.") New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1934. Pp. xviii+473. \$3.00.

Perhaps the most significant result of the present research for the field of sociology is that the authors were successful in combining case history and statistical techniques in the isolation of certain subtle and intangible factors in family life. Among these were the subjects on which children confided or failed to confide in father or mother, bases of their criticism of either, response to forms of family control, and other phases which bear direct relation to the emotional and social attitudes of the child. At the

same time, the socioeconomic, occupational, and educational status of the family, usually regarded by common sense as important, were not neglected. The Appendix on discussion of method, which gives in detail the questionnaires compiled by the authors, as well as those adapted from Sims, Thurstone, and Wickman, is of paramount interest to research students.

Materials for the study were gathered from public-school children in the eighth, ninth, and tenth grades; their teachers; a few delinquent and predelinquent children; six hundred students in fifteen colleges—about eight thousand subjects in all. The children lived in cities of different sizes and rural areas in most sections of the country, and were the offspring of native white and Negro fathers, as well as of fathers born in Germany, Italy, Russia, and Mexico.

Conclusions of the study are as expected in some phases, contrary to traditional opinion in others. The authors caution against uncritical acceptance of findings in the latter. First, relations of close intimacy between parents and children, involving affection, trust, loyalty, and informal means of control, play a potent role in the child's personal and social development. Failure of parents to give sex education is so closely linked with lack of confidential relations that it constitutes by itself a valid clue to the disunity of a family. Such relations, however, require neither that the child spend most of his time in the home nor that he be responsible for a multiplicity of home duties; indeed, the presence of these factors is correlated inversely with adequate social development, as is most vividly demonstrated in the comparison of rural with urban children. It may be that intimacy in the family is facilitated by the transference of some of the family's traditional functions to secondary groups; contact with the latter are necessary for well-rounded personalities. The socioeconomic, occupational, and educational status of parents bear little direct relation to the success of family life.

Second, among the families of immigrants, those of German- and Russian-Jewish fathers show a fairly high degree of psychological unity, in general following in urban family pattern with regard to the incorporation of children into family life. By contrast, those of Italian and Mexican origins are more comparable to rural families, showing more criticism, less intimacy, and a lower degree of psychological unity.

EVELYN B. CROOK

*Kingston, Pennsylvania*

*Five Hundred Delinquent Women.* By SHELDON and ELEANOR T. GLUECK. With an Introduction by ROSCOE POUND. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1934. Pp. xxxiv+539. \$5.00.

First of a series projected under the auspices of the Institute of Criminal Law of the Harvard Law School, this study of five hundred women, whose paroles from the Women's Reformatory at Framingham, Massachusetts, expired between 1921 and 1925, weighs the relation of individual and personal traits and background to behavior in the institution, and of both to adjustment during and after parole. So far as the reviewer is aware, this is the first well-rounded scientific survey of its kind in the field of women offenders in American institutions.

Histories of eleven type cases are used to illumine the problems involved. For the benefit of research to come, appendixes present complete enumerations of the factors of background, institutional, and post-institutional experience, together with a meticulous description of the method of study, and the basic statistical data used in forming conclusions.

A notable chapter on prediction offers prognostic tables, affording courts and parole authorities potent materials for injecting scientific knowledge into the processes of commitment and parole of women offenders.

Added significance is given the findings by the fact that the institution was superintended by a woman of social insight and human understanding, whose efforts transformed it from a prison into a reformatory giving individualized treatment, the while she made and preserved complete case records.

An outstanding fact is that, apart from being young (four-fifths were under thirty years), few of the subjects when committed offered hopeful material; only one-fifth were normal in intelligence and one-third normal emotionally, while less than 7 per cent were of normal intelligence and without emotional imbalance or abnormality; their social backgrounds, too, were poor. Yet most of them profited in some small way by experience in the Reformatory. It is significant for prediction of success in commitment of women generally, that, having between nine and thirty months in most cases for working with this group, the Reformatory definitely influenced only 15 per cent. Recidivism was not prevented in the other 85 per cent. Successful adjustment correlated highly with twelve factors in the life of the girl prior to commitment; factors included health, recreational interests, school and vocational adjustment, lack of

experience with the law and in correctional institutions, absence of the liquor habit, and misconduct centered in lack of control of sexual impulses.

EVELYN B. CROOK

*Kingston, Pennsylvania*

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*Public Plunder: A History of Graft in America.* By DAVID LOTH. New York: Carrick & Evans, Inc., 1938. Pp. 436. \$3.00.

The task undertaken in this book is a very ambitious one; and, while the product is good from the literary point of view, it leaves much to be desired from the scientific point of view. Although emphasis is placed upon the personal histories of famous American grafters, no mention is made of the work of Zink in this field. Most of the illustrative materials are drawn from national or New York politics.

The author begins his analysis with a brief biographical sketch of Captain Samuel Argall, the grafting and land-grabbing Colonial governor of Virginia in the seventeenth century. He then discusses the corruption of Governor Benjamin Fletcher of New York by the pirates who sought to dispose of their stolen goods. From this point the story proceeds rapidly through the pages of American history down to the present day. Among the prominent figures in the history of large-scale graft, Loth would put Robert Morris, Alexander Hamilton, Nicholas Biddle, Jay Cooke, Jay Gould, Jim Fisk, Stephen B. Elkins, Edward A. Deeds, and Andrew Mellon. Some attention was also given to the lesser lights such as Swartwout, Tweed, Fall, and Capone. The author noted that the latter were frequently brought to justice and held in disgrace but that the former—men who made even greater profits from the system—were acclaimed as wizards of finance.

The theme of the author seems to be that graft is the handmaiden of profits, the indispensable persuader that reconciles the people's servants to a more exclusive policy than the general welfare. On the last page he offers as the "true solution of the problem" the overthrow of the economy of profit for one of use, but he fails to explain his thesis. No mention is made of the important trends in the field of public administration which have greatly reduced certain types of graft. A more systematic treatment of this subject would call for a careful definition of the concepts and for a more thorough marshaling of the evidence regarding the social and economic conditions associated with "graft."

HAROLD F. GOSNELL

*University of Chicago*

*Mental Conflicts and Personality.* By MANDEL SHERMAN. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1938. Pp. x+319. \$2.25.

A few years ago the sciences of psychiatry, psychology, and sociology were almost completely separate. Each had its own specialized body of facts and its own bewildering jargon. Each of these sciences had also its cultistic aspects and its religious wars waged within and without the group of devotees. A vigorously growing body of literature now testifies to the rapidity with which this situation is disappearing. The book under review is a worthy contribution to this literature.

Primarily psychiatric in its focus, *Mental Conflicts and Personality* calls upon psychology and sociology for a great deal of relevant information. Mental conflicts arise in a social setting; they develop slowly as the individual meets more difficult problems; and usually there are many inter-related conflicts rather than one. Complete integration of personality is considered "impossible in a competitive, complex society where varying types of adjustment must be made quickly."

The complex theoretical structure characteristic of the orthodox Freudian formulation is lacking in the work under review. With it has gone the rigidity of interpretation which many scholars have found objectionable, and also the well-known tendency for generalization to outrun evidence. Sherman presents a set of interpretations which cannot be perfectly related to one another or fused into a system. This enables him to stick closely to his evidence, but it involves the sacrifice of the aesthetic qualities inherent in a nicely articulated system of thought. A particularly valuable feature of the work is the extensive use of concrete illustrations, given in their social setting. Questions for discussion are given in an appendix. Bibliographical suggestions are very scanty.

WILLARD WALLER

*Columbia University*

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*Taboo.* By A. R. RADCLIFFE-BROWN. Cambridge: University Press, 1939. Pp. 47. 2/6.

The author shows that the term "taboo" as ordinarily used by social scientists covers only part of the meaning of the original Polynesian word *tabu* and suggests resolving this confusion by using the technical terms "ritual avoidance" or "ritual prohibition" instead of taboo. He shows how these, plus the concepts "ritual status" and "ritual value"—all of which he defines—can be used to analyze similar segments of social behavior in diverse societies.

He points out that none of the various criteria that have been offered to distinguish religion from magic have universal application and demonstrates, briefly, that the concepts mentioned above can be used to analyze all such data without attempting this difficult and perhaps unnecessary distinction.

The booklet also contains a brief and partial statement of Radcliffe-Brown's conception of the natural science of society that he feels will one day underlay the more practical social sciences. It is to be hoped that he will soon make generally available a detailed statement of his viewpoint; it would be very stimulating to those who are interested in developing theoretical social science.

JOE WECKLER

Chicago

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*After Freedom: The Portrait of a Community in the Deep South.* By HORTENSE POWDERMAKER. New York: Viking Press, 1939. Pp. xx+408. \$3.00.

*After Freedom* is undoubtedly the most complete, accurate, and understanding report on manners, customs, and conditions of life of the Negro in a southern rural community so far published. I am impressed again, in reading it, with the fact that the tone of voice in which it is uttered is likely to alter profoundly the impression which any account of a human situation makes upon one. Miss Powdermaker seems to be able to tell us all, or nearly all, that the most searching inquirer needs to know about race relations in Cottonville, without any apparent inhibitions and without the necessity of lifting her voice for the sake of emphasis.

The result is that this study will probably not get the reaction from the general reading public that the facts stated might call out if retold in a tone suggesting "something ought to be done about this now." The effect is, however, to set the racial situation out in a light where it seems less shocking and more human, suggesting the necessity for action no doubt, but for action less drastic and more intelligent than the situation, as ordinarily conceived, has seemed to demand.

It was interesting to know that, in the long period since emancipation, the caste system is still functioning in the region of the Mississippi Delta much as it did sixty years ago, the chief differences being that a Negro middle class has, in the meantime, come into existence and the topics of conversation in Negro society have become more worldly and sophisticated.

One thing one misses in this report is some more complete account of



the poor white class or caste. This seems the more important in view of the fact that the two most obvious examples of the neglected man, the Negro and the white share-cropper, though visibly antagonistic to one another, seem nevertheless so obviously bound together in a common destiny that the struggle of one to rise inevitably impedes the efforts of the other. But that is, of course, another story, and I merely mention it to emphasize the fact that the subject, even by so intelligent a study as this, is by no means exhausted.

ROBERT E. PARK

*University of Chicago*

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*Brass Tacks.* By A. G. KELLER. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1938. Pp. 233. \$2.00.

If one wishes the Sumner-Keller political and social philosophy in journalistic English, this is by all means the book to read. The publisher claims that this book deals with the unchanging things—the things upon which all human societies, at all times, have been founded, namely, the home, property, government, and religion. The general philosophy advocated is of course one of laissez faire and “mind your own business” along all lines. It is a book to be commended to political, economic, and social radicals, because it will tell them more clearly than any other book that I can think of, of the social and political philosophy against which they will have to contend. Nevertheless, there is much in the book with which the critical reader will find himself in hearty agreement. Such, for example, are Professor Keller’s contentions against wishful thinking, against the eclipse of the social virtues, against the mutilation of facts. Again, all sociologists would agree with him that a social creed should be derived from experience, not from superstitions or mere emotions. His contention against rash experimentation and the easy setting-aside of social traditions that have been tested by the experience of the past is worthy of commendation.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

*Duke University*

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*Jugendbriefe.* By MAX WEBER. Tübingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1937. Pp. 375. Rm. 4.80.

*Early Letters* covers that part of Weber’s correspondence from the age of thirteen to thirty which Marianne Weber, his widow and biographer, thought to be of legitimate public interest. The recipients are almost ex-

clusively near-relatives. Subjects of the letters are anything that attracted young Weber's interest.

The letters are particularly suitable for tracing almost all the significant characteristics of the mature Weber and for studying the personal and intellectual environment which shaped the progress from school-boy to scholar. One would look in vain for a stroke of genius in the letters, for they can almost be characterized by their normality and soundness. Yet they betray the unusual personality: a deep, almost priestly, seriousness and a strong feeling of responsibility; keen judgment and clarity of thought and expression; pointedness and conciseness of style; and universality and depth of interest.

Weber's environment is the typical highly cultivated Berlin home of the late nineteenth century—somewhat like that of Thomas Mann's *Buddenbrooks*. The atmosphere was that of the German-Christian, religious, liberal family of the period: liberal and yet conservative, traditional, and national; mildly critical toward the government; safe, stable, and secure but with an occasional touch of social responsibility.

PHILIPP WEINTRAUB

*Cornell University*

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*A Social Study of Pittsburgh.* By PHILIP KLEIN *et al.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1938. Pp. xxvi+958. \$4.75.

This is one of those rare jobs which so successfully effects the purpose for which it was designed that it is difficult to imagine, realistically, how the task could have been substantially better done. "In prime intention this is a social work survey: an examination of agencies and institutions that provide social and health services, whether under public or voluntary auspices." The purpose suggests a relatively narrow focus, but in no sense can it be said to limit the perspective.

The first 346 pages are devoted to "an interpretation of the social and economic life of the community—the background and matrix of social work." This section of the book might well stand by itself as an independent study and receive high praise for the range of material included, the penetrating, mature analysis, and the discrimination with which emphases are placed on underlying relationships of basic importance and local situations are seen in terms of the more general issues which they exemplify.

Part II deals with all major social and health services in Allegheny County from the point of view both of the social scientist and of the professional social worker. It includes both description and critical appraisal of existing services upon which to base specific recommendations to the

citizens' committee which sponsored the study. The competence and possible biases of members of the study staff are indicated by summaries of their previous experience; the recommendations for action are summarized; and the whole is given a practical and realistic import by the epilogue reporting on how far those recommendations had been carried out by the time the book went to press—three years after the launching of the study.

CAROLINE F. WARE

*American University*

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*Lillian Wald, Neighbor and Crusader.* By R. L. DUFFUS. New York: Macmillan Co., 1938. Pp. xiii+371. \$3.50.

In this biography of the founder and moving spirit of the Henry Street Settlement and Visiting Nursing Service the author has succeeded admirably in what he declares to be his main purpose "to present, as well as I could, a personality" (p. vi). Miss Wald's personality comes through on almost every page; virtually any chapter, read alone, tells the story. Even the illustrations, taken by themselves, show what the narrative only confirms, the immense vigor, sympathy, and charm which made Miss Wald so powerful and so beloved a leader, and, above all, her unconquerable gaiety. The appraisals by her friends in the concluding chapter seem like echoes of the reader's own thoughts. Perhaps it is not Mr. Duffus who deserves the credit, for it may well be that no one writing of Miss Wald could fail to reveal her personality.

At the same time, this book suggests that the kind of job which Mr. Duffus undertakes is better suited to an article or brochure than to a full-length book in which the theme inevitably becomes repetitious. Since the material is organized to bring out Miss Wald's personality rather than to provide a narrative of events, it is interesting in detail but does not carry as a sustained story.

It does, however, in a measure achieve the author's second purpose, that "through this focused life we might also see the picture of America, in her time, more plainly" (p. vi). It is timely today to contemplate the evidence here presented on the validity of the American faith that welcomed Miss Wald's grandparents in 1848. It was this same faith which Miss Wald herself displayed in her confidence that the East Side men toiling in sweatshops, the women struggling in dark tenements, and the bright-eyed boys and girls playing in the gutter were first-class Americans in the making, worth a lifetime of devotion and, even more, of friendship.

CAROLINE F. WARE

*American University*

*The Philanthropic Motive in Christianity: An Analysis of the Relations between Theology and Social Service.* By FRANK M. HÁNIK. Translated from the Czech by R. and M. WEATHERALL. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1938. Pp. 327. 16s. net.

In Part I the author discusses the ethos of the beginnings of the Christian religion; in Part II, the social philosophy of medieval Catholicism; in Part III, the social philosophy of the classical Reformation which centers around the writings of Martin Luther and John Calvin; in Part IV, the social philosophy of modern humanitarianism which largely centers around the ideas of William E. Channing and his successors in American unitarianism; Part V takes up the social-theological phase of charity in the Czechoslovakian church.

This is an important book—far more important than the writings of Visser t'Hooft; not so important as some sections of Ernest Troeltsch's *Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*. One is never quite certain whether Professor Hánik desires to include under the title *The Philanthropic Motive in Christianity* all that Troeltsch would include in his use of the term "social teachings of the churches." In his definition of social work the author limits the expression of social work to that group of people who are in need and must receive something from those who have. That seems to us to be true to the definition of the social work concept and to a large degree it is true to the type of work which social workers carry on. It is not large enough to include all that is included in social teachings of the church, since social teachings have to do with such matters as the relationship between those who have as well as the relationship between those who have and those who have not.

ARTHUR E. HOLT

*Chicago Theological Seminary*

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*France Faces Depopulation.* By JOSEPH J. SPENGLER. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1938. Pp. xi+313. \$3.00.

Dr. Spengler undertook a gigantic task and quite satisfactorily coped with it. Essentially there are three parts to the study. The first part of the book, comprised of the first four chapters, deals with the general growth of the population of France; the factors responsible for its decline; and the geographic shifts in its distribution due to urbanization. It includes an important chapter on differential fertility. Highly informative in its nature, this part of the study is not too well digested. A graph or

two and a few additional tables would have undoubtedly greatly facilitated the reading of the statistically overloaded text.

Far more integrated is the second part of the book. This major part of the study presents a detailed and clear historical account of the repopulationist movement in France; it analyzes the theoretical explanations of the causes of the decline in the growth of the population and their underlying social and political rationales. It examines the measures undertaken to encourage natural increase and critically weighs the factors accountable for their failure. It is thoroughly documented and should prove of great value to the student of social problems.

The third part is devoted to the economic changes expected because of a declining population. Necessitated by theoretical consideration, the analysis is based on a closed economy. Whatever the author's conclusions are, in his very wide attack of the population problem lies the contribution of his study, especially since the population pattern of France is symptomatic of many other countries.

BERNARD D. KARPINOS

*U.S. Public Health Service*  
*Washington, D.C.*

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*Public Health Services.* By NORMAN WILSON. London: Hodge & Co., 1938. Pp. 244. \$1.50.

This is a straightforward factual account of four important groups of health services in England—maternity and child welfare, the medical inspection and treatment of school children, tuberculosis care, and medical provision for those without the means to pay for it. Its special value lies in two facts. It deals with public health measures only incidentally as a matter of national legislation, more specifically as they are actually put into practice by the county boroughs, the largest units of English local government. Second, it is a study by a member of the municipal civil service who is himself engaged in the practical and difficult task of transmuting legislation and departmental orders into the welfare of the ordinary citizen. Since the author writes "from the inside," it is interesting to see whether he is inhibited from being critical where criticism is due, and also whether, immersed in the trees, he is unable to visualize the wider horizons of the woods.

Considering all the difficulties of making studies of detailed administration "live," Mr. Wilson acquits himself well on both counts. The theme which runs through the examination of each of the services is the great

and unjustifiable disparity in their standards and adequacy, as between the eighty or so counties which cover the country.

Mr. Wilson courageously recommends stronger central government powers, a national public health advisory council, and regional public health commissioners, to bring about the planning and extension of health services where they are most needed. It will encourage many health reformers on this continent to read the view of an English public servant—and one in local government at that—that democracy must concern itself with the *ends* of public health and not stop short at local autonomy and “the distribution of powers” as democratic means, if these perpetuate too many gaps in the national welfare network.

LEONARD C. MARSH

*McGill University*

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*Incentives and Contentment.* By PATRICIA HALL and H. W. LOCKE. London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, 1938. Pp. xii+190. \$1.00.

In this interesting study of the behavior and attitudes of workers in a British factory the “unguided interview” was the principal research tool. The writers examined problems of worker satisfaction and discontent, work incentives, leadership, and worker maladjustment. It is an important attempt to study the human problems of the factory situation. It is significant that the problems and the workers’ attitudes are similar to those found in factories in the United States. Actually the method used and much of the interpretation suggest that the writers were strongly influenced by the work of Drs. Elton Mayo and F. J. Roethlisberger, of Harvard University, and W. J. Dickson, of Western Electric Company.

The book is weak in not presenting sufficient data to illustrate the methods of interpretation and conclusions. Also, it leaves one with a feeling of a number of interesting conclusions which do not fit together into a coherent whole. Certainly, it suggests that the authors have been unable to see beyond the superficial aspects of their subject.

B. B. GARDNER

*Chicago*

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*British Experiments in Public Ownership and Control.* By TERENCE H. O'BRIEN. London: Allen & Unwin, 1938. Pp. 304. \$1.50.

Like most other studies sponsored by the (British) Institute of Public Administration, this book marks off a particular part of a field, examines

it ably and comprehensively, but stays carefully within its self-imposed boundaries. Taking three major examples of what are now commonly called "public corporations"—the Central Electricity Board, the British Broadcasting Corporation, and the London Passenger Transport Board (the first two created in 1926 and the latter in 1933)—Mr. O'Brien gives a fully documented account of their legislative origins, their organization and personnel, their functions, problems, and achievements. The "practical" politics and economics of each body are well and readably discussed; but the author deliberately eschews the broader questions of what economic services in general should be socialized, or their best form of organization and finance as part of a national plan. A specific concern of the book, however, is the extent to which the public corporation is or should be removed from political control, the exact relation of each body to Parliament, and how far it maintains a proper "accountability" to the public.

As between these three great services alone, there are many differences which offer intensely interesting comparisons for the student of politico-economic development. The Central Electricity Board, organized only after a long period of government and private reports, press campaigns, and political agitation both open and under cover, has now replaced completely the former "confused medley of normally small and economically haphazard" undertakings, though it is still confined only to production and transmission. Its efficiency, technically in the organization of the national power-production network known as the Grid, and in reducing rates and extending consumers' use of electricity, is now widely conceded, though it has been developed in a singularly uneventful and unpublicized atmosphere. The London Transport Board raised the issue of capitalism versus socialism in much more decided form. Even the legislation which finally created the L.P.T.B. underwent three years of vicissitudes. Today a unit whose size alone "is imposing to the point of bewilderment," with operating statistics of an astronomical character, it is making evident and continuous progress in one of the world's most formidable transport areas. But, compared with the tangle of compromise and classification which characterize its capital structure, the financing of the Electricity Board and, most of all, of the B.B.C., seems simplicity itself. This chapter for the L.P.T.B. is not yet finished, as events since Mr. O'Brien's book was published are bearing out.

The most striking feature of the history of British broadcasting is the almost complete unanimity with which it has been voted a matter for public operation. Yet, of all services, it has had to live the most per-

petually bathed in the fires of public like and dislike. Mr. O'Brien's book is worth reading alone for the sections in which he reviews the pros and cons of its programs, political broadcasts, censorship, educational developments, etc. (pp. 124-39, 193-201). He acquits it with credit on its programs, with more room for serious doubts on the influence of the *status quo* on politics and directorships.

What emerges most clearly from the whole is that in all these "experiments" there has been far more of compromise than of principle. Much British "nationalization" is not merely "nationalization in a rubber sheet, so that those who handle it should not be shocked," as Mr. Lloyd George once referred to the C.E.B., but state-regulated monopoly organized perforce to meet the obvious logic of co-ordination or an urgent problem of competitive inefficiency. It is public responsibility in various forms (some of them vague) rather than out-and-out public ownership, which is the more universal commodity in Britain. The reader who wishes to examine this thesis, though it is not Mr. O'Brien's own, will find in his book a mine of material which is excellently disposed and treated.

LEONARD C. MARSH

McGill University

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*How To Promote Community and Industrial Development.* By FREDERICK H. McDONALD. New York: Harper & Bros., 1938. Pp. xii+260. \$3.00.

An urban sociologist will find it wholesome once in a while to read a book like this one by a consulting engineer with "long experience in representing both cities and manufacturers in negotiating for changes in plant location," apparently especially in the South. The sociologist will see familiar words—"community development," "measuring local trends," "surveys and data," "community influences"—in contexts that will shock him; and he will realize, upon reflection, that it is in these contexts, rather than his own, that the terms are being discussed with legislators, councilmen, and industrialists and are being used to influence the migration of industry that is changing the face and organization of many southern communities.

The sociologist will be interested, too, in the careful description of local organization for the business of attracting industry: why state-wide organization will not do, what pitfalls to avoid, how to produce power from that "generating core from which radiates much of the people's unselfish action"—enlightened self-interest. Here, too, are the arguments that presumably appeal to the industrialist, the movement of whose plant



may change the whole life of a community. Thus, "the advantages of having a self-contained area, detached from interfering and competitive community life, have been apparent to many enterprises, and there have been many thriving communities developed around the detached production and housing facilities of such operations" (p. 165).

There is a special supplement on "The Southern Economic Frontier." The South is leading in "new population: the lack of congestion of similarly employed laborers in any locality in the South has made for a relatively free play of wage influences" (p. 247). Whether we like them or not, here are the ideas that seem to be leading the southern states to a competitive orgy of state advertising, promotion, offers of tax exemption, and the rest.

CHARLES S. ASCHER

*New York City*

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*The Right To Work.* By NELS ANDERSON. New York: Modern Age Books, 1938. Pp. 152. \$0.50.

Anyone looking for an excellent summary of the self-justification by the Works Progress Administration of its own efforts will welcome this book. This is no negative criticism, for on the whole the W.P.A. through its research and public relations departments has done a first-rate job of meeting criticism with pertinent facts. I have no doubt that Mr. Anderson, in his position as director of the Section on Labor Relations, W.P.A., has made numerous contributions to such justification.

Nevertheless, it is to be regretted that one in such a key position has not given us a more critical treatment of this subject. The book has many and good answers to the major criticisms of W.P.A. from opponents of the system. It contains little if any self-criticism. The tone of the book is well represented by the declaration on the jacket: "At last, a Magna Charta for the unemployed." Since that statement obviously gives a clue to the book's purpose, one should perhaps judge it from that point of view, recommend it as an enthusiastic and well-written accomplishment of that purpose, and then hope that Mr. Anderson will not too long wait to give us the benefit of his experience, training, and analytical ability applied to the task of thoroughly appraising the shortcomings as well as the advantages of W.P.A.

One who is trying to think clearly on the economic and social implications of the presence of eleven million unemployed in our midst will find throughout the book suggestions that stimulate his interest for a more thoroughgoing development of the ideas. The major premise of some of these suggestions—that social economics rather than business

economics alone is the appropriate guide for government action—promises to demand increasing attention from all thoughtful persons.

E. WIGHT BAKKE

*Yale University*

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*Migration and Environment.* By H. L. SHAPIRO (with the field assistance of FREDERICK HULSE). New York: Oxford University Press, 1939. Pp. xi+594. \$7.50.

The study is based upon the anthropometric and morphologic analysis of 2,594 individuals, of whom 1,781 were children and 813 were adults. Three groups are considered: (1) "sedentes," natives born and still resident in Japan, selected on basis of kinship to the other groups; (2) Japanese-born residents of Hawaii; and (3) Hawaiian-born children of these immigrants. The broad aim of the study is to observe the physical effect of migration in terms of selective factors and in terms of impact of changed environment.

When "sedentes" and immigrants are compared, significant differences (three times their standard errors) are found in 72.4 per cent of the measurements of males and in 67.9 per cent of the measurements of females. When immigrants and Hawaiian-born are compared, measurement differences are found in 55.2 and 42.9 per cent, male and female, respectively. For "sedentes" and Hawaiian-born the differences found are 79.3 and 67.9 per cent. These differences are progressive from "sedentes," to immigrants, to Hawaiian-born; but, whereas between "sedentes" and immigrants disproportional changes occur, between immigrants and Hawaiian-born proportionate changes are the rule. The progression is a real one, relatively unaffected by age changes or changes in occupational status.

From the study two major concepts emerge: (1) the selective power of a changed environment, presumably acting on phenotypic characters; and (2) the essential plasticity of man as an organism, although range of variability is a predictable quality; human types are essentially unstable within measureable bounds.

WILTON MARION KROGMAN

*University of Chicago*

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*Individual Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges.* By FREDERICK J. GAUDET. ("Archives of Psychology," No. 230.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1938. Pp. 58. \$1.00.

Dr. Gaudet has here undertaken an original empirical research on the psychology of the Judge's sentencing tendencies based upon the sound as-

sumption that we do not have "a justice of laws" but, as Justice Hughes points out, a "justice of laws, through men."

The research found that judges do differ considerably in their sentencing behavior as measured by the type of sentences they impose upon prisoners; in spite of some fluctuations which appear from year to year and for certain types of crime, most of the judges considered in this study maintained a relative consistency which differentiates the "severe" from the "lenient" judges; experience on the bench, imminence of reappointment, or change in business conditions are not determining factors in the differences found.

From a psychological point of view the basic finding of the study is that "judges come on the bench with a certain sentencing tendency which remains at a relatively constant level. . . . Differences among the judges can probably best be accounted for by the use of the general term, personality" (pp. 42 and 55).

Since the author has not indicated the actual years (nine) covered by the study (for the purpose of preserving the anonymity of the subjects), and since the comparative data for curves of business conditions and sentencing tendencies for the period studied are not presented, there is good reason to doubt the conclusion that differences in sentencing tendencies are not a function of changes in general business conditions. One must also question the amorphous conclusion that individual differences in the sentencing tendencies of judges are accounted for by "personality." Granted that the object of this study was "to obtain quantitative estimates of differences," the author has a chapter on "Some Factors Influencing the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges" (p. 31). But in no instance are these factors indicated or their relative influence measured. The psychologist and sociologist should know *what* personality factors accounted for the persistence of tendencies of "leniency" or "severity" among the judges, as well as their personal, political, social, and economic background which served to form the "personality."

NATHAN BODIN

*Chicago*

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*The Startle Pattern.* By CARNEY LANDIS and WILLIAM A. HUNT. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1939. Pp. x+168. \$2.50.

A loud, unexpected sound causes in most persons a startle. Earlier accounts in the psychological literature failed to agree on the description of just what this startle is. Landis and Hunt, using cameras with speeds as high as three thousand exposures a second, are now able to describe

what takes place and the duration of the reaction. The full pattern involves an eye blink, a facial expression, and characteristic movements of head, shoulders, arms, trunk, and knees, generally occurring within half a second. But this is far from invariable. Most individuals apparently show only a part of the pattern, and some give responses in some muscles the opposite of the typical pattern. The pattern is clearly distinct from voluntary movement, which may occur after the startle. Observations on variations with age, race, drugs, psychoses, etc., showed little differences—the principal exceptions being catatonic schizophrenia, in which the startle is increased, and epilepsy, in which it is sometimes absent.

The study is exploratory rather than definitive. In spite of the superior techniques, there are flaws resulting from small numbers of cases, and a visible tendency of the authors to summarize results in a manner suggesting that these results are neater than the data really show.

ROBERT E. L. FARIS

*McGill University*

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*Southern Plainsmen.* By CARL COKE RISTER. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1938. Pp. xviii+289. \$3.00.

From material gathered from varied sources—anecdotes, memoirs, letters, diaries, newspaper files—the author presents in an entertaining fashion an account of cultural accommodation to conditions of the frontier. The reader is introduced to a large number of personality types peculiar to a former day and to the pioneering community—the parson, the schoolmaster, the doctor, the cowhand, and the trader. The student of sociology will be especially interested in the author's treatment of the process of settlement and the round of life of the settler in the home, on the range, at work, at play, in sickness and health, in dealing out justice, and in defense against marauding Indians and lawless whites.

W. E. GETTYS

*University of Texas*

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*The Functions of the Executive.* By CHESTER I. BARNARD. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938. Pp. xvi+334. \$3.50.

From the ranks of the country's leading executives comes a major contribution to the understanding of our society. In his book, *The Functions of the Executive*, Chester I. Barnard, president of the New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, presents an analysis of the nature of business

organizations and the functions of executives in them. He has been able to stand apart from the minutiae of his everyday experiences and to view them as part of the orderly functioning of the organization as a whole.

Mr. Barnard sees all organizations as co-operative systems, complex systems of interrelated factors, basic to which are the individuals and processes of communication between individuals. He discusses the physical and biological limitations, the nature of co-operative action, the relations between formal and informal organizations, problems of incentives, the function of communication, sources of authority, and other aspects in a very general way; and he tries to show how they all fit together as parts of a working whole. He analyzes in more detail the nature of the executive function, its place in the total structure, and the limitations and problems arising from that position and function.

Because of the functional approach, the scope of the subject is very great, and the whole book is hardly more than a general and summary statement. For this reason, it may have little appeal to those executives who, because of their concern with immediate and specific problems, fail to consider the so-called "theoretical" problems of organization. Nevertheless the work has important implications, for it points the way to the development of more effective co-operative systems and at the same time to the development and communication of the executive techniques essential to such systems.

BURLEIGH B. GARDNER

*Chicago*

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*A Regional Program for the Social Studies.* By A. C. KREY. New York: Macmillan Co., 1938. Pp. xiii+140. \$1.25.

*Adaptability of Public School Systems.* By PAUL R. MORT and FRANCIS G. CORNELL. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1938. Pp. xii+146. \$2.10.

If schools can be expected to perform their functions as well as known facts permit, these books are a severe indictment. They criticize many present purposes and practices as obsolete, bring to light various lags and drags affecting education, and offer what are viewed as better ways of relating the school to our complex and changeful scheme of living.

Krey's program is rooted in a social-studies experiment at the University of Minnesota. In essence, it weaves together the *here* and *now* with the *there* and *then* in a supposedly regional frame of reference. One who is familiar with the robust regionalism of Odum and others will be disappointed in the shadowy concept sketched by Krey. For example,

aside from two references to "the grain and dairy industries," the curricular program (pp. 58-59) developed for this region seems equally applicable to any other region. Nowhere is it made evident that these basic industries condition collective life in distinctive ways, and the Tuttle School District (survey appended) might be almost anywhere within the nation.

Mort and Cornell approach school problems not from the standpoint of regionalism but in terms of national trends and locality variations. Their major concern is with the school's adaptability, i.e., its capacity to initiate changes in course content, teaching methods, and administrative procedures to meet the needs of the local community. Their work is admittedly exploratory, evaluative, and incomplete. Its chief contributions would seem to lie in the lists of criteria set up for judging institutional adaptability and for identifying environmental and school factors affecting this process of change.

LLOYD A. COOK

*Ohio State University*

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*English Radicalism, 1832-1852.* By S. MACCOBY. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1938. Pp. 462. \$5.00.

When the House of Lords in 1831 rejected the Reform Bill, England was very close to civil war. The social ferment was in large measure due to the many radicalisms which had been organizing the middle and working classes. These were the political radicalism of Place and Attwood; the agricultural radicalism of Cobbett; the factory radicalism of the trade-unions; the commercial radicalism directed against the Corn Laws; the philosophic radicalism of Bentham and James Mill; and finally the extreme working-class radicalism of Carlisle, Hetherington, and Benbow. The purpose of this book is to trace the impact of these currents in terms of the pressure groups directing them "upon all the oppressive, irrational and selfishly maintained archaisms of English society." A great deal of attention is paid to the influence of the ultra-radicals.

The study is based on manuscript sources, periodicals, and parliamentary papers of the time, and the select Bibliography alone makes it a valuable contribution to political history. But the book is not well organized or easy to read, and the mass of detail is sometimes confusing. The Index, too, is incomplete.

The author has recently issued a sequel which carries the story of English radicalism to 1885.

J. RUMNEY

*Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton*

*Insecurity: A Challenge to America.* 2d rev. ed. By ABRAHAM EPSTEIN. New York: Random House, 1938. Pp. xvi+939. \$4.00.

The first 750-odd pages of this standard work remain identical with the first revised edition issued in 1936. The final chapter of that volume has been re-written and expanded into chapters xxxvii and xxxviii of the present edition. In these the author reiterates his opposition to and criticism of the existing Social Security Act. Much of it he asserts is "more glitter than gold." He charges that "governmental experts have been so busy working out the complicated details of the programs that they have had little time to become informed on fundamental objectives." He grants that progress has been made in several important directions but deplores the political corruption which has crept into many of the state systems of old age assistance. He considers that much money is wasted on the undeserving aged and that sales taxes especially on liquor are dubious means of financing such relief; urges a minimum state average of \$30 per month; attacks the reserve plan of financing old age benefits; rejects the present unemployment insurance plan as not reducing the burden of relief or protecting the lower wage workers most who need security; and argues for a system of benefits related to minimum subsistence standards rather than wages earned.

ARTHUR J. TODD

*Northwestern University*

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*The Nazi Primer: Official Handbook for Schooling the Hitler Youth.* Translation and Preface by HARWOOD L. CHILDS. Commentary by WILLIAM E. DODD. New York: Harper & Bros., 1938. Pp. xxxvii+280. \$2.00.

This handbook, issued in 1937 to the seven million members of the Hitler Jugend under the title of *Vom deutschen Volk und seinen Lebensraum*, is accurately described by former Ambassador Dodd as "the Bible of a Political Church." Its writ is less sacred than *Mein Kampf*, but its German circulation is greater, and the pleasing simplicity of its style renders it far more readable. It contains the most useful and authoritative summary of the Nazi credo: Nordic supremacy, Aryan superiority, Teutonic invincibility, and the Germanic mission to conquer the world.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

*Williams College*

*Group Methods in Vocational Guidance.* By LOUIS H. SOBEL and JOSEPH SAMLER. New York: Furrow Press, 1938. Pp. 111.

This is a manual intended as an aid "to workers in Jewish centers, teachers in Hebrew schools, and youth workers generally who have become conscious of the economic adjustment problems faced by Jewish youth." The authors have drawn freely upon the fields of vocational guidance, group work, and literature on Jewish economic adjustment problems for their material. They discuss vocational guidance as it may be undertaken in clubs, special-interest groups, camps, child-care institutions, and other organized groups. The manual is of general value in making accessible to workers in all group-work agencies, even to those operating outside the field of Jewish youth, information concerning contemporary methods and techniques in vocational guidance. It serves the additional purpose of placing group work in a more significant frame of reference than is frequently the case by relating it to the occupational world. The content is admittedly not creative.

CHARLES H. YOUNG

*San Francisco*

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*Shamanism in Western North America: A Study in Cultural Relationships.*

By WILLARD Z. PARK. ("Northwestern University Studies in the Social Sciences," No. 2.) Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1938. Pp. viii+166. \$2.25.

The social scientists interested in development in ethnology may well look into this little volume by Willard Park, both for its methodology and for its presentation of original materials on the religious practices of the Paviotso of western Nevada. Here is a model study of the distributional type with the aims and limitations clearly set forth, the shamanistic patterns of the Paviotso presented in theory and actuality, and the distributional data both extensive and well interpreted.

The results achieved are considerable, even though no definite time sequences are established. The shamanistic complex of the Paviotso is seen to have a multiplicity of linkages with surrounding regions which cut across the "culture areas" and suggest a long and complex culture history. To understand the significance of Shamanism in the cultures of western North America and the factors influencing its development, however, we need studies of a different kind—detailed comparative studies of the shamanistic complex in a whole series of tribes.

FRED EGGAN

*University of Chicago*



*Rural Relief Trends in Wisconsin from 1934 to 1937.* By GEORGE W. HILL and RONALD A. SMITH. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1939. Pp. 57. \$1.00.

This study, based on rural-farm and nonfarm families in nine Wisconsin counties, shows that (a) more than half of the rural relief population lives in the open country, the balance living in villages and small towns; (b) rural relief families contain higher percentages of children than the total of rural families of 1930, and a disproportionate number of family heads are over sixty-five; there are fewer adults in the productive age group thirty-five to fifty-four; (c) half of the heads of rural relief families are unemployable; (d) half of the employable ones are unskilled; and (e) not more than half of the rural-farm family heads are farmers, the remainder being largely unskilled laborers. The need for relief in rural areas appears to the authors to be "permanent."

LOWRY NELSON

*University of Minnesota*

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*Labor Leader: A Story of Progressive Unionism.* By GLEN DALE CAROTHERS. Published privately by the author. Pp. 148.

This book, published posthumously, was written by a man who probably had an intimate knowledge of the labor movement in America. It is a story of life during the mid-thirties in a large industrial community of Ohio—named Colopolis for the purposes of the story. It deals with the impact of the depression and the New Deal on a group of workers and their attempts in the direction of progressive unionism. Many of the incidents are taken from actual happenings; the author states that a number of the characters are patterned on persons whom he knew.

The book is a series of short episodes relating to the labor movement. What unity the book has results from the emphasis placed on the attempts of the workers to organize intelligently along progressive lines. What it lacks as a novel is made up by several bits of excellent reporting on the labor movement in our times in a typical industrial community.

N. H. ROGG

*Washington, D.C.*

*Broadcasting and the Public: A Case Study in Social Ethics.* By the DEPARTMENT OF RESEARCH AND EDUCATION OF THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN AMERICA. New York: Abingdon Press, 1939. Pp. 220.

*Education on the Air, 1938: Ninth Yearbook of the Institute for Education by Radio.* Edited by JOSEPHINE H. MACLATCHY. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1938. Pp. vii+351. \$3.00.

The first of these is a calm review of a number of the more obviously perplexing issues involved in the social control of broadcasting. It recommends a type of regulation by means of progressive co-operation in the formulation of codes, rather than by drastic change.

The *Yearbook* includes papers and reports of discussions on such topics as types of educational programs, school and university broadcasts, and recent developments in educational broadcasting. Of particular interest, however, are the discussions by Bode, Angell, and Lazarsfeld, which express a growing realization of the need for a comprehensive analysis of characteristics peculiar to radio and, by implication, suggest the need for study of the radio in its relation to other mediums of mass communication.

HARRY BRICKER

*Chicago*

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*Opening and Penetration of Foreign Influence in Samoa to 1880.* By JOSEPH W. ELLISON. Corvallis, Ore.: Oregon State College, 1938. Pp. 108.

This monograph is the first instalment of a painstaking documentary history of Samoa, scene of international rivalries and native factional struggles during the nineteenth century. Of necessity it draws primarily upon American and British archive materials; the corresponding German sources that would give a fully rounded interpretation are not yet available. A brief introductory statement on the people and culture omits reference to recent definitive ethnographic studies by Buck, Mead, and others. Even so, the monograph will be welcomed by scholars interested in "colonial" history and problems.

F. M. KEESING

*University of Hawaii*

*Proceedings of the National Health Conference.* By the INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE TO COORDINATE HEALTH AND WELFARE ACTIVITIES. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1938. Pp. ix+163. \$0.35.

*The Nation's Health.* By the INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE TO COORDINATE HEALTH AND WELFARE ACTIVITIES. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1939. Pp. 116. \$0.20.

In a large folio pamphlet are presented in full the official reports and the discussion at the National Health Conference called in July, 1938, by the federal Interdepartmental Committee To Coordinate Health and Welfare Activities. The significance of the conference was in part the health program itself. Federal administration of medical services was not proposed. The program is for federal aid to the states for the expansion of public health, maternal and children's services, of hospital facilities where needed, especially in rural areas, of plans of general medical care covering either self-supporting or dependent persons or both, and of temporary disability compensation to meet loss of wages due to sickness. Either general taxation or insurance, or any combination of these, might be adopted by states as means of financing organized medical care for the self-supporting.

Perhaps more notable than the program was the vigorous demand for governmental action voiced by the largest organized groups in the United States—both sections of labor, the major farm organizations, women's clubs, and civic bodies. Business was slightly represented. Significant also was an open cleavage between representatives of the American Medical Association and a considerable number of prominent physicians who disagreed sharply with its attitudes and policies. The conference seems to mark the emergence into public consciousness, and probably into the political arena, of a demand for large-scale organized action to make medical care widely available.

*The Nation's Health* is a convenient-sized pamphlet, summarizing the conference program and discussion—an unusually vigorous condensation.

MICHAEL M. DAVIS

*New York City Committee on Research in Medical Economics*

*Recreational Use of Land in the United States.* Part XI of the *Report on Land Planning*. By the NATIONAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1938. Pp. 280. \$1.25.

This survey of the outdoor recreational resources of the nation by the National Park Service is striking evidence of the growing interest of the federal government in recreational problems. Through the co-operation of various government agencies there was assembled a vast amount of data concerning the present extent and use of public lands for recreation, including federal and state lands, as well as the park systems controlled by counties and municipalities. An effort was made to estimate the total area needed to meet the recreational requirements of the people and to determine the division of responsibility between the federal and local governments for the further development of recreational resources. The volume contains many maps, charts, and pictures and in addition extensive lists of the recreational areas of different kinds administered by the states and the federal government.

J. F. STEINER

*University of Washington*

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*Supervision in Group Work.* By SIDNEY J. LINDENBERG. New York: Association Press, 1939. Pp. xiv+141. \$1.50.

Mr. Lindenberg has produced a much-needed book on methods of supervision of group leaders. He is clear and decisive in his presentation and describes a careful and systematic supervision far beyond that usually practiced in the many organizations where groups of young people are being led by volunteers, by government workers, or by students.

The book suffers somewhat from the fact that Mr. Lindenberg concentrates on the methods used in supervising students who are being trained professionally for work in this field. The great majority of group leaders are volunteers whose attitude toward their groups and toward supervision differs widely from that of the professional student. Adaptation of the methods described here will therefore need to be made to the more common situation. The reviewer also questions how effective some of Mr. Lindenberg's methods might be in breaking down resistance to supervision, especially if attempted with volunteers. With these exceptions, the book has much to offer to those interested in improved group leadership in recreation agencies.

GRACE L. COYLE

*Western Reserve University*

*Illegitimate Birth among the Gunantana.* By JOSEPH MEIER. ("Publications of the Catholic Anthropological Conference," Vol. II, No. 1.) Washington: Catholic University Press, 1938. Pp. 61. \$1.00.

The Gunantana of the northeastern corner of the Gazelle Peninsula, New Britain, Bismarck Archipelago, distinguish between a child reared by his own parents and one reared by foster-parents. They follow uterine or matrilineal descent of moiety, such descent regulating only the moiety affiliation of the child, the patrilineal descent affecting the public status. In cases of bastardy the father is almost certainly not a member of the maternal moiety.

Status is never defined, since paternity is not known. Moiety affiliations are maternal in origin; the male relatives of the bastard's mother must provide for the child. Illegitimacy among the Gunantana is a disgrace and often the bastard is done away with at birth. Ordinary participation rites are denied the child, and he is the object of a special class of slurring reference in speech.

WILTON MARION KROGMAN

*University of Chicago*

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*The Two Nations: The Life and Work of Liverpool University Settlement and Its Associated Institutions, 1906-1937.* By CONSTANCE M. and HAROLD KING. University Press of Liverpool; London: Hodder & Stoughton, Ltd., 1938. Pp. xvii+238. 7s. 6d. net.

The subtitle of this book completely describes its contents. The authors state: "Liverpool University Settlement, like Toynbee Hall, was founded by a small group sharing a belief that poverty was not an act of God but a disease of the industrial system." The simple faith of the authors that the settlement house is a key weapon "founded to break down class distinctions recognized as destructive of contemporary living" cannot be shared by the reviewer.

SAUL D. ALINSKY

*Institute for Juvenile Research*  
*Chicago, Illinois*

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*Looking behind the Censorships.* By EUGENE J. YOUNG. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1938. Pp. 368. \$3.00.

The author, who until his death in March was cable editor of the *New York Times*, has written a book that is as interesting as its title is mislead-

ing. He never discusses how censorships operate or how newspapermen get the news in spite of them.

Each European power, he states, in whatever it does, acts to protect and assure certain "elementals." For Great Britain, for instance, one elemental is the freedom of the Mediterranean passage to India; in terms of it the author interprets innumerable details of her behavior toward Spain and Italy. Again in the light of these "ultimate realisms," Mrs. Simpson appears as a useful trap to bring about the downfall of a king who was pro-German at a time when the cabinet happened to be pro-French. Hidden behind political oratory and official statements the elemental interests always provide the explanation of foreign policy.

A rather surprising chapter attempts to show that Mussolini's reputation is chiefly "build-up." Mr. Young maintains that in every public act of recent years he has been worsted by the Vatican or the House of Savoy. How he thrives on failure!

HELEN MACGILL HUGHES

*Chicago*

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*The Turkey of Ataturk: Social Process in the Turkish Reformation.* By DONALD EVERETT WEBSTER. Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939. Pp. xv+337. \$2.50.

While Dr. Webster was completing his book, Kemal Ataturk died, and the volume thus became a valedictory to an era. Knowing the country well and loving it rather wisely, the author has faith in the soundness of Turkey's sociopolitical fabric as re-woven by the late leader; this is a staunch belief that the changes toward ethnic homogeneity, social harmony, and political stability will not be undone or stagnated now that Kemal is gone. Turkey of the post-Kemal times will continue to flourish because Kemal (contrary to a general belief) was not so much a daring innovator as a clever crystallizer and channelizer of needs and transformations slowly accumulating through centuries and coming to a head during the World War. Occasionally, Dr. Webster betrays a faint excess of idolizing the late Kemal and minimizing the iniquities of the pre-Kemal Turks toward Christian minorities. On the other hand, numerous charts, maps, and other addenda more than strengthen the book's general stamp of sober and reliable scholarship.

ALBERT PARRY

*New York City*

*Rural Australia and New Zealand.* By EDMUND DE S. BRUNNER. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1938. Pp. xiii+70. \$1.50.

These charming essays by Brunner deal respectively with rural Australia and New Zealand, Pacific outposts of the North European whites. Each essay considers briefly the problems of population, land use, size of settlement, and the government's interference in the agricultural economic system. Australia, with room for at least twenty million people, has less than seven million and a birth-rate (1932-34) probably less than replacement capacity. New Zealand, much smaller, has a population of one and one-half millions, but enough fertile land for many more. Here also he finds a population which is biologically bankrupt, although Brunner does not underline this fundamental difficulty. He seems to imply (p. 13) by his quotation from Madgwick that there is no danger to the country from the increasing births among the Asiatic countries. The resettlement administration has made a miserable failure after spending \$150 per capita for every person in Australia and adding very little if any to the population or the number of satisfied farmers. In the end, the résumé of barked and burned timber, ruined soil, bankrupt governments, and increasing interference in economic processes almost seems to drive Brunner to a pessimistic outlook, although his last sentence is indefinite.

CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN

*Harvard University*

*Local Economic Effects of a Large-Scale Industrial Undertaking.* By BØRGE BARFOD. Copenhagen: Einar Munksgaard; London: Oxford University Press, 1938. Pp. 74. 3s. 6d.

The author has estimated the amount of money directly and indirectly distributed, and the amount of employment directly and indirectly afforded, to the city of Aarhus, Denmark, by the Aarhus Oil Factory, a large industrial establishment. The study reveals that this company contributes about 10 per cent of the total income of this city and its suburbs, and that between six thousand and ten thousand persons are afforded employment by it.

The author shows himself to be both ingenious and thorough. Nevertheless, he has had to make so many assumptions and estimates, owing to lack of specific data, that the results are of questionable validity. In general, however, the sociologist interested in the community will find here a fresh and stimulating inquiry and a method of approach with which he should be familiar.

A. J. JAFFE

*Chicago*

*Gypsies: Their Life and Their Customs.* By MARTIN BLOCK. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1939. Pp. xi+248. \$3.50.

In this compendium of observations, one who has lived with European gypsies has drawn upon the scholars and experts for introductory materials and has discovered for himself the difficulties of cultural reporting.

Unfortunately, the author attempts a synthetic view, under such chapter headings as "Clothes," "Religion," "Hospitality," and "Tribal Organization." But he is betrayed by firsthand knowledge into suggesting the rich diversity of gypsy life in Europe. Again, attempting to derive from the gypsies' nomad life and primitive nature the unique in gypsy gesture, food, and folklore, he finds everywhere striking similarities to the customs of the country.

Though a blend of traveler's tale and objective report, this volume serves to emphasize the isolated, self-conscious life of gypsy groups, which, in spite of European efforts to control and civilize them, continue their separate and adventitious life, alien and hostile to the settled world.

EUGENIA REMELIN WHITRIDGE

*Chicago*

*South Italian Folkways in Europe and America.* By PHYLLIS H. WILLIAMS. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938. Pp. xviii+216. \$2.50.

This "handbook for social workers, visiting nurses, school teachers and physicians," as the author subtitles her little volume describing the folkways, mores, and institutions of the regionally differentiated south Italian peoples both in the Old World and in America, is a most useful by-product of the research projects sponsored by the Institute of Human Relations at Yale. Her portrayal of social practices in south Italy as revealed in the available anthropological literature, in addition to her own comments on the Italo-American scene based on "first hand . . . contact for eleven years with over five hundred Italian and Italian-American families" should prove a source of enlightenment and understanding to those professional agencies whose task it is to function with reference to Italian immigrants and their offspring. The volume's usefulness to its special public is enhanced by a topical treatment of the areas of chief interest to social welfare workers: "Housing," "Diet," "Dress," "Marriage," "Recreation," "Education," "Religion," "Health," "Dependents," and "Death," and by the inclusion of a carefully developed index.

JOSEPH D. LOHMAN

*Institute of Juvenile Research*



*Lectures on Japan.* By INAZO NITOBÉ. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938. Pp. xii+393. \$2.00.

This is the American edition of Dr. Nitobé's American lectures given in 1932 and first published in Japan in 1936. These lectures were given for unspecialized audiences and cover a wide range of topics, including race, literature, family life, economic developments, political problems, etc. Their importance lies not so much in the information which they contain about Japan but rather in representing a well-planned effort of a liberal Japanese scholar to interpret his people to Occidentals. The writings of Dr. Nitobé are important as an introductory view of Japanese life but do not add to the more penetrating and critical studies which are increasing our knowledge of Japan.

FORREST LAVIOLETTE

*University of Washington*

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*Clippers and Consuls: American Consular and Commercial Relations with Eastern Asia, 1845-1860.* By ELDON GRIFFIN. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Edwards Bros., Inc., 1938. Pp. xxii+533. \$10.

Mr. Griffin suggests that "haltingly the two worlds—Occident and Orient—are becoming one." To trace the salient beginnings of such cultural integration, he goes back to the opening of the Far East by merchants, navy men, and consuls. In the storm and pain of the early American relations with Eastern Asia he seeks an answer to the latter-day problem of China's slow and unstable acceptance of white man's ways and of Japan's too enthusiastic adaptation of our guns and greed. The work is but part of a larger and as yet unpublished manuscript based on years of painstaking research in a great range of primary sources. A book mainly for historians, it nevertheless holds much of value to sociologists as well.

ALBERT PARRY

*New York City*

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*Women in the Soviet East.* By FANNINA W. HALLE. Translated from the German by MARGARET M. GREEN. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1938. Pp. xvii+363. \$4.00.

The author of *Women in Soviet Russia* continues her researches in the present volume dealing with those "slaves among slaves"—the women of Russian Asia emancipated by the Soviets. Dr. Halle convincingly shows that much of this equalization of the woman's status has been done

through propaganda rather than law and through social pressure rather than punishment of the male. The material of the book is ample and valuable but the presentation a bit too eulogistic to be wholly scholarly.

ALBERT PARRY

*New York City*

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*The Black Man in White America.* By JOHN G. VAN DEUSEN. Washington: Associated Publishers, Inc., 1938. Pp. 338. \$3.25.

This work attempts to describe and interpret the development and the present status of Negro-white relationships in the United States in terms of selected economic, political, cultural, and social data. The book is well documented, including references to considerable material in recent newspapers, magazines, and government publications, and it contains a good bibliography.

Dr. Van Deusen is convinced that improvement in race relations will depend in part upon the rise among Negroes of a leadership spiritually and intellectually oriented to the philosophy of Mr. Booker T. Washington.

ESTELLE HILL SCOTT

*Chicago*

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*Social Adjustment in Methodism.* By JOHN PAUL WILLIAMS. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1938. Pp. ix+131. \$1.60.


The author attempts to relate present attitudes of methodists to the formal standards of the church as found in its law and discipline. The attitudes of present-day Methodists were secured through 189 interviews and 347 responses to questionnaires from various official and lay groups in and around Springfield, Massachusetts.

The value of the findings is lessened because of certain weaknesses in technique and because the town is not typically Methodist. At times the researcher allows his own attitudes and assumptions to intrude unduly. Hypotheses too easily become accepted bases for further hypotheses. The significance of the emotional factor is often overlooked, as in the analysis of the worship value of hymns in terms of lay agreement with a prose paraphrase of their literal meaning.

MURRAY H. LEIFFER

*Garrett Theological Seminary*

## BOOK REVIEWS



*Curious Sex Customs in the Far East.* By MAGNUS HIRSCHFELD. New York: Grosset & Dunlap. Pp. xix+325.

This book by the eminent German sexologist was first published under the title "Men and Women." It reports in narrative form the observations and reflections made by the author during his travels in the Far East and in the Pacific islands. His primary interest was to secure information on the sex practices of the different peoples he visited. The discussion is casual, discursive, somewhat romantic, and full of quaint errors. Only an occasional shrewd observation makes the book of value to the social scientist. A number of interesting photographs are included with the text.

*University of Chicago*

HERBERT BLUMER

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*Prostitutes: Their Early Lives.* By the ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL QUESTIONS. ("League of Nations," Vol. IV, Official No. C. 218, M. 120.) Geneva, 1938. Pp. 140.

The Advisory Committee on Social Questions of the League of Nations undertook to procure information on the social background and personal factors of prostitutes. Data from replies, covering 2,659 prostitutes in 20 countries, comprise the contents of this publication. Apart from grave questions concerning the typicality of small samples from several countries and the comparability and reliability of the information, the report pricks the bubble of many falsely exaggerated notions about prostitutes. No one set of factors appears to be preponderantly related to a career of prostitution. Poverty is not indicated as being an outstanding background condition, although the women do not come from homes of high material advantages. Interesting, too, is the finding that the often suspected forced entry into prostitution through the seductive agency of procurers is not confirmed. The investigation paves the way for a realistic approach to the problem of prostitution by those who are actively concerned about it.

WALTER C. RECKLESS

*Vanderbilt University*

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*The People and the Land: Proceedings of the Twentieth American Country Life Conference.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938. Pp. 124. \$1.50.

The annual conference reported in this volume afforded an opportunity for the members to dig into many aspects of the question of how our rural

population may effect a better adjustment to the land and to a changing social milieu. Although statements of a trite "inspirational" kind are by no means absent, most of the papers attempt to deal realistically with the facts of rural life and social change. A new feature is the reporting of samples of the discussions from the "Youth Section" and the "Conference on the Rural Home."

CARROLL D. CLARK

*University of Kansas*

*Immigrant Settlements in Connecticut: Their Growth and Characteristics.*

By SAMUEL KOENIG. (Works Progress Administration, Federal Writers' Project for the State of Connecticut.) Hartford: Connecticut State Department of Education, 1938. Pp. 68.

This pamphlet is a compilation of existing data on ethnic groups in Connecticut. The account shows familiarity with historical and statistical sources of information on nationality groups. The report is well supported by diagrams and bibliography. The author includes descriptive sketches of seventeen cultural groups easily identified by numerical preponderance and by the fact that they have some form of organized communal life.

Another project now under way will be "a comprehensive treatise on the role of immigrant groups in Connecticut life."

BESSIE BLOOM WESSEL

*Connecticut College*

*Le Problème de la méthode.* By MARIN STEFANESCO. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1938. Pp. vi+361. Paper, Fr. 40.

This book will be of little interest to sociologists as such; it is devoted to a review and consideration of the problem of method in a metaphysical sense, and has only remote bearing on the problems of scientific method. The author seeks to defend a theological point of view and devotes a large part of his space to purely theological reasoning.

*Children in Court.* By MALCOLM HATFIELD. New York: Paebar Co., 1938. Pp. ix+184. \$2.00.

As a member of the Michigan Corrections Commission and as judge of the probate and juvenile courts of St. Joseph, Michigan, has prompted this sermon and compendium of "horse sense," further adulterated by a dubious admixture of science and percentages. The judge presents in summary style a long list of his experiences with offenses and offenders, ranging from The Air Gun Evil

and Voodooism through Theft, Insanity, and Dangerous Philosophies. The book is addressed to citizens and students in all walks of life, for "nothing less than a phenomenon can awaken the public from its deep seated lethargy" (p. 183).

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*Are We Movie-Made?* By RAYMOND MOLEY. New York: Macy-Masius, 1938. Pp. viii+64. \$1.00.

Mr. Moley herein undertakes—at the suggestion of representatives of the motion-picture industry—to present in brief those parts of Mr. Mortimer Adler's book, *Art and Prudence*, which survey the Payne Fund motion-picture studies. That is fair enough. Mr. Moley should, however, have made it clear that Adler is not party to statements to the effect that the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America represent "prudence" in Mr. Adler's sense of that term.

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*Society Faces the Future.* By RUTH WOOD GAVIAN. New York: D. C. Heath & Co., 1938. Pp. xiv+656. \$1.96.

This is a high-school text in sociology. The generally accepted sociological concepts are presented and used. Numerous pictorial charts present facts and trends in an interesting way.

Sociology is considered the inclusive social science, which allows the author to introduce some political science and some economics. It is also called an evaluative science, which allows her to discuss social planning and suggest how to correct the faults of the present state of things. The tone is, in general, rather moralistic and optimistic. That is perhaps necessary in a book to be used in high schools.

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*Redirecting Teacher Education.* By GOODWIN WATSON, DONALD P. COTTRELL, and ESTHER M. LLOYD-JONES. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, 1938. Pp. x+105. \$1.35.

This little book will be of interest mainly as a statement of what the professors in leading teachers colleges are thinking about. The talk is of higher standards, adjusted personality, breadth of education, the value of research as teacher training, etc. It seems implicitly assumed that teachers' education is a thing apart from education for others.

# ABSTRACTS OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

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The persons who have aided in the preparation of the material for this issue are: Hubert Bonner, Hugh D. Duncan, Georg B.-de Huszar, Merton D. Oyler and Paul C. P. Siu. The numerals and letters appearing after each abstract correspond to the items in the following scheme of classification:

- |                                 |                                      |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| I. THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY        | e) The State and Political Process   |
| a) Sociological Theory          | f) The School and Education          |
| b) History of Sociology         | g) Economic Institutions             |
| c) Methods of Research          | h) Voluntary Associations            |
| d) The Teaching of Sociology    | IV. POPULATION AND HUMAN ECOLOGY     |
| II. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY           | a) Demography                        |
| a) Human Nature and Personality | b) Ecology                           |
| b) Collective Behavior          | c) The Rural and the Urban Community |
| III. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION        | V. DISORGANIZATION                   |
| a) The Family                   | a) Personal Disorganization          |
| b) Ethnic and Racial Groups     | b) Social Disorganization            |
| c) Social Stratification        |                                      |
| d) The Church and Religion      |                                      |

239. Some Changes in Social Life in a Community with a Falling Intelligence Quotient.—The following results are predicted as probable consequences of a fall in the intelligence distribution curve: (1) a drop in the academic standards in schools accompanied by an increased cost of education; (2) an increase in the unemployment of the less skilled workers; (3) a decrease in the average real earning capacity of the community as a whole; (4) an increase in delinquency and a rise in aggressiveness between individuals and nations; (5) an increase in the crudeness of general cultural tastes and interests and the progressive dominance of the average in human life; and (6) the reduction of social and political freedom and an intensification of control over the behavior of the individual.—R. B. Catell, *British Journal of Psychology*, XXVIII (1938), 430-50. (Va, b.) H. B.

240. Quelques remarques sur les rapports de la sociologie et de la linguistique: Durkheim et F. de Saussure [Some Remarks on the Relations of Sociology and Linguistics: Durkheim and F. de Saussure].—The thesis that language is a social fact holds a definite place in general linguistics. Partisans of the sociological doctrine in linguistics indicate clearly that the sense of this thesis is a Durkheimian one. Collective representations are the chief social facts, exterior to the consciousness of the individual, endowed with the power of coercion by means of which they are imposed upon the individual, and reinforced by the collective conscience. Language as conceived by De Saussure corresponds exactly to the social fact of Durkheim in that it is half-psychoic and half-social, is exterior to the individual, and exists in the collective conscience of the group. F. de Saussure followed with great interest the philosophical debate between Durkheim and Tarde. In the opposition of "language" and "word" one sees the contrast between the ideas of Durkheim and those of Tarde.—W. Doroszewski, *Journal de psychologie*, XXX (1933), 82-91. (IIb, Ia.) H. W. D.

241. **A Bird's-Eye View of the Han Society.**—The society of the Han dynasty was in the process of transition which marked the end of the ancient and the beginning of the Middle Ages. The original cultural areas centered around the Yellow River and began to expand farther south to the Yangtze regions. The influence of the old ruling families vanished, but there arose numbers of smaller ones. The whole social structure seemed to be in the midst of change. Social life between the sexes began to enjoy more freedom. Although marriage was arranged by the parents, son and daughter were given the right to make the ultimate decision. The most popular form of recreation in the Han period was gambling in various forms, and the most serious crime was tomb-excavating.—Yu-chin Chu, *Sociological World*, III (1930), 99-128. (IIIe.) P. C. P. S.

242. **An Attitude Study of Chinese Women toward Marriage Problems.**—Two hundred college and middle-school girls in Peiping, ages fourteen to twenty-seven, from thirteen different provinces, answered the questionnaires. According to the data obtained, the change of ideas of the modern woman is remarkable. The percentages of preference being: for "small family," 79; for activity in society after marriage, 79.5; for sex equality, 98; for birth control, 90.5. Health and knowledge are considered as most important qualities of man, while wealth and political power are regarded as not necessary.—Le-lan Chen, *Sociological World*, III (1930), 129-58. (IIa.) P. C. P. S.

243. **The General Trend of the Present National Salvation Movement in China.**—Among the family of nations there are two types: the economically superior and the economically inferior. As an agricultural civilization China had been in an advanced position. She has fallen behind ever since the Industrial Revolution. The general trend of the present national movement seems to be an attempt to recover the economically superior status among nations.—Yu-lan Feng, *Sociological World*, IX (1936), 257-65. (IIIe.) P. C. P. S.

244. **The Chinese Feudal Society.**—The Chow dynasty marked the end of hunting life and the beginning of agricultural civilization in China. The birth of the Chinese feudal system took place in the midst of this cultural transformation. Territories bestowed upon the feudal kings became their own private properties, and they were at liberty, in turn, to bestow upon their subordinates, the feudal lords, land holdings of whatever size they pleased. According to the system, the oldest son of the family was the legitimate heir to the father's estate. Socially there were five classes: the emperor, the feudal kings, the feudal lords, the scholars, and the commoners.—Tung-tsu Chu, *Sociological World*, IX (1936), 283-99. (IIIe.) P. C. P. S.

245. **Crime and Punishment in Preliterate Societies.**—One aspect of the cultural life of man is the demand for consensus and absolute co-operation in maintaining its solidarity. Crime occurs when one challenges the existing social order; to protect it, laws and social sanctions become established. Crime, however, changes as well as culture. It is, moreover, always defined by culture. According to Radcliffe-Brown, crime in preliterate societies can be classified into two types: (1) public crime, considered as challenging the group solidarity, which must be judged by the group; and (2) private crime, regarded as harmful only to the individual, which is to be settled, therefore, between individuals. Sorcery, incest, and sacrilege are considered as public delicts, and murder, adultery, and robbery are considered as private delicts.—Ching-yueh Yen, *Sociological World*, IX (1936), 221-56. (Vb.) P. C. P. S.

246. **Suggestions for the Study of Chinese Family Problems.**—Owing to the impact of social change, the Chinese family is now in a transitional period. According to recent statistical data, among the various causes of suicide, domestic discord is estimated as a strong factor, accounting for slightly more than 25 per cent. In order to solve the problem successfully, the family population, economic, adjustmental, and educational aspects of the institution must be studied systematically and objectively.—Kit-king Lei, *Sociological World*, IX (1936), 267-82. (IIIa, 1c.) P. C. P. S.

247. **Social Survey and Community Study.**—The social survey has had a great vogue in recent years in China. From the years 1927 to 1935, 9,027 surveys of different interests

and extent were completed. The attempt here is to examine the social survey critically and to introduce intentionally the conceptual framework and methods of research of community study. The social survey may be treated separately as (1) a form of social movement and (2) a technique of social study. As a form of social movement the social survey is a product of a current social condition. It ends as soon as its goal is achieved. As a technique of social study it serves as a tool for the social reformer. As a technique, some of the social surveys carried on in the West have obtained quite satisfactory results. The technique, however, may not be successful if applied in surveys of the illiterate masses in China. Furthermore, it overemphasizes quantitative and economic analysis and fails to treat the community as an organic whole. Its chief value lies in carrying on a reform program rather than in finding laws and principles of common life. Stimulated by the survey movement, social scientists began to apply their conceptual framework in actual researches. There are two disciplines from which the community may be studied: human ecology and functional anthropology. The former is represented by the "Chicago school" of sociology, whose chief exponents are Park, Burgess, and McKenzie; the latter is represented by Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski. Although these two disciplines are different in their origin, point of view, and field of interest, they have in common the study of the community as a whole. The methods of these disciplines may be used interchangeably.—Ch'eng-hsin Chao, *Sociological World*, IX (1936), 151-205. (1c.) P. C. P. S.

**248. Changes Taking Place in the Chinese Language and Chinese Thought Forms.**—

The relationship between Chinese thought forms and the Chinese language can be studied from the standpoint that linguistic forms and thought forms are merely different aspects of the same entity. During the present period of transformation new thought forms often appear within old linguistic forms. This transformation indicates the confused condition of communication which may be compared to the use of old-fashioned wooden carts to transport imported foreign gasoline.

The national tongue movement, the westernization of speech, and the great westward migration due to the present Sino-Japanese war are the motivating forces of the linguistic change. The change of the Chinese language has taken place in two ways: (1) the phonetic change, showing that the coming national tongue, based upon the Peiping dialect, will have the strong accents flattened out and the supradental initial modified; (2) the vocabulary change, showing that the transliteration of foreign words will not play an important role and that polysyllabic verbs will increase in number. The introduction of Western concepts and methods will perhaps necessitate the creation of new linguistic forms. The Chinese language may become more abstract and the definition-making linguistic forms may play an important part in it.—C. W. Luh, *Sociological World*, X (1938), 1-15. (1a.) P. C. P. S.

**249. Thought, Language, and Culture.**—From the study of the history of Western philosophy, we learn that the philosophical problems of the West are not the same as those of the Chinese philosophers. The difference between Western and Eastern thought lies in cultural and linguistic differences, in the fact that Western logic is but a particular form of logic characteristic of the Western subject-predicate form of language construction, and in the belief that a theory of knowledge must be studied in relation to the cultural history of the society in which it is found. Thus the law of identity, the subject-predicate proposition in sentence structure, and the categories of substance and causality in philosophy take religious thought as a background and are characteristic of Western culture; while correlation logic, nonexclusive classification, and analogical definition, taking political thought as a background, are characteristic of Chinese culture. These two types of thought differ not only in their categories and their basic rules of logic but also in their attitudes. Considering his attitudes in putting a question about anything, the Western thinker is concerned with the question, "What is it?" and later with the question, "How should one react to it?" The Chinese thinker's concern is with "how?" rather than with "what?" The latter may be characterized as the "how-priority attitude" and the former as the "what-priority attitude." In any society the immediate social forces determine the trend of thought, while the remote cultural heritage determines the forms upon which thought is made possible. Culture



may be used to explain categories which in turn may be used to explain mental differences. So far as basic human nature is concerned, two kinds of "residues" may be distinguished, namely, the residues of persistence and of dominance. With these emotional drives come outward manifestations or "derivations." From the residue of persistence develop Western culture, and from that of dominance develops Chinese culture. It is not that the Chinese do not have the residue of persistence, but in their original nature or derivations it is undeveloped. Nor is it that the Western people do not have the residue of dominance, for Western metaphysics is nothing but a disguised form of socio-political thought. Human knowledge has four levels: the external structure behind sensations, the sensations, the constructions, and interpretation. These levels are interrelated. The former two are external and objective, the latter internal and subjective, aspects of the process.—Tung-sun Chang, *Sociological World*, X (1938), 17-54. (1a.) P. C. P. S.

250. **The Population Question in Community Studies.**—Population seems to be treated best from the community standpoint. By community is meant the living-together of a population in a common area. Community as thus defined is made up of three elements, namely, habitat, population, and the process of living together. The study of population in all its aspects is a prerequisite to the understanding of the process of living together. Conversely, it can be equally claimed that a thorough treatment of a human population must involve an analysis of the behavior of the group concerned as well as of the physical materials. A demographic analysis of the community's population falls into three divisions, namely, the size, the composition, and the distribution (spatial). This classification is necessarily arbitrary, but, as in the case of any scientific classification, it serves as a basis for the collection and analysis of data. The complicated functional relationship of the population, habitat, and culture can be illustrated by consideration of the balance of human reproduction and cultural production. The dynamic balance between human reproduction and cultural production is radically different from the Malthusian static balance between population and means of subsistence. In order to complete a population study of a Chinese village community it is suggested that a minimum of one year's residence be required of the investigator, who, with the help of assistants, would take two general censuses, one at the beginning and the other at the end of his work. In the intervening period he would register births, deaths, marriages, and migrations, and record social practices relating to population. It might be further suggested that four occupational censuses are needed in order to understand thoroughly the seasonal nature of occupational activities.—Ch'eng-hsin Chao, *Sociological World*, X (1938), 336-57. (IVa.) P. C. P. S.

251. **Társadalmi Fejlődések és a Modern Államok Alakulásai [Social Movements and the Foundation of Modern States].**—Fascism is the synthesis emerging from the conflict of individualism and collectivism. Owing to the development of modern technology, society is based much more than previously on collective interests. Thus arise the idea of the state and the concept of order and regimentation. The state intervenes in social life in order to harmonize the different interests in the life of a nation and to provide organization.—Gerolamo L. Bassani, *Külügyi Szemle*, XV (1937), 349-58. (IIIc.) G. B. de H.

252. **Race et nation [Race and Nation].**—In the liberal state the members of a nation are related by a common culture, the expression of which is the language. Today many nations of Europe, e.g., National Socialist Germany, have adopted the ideal of a community in which the ethnic factor is decisive. The nation is regarded as a spiritual community formed in the course of history. Individuals change continually, while race is something more constant. It is not race, however, but similar subjective appreciation and feeling which make a man a member of a nation. The race in the nation is only one component; and it is not ethnic origin but consciousness of a common historical tradition which makes one a member of a nation. When one speaks of a Hungarian race, it cannot be a biological but a historical formation, for the Hungarian race is the fusion of many races that have lived in symbiosis for hundreds of years.—Etienne Csekey, *Nouvelle revue de Hongrie*, XXXII (1939), 107-14. (IIIb.) G. B. de H.

253. *Le Problème de la méthode dans la science historique des institutions* [The Problem of Method in the Historical Science of Institutions].—Whenever the scholar and the technician are concerned with the history of their disciplines, they most often place themselves at the standpoint of contemporary doctrines and show more interest in the genesis of accepted truths than in a study of theories which have been abandoned. Although this attitude tends to impoverish the science of history, it is legitimate in itself: it is a matter of preference in orientation and research. Through functional analysis we always take into consideration the social function of an act, i.e., its correspondence to an institution. A past act is qualified by taking cognizance of its social function. Contrary to the jurist's belief, an institution is not a constant but a variable. A legal form of the past is not susceptible of interpretation in terms of a contemporary form. In *formal* analysis we make a philological approach by studying the technical vocabulary of an outworn law in order to understand both its conventional or practical meaning and its meaning independent of that convention. In *dogmatic* analysis there is a demand for the concurrence of jurists, not so much of the technicians of a determinate system of positive law, but of comparative students who never lose sight of the ideal of a juridical science consecrated to the system of elementary and irreducible forms of juridical documents. Functional, formal, and dogmatic analyses co-operate to form a synthesis or relationship between several factors which vary functionally with one another. The primordial question of historical method is this: Is it possible to establish correlations and concomitant variations without recourse exclusively to the direct observation of an actual social fact? The answer is in the affirmative provided that historians succeed in establishing the existence of the same relation in as large a number of cases of independent historical milieus as possible. It is important to avoid the common confusion of the dual meaning of law. Law is, first, an observational science which deals with individual facts of the material world. But law is also an ideological construction created by the technicians of every epoch to guarantee its satisfactory function and its perpetuation. From this standpoint juridical science is applicable not only to the facts of experience but also to ideas having no material existence, such as obligation, the moral individual, or a void act. The history of law in the first sense is the history of the development of human society; while in the second sense it is the history of a technique, a stock of purely intellectual tools, analogous to a language.—Werner Kamps, *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie*, XVIII (1938), 13-37. (Lc.) H.B.

254. *L'Art de persuader: compte rendu de la XX<sup>e</sup> semaine sociale de l'Institut de Sociologie Solvay* [The Art of Persuasion: An Account of the Twentieth University Conference of the Solvay Institute of Sociology].—Suggestion, according to Auguste Ley, implies control of the subject; whereas persuasion does not involve immediate compliance and docility. Among numerous psychological factors in persuasion, are imitation, habit, repetition, eloquence, and visual, auditory, and motor influences. There are three main kinds of persuasion: perceptual, logical, and affective. The essence of persuasion is the provoking of conflict with the fundamental instincts of selfishness, sex, ownership, etc. There are two means, according to Marcel Barzin, by which the transmission of ideas takes place: contagion and evidence. The first asserts judgments of value; the second produces evidence. Albert Dustin states that, although many scientific ideas and discoveries are delayed in their acceptance, the newness and originality of ideas are important guaranties of their success. Premature or excessive publicity, however, is often fatal, as is publication in a purely local or in a highly specialized journal. The personality of the author, the time, extreme specialization, such capricious factors as chance and fashion, and the sympathy or hostility of a group or of a religion, also play their parts. Popularization is today widespread and plays a fundamental role in the diffusion of scientific knowledge. F. Vercauteren points out that a reaction against historicism has set in since the World War, and the extremist political movements have favored the method of tendentious history. The public has thus come to believe less and less in the objectivity of history. Efforts to interest the public in unified history have not been successful, for it prefers the romanticism and the lucubrations of the demagogue. There is an International Committee on Historical Sciences with a committee in every country, whose task is to promote collaboration, encourage research, and abolish chauvinism in history. According to Jean LaMeere, exploitative persuasion, which tries to render acceptable what reason rejects, is sovereign in the field of aesthetic

values. Many art merchants know how to use the mechanism of fashion to assure the success of a work of art. The means employed to persuade the public of the value of an art object are extrinsic to the value. From the standpoint of Catholicism, Hilaire Duesberg states that salvation cannot be transmitted through compulsion but by winning souls through persuasion. Religious conviction is not a product of mental activity, nor is it irrational, but super-rational and in all cases much different from scientific conviction. In Protestantism, according to Pierre Blommaert, the two most effective aids to the spread of the Gospel are the reading of the Bible and the sentiment of a "living God in the heart." Among the many techniques of propaganda, according to Georges Housiaux, the most efficacious is personal in nature—the kind exercised by a newspaper, for example, when it establishes a "personal appeal" relationship between itself and the reader. In advertising, says W.-G. Tordeur, the perceptual preferences of subjects have been found to agree much more with the opinions of specialists in advertising than with those of artists. The attractiveness of colors corresponds to certain constitutional types, the asthenic preferring blue, the pyknic, red. According to Paul-M.-G. Lévy, the reading public uncritically accepts an approximation to truth as absolute fact and is especially misled by a naïve confidence in the veracity of figures, charts, and photographs. A newspaper is almost always inclined to furnish its readers with "directed information," whose persuasiveness is, nevertheless, limited by the state of opinion. The reader is receptive only to what fits in with his own beliefs and seeks in his newspaper a mirror of his own prejudices. He is thus not completely without defense against the news, and in time experience develops in him a more judicious discrimination.—Nelly-Jean LaMeere, *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie*, XVIII (1938), 751-829. (IIa.) H. B.

255. *The Migration of British Citizens between the United Kingdom and Europe.*—Ever since migration statistics have been collected in 1880, it has been noted that the net movement of migrants has been outward from Great Britain to the Dominions and the United States. In 1930 the trend was reversed, and a peak of inward migration of over 54,000 was reached in 1932. Escaping general notice has been a similar return movement, at least since 1921, from the Continent of Europe, including the Mediterranean region. This net migration from Europe has been correlated negatively with the value of foreign trade; reaching a low point of 1,000 in 1925, when foreign trade was largest, and a high point of 45,000 in 1931, the year in which the pound sterling was devalued and foreign trade was lowest. During this decline in trade, many representatives of British firms must have been withdrawn from the Continent, and many nationals, preferring to live on the Continent, suddenly encountered an unfavorable rate of exchange which brought them homeward. During the fourteen years from 1921 to 1934, the total gain in numbers by the United Kingdom owing to the return of British citizens from Europe, was about 220,000.—R. S. Walshaw, *Sociological Review*, XXI (1937), 190-97. (IVa.) M. D. O.

256. *Migration Movements to and from the British Isles.*—Since the close of the Napoleonic Wars three periods may be noted, with reference to British emigration policy: (1) up to 1878, when the government was promoting migration to the colonies; (2) from 1878 to 1919, when the government maintained only an information bureau; (3) following 1919, when the government established an Overseas Settlement Committee. In 1922 intermittent help was replaced by the provision of the Empire Settlement Act, which, with slight modification, is still in force. After 1900 the direction of the migration stream veered from the United States toward the Dominions; and after 1923 government assistance played a large part in peopling Australia and New Zealand, and somewhat less of Canada, although the unassisted migration to the latter equaled the state-assisted migration to the other two. British emigrants have, as a rule, gone only to English-speaking countries. The sharp decline of emigration following 1931 has temporarily concealed the approaching day when the British Isles will cease to show natural increase. The reproduction rate is now well below permanent maintenance and the supposed surplus of women is of those older than thirty years, or beyond the significant reproductive ages or the usual migration age. The volume of migration to Australia and New Zealand is likely to be small in the future. These Dominions no longer have a replacement rate of fertility and the non-French parts of Canada also

probably have not. Since they show no willingness to look to other countries than Great Britain, will future records show that, unlike the United States, the peopling of the Dominions began too late to be effectively occupied by the white races? The reversal since 1931 in the net balance of aliens to the British Isles, who are mostly of the class that would create employment, seems to call for either a more liberal system of work permits or a freer system of naturalization by the government. After the creation of the Irish Free State in 1923, it seems strange that the government should pay its own citizens to go abroad while Irish people are coming in. The elastic method of birth restraint in southern Ireland through few and late marriages, in contrast to less elastic methods in the rest of the British Isles, means that, if the country prospers and employment opportunities multiply, these opportunities will be absorbed by the Irish immigrants rather than by the naturally increasing British population.—A. M. Carr-Saunders, *Sociological Review*, XXIX (1937), 232-42. (IVa.) M. D. O.

257. **The Social Consequences of Industrial Transference.**—The ebb and flow of economic life has always set up currents of internal migration and has resulted in profound changes in the geographical distribution of population. There has been no attempt in the past on the part of the state to stimulate or guide internal migration, and the acute problems resulting from population movements within Britain have been allowed to "solve themselves." Today internal migration, under the name of industrial transference, is the subject of state policy. During the last ten years the Ministry of Labor has helped nearly a quarter of a million workers move from depressed areas to areas of new industrial growth. As measured by change between census years minus natural increase, the internal migration between regions is presented as net regional change. The system of government assistance to laborers and their families serves as a subsidy to new industries in expanding areas. This industrial transference has helped in the immediate relief of unemployment but it has also laid up a good deal of trouble for the future. The effects of this program in the areas to which transference takes place are almost exactly the reverse of those in the depressed areas. From the standpoint of national welfare appraisal, the Ministry of Health and the Special Area Commissioners are doing their best to maintain and augment the social capital (schools, hospitals, civic buildings, roads, sewers, public utility undertakings, parks, and all the paraphernalia of modern urban society) at national expense; while, on the other hand, the Ministry of Labor, with the best intentions in the world, is helping to render much of this social capital redundant long before it has worn out. In addition, the devaluation of provincial life and of the vigorous and distinctive national culture of Wales must surely be deplored. It is extremely doubtful if the growing concentration of population in the southeastern counties of England is in the national interest on economic, social, or strategic grounds. The rearmament program has made it possible for a certain number of government factories to be established in strategically safe places in the north and the west. The recent appointment of a Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population of Great Britain is welcomed, for a policy is needed which takes account of social as well as economic and strategic considerations.—A. D. K. Owen, *Sociological Review*, XXIX (1937), 331-54. (IVa.) M. D. O.

258. **L'Art et le phénomène de la mode** [Art and the Phenomenon of Fashion].—Art plays many roles in the life of men and society although these roles do not define its specific character. It is an activity upon which one is easily inclined to confer an importance which it does not possess. The relation between aesthetic judgment and "taste" illustrates this point. "Taste" is regarded as a function of fashion rather than as a mysterious, intuitive capacity to judge beauty. Thus the post-war popularity of cubism and surrealism illustrates the fashionable nature of these art forms. The prestige of the critics determines the public's attitude toward works of art. Fashion is characterized by the imitation of someone's attitude toward an object, a work of art, or some other reality. If fashion is dedicated to a value, it is not to that of a work of art itself but toward someone's attitude toward the work of art. What we have come to consider as collective taste is in reality imitation.—Jean Lameere, *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie*, XVIII (1938), 1-11. (Ia.) H. B.

259. *Une loi de l'évolution sociale* [A Law of Social Evolution].—Every social organization is founded on a fundamental mechanism, which appears by inference to be economic and is illustrated by reference to such economic forms as slavery and servitude. Owing to the force of inertia, a specific economic form, which ought to disappear with the evolution of society, perpetuates itself. When society recognizes that it is impossible to continue under a set of maladjusted economic conditions, in its reorganization diametrically opposed mechanisms are instituted. These are two phases of social organization: ascension and equilibrium and decadence and disorganization. All forms of social organization die by the exaggeration of their fundamental mechanism.

The laws of literary evolution help us to comprehend the evolution of social organization. Literature is not only the mirror but also the thermometer of society. The history of literature can become a science, a branch of sociology. Sociology is at present far from being a science; it has not arrived at the last phase of scientific endeavor. Even the classificatory phase of science in the history of literature is far from being adequate. A perfect classification of literary phenomena has to correspond to the order in which these phenomena occur. The terms "classical," "romantic," and "realistic" are to be employed in a general meaning for schools which regularly occur in the history of every civilized people. Dissatisfied and inactive layers of society produce romanticism, satisfied and active layers produce classicism, and active but dissatisfied layers produce realism. Classicists elevate reality to the rank of the ideal, romanticists escape from reality and find refuge in the world of imagination, and realists combat reality in the name of the ideal. In the ascending and equilibrium phase of society the ruling class occupy a useful role, and all the classes are more or less satisfied. In such a society classicism emerges. When society enters into its decadent phase, the ruling class loses its useful role and indulges in idleness and boredom. This leads to romanticism. Active and hopeful people, who are made to suffer by the useless parasitism of the ruling class turn to realism, while others seek refuge in the world of imagination. Despite many exceptions, classicism prefers the drama and epic as a mean of expression; romanticism prefers the lyric form, realism the didactic, the novel, satire, and the pamphlet. Classicism is characteristic of social solidarity. Romanticism appears in an epoch of disorganization; certain classes find themselves isolated and live in contempt of society by creating an inner life of exaggerated sensibility. Romanticism is always a creation of the soul which does not find any possibility of employing itself in actual life. One writer does not always identify himself with the same school during his entire literary career. With the assimilation of Gerhart Hauptman and Maupassant into the idle classes their art turned toward romanticism. Since romanticism and realism are the product of disorganized society, they often merge into one another.—H. Sanielevici, *Revue anthropologique*, XLIX (1939), 116-23. (1a). G. B. deH.

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## METHODOLOGY IN THE NATURAL AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

E. B. WILSON

### ABSTRACT

By the time young persons go to college they seem to be already differentiated with respect to their interest both in subject matter and in method of approach to an extent sufficient somewhat to condition their educability. The emotional appeal of the social sciences cannot be disregarded as a selective factor in drawing students into them or as a psychological factor limiting the attractiveness of the scientific method. Whether this differentiation and selectivity are due to differences in kind of intellect or to differences in personality are unanswered questions which may ultimately be important in any basic discussion of methodology. Particular methods or techniques are universally available though not necessarily universally applicable; but the general principles of detachment and consensus in the study of observed facts seem indispensable to whatever may be called science, whether natural or social.

### •AN EDUCATIONAL REMINISCENCE AND REFLECTIONS

Across the summer of 1907 I transferred from Yale, where I had been teaching mathematics to Freshmen in Yale College, to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where I again had Freshmen sections. This gave me an interesting experience in comparing the two groups of young men, both coming from our private and public schools, each of the same average age, each a cross-section of our American youth. I was struck by differences as well as by similarities in the groups. Neither was brighter or more stupid than the other, but they seemed to have a different attitude. The Yale group was, of course, in a liberal arts college with professional training well in the future; the M.I.T. group was at a professional school. If it be granted that these two different environments would in due time make different imprints on the youth, it would still be hard

to admit that this imprint had already become marked at the beginning of the Freshman year. The heredity, both the physical and more especially the social heredity, of the two may well have differed somewhat—how greatly it would be difficult to determine and was certainly impossible for me to estimate. The easiest allocation of cause for the differences was to attribute them to self-selection on the part of the students or selection of them by their friends, families, and teachers for attendance at a professional school or at a liberal arts college. It had indeed been my impression that there were similar differences between the Freshmen in Yale College and in the Sheffield Scientific School.

The engineering group appeared less interested in logic per se, in the aesthetic elements of mathematics, in the meaning of it in the sense of theory, and more interested in its meaning in concrete examples, especially those dealing with material things, more in the routine operations—in short, less interested in principles and more in practices. If I was right in this judgment the differences may have been both natural and fortunate, for certainly the place of mathematics, as of many another subject, is different in a liberal from what it is in a professional education, though, of course, with a certain amount of overlap. Indeed these differences were so natural and so fortunate that one might easily persuade himself that they existed even if they in fact did not! Still, I believe that there is a widespread belief and no inconsiderable amount of evidence that groups of youth do have different interests and attitudes by the average age of eighteen. Although the student at a liberal arts college may not have any definite ideas as to what curriculum he wants, the student at an engineering school often knows he wants engineering, not science, whether it be mathematics, physics, chemistry, or even so-called applied mechanics. I believe that if our medical schools took boys direct from preparatory school we should find them upon their arrival highly selected in respect to their interest in medicine rather than in the sciences, whether of anatomy, physiology, or bacteriology. It appears to be the factual, empirical, practical side that has attracted the interest, and perhaps one of the tragedies of professional, and even of other, education may be that we put theory so much to the fore.

A hundred years ago physics and chemistry were largely taught by the book like geometry and mechanics. It is probably of little use to introduce laboratory exercises in either of the latter two subjects; by the time we reach them in our studies as adolescents we have presumably had in our common experiences and observations a sufficient development of the visual and kinesthetic senses so that we are ready for systematic theory—besides, the theory is relatively simple and deals with relatively simple matters. The introduction of laboratory into the teaching of physics and chemistry was certainly not for the purpose of making our youth into experimental scientists; it was an educational necessity due to the variety of forces, materials, operations, and relationships, for the most part not familiar through our everyday experiences, with which it was necessary to become acquainted. The best students may gain an intimate acquaintance with a great variety of objects and ideas by the exercise of their imaginations. It has indeed been suggested that the introduction of laboratory methods into elementary instruction may have hindered rather than accelerated the induction of the best students into science, even experimental; but few would deny that for the general run the laboratory is an educational necessity if instruction is to be given on matters not immediately accessible to their senses and thus to a large extent unfamiliar as facts.

In the social sciences the materials may or may not be matters of knowledge to the students: Exchange of goods by barter or for cash is undoubtedly familiar in a simple way and may be an adequate basis for the elements of the economic theory of free exchange, but no student will have lived through a Kondratief cycle and not many will have lived observantly through a ten-year cycle and hence the experience of the student can furnish but a meager basis for understanding the cycle. Whether cultural diversity is familiar to the undergraduate through experience may be doubted; Sumner taught folkways rather than sociological theory, or, better, he taught about folkways as best he might without being able to take his students afield. How the social sciences are taught may properly vary between liberal arts colleges and professional schools, whether of business, social work, or public administration, but what can be done in either to bring to the students of these intricate subjects

that personal observation of and acquaintance with facts and relationships which the laboratory has introduced into the study of chemistry and physics is difficult to say. These difficulties are not unique to the social sciences, for geology and geography can hardly be adequately illustrated by field explorations in the immediate vicinity of most educational institutions even if tabular view arrangements could be made which would free sufficient blocks of the students' time to permit excursions into the field. How the social sciences were taught one hundred years ago when they were studied relatively little and by a relatively selected group may have no major bearing on the question as to how they should be taught to-day when a large horde of the general run of students is stampeding into concentrations in those subjects.

It may seem that discussions of the educational interests of different groups and of educational methods have little bearing on method in the social sciences, but if the environmentalists be right in their contention that as the twig is bent so the tree will incline, it may well be that the educational methods adopted will have a considerable influence on the attitude of the rising generation toward social phenomena and toward social scientists. If the young be given a wide factual basis of knowledge, if we teach them in social science those things which we know with the evidence on which that knowledge is based, and if we largely eschew speculation (as is the method of instruction in the natural sciences),<sup>1</sup> we may increase their reliance on the expert in social science and may in the long run increase the demand for the application of scientific method in these fields. If, however, we choose to regard the social studies as primarily exercises in emotion and practice in discussing what we do not know and what "should be" (regardless of lack of evidence that it ever

<sup>1</sup> Ruskin, *The Eagle's Nest*, Lecture IV, art. 65, writes: "We have the misfortune to live in an epoch of transition from irrational dulness to irrational excitement; and while once it was the highest courage of science to question anything, it is now an agony to her to leave anything unquestioned. So that, unawares, we come to measure the dignity of a scientific person by the newness of his assertions, and the dexterity of his methods in debate; entirely forgetting that science cannot become perfect, as an occupation of the intellect, while anything remains to be discovered; nor wholesome as an instrument of education, while anything is permitted to be debated." The acceptance of this final clause would certainly raise havoc with our collegiate courses in the social sciences.

was or is becoming or could be), we may bring up a generation of enthusiastic welkin-ringers, everyone his own expert, with an antipathy to dispassionate scientific study. Some have urged the appointment of "thoughtful rebels" to social science staffs; that is a phrase one would scarcely use relative to natural science. Science evolves; Newton, Faraday, and Gibbs were not "thoughtful rebels" but original builders upon the known out into the unknown. One would scarcely use the phrase of linguistics; its use may be a symptom of a serious attack of anti-intellectualism. After all, the methodology of the social studies depends first and foremost on whether the social studies are or are not sciences.

The welkin-ringers will talk of social progress except as some Cassandra's wail of social decay. The former is probably the healthier doctrine for the young. The lack of definition of social progress will trouble no one. The apparent fact that there is no ascertained change in man and his abilities (other than an accumulation of tools or technologies and an increase in population) in historic times will also cause no difficulty. In the words of Emerson: "Society never advances. It recedes as fast on one side as it gains on the other. Its progress is only apparent like the workers in a treadmill. It undergoes continual changes; it is barbarous, it is civilized, it is christianized, it is rich, it is scientific; but this change is not amelioration. For everything that is given something is taken"—such words will be taken as not meaning what they say or as a mere opinion not entitled to credence. In science an opinion is not entitled to credence unless supported by evidence or unless coming from one who is known not to issue opinions except as he has trustworthy factual support therefor, but in nonscientific fields an opinion is not entitled to credence if it is at variance with accepted dogma or with dogma that the powers which be intend shall become accepted. Now I would not be misunderstood to be stating that the social studies should be taught as sciences. I am prepared to admit that to teach them as a system of ethics, to use them to stimulate patriotism even to the point of considering the state as supreme, may be the better course for society. Nobody knows the effects, good or bad, that would come from teaching them as sciences; society has never tried that on any large scale. I am only saying that

the educational methodology, now that so many of our youth are concentrating in the social fields, needs careful study as it may well make some considerable difference in the long run to social science and to the respect for expert knowledge in this field.

#### PERSONALITY AND INTELLIGENCE

Group and individual attitudes, interests, and self-selectivities may well be due to differences in personalities. Unfortunately personality is a difficult subject. Some great artists, whether dramatists, novelists, or administrators, seem to understand something about it without formal study, and psychologists have studied the matter a good deal, apparently without coming to much understanding of it. The two groups do not appear to be of much assistance, one to the other, though there may have been an exception in the brothers James—Henry who wrote novels like a treatise on psychology and William who wrote treatises on psychology like a novel. A middle-aged psychologist who has long been interested in certain aspects of personality once told me that there were probably some five hundred personality tests which had been proposed; that is certainly far too many. The development of intelligence tests took a long time, and it is likely that the development of tests for any important personality trait will require a comparable patient endeavor. I once heard a distinguished psychologist say that one's personality was different at four o'clock in the afternoon from what it was at ten o'clock in the morning. We all know that "in the Spring a young man's fancy. . . ." and those other observations on "crabbed age and youth. . . ." It may, of course, be true that there are diurnal, seasonal, and secular changes in the personality of an individual, and while a general awareness of such qualitative phenomena may be of aid in the scientific study of personality, whether that study be qualitative or quantitative, it does not help much in our present ignorance and is unlikely to be the methodological key that will let us into the secrets of nature relative to personality.

A biologist, like Stockard, working experimentally upon cross-breeding of dogs, may point out important relations of some personality differences to differences in the endocrine constitution and draw the further inference that both the latter and the former may be largely genetic, hereditary, phenomena. Some will be inclined



to claim that the really important persistent personality traits of an individual, those by which we recognize him as himself, are largely determined by his heredity; others will maintain that personality is largely a result of environment and, if they can find no postnatal environment that might be effective, may even push the environmental influences back into the intrauterine life. One has to be careful in such cases to avoid that sort of recourse to verbalisms which prevents one's getting forward with knowledge—unless it be that the object is really the evasion of knowledge, the refusal to admit ignorance, the pleasure of indulgence in self-expression unconstrained by logic. As a matter of fact, we know that the nature-nurture problem has been but partly solved, and only for a few traits. The problem is that of determining what fraction of the variance is due to nature and what to nurture. Even the setup of an observational program which will yield a solution is difficult, and there remain today those who maintain that intelligence is largely genetic while others rate it as largely environmental despite the great amount of conscientious scientific work which has been put upon this one topic. However, there seems to be a general agreement among practically all workers on personality that there are many diverse types thereof. Indeed, our very language with its many adjectives applied to shades of personality differences, and even the *epitheta opprobria* of our adolescents or still younger persons, would indicate that we all recognize, often with a keen appreciation of rather fine distinctions, that such differences are real, personal, and maintained over time. There is a distinction between "screwy" and just plain "nuts."

Provided interests and self-selectivities depend upon personality, whether inherited or acquired, the importance of the latter to educational and professional methods may be great. Suppose, for example, that those drawn to the social sciences were confirmed verbalists, disliked and were inept in careful reasoning on facts, were intrigued by complexities and by personalities or were motivated by service or by reform, whereas, those drawn to the natural sciences were determined to have system and simplicity, liked material facts (regarding even persons materialistically), tended to think in numbers rather than in words or desired to build or otherwise to manipulate inanimate (nonhuman) material. It is clear that under such

differentiation there might be little possibility of a common point of view with respect to the meaning of science or the methods of pursuing a branch of learning between natural and social scientists or even among social scientists themselves. The model for the social scientist would then be found from among the fine arts, belles-lettres, and the humanities (which offer perfectly good models of their kind) rather than from among the natural sciences. If there were no such selectivity one must expect to find both in the social sciences and in the natural sciences persons of both extreme types and of a variety of intermediary ones—physicists who are such by accident while really theologians or reformers at heart, sociologists who seek the facts merely for the purpose of finding out about human behavior and dreaming not of social progress but only of the advance of their science.

The personalities of Plato and Aristotle were apparently very different. Each was well educated and well situated to take advantage of a great variety of opportunities, but the ways in which they performed were dissimilar. Let me quote from that Grecian, once president of Harvard, C. C. Felton:

In his Republic he [Plato] shadows forth a constitution of society, by which he seems to think that the evils which afflicted humanity under existing institutions might be cured; but the cure, so much worse than the disease, is a sad proof how little the most brilliant genius and the most profound learning avail in dealing with human affairs on *a priori* grounds, setting aside the lights of experience. . . . Aristotle had nothing of the eloquence and fervor which belonged to Plato. . . . Aristotle, with a style somewhat dry and precise, was a keener observer of nature, and a surer judge of practical ethics, political questions, and constitutional systems. . . . Plato ascended on the wings of speculation to the highest empyrean of thought; but Aristotle had a firmer foothold on the solid earth.<sup>2</sup>

. . . . The lost work of Aristotle, the *Politeiai*, contained an analysis of one hundred and fifty-eight constitutions of cities, besides several peculiar democratic, oligarchic, aristocratic, and tyrannic forms . . . fragments of fifty-two of these constitutional analyses are found in his extant writings.<sup>3</sup>

. . . . The Republic, as a representation of a possible state, is infinitely absurd; and when we regard it as a picture of a happy state,—of a state wherein a human being could possibly enjoy a fair share of rational contentment, to say nothing of the delights of intellectual culture,—the only wonder is that a man of Plato's "large discourse, looking before and after," could have brought

<sup>2</sup> *Ancient and Modern Greece* (Boston: Ticknor & Fields, 1867), I, 478-79.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 17.

himself even to conceive of it. I wish we could reject it from his works; but the searching criticism of it in Aristotle's *Polity*, while it shows the superior practical sense of the Stageirite on this class of subjects, unfortunately proves it to be without doubt the work of the illustrious master of the Academy.<sup>4</sup>

So much has been done with various intelligence tests, to calibrate them one with another and to lap-weld them when applicable only to restricted age ranges, with the result that a reasonably reliable intelligence rating may be assigned to an individual, that there is a tendency in some quarters to consider intelligence as unitary and measured by this technique. Indeed, I once heard a distinguished social scientist, participating in a symposium on method in the natural and social sciences, state that we have but one mind which we can apply to the facts in any field; whether he interpolated this remark in his manuscript while reading or whether he struck it from the copy before printing I do not know—it does not appear in the printed form of his address. Although some psychologists may consider that intelligence is unitary, the leaders seem to feel that it is diverse; Spearman mentioned four factors with claims to the character of universality—only the general *g* manifesting appreciable individual differences in the ordinary tests of intelligence—and Godfrey Thomson seems to agree with him on the general position that intellect is not unitary. About 1,700 years ago Liu Shao in his *Jen wu chih*<sup>5</sup> took the definite position that mental abilities were innate, varied, and impossible of acquisition by education or experience. Those innate abilities which one had might be improved by education, but unless one were possessed of all the abilities there was likelihood that the improvement by education of those he had might unbalance him and thus serve to emphasize his defects. Indeed Liu Shao drew a distinction between real and apparent abilities, the latter being but the “similitude” of the former: acquirable, deceptive, and dangerous. It is always difficult to understand an ancient Chinese classic, and it is not clear to me whether Liu Shao considered mental ability and personality as distinct (though somewhat correlated), but I believe he did and further considered capacity as something still different.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 203-4.

<sup>5</sup> Recently translated with elaborate analysis and comment for the “American Oriental Series” (Vol. II) by J. K. Shryock under the title *The Study of Human Abilities*. The translator considers it unique in its viewpoint, thoroughness, and systematic development.

If intelligence, or that intelligence necessary for the pursuit of learning, is unitary, we have indeed but one mind which we may apply to any factual materials, these materials for any one person being influenced by his personality and experiences; if, however, intelligence is plural, there lies open the possibility and indeed the probability that minds of different abilities in kind might tend to work in different branches of knowledge entirely apart from (though presumably not uncorrelated with) differences of natural interest arising out of personality differences. How much it is possible to separate personality and intellect I do not know; the future may decide on scientific grounds; at present a variety of suggested hypotheses seems the only scientific procedure—that of suspended judgment. For the basic discussion of methodology in the social as compared with the natural or the humanistic sciences such questionings are important because of their bearing on selectivities which may seriously limit what we can do in education or in research with respect to forwarding the social sciences or any other branches of learning. Many discussions of methodology seem entirely to ignore such basic and unanswered questions and thus to have a definiteness which may be but a deceptive “similitude.” So much in general as a prolegomenon to methodology.

#### METHODS OR TECHNIQUES

When we come to particular methods or techniques such as deductive logic, Mill's canons of induction, mathematics, statistics, chemical analysis, time series, classification, measurement, ranking, case studies, and what you will, from the very general to the very specific, it may be remarked that any definable definite method or technique of any science may be learned and may be applied to any kinds of facts to which it is applicable—meaning that it may be tried out on the facts and considered to be applicable if it yields results that are widely deemed to be worth while. No matter how different personalities or minds may be, there seems to be no present conclusive evidence that learning a particular technique is impossible to any person (albeit some take more readily to certain techniques than to others) and, therefore, each could presumably learn any technique and use it in much the same sense as he could learn any language and write in it. The statement that the social sciences

must develop their own methods can only mean that certain scientific methods which are necessary for the development of the social sciences have not as yet been developed either in them or in other sciences—and this statement may be equally true of any science and in respect to details must be true of all—but once those methods have been developed they become the general property of science and are available anywhere there is need for them. Only if it should prove true that some particular method useful in the social sciences had no applicability whatsoever elsewhere could it be affirmed a posteriori that it was in fact a strictly social science method, and so various are the social sciences that it may be doubted whether any method generally applicable in them would fail to find uses in some other branches of learning.

The president of Princeton University has recently written on the "Problem of Social Studies" (*Educational Record Supplement* for January, 1939) in which he states:

The social studies are a science only within narrow limits. They are concerned with self-conscious individuals who are within limits masters of their fate and thus are able to circumvent prophecy. Science is impersonal; social life is incorrigibly personal. Science belittles the individual; it is interested only in statistics.


The method of science is repeated experimentation under controlled laboratory conditions. . . .

This is a very common sort of remark, and as such not likely to be particularly discriminating. It perhaps should not be taken out of its context, but as there seems to be much in its context which is like it (as well as some that is different), one may be allowed to comment. If we take the first sentence literally, we remove the social studies fairly completely from among the sciences—and comment here might be out of place. Let us therefore look at the last sentence. Is it true that the method of science is repeated experimentation under controlled laboratory conditions? This is certainly untrue of mathematics, but mathematics may not be a science. How about paleontology? What are the repeated experiments under controlled laboratory conditions? And, as a matter of fact, is the collection and comparative study of fossils, the arrangement of and induction from such materials, in any way essentially different from the similar processes performed on constitutions by Aristotle? If we turn to astronomy we find astronomers still speaking of observa-

tories and, at least prior to the development of astrophysics, few of them thinking of laboratory experiments. Geology is probably as much of a field study as one of the laboratory. Meteorology—is it not chiefly as observational as the study of primitive behavior or that of the international balance of payments? What are the laboratory experiments under controlled conditions on which the systematic sciences of botany and zoölogy depend? I believe it is a very one-sided view of science which considers its method as that of repeated experimentation under controlled laboratory conditions, which is only one of the methods, often inapplicable, in the study of nature.

It is often stated that the social scientist cannot experiment. It is doubtless true that our experiment nobly conceived (national prohibition) was not undertaken as an experiment by those most interested in its adoption; no more is the explosion of a nova, the eruption of a volcano, or the advent of a dinosaur. Science learned from observations of happenings long before experiment became prominent; it still does, and so can the social sciences. But the social sciences do have some recourse to experiment—in psychology, in education, even in sociology. It is just too bad that anyone should speak of “the method of science” when science has so many and diverse methods, or speak as so many do as though the elaborate deductive systems of celestial mechanics or of theoretical optics, on the one hand, or the refined experimental procedures of the physicist or chemist, on the other, were fairly representative of the methods of the natural sciences. In a broad sense all science is experimental, for fundamentally an experiment is a question framed on the basis of what is known and addressed to nature to elicit further knowledge. It thus transcends mere observation or collection of materials; it is consciously directed, purposeful observation whether it be carried out in the laboratory or in the field. In so far as the social sciences have a body of ascertained knowledge on the basis of which significant questions may be framed for the purpose of increasing that knowledge, to that extent the social scientist may follow the experimental method in principle. He may have to wait for a favorable constellation of events, but nature in her infinite variety is reasonably sure to furnish a satisfactory situation somewhere sometime. Astronomers have to wait for solar eclipses; they have the

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questions they are to ask well prepared long in advance. A volcanologist cannot have so precise an assurance as to when his opportunity will arise, and the same is true of the medical scientist interested in epidemics. A social scientist should be ready in advance for booms and depressions, for war and for revolution, ready with his scientific questions on which to set to work.

"Science is impersonal; social life is incorrigibly personal." This is neat-sounding rhetoric, but is the antithesis sound? Are science and social life comparable categories? And why the adverb "incorrigibly"? Social life must involve more than one person; if the group involved is small each individual may really be intimately and personally related to every other, but with increase in the size of the group the personal element may well diminish. Indeed there is much discussion as to whether our industrial organization with its absentee ownership, its remote management, and its mechanization may not be so impersonal as to be quite unsatisfactory to the worker and so be responsible for many an ill. Over the radio today came a brief heartening message from Berlin: The Englishman believes in England, the Frenchman believes in France, but we believe in our Fuehrer. Apparently the relation of an individual to his country is more personal in Germany than in England and France, perhaps incorrigibly so. Science is or should be impersonal in the sense that it derives from a sincere effort to reach a consensus based on observed facts, but it is not impersonal in that it is not interested in persons or that it belittles the individual or is interested only in statistics. It would perhaps be feasible to study scientifically some aspects of the limits within which individuals are masters of their fate and are able to circumvent prophecy and the extent to which social life is personal. It may interest few to make such studies, the time required may be long, our university administrators may not be able adequately to finance the efforts of those of their staffs who would undertake the work, and neither industry nor business may have any interest in the matter. We may have to wait; both in waiting and at work we may need more patience in the social than in the natural sciences; we may have to depend for advances on fewer and greater men and on their more elaborate provision with assistants. Do we have the patience? Without it methodology and methods are unavailing.

Two somewhat overlapping but generally contrasting methods of science are statistics and case studies; both require proper "controls." The former deals with many individuals and few variables, the latter with many variables and few individuals, often too few for statistically significant inference. Yet I believe that there are other types of inference than the statistical, and I am far from sure that a serious case study of a single individual may not yield results of value. It depends on what is an individual. We have but one moon and one sun. Astronomers have devoted a lifetime to the study of one or the other. No individual is simple; in the study of the individual it is the complexities that are interesting and illuminating. Every individual is made up of other individuals. The American commonwealth is an individual—Bryce studied it as Lowell studied the British. Some believe these studies are better than if each had studied his home commonwealth, because the emotions were less involved and a greater scientific detachment could be secured—much as in the case of the physician who calls in another to treat members of his family. The difficulty of obtaining that detachment which is a necessary attitude in scientific work is one reason why the social scientist should be ready with his questions in advance of social upheavals; another reason is that live material is in some ways more suggestive than dead material. The basic methodology of science is this detachment in the study of observed facts and the fundamental result is consensus relative to those facts and to the relations between them. It has long been a matter of professional etiquette or ethics among those working in the older natural sciences to put before the general public and the elementary student chiefly the points upon which agreement has been reached, reserving for discussion among small groups of qualified investigators the differences which remain outstanding. This in itself is a species of detachment which it might be of value for the social scientist to practice more than he does.

I have referred to observed facts and to consensus. These matters are to some extent relative to the state of knowledge. Lest I be considered too hardboiled I would recommend the study of Henry Osborn Taylor's *Fact: The Romance of Mind* to all scientists whether social or natural, and particularly to the latter!



## NEWS AS A FORM OF KNOWLEDGE: A CHAPTER IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

ROBERT E. PARK

### ABSTRACT

Following James's categories, "knowledge about" is formal knowledge; "acquaintance with" is unsystematic, intuitive knowledge or "common sense." When the above are regarded as being points on a continuum, news also has a point characteristic of its transient and ephemeral quality. The extent to which news circulates determines the extent to which the members of a society participate in its political action. News is "something that will make people talk," tends to have the character of a public document, and is characteristically limited to events that bring about sudden and decisive changes. Exclusive attention to some things inhibits responses to others resulting in a limitation of the range and character of the news to which a society will respond collectively or individually. The function of news is to orient man and society in an actual world.

### I

There are, as William James and certain others have observed, two fundamental types of knowledge, namely, (1) "acquaintance with" and (2) "knowledge about." The distinction suggested seems fairly obvious. Nevertheless, in seeking to make it a little more explicit, I am doubtless doing injustice to the sense of the original. In that case, in interpreting the distinction, I am merely making it my own. James's statement is, in part, as follows:

*There are two kinds of knowledge broadly and practically distinguishable: we may call them respectively knowledge of acquaintance and knowledge-about. . . . In minds able to speak at all there is, it is true, some knowledge about everything. Things can at least be classed, and the times of their appearance told. But in general, the less we analyze a thing, and the fewer of its relations we perceive, the less we know about it and the more our familiarity with it is of the acquaintance-type. The two kinds of knowledge are, therefore, as the human mind practically exerts them, relative terms. That is, the same thought of a thing may be called knowledge-about it in comparison with a simpler thought, or acquaintance with it in comparison with a thought of it that is more articulate and explicit still.<sup>1</sup>*

At any rate, "acquaintance with," as I should like to use the expression, is the sort of knowledge one inevitably acquires in the

<sup>1</sup> William James, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1896), I, 221-22.

course of one's personal and firsthand encounters with the world about him. It is the knowledge which comes with use and wont rather than through any sort of formal or systematic investigation. Under such circumstances we come finally to know things not merely through the medium of our special senses but through the responses of our whole organism. We know them in the latter case as we know things to which we are accustomed, in a world to which we are adjusted. Such knowledge may, in fact, be conceived as a form of organic adjustment or adaptation, representing an accumulation and, so to speak, a funding of a long series of experiences. It is this sort of personal and individual knowledge which makes each of us at home in the world in which he elects or is condemned to live.

It is notorious that human beings, who are otherwise the most mobile of living creatures, tend nevertheless to become rooted, like plants, in the places and in the associations to which they are accustomed. If this accommodation of the individual to his habitat is to be regarded as knowledge at all, it is probably included in what we call tact or common sense. These are characters which individuals acquire in informal and unconscious ways; but, once acquired, they tend to become private and personal possessions. One might go so far as to describe them as personality traits—something, at any rate, which cannot well be formulated or communicated from one individual to another by formal statements.

Other forms of "acquaintance with" are: (1) clinical knowledge, in so far at least as it is the product of personal experience; (2) skills and technical knowledge; and (3) anything that is learned by the undirected and unconscious experimentation such as the contact with, and handling of, objects involves.

Our knowledge of other persons and of human nature in general seems to be of this sort. We know other minds in much the same way that we know our own, that is, intuitively. Often we know other minds better than we do our own. For the mind is not the mere stream of consciousness into which each of us looks when, introspectively, he turns his attention to the movements of his own thoughts. Mind is rather the divergent tendencies to act of which each of us is more or less completely unconscious, including the ability to control and direct those tendencies in accordance with some more or less

conscious goal. Human beings have an extraordinary ability, by whatever mechanism it operates, to sense these tendencies in others as in themselves. It takes a long time, however, to become thoroughly acquainted with any human being, including ourselves, and the kind of knowledge of which this acquaintance consists is obviously not the sort of knowledge we get of human behavior by experiments in a psychological laboratory. It is rather more like the knowledge that a salesman has of his customers, a politician of his clients, or the knowledge which a psychiatrist gains of his patients in his efforts to understand and cure them. It is even more the sort of knowledge which gets embodied in habit, in custom, and, eventually—by some process of natural selection that we do not fully understand—in instinct; a kind of racial memory or habit. Knowledge of this sort, if one may call it knowledge, becomes, finally, a personal secret of the individual man or the special endowment of the race or stock that possesses it.<sup>2</sup>

One may, perhaps, venture this statement since the type of intuitive or instinctive knowledge here described seems to arise out of processes substantially like the accommodations and adaptations which, by some kind of natural selection, have produced the different racial varieties of mankind as well as the plant and animal species. One may object that what one means by knowledge is just what is not inherited and not heritable. On the other hand, it is certain that some things are learned much more easily than others. What one inherits therefore is, perhaps, not anything that could properly be called knowledge. It is rather the inherited ability to acquire those specific forms of knowledge we call habits. There seems to be a very great difference in individuals, families, and genetic groups as to their ability to learn specific things. Native intelligence is probably not the standardized thing that the intelligence tests might lead one to believe. In so far as this is true studies of intel-

<sup>2</sup> "The biologist ordinarily thinks of development as something very different from such modification of behavior by experience, but from time to time the idea that the basis of heredity and development is fundamentally similar to memory has been advanced. . . . Viewed in this way the whole course of development is a process of physiological learning, beginning with the simple experience of differential exposure to an external factor, and undergoing one modification after another, as new experiences in the life of the organism or of its parts in relation to each other occur" (C. M. Child, *Physiological Foundations of Behavior*, pp. 248-49; quoted by W. I. Thomas in *Primitive Behavior* [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1937], p. 25).

ligence in the future are, I suspect, more likely to be concerned with in the idiosyncrasies of intelligence and the curious individual ways in which individual minds achieve essentially the same results than in measuring and standardizing these achievements.

It is obvious that this "synthetic" (i.e., the knowledge that gets itself embodied in habit and custom, as opposed to analytic and formal knowledge) is not likely to be articulate and communicable. If it gets itself communicated at all, it will be in the form of practical maxims and wise saws rather than in the form of scientific hypotheses. Nevertheless, a wide and intimate acquaintance with men and things is likely to be the bulwark of most sound judgment in practical matters as well as the source of those hunches upon which experts depend in perplexing situations and of those sudden insights which, in the evolution of science, are so frequently the prelude to important discoveries.

In contrast with this is the kind of knowledge that James describes as "knowledge about." Such knowledge is formal, rational, and systematic. It is based on observation and fact but on fact that has been checked, tagged, regimented, and finally ranged in this and that perspective, according to the purpose and point of view of the investigator.

"Knowledge about" is formal knowledge; that is to say, knowledge which has achieved some degree of exactness and precision by the substitution of ideas for concrete reality and of words for things. Not only do ideas constitute the logical framework of all systematic knowledge but they enter into the very nature of the things themselves with which science—natural as distinguished from the historical science—is concerned. As a matter of fact, there seem to be three fundamental types of scientific knowledge: (1) philosophy and logic, which are concerned primarily with ideas; (2) history, which is concerned primarily with events; and (3) the natural or classifying sciences, which are concerned primarily with things.

Concepts and logical artifacts, like the number system, are not involved in the general flux of events and things. For precisely that reason they serve admirably the purpose of tags and counters with which to identify, to describe, and, eventually, to measure things. The ultimate purpose of natural science seems to be to substitute for the flux of events and the changing character of things a logical

formula in which the general character of things and the direction of change may be described with logical and mathematical precision.

The advantage of substituting words, concepts, and a logical order for the actual course of events is that the conceptual order makes the actual order intelligible, and, so far as the hypothetic formulations we call laws conform to the actual course of events, it becomes possible to predict from a present a future condition of things. It permits us to speculate with some assurance how, and to what extent, any specific intervention or interference in a present situation may determine the situation that is predestined to succeed it.

On the other hand, there is always a temptation to make a complete divorce between the logical and verbal description of an object or a situation and the empirical reality to which it refers. This seems to have been the cardinal mistake of scholasticism. Scholasticism has invariably tended to substitute logical consistency, which is a relation between ideas, for the relation of cause and effect, which is a relation between things.

An empirical and experimental science avoids a purely logical solution of its problems by checking up its calculation at some point with the actual world. A purely intellectual science is always in danger of becoming so completely out of touch with things that the symbols with which it operates cease to be anything more than mental toys. In that case science becomes a kind of dialectical game. This is a peril which the social sciences, to the extent that they have been disposed to formulate and investigate social problems in the forms in which they have been conventionally defined by some administrative agencies or governmental institution, have not always escaped. Thus investigation has invariably tended to take the form of fact-finding rather than of research. Having found the facts, the agencies were able to supply the interpretations; but they were usually interpretations which were implicit in the policies to which the agencies or institutions were already committed.

These are some of the general characteristics of systematic and scientific knowledge, "knowledge about," as contrasted with the concrete knowledge, common sense and "acquaintance with." What is, however, the unique character of scientific knowledge, as contrasted with other forms of knowledge, is that it is communicable to the extent that common sense or knowledge based on practical and

clinical experience is not. It is communicable because its problems and its solutions are stated not merely in logical and in intelligible terms but in such forms that they can be checked by experiment or by reference to the empirical reality to which these terms refer.

In order to make this possible, it is necessary to describe in detail and in every instance the source and manner in which facts and findings were originally obtained. Knowledge about, so far at least as it is scientific, becomes in this way a part of the social heritage, a body of tested and accredited fact and theory in which new increments, added to the original fund, tend to check up, affirm, or qualify, first of all, in each special science and, finally, in all the related sciences, all that has been contributed by earlier investigators.

On the other hand, acquaintance with, as I have sought to characterize it, so far as it is based on the slow accumulation of experience and the gradual accommodation of the individual to his individual and personal world, becomes, as I have said, more and more completely identical with instinct and intuition.

Knowledge about is not merely accumulated experience but the result of systematic investigation of nature. It is based on the answers given to the definite questions which we address to the world about us. It is knowledge pursued methodically with all the formal and logical apparatus which scientific research has created. I might add, parenthetically, that there is, generally speaking, no scientific method which is wholly independent of the intuition and insight which acquaintance with things and events gives us. Rather is it true that, under ordinary circumstances, the most that formal methods can do for research is to assist the investigator in obtaining facts which will make it possible to check up such insights and hunches as the investigator already had at the outset or has gained later in the course of his researches.

One of the functions of this methodical procedure is to protect the investigator from the perils of an interpretation to which a too ardent pursuit of knowledge is likely to lead him. There is, on the other hand, no methodical procedure that is a substitute for insight.

## II

What is here described as "acquaintance with" and "knowledge about" are assumed to be distinct forms of knowledge—forms having

different functions in the lives of individuals and of society—rather than knowledge of the same kind but of different degrees of accuracy and validity. They are, nevertheless, not so different in character or function—since they are, after all, relative terms—that they may not be conceived as constituting together a continuum—a continuum within which all kinds and sorts of knowledge find a place. In such a continuum news has a location of its own. It is obvious that news is not systematic knowledge like that of the physical sciences. It is rather, in so far as it is concerned with events, like history. Events, because they are invariably fixed in time and located in space, are unique and cannot, therefore, be classified as is the case with things. Not only do things move about in space and change with time but, in respect to their internal organization, they are always in a condition of more or less stable equilibrium.

News is not history, however, and its facts are not historical facts. News is not history because, for one thing among others, it deals, on the whole, with isolated events and does not seek to relate them to one another either in the form of causal or in the form of teleological sequences. History not only describes events but seeks to put them in their proper place in the historical succession, and, by doing so, to discover the underlying tendencies and forces which find expression in them. In fact, one would not be far wrong in assuming that history is quite as much concerned with the connections of events—the relation between the incidents that precede and those that follow—as it is with the events themselves. On the other hand, a reporter, as distinguished from a historian, seeks merely to record each single event as it occurs and is concerned with the past and future only in so far as these throw light on what is actual and present.

The relation of an event to the past remains the task of the historian, while its significance as a factor determining the future may perhaps be left to the science of politics—what Freeman calls “comparative politics”<sup>3</sup>—that is to say, to sociology or to some other division of the social sciences, which, by comparative studies, seeks to arrive at statements sufficiently general to support a hypothesis or a prediction.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Edward A. Freeman, *Comparative Politics* (London, 1873).

<sup>4</sup> The sociological point of view makes its appearance in historical investigation as soon as the historian turns from the study of “periods” to the study of institutions. The

News, as a form of knowledge, is not primarily concerned either with the past or with the future but rather with the present—what has been described by psychologists as “the specious present.” News may be said to exist only in such a present. What is meant here by the “specious present” is suggested by the fact that news, as the publishers of the commercial press know, is a very perishable commodity. News remains news only until it has reached the persons for whom it has “news interest.” Once published and its significance recognized, what was news becomes history.

This transient and ephemeral quality is of the very essence of news and is intimately connected with every other character that it exhibits. Different types of news have a different time span. In its most elementary form a news report is a mere “flash,” announcing that an event has happened. If the event proves of real importance, interest in it will lead to further inquiry and to a more complete acquaintance with the attendant circumstances. An event ceases to be news, however, as soon as the tension it aroused has ceased and public attention has been directed to some other aspect of the habitat or to some other incident sufficiently novel, exciting, or important to hold its attention.

The reason that news comes to us, under ordinary circumstances, not in the form of a continued story but as a series of independent incidents becomes clear when one takes account of the fact that we are here concerned with the public mind—or with what is called the public mind. In its most elementary form knowledge reaches the public not, as it does the individual, in the form of a perception but in the form of a communication, that is to say, news. Public attention, however, under normal conditions is wavering, unsteady, and easily distracted. When the public mind wanders, the rapport, grapevine telegraph, or whatever else it is that insures the transmission of news within the limits of the public ceases to function, tension is relaxed, communication broken off, and what was live news becomes cold fact.

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history of institutions—that is to say, the family, the church, economic institutions, political institutions, etc.—leads inevitably to comparison, classification, the formation of class names or concepts, and eventually to the formulation of law. In the process history becomes natural history, and natural history passes over into natural science. In short, history becomes sociology (R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921], p. 16).



A news item, as every newspaperman knows, is read in inverse ratio to its length. The ordinary reader will read a column and a half of two- or three-line items about men and things in the home town before he will read a column article, no matter how advertised in the headlines, unless it turns out to be not merely news but a story, i.e., something that has what is called technically "human interest."

News comes in the form of small, independent communications that can be easily and rapidly comprehended. In fact, news performs somewhat the same functions for the public that perception does for the individual man; that is to say, it does not so much inform as orient the public, giving each and all notice as to what is going on. It does this without any effort of the reporter to interpret the events he reports, except in so far as to make them comprehensible and interesting.

The first typical reaction of an individual to the news is likely to be a desire to repeat it to someone. This makes conversation, arouses further comment, and perhaps starts a discussion. But the singular thing about it is that, once discussion has been started, the event under discussion soon ceases to be news, and, as interpretations of an event differ, discussions turn from the news to the issues it raises. The clash of opinions and sentiments which discussion invariably evokes usually terminates in some sort of consensus or collective opinion—what we call public opinion. It is upon the interpretation of present events, i.e., news, that public opinion rests.

The extent to which news circulates, within a political unit or a political society, determines the extent to which the members of such a society may be said to participate, not in its collective life—which is the more inclusive term—but in its political acts. Political action and political power, as one ordinarily understands these terms, are obviously based not merely on such concert and consensus as may exist in a herd or in a crowd. It rests ultimately, it seems, on the ability of a political society, aside from whatever of military or material resources it possesses, to act not only concertedly but consistently in accordance with some considered purpose and in furtherance of some rational end. The world of politics, it seems, is based, as Schopenhauer has said of the world in general, on the organic relation of will and idea. Other and more material sources of political power are obviously merely instrumental.

Freeman, the historian, has said that history is past politics and politics is present history. This puts a great deal of truth into a few words, even if the statement in practice needs some enlargement and some qualification. News, though intimately related to both, is neither history nor politics. It is, nevertheless, the stuff which makes political action, as distinguished from other forms of collective behavior, possible.

Among other kinds of collective behavior are the recognized and conventional forms of ceremonial and religious expression—etiquette and religious ritual—which, in so far as they create unanimity and maintain morale, play directly and indirectly an important role in politics and in political action. But religion has no such intimate connection as politics with the news. News is a purely secular phenomenon.

### III

There is a proverbial saying to the effect that it is the unexpected that happens. Since what happens makes news, it follows, or seems to, that news is always or mainly concerned with the unusual and the unexpected. Even the most trivial happening, it seems, provided it represents a departure from the customary ritual and routine of daily life, is likely to be reported in the press. This conception of news has been confirmed by those editors who, in the competition for circulation and for advertising, have sought to make their papers smart and interesting, where they could not be invariably either informing or thrilling. In their efforts to instil into the minds of reporters and correspondents the importance of looking everywhere and always for something that would excite, amuse, or shock its readers, news editors have put into circulation some interesting examples of what the Germans, borrowing an expression from Homer, have called *geflügelte Wörter*, "winged words." The epigram describing news which has winged its way over more territory and is repeated more often than any other is this: "Dog bites man"—that is not news. But "Man bites dog"—that is. *Nota bene!* It is not the intrinsic importance of an event that makes it newsworthy. It is rather the fact that the event is so unusual that if published it will either startle, amuse, or otherwise excite the reader so that it will be remembered and repeated. For news is always finally, what Charles

A. Dana described it to be, "something that will make people talk," even when it does not make them act.

The fact that news ordinarily circulates spontaneously and without any adventitious aids—as well as freely without inhibitions or censorship—seems to be responsible for another character which attaches to it, distinguishing it from related but less authentic types of knowledge—namely, rumor and gossip. In order that a report of events current may have the quality of news, it should not merely circulate—possibly in circuitous underground channels—but should be published, if need be by the town crier or the public press. Such publication tends to give news something of the character of a public document. News is more or less authenticated by the fact that it has been exposed to the critical examination of the public to which it is addressed and with whose interests it is concerned.

The public which thus, by common consent or failure to protest, puts the stamp of its approval on a published report does not give to its interpretation the authority of statement that has been subjected to expert historical criticism. Every public has its local prejudices and its own limitations. A more searching examination of the facts would quite possibly reveal to a more critical and enlightened mind the naïve credulity and bias of an unsophisticated public opinion. In fact, the naïveté and credulity thus revealed may become an important historical or sociological datum. This, however, is merely another and further illustration of the fact that every public has its own universe of discourse and that, humanly speaking, a fact is only a fact in some universe of discourse.<sup>5</sup>

An interesting light is thrown on the nature of news by a consideration of the changes which take place in information that gets into circulation without the sanction which publicity gives to it. In such case a report, emanating from some source not disclosed and traveling to a destination that is unknown, invariably accumulates

<sup>5</sup> A universe of discourse is, as the term is ordinarily used, no more than a special vocabulary which is well understood and appropriate to specific situations. It may, however, in the case of some special science include a body of more precisely defined terms or concepts, which in that case will tend to have a more or less systematic character. History, for example, employs no, or almost no, special concepts. On the other hand, sociology, and every science that attempts to be systematic, does. As concepts assume this systematic character, they tend to constitute a "frame of reference."

details from the innocent but mainly illicit contributions of those who assist it on its travel. Under these circumstances what was at first mere rumor tends to assume, in time, the character of a legend, that is, something which everyone repeats but no one believes.

When, on the other hand, reports of current events are published with the names, dates, and places which make it possible for anyone concerned to check them, the atmosphere of legend which gathers about and clothes with fantastic detail the news as originally reported is presently dispelled, and what is fact, or what will pass for fact, until corrected by further and later news reports, is reduced to something more prosaic than legend and more authentic than news, i.e., historical fact.

If it is the unexpected that happens, it is the not wholly unexpected that gets into the news. The events that have made news in the past, as in the present, are actually the expected things. They are characteristically simple and commonplace matters, like births and deaths, weddings and funerals, the conditions of the crops and of business, war, politics, and the weather. These are the expected things, but they are at the same time the unpredictable things. They are the incidents and the chances that turn up in the game of life.

The fact is that the thing that makes news is news interest, and that, as every city editor knows, is a variable quantity—one that has to be reckoned with from the time the city editor sits down at his desk in the morning until the night editor locks up the last form at night. The reason for this is that the news value is relative, and an event that comes later may, and often does, diminish the value of an event that turned up earlier. In that case the less important item has to give way to the later and more important.

The anecdotes and "believe it or not" which turn up in the news are valuable to the editor because they can always be lifted out of the printer's form to make way for something hotter and more urgent. In any case it is, on the whole, the accidents and incidents that the public is prepared for; the victories and defeats on the ball field or on the battlefield; the things that one fears and things that one hopes for—that make the news. It is difficult to understand, nevertheless, considering the number of people who are killed and maimed annually by automobile accidents (the number killed in 1938 was 32,600) that these great losses of life rarely make the front page. The

difference seems to be that the automobile has come to be accepted as one of the permanent features of civilized life and war has not.

News, therefore, at least in the strict sense of the term, is not a story or an anecdote. It is something that has for the person who hears or reads it an interest that is pragmatic rather than appreciative. News is characteristically, if not always, limited to events that bring about sudden and decisive changes. It may be an incident like that of the colored family in Philadelphia, Frances and Ben Mason, who won a fortune in the Irish sweepstakes recently.<sup>6</sup> It may be a tragic incident like the battle off the coast of Uruguay which resulted in the destruction of the German battleship, the "Graf Spee," and the suicide of its captain. These events were not only news—that is, something that brought a sudden decisive change in the previously existing situation—but, as they were related in the newspapers and as we reflected upon them, they tended to assume a new and ideal significance: the one a story of genuine human interest, the other that of tragedy, something, to use Aristotle's phrase, to inspire "pity and terror." Events such as these tend to be remembered. Eventually they may become legends or be recorded in popular ballads. Legends and ballads need no date line or the names of persons or places to authenticate them. They live and survive in our memories and in that of the public because of their human interest. As events they have ceased to exist. They survive as a sort of ghostly symbol of something of universal and perennial interest, an ideal representation of what is true of life and of human nature everywhere.

Thus it seems that news, as a form of knowledge, contributes from its record of events not only to history and to sociology but to folklore and literature; it contributes something not merely to the social sciences but to the humanities.

#### IV

The sociological horizon has recently taken on new dimensions. Social anthropology, no longer interested in primitive society merely, has begun to study not only the history but the natural history and function of institutions. In doing so it has appropriated more and more the field of sociological interest and research. Psychiatry,

<sup>6</sup> See *Time*, December 25, 1939, p. 12.

likewise, has discovered that neuroses and psychoses are diseases of a personality which is itself a product of a social milieu created by the interaction of personalities. Meanwhile there has grown up in the United States and in Europe a sociology of law which conceives as natural products the norms which the courts are seeking to rationalize, systematize, and apply in specific cases. Finally, there have been some interesting recent attempts to bring the subject of knowledge itself within the limits of a sociological discipline.

Theories of knowledge have existed since the days of Parmenides. They have, however, been less interested in knowledge which is a datum than in truth or valid knowledge which is an idea and an ideal. The question with which the sociology of knowledge is concerned is not what constitutes the validity of knowledge—of a statement of principle or of fact—but what are the conditions under which different kinds of knowledge arise and what are the functions of each.

Most of the forms of knowledge that have achieved the dignity of a science are, in the long history of mankind, of very recent origin. One of the earliest and most elementary forms of knowledge is news. There was a period, and not so long ago, either, when there was neither philosophy, history, nor rational knowledge of any sort. There was only myth, legend, and magic. What we now describe as the exact sciences did not exist until the Renaissance. The social sciences have, roughly speaking, only come into existence in the last fifty years. At least they have only begun within the last half-century to achieve, with the wider use of statistics, anything like scientific precision.

News, so far as it is to be regarded as knowledge at all, is probably as old as mankind, perhaps older. The lower animals were not without a kind of communication which was not unlike news. The "cluck" of the mother hen is understood by the chicks as signifying either danger or food, and the chicks respond accordingly.

This is not to suggest that every kind of communication in a herd or flock will have the character of news. What is ordinarily communicated is merely a kind of contagious excitement—sometimes merely a sense of well-being and security in the gregarious association of the herd, at others a sense of unrest or malaise, manifested

and often intensified in the milling of the herd. It seems likely that this pervasive social excitement, which is essential to the existence of the herd as a social unit, serves, also, to facilitate the communication of news, or what corresponds to it in the herd.

There is in naval parlance an expression, "the fleet in being," which means, apparently, that the ships which constitute a fleet are in communication and sufficiently mobilized, perhaps, to be capable of some sort of concerted action. The same expression might be applied to a community, a society, or a herd. A society is "in being" when the individuals that compose it are to such an extent *en rapport* that, whether capable of united and collective action or not, they may be described as participating in a common or collective existence. In such a society a diffuse social excitement tends to envelope, like an atmosphere, all participants in the common life and to give a direction and tendency to their interests and attitudes. It is as if the individuals of such a society were dominated by a common mood or state of mind which determined for them the range and character of their interests and their attitudes or tendencies to act. The most obvious illustration of this obscure social tension or state of mind in a community is the persistent and pervasive influence of fashion.

At certain times and under certain conditions this collective excitement, so essential to communication if not to understanding, rises to a higher level of intensity and, as it does so, tends to limit the range of response but to increase the intensity of impulses not so inhibited. The effect of this is the same as in the case of attention in the individual. Exclusive attention to some things inhibits responses to others. This means in the case of a society a limitation of the range and character of the news to which it will either collectively or individually respond.

The rise of social tension may be observed in the most elementary form in the herd when, for some reason, the herd is restless and begins to mill. Tension mounts as restlessness increases. The effect is as if the milling produced in the herd a state of expectancy which, as it increased in intensity, increased also the certainty that presently some incident, a clap of thunder or the crackling of a twig, would plunge the herd into a stampede.

Something similar takes place in a public. As tension arises, the

limits of public interest narrows, and the range of events to which the public will respond is limited. The circulation of news is limited; discussion ceases, and the certainty of action of some sort increases. This narrowing of the focus of public attention tends to increase the influence of the dominant person or persons in the community. But the existence of this dominance depends upon the ability of the community, or its leaders, to maintain tension. It is in this way that dictators arise and maintain themselves in power. It is this that explains likewise the necessity to a dictatorship of some sort of censorship.

News circulates, it seems, only in a society where there is a certain degree of rapport and a certain degree of tension. But the effect of news from outside the circle of public interest is to disperse attention and, by so doing, to encourage individuals to act on their own initiative rather than on that of a dominant party or personality.

Under ordinary circumstances—in a time of peace rather than of war or revolution—news tends to circulate over an ever widening area, as means of communication multiply. Changes in society and its institutions under these circumstances continue to take place, but they take place piecemeal and more or less imperceptibly. Under other conditions—in war or revolution—changes take place violently and visibly but catastrophically.

The permanence of institutions under ordinary conditions is dependent upon their ability, or the ability of the community of which they are a part, to adapt themselves to technological and other less obvious changes. But these changes and their consequences manifest themselves not only directly but rather indirectly in the news. Institutions like the Catholic church or the Japanese state have been able to survive the drastic changes of time because they have been able to respond to changes in the conditions of existence, not merely those physically and obviously imposed upon them but those foreshadowed and reflected in the news.

I have indicated the role which news plays in the world of politics in so far as it provides the basis for the discussions in which public opinion is formed. The news plays quite as important a role in the world of economic relations, since the price of commodities, including



money and securities, as registered in the world-market and in every local market dependent upon it, is based on the news.

So sensitive are the exchanges to events in every part of the world that every fluctuation in fashion or the weather is likely to be reflected in the prices on the exchanges. I have said that news is a secular phenomenon. But there come times when changes are so great and so catastrophic that individuals and peoples are no longer interested in worldly affairs. In such case men, frustrated in their ambitions and their hopes, turn away from the world of secular affairs and seek refuge and consolation in a flight from the great world into the security of the little world of the family or of the church. The function of news is to orient man and society in an actual world. In so far as it succeeds it tends to preserve the sanity of the individual and the permanence of society.

Although news is an earlier and more elementary product of communication than science, news has by no means been superseded by it. On the contrary, the importance of news has grown consistently with the expansion of the means of communication and with the growth of science.

Improved means of communication have co-operated with the vast accumulations of knowledge, in libraries, in museums, and in learned societies, to make possible a more rapid, accurate, and thoroughgoing interpretation of events as they occur. The result is that persons and places, once remote and legendary, are now familiar to every reader of the daily press.

In fact, the multiplication of the means of communication has brought it about that anyone, even in the most distant part of the world, may now actually participate in events—at least as listener if not as spectator—as they actually take place in some other part of the world. We have recently listened to Mussolini address his fascist followers from a balcony of Rome; we have heard Hitler speaking over the heads of a devout congregation in the Reichstag, in Berlin, not merely to the President, but to the people, of the United States. We have even had an opportunity to hear the terms of the momentous Munich agreement ten seconds after it had been signed by the representatives of four of the leading powers in Europe and the

world. The fact that acts so momentous as these can be so quickly and so publicly consummated has suddenly and completely changed the character of international politics, so that one can no longer even guess what the future has in store for Europe and for the world.

In the modern world the role of news has assumed increased rather than diminished importance as compared with some other forms of knowledge, history, for example. The changes in recent years have been so rapid and drastic that the modern world seems to have lost its historical perspective, and we appear to be living from day to day in what I have described earlier as a "specious present." Under the circumstances history seems to be read or written mainly to enable us, by comparison of the present with the past, to understand what is going on about us rather than, as the historians have told us, to know "what actually happened."

Thus Elmer Davis in a recent article in the *Saturday Review* announces as "required reading" for 1939 two volumes: Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* (431 B.C.). He recommends the history of the Peloponnesian War because, as he says, "Thucydides was not only a brilliant analyst of human behavior both individual and collective" but was at the same time "a great reporter."<sup>7</sup>

One notes, also, as characteristic of our times, that since news, as reported in American newspapers, has tended to assume the character of literature, so fiction—after the newspaper the most popular form of literature—has assumed more and more the character of news.<sup>8</sup>

Emile Zola's novels were essentially reports upon contemporary manners in France just as Steinbeck's *The Grapes of Wrath* has been described as an epoch-making report on the share-cropper in the United States.

Ours, it seems, is an age of news, and one of the most important events in American civilization has been the rise of the reporter.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

<sup>7</sup> "Required Reading," *Saturday Review of Literature*, October 14, 1939.

<sup>8</sup> See Helen MacGill Hughes, *News and the Human Interest Story* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940).

## A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME OF SOCIETY

GEORGE DEVEREUX

### ABSTRACT

Society is not an emergent. It is introduced into sociological discourse by subjecting sets of sense data pertaining to individuals to logical analysis in terms of the basic concepts of probability and of statistical mechanics. Sociology needs only three operationally definable basic concepts: "individual," "order," and "motion." Social equilibrium is defined with respect to social mobility. Units of social space and the concept of social mass are defined. Some basic theorems of social process are enunciated. It is shown that, after an external disturbance, society cannot return to its previous state but only to a related one, since society is a hereditary system. Culture is defined in terms of the principle of the least path, of groups of transformation, and of the Heisenberg-Dirac uncertainty principle. It is shown that social space has certain properties of a curved space. Statistical and other formulas are useless in an analysis of social process, since they are incapable of describing hereditary processes which are statistical rather than mechanical. The logico-meaningful procedures of scientific method must be applied in, and adapted to the purposes of, systematic sociology.

The concept "society" can be introduced into sociological discourse in three ways. We may consider it as a metaphysical reality. This is scientifically meaningless. We may introduce it as a working hypothesis or as a concept. This is permissible. It precludes, however, the possibility of making sociological statements with respect to the individual. The definition of the individual or of individual process with reference to, or in terms of, a society of which he is a part is a nonpredicative statement. Such statements lead to vicious circles.<sup>1</sup> Last of all, we may introduce society as a conceptual scheme, derived from individual data. We can "describe given and possible aspects, or elements, without considering the problem of their subjectivity or independent reality."<sup>2</sup>

The introduction of the conceptual scheme "society" into scientific discourse is a matter of manipulatory convenience and of conciseness of expression. The same may be said of the conceptual scheme "space." Both are constructed inductively from concepts derived from sense data concerning individuals. It is desirable that these concepts should be operationally definable.<sup>3</sup> It permits us to

<sup>1</sup> R. Carnap, "Die logizistische Grundlegung der Mathematik," *Erkenntnis*, II, Nos. 2-3 (1931), 99.

<sup>2</sup> V. F. Lenzen, *The Nature of Physical Theory* (New York, 1931), p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> P. W. Bridgman, *The Logic of Modern Physics* (New York, 1927).

think of society as a conceptual scheme. We can then study its implications, including those referring to the individual.

The relationship between the individual and society is the central problem of sociology. Three types of approaches to this problem exist.

1. *The theory of emergence* has been summarized by White: "Each forward integration emerges into a field of entirely new possibilities, which cannot be forecast by the understanding of the previous state. [This new state] is an emergent . . . a new being with laws of action unpredictable on the basis of the preceding lower stage of development."<sup>4</sup> The "emergent" is obviously introduced not as a concept but as a reality. This method is exemplified by the theories of Le Bon (collective mentality, genius of the race), Durkheim (collective representations), McDougall (group mind), etc. The solution offered is purely formal. Poincaré would say that they baptize the problem instead of solving it. The "emergent" is nowhere derived from individual data. They consider it an independent reality, which is metaphysical and therefore meaningless.

2. *The organismic theory* has been presented in the shape of *Gestalt* and field theories. Inspired by the works of Neurath<sup>5</sup> and Lewin<sup>6</sup> it has been elaborated by Brown: "The whole includes the parts. . . . [That which] occurs at any given position within the whole is determined by the structure of the whole."<sup>7</sup> This is a nonpredicative statement. The social "field" is nowhere derived from the individual "fields." Brown studies the dynamics of individual motion in the hypothecated social field. Methodological objections notwithstanding, both the emergence and the field hypotheses are more or less useful working hypotheses.

3. *The method of contrast* does not pretend to be a theory. The concepts "individual" and "society" are introduced almost simultaneously. The methodological utility of the concept "society" is explained as follows. The sum total of individual behavior cannot be explained in terms of biopsychological theories only. From this total

<sup>4</sup> William A. White, "Psychiatry and the Social Sciences," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, VII, No. 5 (1928), 729-47, esp. 732.

<sup>5</sup> O. Neurath, *Empirische Soziologie* (Vienna, 1931); cf. also "Soziologie im Physikalismus," *Erkenntnis*, II (1931), 293-341.

<sup>6</sup> K. Lewin, *Principles of Topological Psychology* (New York, 1936).

<sup>7</sup> J. F. Brown, *Psychology and the Social Order* (New York, 1936), p. 28.

behavior those parts which are more or less understandable in terms of biology and psychology are subtracted. The residue is then "explained" by introducing the concept "society." Only such properties as are necessary to explain this residue are ascribed to society. Actually, the best authors do not "subtract" but "differentiate," which is a far better procedure. All concepts are used as working hypotheses. The scientific self-restraint and the simplicity of this procedure make it the practical method par excellence. It works by analogy, enumeration, exemplification, and contrast. It permits us to discover a wealth of new data. A good example of this approach is the work of Linton.<sup>8</sup> Unlike some self-styled "empiricists," he does not confuse hypotheses with objective reality.

According to Meyerson,<sup>9</sup> to explain a natural process means to recognize it as rational, to reduce it to identical things in space and time, and to present the diversity of temporal change as only apparent. The explanation is always partial since we cannot pursue the chain of causes ad infinitum. We differ from Meyerson in believing that the unknowable or irrational substratum is not the proper subject matter of scientific discourse. The existence of the unknowable and irrational is a metaphysical *Scheinproblem*. We shall therefore start with sense experience, from which we derive operationally definable concepts. We refuse to look for explanation beyond these concepts. The existence of even more "ultimate" causes—or their nonexistence—is meaningless to the scientist.

The concepts selected are not further analyzable. They are mutually independent. We can change the meaning of any one of these concepts without thereby changing the meaning of any of the other concepts. They are sufficient for our purpose. From them a number of propositions can be deduced. The choice of the basic concepts is arbitrary. Any other set of basic concepts from which the same set of propositions can be deduced is equivalent to our set of basic concepts.<sup>10</sup> The ultimate test of a conceptual scheme is its coherence and internal compatibility as well as the facility with which we can manipulate it for the purpose of making predictions.

Two concepts suffice to define society: individual and the rela-

<sup>8</sup> R. Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York, 1936).

<sup>9</sup> E. Meyerson, *De l'explication dans les sciences* (Paris: Payot, 1921).

<sup>10</sup> L. Rougier, *La Philosophie géométrique de Henri Poincaré* (Paris: Alcan, 1920).

tive position of individuals. This harks back to Osvald Veblen's starting-point for geometry: the point and order (cf. also Leibnitz: Time is the order of events; space is the order of bodies). A third concept is necessary for the analysis of social process—change. (According to Maxwell, kinetics differ from geometry in that time is explicitly introduced into it as a commensurate quantity.) We need no further concepts.

The individual can be defined operationally. We can measure his age, his weight, his wealth, etc. We state that he has mass.

The relative position of individuals (order of individuals) can also be defined operationally in terms of transitive, asymmetrical relations. Consider individuals A, B, and C. If individual A is the ancestor of B, and B the ancestor of C, then A is not C but the ancestor of C. The same is true if we substitute to the relation "ancestor of" the relation "superior of," "richer than," etc. In some cases other orders exist. If the relation is "loves," the resulting proposition is not necessarily transitive and asymmetrical and may not indicate "order."<sup>11</sup>

Change is operationally definable. It involves the dimension "time." If A takes a trip, ages a minute, becomes more learned, etc., he has changed. It is only by definition that we agree to consider individual A of whom we had a sense experience at 1:59 P.M. the same A of whom we have a sense experience at 2:00 P.M. We can agree on some sort of operation whereby we "ascertain" that the two sources of stimuli are the "same" person. We can ask A to tell us his name at 1:59 P.M. and at 2:00 P.M. We may also take his fingerprints on both occasions. We may, if we wish, use a motion-picture camera which follows and records all his movements, etc. Hereby we concede to the individual a measure of permanence. We assume that A, when he comes in contact with B, does not coalesce with the latter into a single continuum. Weyl's definition of the atom also applies to individuals: "If a given individual occupies a specific place at a specific time, then after a sufficiently small interval there is one individual who occupies a space which differs less than any assignable amount from the space occupied by the given

<sup>11</sup> V. F. Lenzen, *The Nature of Geometrical Relations* ("University of California Publications in Philosophy" [Berkeley, 1930]), pp. 101-23, esp. 115.

individual at the earlier time."<sup>12</sup> The operation whereby we define a concept is not important in itself, as long as there exists a conventional operation which permits us to recognize and accept A's identity through every change. We may call change "motion." This tallies with the terminology adopted by Sorokin<sup>13</sup> and Brown.<sup>14</sup> We mean thereby that, if individual A changes in any way, his position with respect to other individuals has changed. (Example: A has become richer than B; B has become the husband of C; etc.) Thus we must revise our nomenclature and call our third fundamental concept "motion."

We can now define society as the order of individuals. We define social process as the order of successive orders of individuals (cf. the Leibnitzian definition of space and time noted above).

We have agreed that we shall not attempt to "explain" individual change or motion in terms of biology, psychology, biochemistry, or physics. We are entitled to do so. Bohr makes the following statement:

Every experimental arrangement suitable for following the behavior of the atoms constituting an organism in an exhaustive way as implied by the possibilities of physical observation and definition would be incompatible with the maintaining of the life of that organism. . . . Those essential features of living organisms which are brought to light only under circumstances which exclude an exact account of their atomic constituents are laws of a nature which stand in a complementary relationship to those with which we are concerned in physics and chemistry.<sup>15</sup>

In other words, it is impossible to determine operationally with any precision the "internal motivation" of the motion of living organisms without killing them. Vice versa, the complete description of a corpse yields no complete clues to processes in living organisms. Hence "motivation" must be excluded from our approach. On the other hand, we must so formulate our conceptual scheme as to leave us free to assume anything with respect to individual processes. Thus we may assume that there are causes for any motion. The nature of these causes is left undefined. We can assume, if we

<sup>12</sup> H. Weyl, *Was ist Materie?* (Berlin, 1924).

<sup>13</sup> P. A. Sorokin, *Social Mobility* (New York, 1927).      <sup>14</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>15</sup> N. Bohr, "Causality and Complementarity," *Philosophy of Science*, IV, No. 3 (1937), 289-98, esp. 296.

wish, that any motion "proves" predestination, free will, divine guidance, mechanism, vitalism, reversibility of individual processes (Lewis,<sup>16</sup> Jeans<sup>17</sup>), irreversibility of individual processes (Ehrenberg,<sup>18</sup> Donnan and Guggenheim<sup>19</sup>), quantic indeterminism and discontinuity of individual processes (Jordan<sup>20</sup>), or any other theory. Although the "nature" of individual processes (motion) does not concern us in the least, since it cannot be defined operationally, certain considerations of Bohr<sup>21</sup> and Blum<sup>22</sup> make it appear useful, although not necessary, to think of individual processes as irreversible.

We are now confronted with the difficulty of accounting for social processes without knowing anything of individual processes. Assume for a moment that we could account causally for the motions of every individual. We would still be confronted with the calculatory difficulty of solving the problem of a great number of bodies in relative motion to one another. We must therefore ignore individual processes and account for social processes in terms of laws independent of the validity of mechanics.<sup>23</sup> The very attempt to account at all for social processes implies that they must be reduced to some sort of regularities. We thereby query, for the time being, the very existence of regularities, since we have renounced the possibility of deriving them from individual regularities of which we know nothing—not even that they exist. On the other hand, there could be no social laws if there were no regularities permitting generalizations. There could be no regularities without some "cause."

<sup>16</sup> G. N. Lewis, *The Anatomy of Science* (New Haven, 1926).

<sup>17</sup> Sir J. Jeans, "Activities of Life and the Second Law of Thermodynamics," *Nature*, CXXXIII (1934), 174: 612, 986. Cf. n. 19.

<sup>18</sup> R. Ehrenberg, *Theoretische Biologie, vom Standpunkte der Irreversibilität des elementaren Lebensablaufs* (Berlin, 1923).

<sup>19</sup> F. G. Donnan, "Activities of Life and the Second Law of Thermodynamics," *Nature*, CXXXIII (1934), 99; F. G. Donnan and E. A. Guggenheim, *ibid.*, pp. 530, 869; *ibid.*, CXXXIV (1934), 255. Cf. n. 17.

<sup>20</sup> P. Jordan, "Quantenphysikalische Bemerkungen zur Biologie und Psychologie," *Erkenntnis*, IV (1934), 215-52; cf. also *Anschauliche Quantentheorie* (Berlin, 1936), pp. iii-ix, 271-319.

<sup>21</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 296-97.

<sup>22</sup> H. F. Blum, "A Consideration of Evolution from a Thermodynamic View-Point," *American Naturalist*, LXIX (1935), 354-69.

<sup>23</sup> Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 140.



We must therefore analyze the meaning of causality and the meaning of law. We must look especially for "causes" which contain no specifications concerning individual processes and yet result exclusively from individual processes.

According to Petzoldt, there are two types of causality: simultaneous and succedaneous. Simultaneous causality implies the coherence of spatial structures. It is exemplified by organization. The belief of Cuvier in simultaneous causality is expressed in his attempt to reconstruct an animal from a single vertebra. Succedaneous causality implies the coherence of temporal structures. It is exemplified in processes. The belief of Newton in succedaneous causality is expressed in his attempt to predict the successive positions and velocities of a freely falling body.

Unless otherwise specified, by "causality" we mean succedaneous causality. We must analyze on precisely what grounds we assume causal connectedness between two events. Let us assume that event *B* always succeeds event *A* and never occurs without being preceded by event *A*. Event *A*, however, can and does occur without event *B*. We tacitly assume that the initial conditions under which *A* occurs are always the same. This is only an ideal possibility. In theory, however, we may approximate the initial conditions as closely as we wish. We repeat the experiment several times. We then enunciate the law: "Event *A* is the cause of event *B*." According to Schroedinger, "From the idea of special regular connectedness, we come to the idea of general necessary connectedness . . . as an abstraction from the mass of connections as a whole."<sup>24</sup> He further states that "the constancy of the laws of nature are guaranteed to us only by experience."<sup>25</sup> This is obvious. We cannot repeat an experiment at all places, at all times, an infinite number of times. We simply assume that the repeated recurrence of the same sequence of phenomena in a finite number of experiments guarantees us, by extrapolation, the recurrence of the same sequence of events always and everywhere. This tallies with Hume's view that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to get at the root of causal connectedness. In that case the difference between true causality (cause and effect) and false causality (*post hoc ergo propter hoc*) is one of degree

<sup>24</sup> E. Schroedinger, *Science and the Human Temperament* (New York, 1935), p. 135.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40.

only. It consists in the greater and probably more uniform repetitiveness of sequences accounted for in terms of "true causality." The problem involves extrapolation and statistical induction only, which can be more or less valid. The modern theory of "functional causality" introduces the concept of function which is not defined with perfect clarity. We shall therefore agree that nothing guarantees us the absolute, universal, permanent, uniform, and infinite repetitiveness of a given sequence of phenomena.

A law is a verbal, mathematical, or any other formulation of observed regularities and of the probability of the recurrence of the same regularities. We state explicitly: "Event *A* is always followed by event *B*." We state implicitly something different: "It is observed that usually the above sequence takes place under given conditions. We therefore think it highly probable that, by duplicating said conditions, the same sequence of events will recur."

These and similar considerations have long troubled physicists. They have attempted to distinguish statistically between degrees of probability. In the wake of Boltzmann,<sup>26</sup> Gibbs and others have developed modern statistical mechanics. Statistical analysis has been substituted for causal analysis. This method of inquiry does not involve belief or lack of belief in ultimate causality; it only implies a refusal to deal with what cannot be interpreted scientifically and defined operationally. Physicists limit themselves to defining operationally the probability of various events and succession of events. They have been thereby enabled to make very accurate predictions, to formulate very simple and coherent systems of laws, etc., without overburdening their schemes with unnecessary ideologies. Their chief triumph, however, was the fact that they not only could foresee deviations but could assign a limit to these deviations. The importance of this argument has been clearly seen by Schroedinger.<sup>27</sup> Physicists have accounted for causality by saying, with Schroedinger, that "chance lies at the root of causality."<sup>28</sup>

The cause-and-effect concept involves the concept of direction. According to Schroedinger, "All laws relating to irreversible natural

<sup>26</sup> L. Boltzmann, *Vorlesungen ueber Gastheorie* (2d ed.; Leipzig, 1910).

<sup>27</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 46.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43.

processes are now known definitely to be of a statistical kind."<sup>29</sup> The second law of thermodynamics,

*which plays a role in positively every physical process . . . , is very intimately connected with the typical one-directional character of all natural processes. . . . Although . . . by itself . . . [it] is not sufficient to determine the direction in which the state of a material system will change in the next instant, it always excludes certain directions of change, the direction exactly opposite to the one which actually occurs being always excluded.*<sup>30</sup>

According to W. S. Franklin,<sup>31</sup> we are aware of the fact that time has a "direction" only because all processes in the universe are irreversible. (Local processes involving but one particle, like a pendulum, etc., are reversible. The particle, on the other hand, can be a closed system in which irreversible thermodynamic processes do take place.) Summing up, in Lenzen's words, "macroscopic laws express the probable sequence of phenomena."<sup>32</sup>

Statistical mechanics start with two additional concepts: It is assumed that the molecules obey Hamiltonian dynamics and that all molecules of the same kind are equal in most respects. Since we know nothing of individual processes or individual nature, we can dispense with these concepts. To our ignorance it seems as though individual motions occurred at random. We shall, nevertheless, be able to obtain, on a purely statistical basis, all the propositions of sociology which, in one form or the other, have obtained universal assent.

THEOREM I.—History is an irreversible social process.

a) A society possesses a large number of states, each of which is characterized by a social structure, which is defined as the order of positions which it is possible for individuals to occupy in that society.

b) If the social structure characterizing a state is not materially modified when at least two individuals exchange positions, then we may say for brevity's sake that that society is in "equilibrium" with respect to certain aspects of social mobility.

c) An exchange of positions between two or more individuals,

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 141.

<sup>31</sup> "On Entropy" *Physical Review*, XXX (1910), 766-75.

<sup>32</sup> V. F. Lenzen, *Statistical Truth in Physical Science* ("University of California Publications in Philosophy," Vol. X [Berkeley, 1928]), p. 131.

which does not involve important changes in the existing social structure, may be denoted as a "change of phase within a given state." The situations obtaining before and after the change of phase are called "phases." (Example: The United States in 1928 and in 1929. "Le roi est mort, vive le roi!")

d) The number of phases possible within a given state assigns a probability value to that state and is a measure of that state's stability. The number of phases pertaining to a given state is usually large.

e) If a society, while in phase  $a$  of state  $A$  is disturbed, then it is highly probable that, after a certain lapse of time, it will return to a different phase  $x$  of state  $A$ , or else to some phase of another state  $B$ , which is not too radically different from phase  $a$  of state  $A$ . (Example: The United States in 1933 and after the N.R.A. was declared unconstitutional.)

This definition of "equilibrium" appears to blend the somewhat divergent views of Cannon, Henderson, and Sorokin<sup>33</sup> and assigns a meaning to the statement that society is a hereditary system.

Because of the large number of individuals involved as well as because of the large number of variables on which human motion depends, social process is an irreversible process.

*Corollary 1.*—Once the state of equilibrium has been reached by a closed system composed of particles having a high degree of freedom, the system will change of phase, but usually not of state (Pareto's law: Change is illusory; circulation of the élites [cf. the static cultures of the Cape York Eskimo, Kesar Island, and Pitcairn Island]).

*Corollary 2.*—When particles or energy are added to a system, the equilibrium is disrupted and the system proceeds toward another state of equilibrium of a higher degree of stability. When particles or energy are extracted from the system, the equilibrium is disrupted and the system proceeds toward a state of equilibrium of a lesser degree of stability.

The stability of a state of equilibrium (its relative probability)

<sup>33</sup> W. B. Cannon, *The Wisdom of the Body* (New York, 1939), pp. 305-24; L. J. Henderson, *Pareto's General Sociology: A Physiologist's Interpretation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1935); P. A. Sorokin, *Le Concept d'équilibre est-il nécessaire aux sciences sociales?* *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XLIV (1936), 497-529.

depends on the number of particles involved. A system composed of six particles will more often be found in a 3:3 distribution than will a system composed of four particles be found in a 2:2 distribution.

Examples: Depopulation, economic crisis, failure of crops. Immigration, sudden industrialization, etc. Both sets disrupt social equilibrium and cause societies to find a new equilibrium.

*Corollary 3.*—The degree of stability of an equilibrium may be greater or smaller than, or equal to, that of the other states of equilibrium which the same system may possess under other conditions. A system is in an unstable equilibrium when the least change causes it to proceed toward a state of equilibrium of a higher degree of stability. Consider the first and the second halves of the reign of Louis XIV.

*Corollary 4.*—By multiplying the specifications of what constitutes an equilibrium, it is possible to consider that no system is in equilibrium at any time in all its parts or with respect to all processes.

Compare Durkheim's law: "The degree of polysegmentation of a given society is the measure of its capacity to change (progress)"; compare the fourfold segmentation of the *ancien régime* (four estates) to the polysegmentation of the Third Republic.

*Corollary 5.*—From the knowledge and observation of any given phase it is impossible to infer the nature of the phases through which the observed phase has been reached.

Reformulation of Durkheim's law: "It is impossible, from the knowledge of an event, to infer by induction or deduction the nature of the preceding event. It is impossible therefore to reconstruct unwritten history statistically."

*Corollary 6.*—From the knowledge of the present event it is impossible to make anything but gross predictions concerning the next event or future events in general.

Compare insurance rates for individuals and for groups.

Corollaries 5 and 6 can be blended as follows:

**THEOREM II.**—The path of a system is not uniquely determined until the system has already covered the path.

Expressed mathematically, the path of a society is not analyzable *a priori* in differential equations. Nor can it be reconstructed

a posteriori in differential equations. This view tallies, I think, with Volterra's and Donnan's integro-differential analysis, to be mentioned briefly later.

Two hypotheses have been implicitly introduced in the preceding discussion. Neither of them has been completely validated by logic. Both have been found useful.

The theory of ensembles has been made fruitful by Gibbs. According to Tolman, we do not really discuss the "behavior of a single system, but rather the behavior of a *collection* of systems, containing an enormous number of sample systems identical in nature with the one of interest."<sup>34</sup>

The ergodic hypothesis (principle of continuity of path) means, according to Tolman, that "we shall have to assume that the results obtained by selecting a collection of systems at random from such an ensemble are practically the same as would be obtained by considering the given system at random times."<sup>35</sup>

Two invalid objections and one valid objection may be raised against this analysis. It will be objected that the behavior of molecules can be described in terms of three generalized coordinates and three momenta, while the individual apparently possesses a large number of degrees of freedom. It should be remembered, however, that in statistical mechanics all demonstrations are made with respect to particles of  $n$  degrees of freedom. As Lewis has pointed out, nowhere is the irreversibility of processes more obvious than in the destruction of living matter and the works of man.<sup>36</sup> The fact that individuals have a large number of degrees of freedom makes the validity of our considerations highly probable. It may be objected that we do not measure but count. That is a general character of modern geometry too. Last of all, one may be inclined to stress that there are certain recurrent regularities in individual processes which apparently exceed our mathematical expectations based on the study of molecules. These regularities are usually explained in terms of "structure" or "heredity," "tradition" or "culture," etc. As a matter of fact, these entities appear to lie at the root of the absolutistic

<sup>34</sup> R. C. Tolman, *Statistical Mechanics* (New York, 1927), p. 32.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>36</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 157 *et passim*.

metaphysical conception of "society." We must attempt to explain these structures in terms of individual data.

We shall now pass from kinetics to statics, by eliminating motion and time. It has been known since Faraday, Lord Kelvin, and Maxwell that statics is a branch of kinetics and not vice versa.

Peirce<sup>37</sup> comes as near as possible to establishing that chance is a metaphysical reality. This would transform the calculus of probability into the epistemologic branch of the philosophy of chance. We dissent from this view. We do not know whether chance "exists." Chance is not observable. We have nowhere introduced chance either as a concept or as a hypothesis. We have only stated that we observe a number of events which we do not know how to analyze in detail. As far as the present analysis is concerned, the whole world may work with the precision of a clock, provided we agree that we know nothing about the mechanism of the clock. Speculations on the nature of chance, on the existence or nonexistence of chance, are not germane to our discussion or the proper subject matter of scientific discourse.

Science makes an arbitrary classification of sense data according to "similarities" which are thought to be "significant" for no better reason than that they are convenient. Statistics enumerates the recurrence of sense data in each of the arbitrary classes. Calculus of probability compares the number of recurrent sense data of one class to the number of recurrent sense data in another class and then assigns relative probability coefficients to either class. If we change the system of classification, we change the coefficients of probability. This is a modification of Mach's principle of variations.

Consider a hypothetical example: Assume that there are as many people in New York City as there are in the rest of New York State. The probability of finding John Doe in New York City is equal to the probability of finding him at any other place within the state. We can say: "New York City equals the rest of New York State." In what way? In population. It is possible to construct a perfectly valid and coherent "geometry" in which the "volume" of New York City is equal to the "volume" of the rest of the state. If we have constructed such a geometry, we can say that the density of

<sup>37</sup> C. S. Peirce, *Chance, Love, and Logic* (New York, 1923).

individuals is the same per unit-volume throughout New York State. This is meant when we say: "The density of population in New York State (including New York City) is  $x$  persons per square mile." We have thus dispensed with force in accounting for empirically nonhomogeneous distributions.

If we keep the volume constant, we assign various coefficients of probability to various elements of volume (or area). We need not go into the causes of these differences. We assign the coefficients statistically a posteriori, or express our mathematical expectation a priori. In the latter case we must consider "causes" (or "forces"). Thus we can say: "In a fertile country like Hungary, the probability of finding individual A living in the city is  $x$ , while the probability of finding him living on the land is, let us say,  $3x$ ." In mountainous Switzerland or industrial Cook County the probability would perhaps be  $4x$  against  $x$ . These coefficients may be calculated from statistical data (census).

Summing up: If people move at random, only activated and oriented by the special structure of their environment, their motions can still be accounted for only in terms of statistical mechanics and the calculus of probabilities. It suffices to assign various coefficients of probability to various elements of space. The same proposition can be stated inversely in terms of the number of individuals. Given John Doe: What is the probability of his being at a given time within an area of a hundred square yards, a square mile, the state of Texas, the United States, America, etc.?

This, I think, is the analysis, in terms of probability and statistical mechanics, of the purely environmentalist theory.

Consider now the theory that society or culture or tradition is an "emergent." We must derive social structure from individual data and individual relations only. This can be done in several ways, proving once more Poincaré's contention that, if a phenomenon admits of one explanation, it admits of a number of others.

*Method of the least path.*—Consider three men on the sidewalk in front of a house. The first is the owner of the house; the second, the butler; the third, the burglar. Which is, for each of them, the least path to the dining-room, where the silver is kept? For the master it is through the front door; for the butler, through the service entrance; for the burglar, through the second-story window, via



the elm tree. The "least path" is the path of least resistance. We can say that social space is "curved" in a different way for each of them. Or else, we may say, with Weyl, that in a very general geometry the path of displacement will influence the "shape" of the displaced figure. We can link either explanation with probability. As a rule, the burglar enters by the window. What is the probability of finding him at (a) the window, (b) the service entrance, (c) the front door? The application of the free-path method to sociology has been first attempted by J. F. Brown.

*Method of transformations.*—We specify for each "group" in geometry what characters of the figure are to remain unchanged (invariant) in a set of transformations. In the same way we may consider society as a special type of group, wherein all transformations maintain certain characters invariant. (The word "group" is used in the mathematical sense.) Thus we may say: "The Constitution of the United States is the invariant character of all statutes." Or: "In whatever way a man changes, he may not have more than one wife at the same time."

*Quantum-mechanical method.*—Consider the burglar. He is burgling the house which is within the beat of Officer Donovan. The law covers the whole beat uniformly. Officer Donovan, however, may be found in any place at the time when the burglar makes his unlawful entry. Consider, within the officer's beat, the unit of volume known as "shouting distance." The center of it is the house which is being burglarized. Let this element of volume be  $1/10$  of the whole beat. The burglar does not know where Officer Donovan is at time  $T$ . He bets 10:1 that he is not within the element of volume, "shouting distance," at time  $T$ . It will be objected that the law is everywhere. As long as Officer Donovan is not within shouting distance, we can measure only the impulse of the law (its moral restraint). This moral restraint is a function of the 10:1 bet and its influence upon the burglar's "better self." We may say: "Officer Donovan is distributed along the law." When Officer Donovan is absent, we can measure the moral force of the law. When he is present, we can measure only the struggle between the officer and the burglar. Hence the problem, "Are there moral values independent of sanctions?" is meaningless. Between moral values and sanctions there exists an uncertainty relation, similar to Heisenberg's

principle of indeterminacy, which forms the basis of Bohr's theory of complementarity. When one of the pair of complementary entities is present and measurable, the other is not.

It may be objected that in all these cases we have taken custom and society for granted and have therefore made nonpredicative statements. That is true. We have done so for reasons of simplicity. We can now attempt to obtain the social field inductively, from individual data only.

According to Mach, the metrical properties of space are determined by the presence of bodies having mass. Gravitational fields do not exist without bodies being present. Is there a gravitational field when only one body is present? The question is meaningless. We cannot answer it operationally. Hence we start with two bodies. Consider two bodies, the respective masses of which are  $M_1$  and  $M_2$ . A mutual attraction exists between the two. Let  $d$  be the distance and  $G$  the gravitational constant. The two bodies "pull" together, according to the formula  $GM_1M_2/d^2$ . The acceleration (force) is  $GM_1/d^2$  (pull of  $M_1$ ) per unit mass. It suffices that the mass of the directing body be very large to explain the "directed" motion of other bodies. To this it will be objected that a hundred-and-forty-pound dictator rules (directs) a huge populace. Let us introduce the operationally definable conventional concept "social mass." A millionaire has a greater social mass than a penniless pugilist; a pretty girl, a greater social mass than a frump. We can erect standards and measure these social masses. These gravitational theories of society tally with our remarks on the nature of gravitational fields in general. Social mass does not exist without two bodies being present. Consider the social mass of a millionaire on Wall Street and compare it to the social mass he would have were he suddenly alone with his millions in the Sahara. In the latter case his social mass does not generate a social field, since there is no second social mass (body) present.

It may be objected that we have introduced social "force" into our discourse. We can eliminate this "force" easily. Maxwell stated that we are able to express physical processes in mathematical formulas because the laws of bodies parallel the laws of numbers. Let us therefore attach a system of coordinates to every individual.

We need not puzzle how we can attach coordinates to individuals. We do so every day when we plot learning curves, growth curves, etc. In daily practice we assume "learning" has a "dimension" and can be assigned a Cartesian coordinate. Consider two individuals. The formulas describing the properties of the gravitational field parallel closely the formulas for the transformation of the individual coordinates. Einstein states that gravitational fields result (symbolically) from the transformation of coordinate systems. Instead of saying, "Body *X* attracts body *Y*," he says, "By transforming coordinates we obtain a space curved so that the least path for body *Y* is the one passing near to body *X*." In the same purely symbolic way a social "gravitational" field can result from the transformation of all individual coordinates of a group of people. This field will direct and restrict the motions of the individual and can be called "custom" or "morals." If we do not wish to use the concept of force, we say that the social field is "curved" (theory of the least path; cf. the expression "keeping to the right side of someone"). We can give custom a Rousseauian *contrat social* meaning, in which case we resort to the quantum-mechanical theory. It states that the law is everywhere but also that the minions of law "are distributed along the law" (cf. the popular expression "the law," meaning policemen). Our group theory is implicit in the gravitational field theory, which is based on the theory of groups in mathematics. Any transformation belonging to a group shares certain invariant characters with other members of the group. All members of a society share the invariant character "obedience to law." When they no longer possess it, they cease to be members of the body social (group). They are incarcerated, deported, exiled, or killed. In geometry this simply means that they are no longer members of a given (selected) group of transformations.

This theory may shock certain readers. Yet Leibnitz,<sup>38</sup> the father of topology, suggested that topology (the science of point-to-point transformations) is especially applicable to living beings. Pareto quotes Volterra<sup>39</sup> as being puzzled by the reluctance of sociologists

<sup>38</sup> In his correspondence.

<sup>39</sup> V. Pareto, "Anwendungen der Mathematik auf die Nationaloekonomie," in *Encyclopaedie der mathematischen Wissenschaften*, I, No. 2 (1904), 1094-1120.

to operate with formally conceived individuals, like *homo oeconomicus*, who have no perfect counterpart in nature. Yet mechanics operates with ideal rigid bodies, having no counterpart in nature. In the same sense we do not imagine that men have concrete coordinate systems attached to their bodies. We merely say that we can account for human customs and traditions as well as for the motion of material particles in gravitational fields by this methodological artifice. We do not state concrete facts. We propose a new method of inquiry and of representation.

Let us now extend this field concept to social process and show its implications. What are the implications of the conceptual scheme: "Society is the order of individuals in a structured space"? We must return to the concept of equilibrium. We have shown that it is always possible to imagine a process with respect to which no system is in equilibrium, even though it is in equilibrium in all other respects.

The meaning of these considerations can be laid down in a general theorem which contains a definition both of social process and of tradition.

THEOREM III.—A society will, when external forces are applied to it, tend to maintain its structure. It can do so only by modifying certain other characters. The less rigid the structure, the smaller the changes in the other characters. If the structure is very rigid, no modification can be made which is sufficient to maintain it when operated on by large forces.

Example: In a war a nation loses many of its citizens, puts itself on a war basis, etc., in the hope of maintaining its structural identity. If the structure is very rigid, the changes to be made are small if the external forces are not very large. A war with Switzerland would cause less upheaval in a totalitarian state than it would in a democracy. If, on the other hand, the structure is very rigid and the forces operating on it are very large, the structure will break down from lack of adaptability. Compare the breakdown of the rigid Pawnee culture and the continuous easy adjustment of the flexible Comanche culture after the establishment of American rule. Compare also the well-known fact that democracies more easily survive defeat while dictatorships survive only on victories.

This concept can further be linked with the theory of hysteresis in physics, which has recently pervaded also certain areas of biological thought. The magnetization of a bar of iron is interpreted as a rearranging of minute magnets in a new pattern. A brisk shock will once more disarrange this pattern and "jam" the small magnets. During these operations, as well as during the process of remagnetization, a certain "lag" (hysteresis) may be detected. Similar social situations will be familiar to every reader ("The Bourbons have learned nothing and have forgotten nothing").

A few words should be said with respect to the mathematical treatment of hereditary or historic systems. Volterra<sup>40</sup> and Donnan<sup>41</sup> have suggested that they should be described in integro-differential equations instead of in differential equations. Schroedinger further specifies that these equations should not be reducible to differential equations by any amount of differentiations, since that would imply a "one-point memory." These approaches have been found useful in the study of evolution, conditioning, and heredity in biology and in population studies. These researches make it seem likely that until statistical hereditary mechanics are evolved it will be impossible to use mathematical formulas in sociology, wherever process is involved. It is emphatically not the intention of the writer to suggest that the formulas of statistical mechanics be taken over into sociology. The illusion of precision is fatal to science.

We have simply suggested that it is possible to construct a conceptual scheme of society, based upon three concepts only, all of which are derived from sense data and are operationally definable. We have shown that we can profit by our ignorance by using the reasoning processes—if not the formulas—of statistical mechanics and of the calculus of probabilities.

Social theory may be compared to the investigation of the "metrical" properties of social "space." Many social theories exist, and, provided that they are coherent, all of them are valid. According to Poincaré, "If a phenomenon admits of a complete mechanical

<sup>40</sup> V. Volterra, "Principes de biologie mathematique," *Acta biotheoretica*, III, No. 1 (1937), 1-36 (Bibliography).

<sup>41</sup> F. G. Donnan, "Integral Analysis and the Phenomena of Life," *Acta biotheoretica*, II, No. 1 (1936), 1-11; *ibid.*, III, No. 1 (1937), 43-50.

explanation, it will admit of an infinity of others which will account equally well for all the peculiarities disclosed by experiment."<sup>42</sup> We have not proposed a social theory. Rather have we tried to elucidate the nature of the fundamental hypotheses of sociology. We have also attempted to define the subject matter of sociological discourse. Our studies no more contradict any imaginable coherent social theory than Riemann's geometry contradicts those of Euclid or Lobatcheffsky—or vice versa. It does contain, however, other social theories as limiting cases.

The scope of a truly scientific sociology is best expressed in the words of a great mathematical physicist, Professor R. C. Tolman:

In spite the impossibility of precise observation and prediction . . . [the sociologists] have not been deterred from [their] labors. . . . Even if they can not follow or predict the *exact* behavior of individual elements, they can observe and predict with remarkable surety the *gross* behavior of their systems as a whole. . . . Each time there is a war, the sociologist can predict that rich men will profiteer and poor men die. These complicated phenomena do not lie beyond the realm of law and predictability.<sup>43</sup>

In conclusion it should be stated that the fact that we used physical examples and laws to formulate social laws must not be construed to imply that sociology is a branch of physics. The whole problem of hierarchy, the question of which field is the general case and which is the special case, is not touched upon in this essay—if for no other reason than because the conclusions in this field would come as a surprise to some social scientists, although they would probably be deemed self-evident by most thinking physicists. The problem is too involved to be discussed in this study. We merely state that we have discussed social laws in terms of physical laws in order to save space and to avoid ambiguities due to the penumbræ surrounding most sociological concepts and terms.<sup>44</sup>

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

<sup>42</sup> Henri Poincaré, *Electricité et optique* (Paris, 1901).

<sup>43</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

<sup>44</sup> Professors L. B. Loeb and V. F. Lenzen, of the department of physics of the University of California, have most generously assisted the writer with their advice and criticism. Without their help, a clear-cut formulation of many problems would probably have been impossible.

# THE PROBLEM OF THE CONCEPT IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

HERBERT BLUMER

## ABSTRACT

Ill-defined and ambiguous concepts are detrimental to definitive theorizing and probative research. Current proposals for meeting this problem are inadequate. To avoid all concepts which are vague and to confine one's self to the quest for exact data and their interrelations is to depart from the actual problems. Merely to discard currently used concepts and to secure new ones brings us back to the same problem. The "operational definition" omits the vital part of the original reference, for the content revealed in the "operational" procedure has by virtue of the operation no content, and hence the conceptualized item cannot be studied. Another suggestion is that definitions of concepts be legislated after critical analysis of their variant usages; being a purely lexicographical procedure, this effort remains unrelated to empirical experience. Each of the foregoing proposals seeks to handle the problem by avoiding it. Facing the problem requires investigation into the peculiar difficulties involved in applying concepts to human conduct. The observer of human conduct can readily identify physical action, but the social aspect of that action cannot be reduced to a physical act. Although the nature of the social aspect of the act may be termed an inference, the crucial question is not whether the observation has an inferential character but whether the inference can be validated. It is in that field of human conduct where there is minimal consensus regarding valid inferences that the problem of the ambiguity of concepts becomes most apparent. Many of the primary and basic observations of human conduct are necessarily a matter of judgment and inference. The answer to the problem is not to repudiate such observations but to improve them by enriching the experience of observers so that more dependable judgments may be made.

The discussion in this paper is confined to concepts in social psychology, although the treatment will be of general relevance to concepts in the social sciences. The problem dealt with is the familiar one of the vague and imprecise nature of most concepts in social psychology. It is trite to point out that concepts which are vague and unclear are an immediate obstacle to effective scientific research and to the attainment of rigorous knowledge. For such concepts introduce a gap between theory and empirical observation and likewise do not allow for rigorous deduction. The vagueness of the concept means that one cannot indicate in any clear way the features of the thing to which the concept refers; hence, the testing of the concept by empirical observation as well as the revising of the concept as a result of such observation are both made difficult. Because of this difficulty in effective validation such concepts are conducive to speculation in the unfavorable sense of that term; the unsettled con-

tent of the concept encourages thinking to move along divergent directions without the benefits yielded by logical coherence. In these ways ill-defined and ambiguous concepts are damaging to both definitive theorizing and probative research.

It might be pointed out, further, that this condition of imprecise conceptualization lies at the heart of the scientific difficulties of such a discipline as social psychology. For, as suggested, it fosters a bifurcation of effort into the channels of detached theorizing and detached research. Such a separation—the antithesis of the productive interaction between the two in the natural sciences—throws open theorizing to the legitimate charge of being speculative and research to the likewise legitimate charge of being planless and frequently pointless.

Many students of the discipline of social psychology, repelled by the vagueness and confusion of contemporary interpretation of human conduct, have turned their attention away from theories and concepts. Attracted by the solid character of fact in the natural sciences, they have committed themselves to the search for exact data by the use of precise techniques, usually of a mensurative and sometimes of an experimental character. In taking this course they have been considerably fortified by an oversimple view of scientific procedure which would reduce the scientific act to a search for quantitative information and quantitative relations. The result has been a plethora of censuses, tests, scales, scoring devices, and minor experiments all yielding a vast amount of scattered propositions. It is not an unfair judgment to declare that these efforts with their resulting information have done little to clarify concepts.

Many other students following the stream of an older tradition continue their efforts to explain human conduct through the use of common-sense concepts and the use of a variety of technical terms. Confronted with problems and kinds of human behavior which require some form of explanation, they apply common-sense ideas or any of a variety of psychological theories. Such efforts have the merit, at least, of choosing to grapple with what seem to be vital problems and of yielding some semblance of intelligibility to these problems. And such efforts, likewise, do gain some re-enforcement from the recognition that exact research, such as spoken of above, does



not seem in its present character to be capable of grappling with such problems. Unfortunately, as a result perhaps of a faulty tradition and of possible intrinsic deficiency, the concepts employed in these interpretations are seldom subjected to rigorous test by empirical observation. The result is that concepts remain vague and the propositions which embody them become incapable of effective validation.

I take it that this separation between conceptual usage and empirical investigation establishes the major dilemma in our field. I take it further that this separation must be bridged if social psychology is to acquire the character of a scientific discipline or to yield knowledge that is scientific in character. To avoid all concepts which are vague and to confine one's self, as an alternative, to the quest for exact data and their relations is to turn away from the problems of the field. This pathway, either in terms of its direction or in terms of its accomplishments so far, does not promise a solution to the dilemma. On the other hand, to continue to form and to use explanations built around concepts that are not to be effectively tested by empiric fact is merely to perpetuate the problem. What is needed is a working relation between concepts and the facts of experience wherein the former can be checked by the latter, and the latter ordered anew by the former. Such a working relation, rigorously conducted, accounts for the development and progressive achievement of natural science; it seems to be essential to any discipline that aspires to the status of science.

It is this problem of the relation between concept and empirical observation in social psychology that I wish to discuss. We can start with the recognition that vagueness is characteristic of concepts in social psychology—vagueness in the sense that they do not have explicit features that would enable one to identify clearly the denotative thing to which the concept refers. To appreciate the point one has merely to think of such concepts as attitude, habit, temperament, personality, self, sentiment, impulse, drive, sublimation, extroversion, socialization, mental conflict, aggression, parent fixation, aversion, character, compensation, inhibition, social control, suggestion, and sympathy. Of course, one may point to some occasional action or condition of conduct as a clear, denotative instance of any

one of these concepts. Difficulty, however, arises in an attempt to identify every instance that should come within the scope of the concept and in being able always to distinguish it from the instances that should not come within the scope of the concept. In other words, the concepts do not allow precise identification or differentiation.

One way, perennially proposed, of dealing with the problem of such abstract concepts is that of discarding prevailing concepts and securing a new set. This does not meet the difficulty, judging from efforts taken in this direction—for the same problem arises with reference to the new concepts. This, I think, can be appreciated by any comparison of different psychological systems. Further, some recognition must be made of the fact that many of the concepts, however vague, have arisen out of repetitive empirical experience and so point to some kind or aspect of conduct that cannot be ignored. Nothing is gained by changing the designation or label. The problem of the vague concept cannot be escaped by resorting to a new set of terms. The only legitimate occasion for the presentation of a new concept comes from the recognition of a new body of fact or from a new perspective which reveals such a new body of fact.

A second proposed way of solving the problem has been presented in recent years under the heading of the method of "operational definition." This method, apparently, would confine the meaning of a concept to quantitative and mensurative data secured with reference to it. Prevailing concepts—or at least some of them—would be accepted; counting and measuring devices would be used in the case of each concept; the resulting information would constitute the content and the meaning of the concept. Seemingly, such a method would yield a precise content, capable of exact test. However, critical consideration of this method should convince one that it does not offer a solution to the problem. It should be noted first of all that the method begins with the selection of a concept, which necessarily already has some meaning and some reference to an area of empirical experience. To limit this meaning to what is determinable quantitatively or mensuratively is essentially an act of reduction which may be at the expense of the empirical reference which the concept originally had and with which one is concerned. For it may well be, as

seems to be attested by the results of "operational" procedure made so far,<sup>1</sup> that what is omitted is the most vital part of the original reference. The operational procedure, of the form spoken of here, could be successful in meeting the problem of vague concepts in social psychology only if the problems out of which the concepts arose and the items to which they refer were themselves essentially quantitative in nature. In present-day social psychology, only by an act of faith can one declare that the empirical problems and empirical items to which its concepts refer are essentially of such a quantitative nature. However vague may be the character of concepts in social psychology, unless it be shown that their nonquantitative aspects are spurious, the "operational" method is not a means of meeting the problem considered in this paper. As a means, of course, of helping to enlarge and to make more definite certain aspects of the concept, the method may be of value.

A word may be said here about a more extreme (as well as more logical) form of "operational" procedure that endeavors also to arrive at precise and unambiguous concepts. Unlike the kind of "operationalism" spoken of above, it does not accept existing concepts and merely try to make them definite by bringing their reference into quantitative or mensurative form. Instead, it would isolate some stable content (yielded as a result of some particular mensurative procedure) and regard the concept as any symbol that refers to this content. The symbol usually is an existing word like "intelligence," or a letter like  $x$  or  $y$ , or an algebraic sign. This procedure may be illustrated by the current view held by some students that "intelligence" is what intelligence tests measure. The argument is that intelligence tests do catch something that is stable, and in place of declaring that one does not know what is this stable content that is caught, one calls it "intelligence," and assigns it a numerical value. Some points should be noted about this interesting means of escaping the problem. First, the stable content that is isolated has no nature; that is to say that the operation by means of which one arrives at that content does nothing more than indicate that there is something that is stable. The operation as such cannot analyze or characterize

<sup>1</sup> As a good example see Stuart C. Dodd, *A Controlled Experiment on Rural Hygiene in Syria* (Beirut, Syria: American Press, 1934).

that "something"; confined to such operations, that "something" neither has a nature nor could it ever secure a nature. Thus, to illustrate, "intelligence" becomes merely a numerical value. Second, not having a nature, the conceptualized item cannot be studied—it gets its significance only through being related to other items. These other items (if one remains inside of the framework of this kind of operational procedure) would be other "somethings," also without a nature—presumably in the form of other numerical values. The relations between the items could be only in the form of quantified correlations.

What such a type of mathematical logic (into which the method resolves itself) could yield in the understanding of empirical life is unknown. If followed successfully, assuming that it could be followed successfully, it would result in an exceedingly odd framework of interrelated symbols. These symbols would be nothing like concepts as we are familiar with them, as in present-day social psychology. For the symbolized item would have neither a content capable of being studied nor a nature capable of generic extension; it would never stand for a problem to be investigated nor have any evolutionary development. To apply such symbols to human conduct as it is being studied by social psychology, one would have to work through concepts such as those we now have.<sup>2</sup> And once this step is taken one is thrown back to the initial problem of the concept. What this means is that the symbols arrived at by the procedure being discussed become intelligible and capable of application only through the use of another order of concepts and hence they do not displace this latter kind of concept.

A few brief remarks can be made about still another way of approaching the problem of the concept.<sup>3</sup> It seeks to arrive at precise definitions through a critical analysis of concepts. A given term is

<sup>2</sup> This is done apparently by those who profess to adhere to the approach being discussed. Thus a person may view "intelligence" as what is indicated by intelligence tests and may use as its symbol some quantitative value, such as the intelligence quotient. In order to apply "intelligence," represented in this way, to human conduct, he has to think of it as standing for something generic, such as "problem-solving ability." In doing so he slips over into a different concept—in this instance a common-sense conception of intelligence.

<sup>3</sup> This approach is exemplified by the endeavors of the Committee on Conceptual Integration of the American Sociological Society.

selected, its different definitions are compared, and its different usages are studied; the effort is to eliminate inconsistencies, to determine similarities, and, where needed, to classify or list companionate definitions. Through such critical consideration one endeavors to arrive at a precise definition (or definitions) which will make for common usage of the concept. This procedure is essentially a lexicographical effort and has value as such, but only as such. It does not meet the problem of the concept as that problem is represented by the need to secure conceptualizations that fit empirical experience. For it undertakes no study of the empirical field denoted, but instead considers the usages of terms; the empirical or denotative item enters only as it may happen to have been covered by the previous experience of the student making the critical analysis, or as it appears in the discussions of usages which are being scrutinized. The diversion of consideration away from the empirical item opens the procedure to the danger of becoming merely a formal elaboration of definitions such as we are familiar with in the case of "scholastic" theorizing. A scientific concept must remain in intimate relation with empirical fact and achieve its character through interaction.

The foregoing discussion has been given to show the inadequacy of proposed means of meeting the problem of the concept in social psychology. By abjuring concepts and so ignoring the problems for which they stand; by narrowly curtailing the area of empirical experience at the expense of perhaps more central forms of such experience; by tending to ignore the empirical factor and becoming a lexicographical undertaking—each in its own way suffers from some vital deficiency. It seems not unfair to state that each seeks to handle the problem by essentially avoiding it. For the problem is set in the need for an effective interrelation between thinking and empirical observation, and no solution can arise at the expense of either of these two factors or of their interrelation.

The problem to be solved has to be faced; and facing the problem requires investigation into the peculiar difficulties involved in applying concepts to human conduct. It is necessary to analyze the relation between conceptual view and empirical observation in this field in order to know what has to be done to improve that relation. The remainder of the discussion is given to this line of thinking.

The vagueness of a concept is equivalent to a difficulty in observ-

ing clearly the thing to which the concept is presumed to refer; indeed, this difficulty—knowing what to observe, being able to observe it, and knowing how to observe it—is the crucial obstacle in bringing the concept into touch with empirical experience. Consequently, it is necessary to consider the nature of observation as it is made of human conduct; for this observation involves peculiarities and difficulties which throw much light on the inadequacies of concepts in social psychology. The following discussion is devoted to the act of observation and will endeavor to point out some of these peculiarities and difficulties.

In the observation of human conduct one kind of item that the observer can detect and identify readily is what can be called the physical action—such as moving an arm, clenching the hand, running, cutting with a knife, and carrying some object. Such kinds of activities can be directly perceived and easily identified; designations or descriptive accounts of them can be readily verified. For, in the last analysis, even though they represent the application of a series of cultural designations, they can be translated into a space-time framework or brought inside of what George Mead has called the touch-sight field. Here people have common experience and therefore verifiable experience. Observations of this kind of behavior do enter into the literature of social science, as in the case of the anthropologist's account of technological activity. Being capable of effective validation, they do not become the cause of disputation. Indeed, they satisfy so nicely the need for verifiable data that one can readily sympathize with the behavioristic desire to limit observation to this sort. If all human conduct could be described by this kind of observation, and if our concepts denotatively referred to such descriptions, there would be little difficulty in having precise concepts in social psychology.

However, there is another kind of item disclosed in the observation of human behavior which is of a markedly different nature, as when we observe that a person is acting aggressively, or belligerently, or respectfully, or hatefully, or jealously, or kindly. This kind of activity cannot be reduced to a physical act or translated into a space-time framework and still retain the character suggested by the adverbs employed. It is such a kind of act which is genuinely social;

and a great many of the observations that are made of human conduct are of such acts. The observation that detects such a kind of act is different from that which reveals the physical act, and, incidentally, is of a complicated nature. It is complicated in that it comes in the form of a judgment based on sensing the social relations of the situation in which the behavior occurs and on applying some social norm present in the experience of the observer; thus one observes an act as being respectful, for example, by sensing the social relation between the actor and others set by the situation, and by viewing the act from the standpoint of rights, obligations, and expectations involved in that situation. Or we may identify the act as being respectful by noticing gestures of behavior which are familiar to us in our own experience as signs of respectful behavior. Usually we observe the act in terms of both grasping the situation and by detecting familiar signs; ordinarily these occur together, although they need not do so.

It may be argued that the designation of an act as being respectful, hateful, aggressive, etc., is actually an inference and so is not properly a part of the observation. That it is an inference is, I think, unquestionable, but in many instances it is an inference that is fused immediately into the observation itself. This is true of every act of observation; even the observation or designation of a physical act is in the nature of a judgment or an inference. The only question is whether the inference will stand up in the face of a test. As I remarked above, the observation of a physical act can be so validated, because it can be brought inside of a space-time framework. Similarly, the observation of a social act of the sort mentioned will hold up if observers have the same grasp of the situation in which the behavior is taking place and, by virtue of a common experience, attach the same meaning to certain gestures in behavior. Where the situation is immediately clear and where the gestures or signs are evident, the inference is fused into the immediate observation; if, however, the situation is not clear and unmistakable signs are not given, the act of judgment becomes less certain; in this case we tend to detach it from the act as observed and are likely to become aware of an inferential character or feature which we give to the observed act. So I am led to repeat that it is of no importance that a character that

we observe in an act is lodged there through a process of inference—all that is of importance is whether the inference can be validated. Such a validation can be made in the case of the physical act, if need be, by applying to it a space-time framework which compels common experience on the part of observers. In the case of the social act, such validation can be made only through a very different kind of common experience based on grasping the social relations in a situation and on recognizing signs of common human experience.

It is in this different framework, by means of which observation of social behavior is made, that we have the cause for the difficulty in getting agreement in much of our observation and the cause also of the difficulty of bringing our concepts to effective empirical test. A great deal of social behavior can be observed accurately in the sense that observers can readily grasp the social relations in which it fits or detect easily dependable signs present in the behavior. Under such circumstances agreement in observation may be reached. In the observation of a great deal of human conduct, however, observers cannot arrive at dependable judgments or at a common judgment; the social situation which must be grasped may be highly complex and pertinent elements in it may be very unclear, or the activity observed may contain no signs that permit an unambiguous identification of the act. I think that this can be appreciated if we consider some of the different kinds of observation that are made, or have to be made, in the field of social psychology.

As previous examples indicate, one kind of observation that is made of human conduct necessarily involves a judgment of evaluation. This is true particularly of social acts that take place in the field of interpersonal association; such acts may be observed in terms of the relations of the people toward one another or, as we say, in terms of their attitudes toward one another. We speak of a child talking discourteously or of a husband acting surlily or of a person treating an associate with disdain, etc. To cast out such observations on the ground that they involve evaluation is not only to ignore what is given to us in empirical experience but would do havoc to the field of social psychology.<sup>4</sup> Now, as stated above, frequently observers

<sup>4</sup> For one thing, practically the whole field of attitudes would be obliterated; for, as treated in contemporary social psychology, the attitude is regarded as some positive



will form the same evaluative judgments and so agree in their observation. But, also frequently, as in the case of family discord, it is difficult to make dependable observations because of an inability to form evaluative judgments; our observations fall to a simpler level or else they become confused and ambiguous.

Another kind of observation in social psychology that becomes very difficult, but seemingly is inevitable, is that which requires the observer to form a judgment as to the intentional character of the act. One is led to infer such features as the meaning of the act, wishes, attitudes, tendencies, drives, impulses, thoughts, feelings, or character dispositions. This kind of observation is present in everyday empirical experience; all people make such observations; if they didn't, they couldn't get along. Theoretically, such kind of observation could be scrupulously abjured; but the question is, If so avoided, can one get descriptions of human behavior that are true to the character of empirical experience, that are of significance to such experience, and that offer any hope of handling the problems set by such experience?

To continue further, one should note that much of the observation of human conduct does not even get into the field of visual perception. Thus we may use as initial data of such conduct such items as a letter written by a person or the items which an individual has checked on a questionnaire, or we may observe that a person to whom we have sent a telegram has failed to reply to it. I think that anyone who reflects on the matter will realize that an enormous amount of the observations of human conduct are of acts that are not visually perceived but which we have to imagine. While agreement and verification may be reached for many observations of this sort, it is also true that many of them are uncertain, with a great possibility of error.

The few remarks given in these paragraphs to the topic of the observation of human conduct should be sufficient to suggest that the observations which are to constitute the initial data of social

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or negative inclination, which to be designated in any specific instance necessarily involves an evaluative judgment. It is a curious paradox that many of those who would argue vigorously for the elimination of evaluation in social psychology do a great deal of work with evaluative data.

psychology are frequently very difficult to make, requiring complicated judgments and inferences which may not be dependable. Propositions based on data of such an inconclusive character become tenuous and difficult to validate. Or, to put the matter in terms of the concepts of social psychology, we may say that such concepts are vague and ambiguous because the observations that we use to serve them are tenuous and uncertain; and that the observations have this character because of an inability to form dependable judgments and inferences; and, further, that such undependable judgments and inference are at present intrinsic to many of the kinds of observation which we have to make and use.

Set in this way, the problem of the abstract concept may seem discouraging; but, at least in knowing where the difficulty lies, we should be prevented from engaging in the practice of the ostrich or in expecting some form of magic to make the problem vanish. Obviously, whatever solution can be made must be along the road of securing reliable observation. But how are we to arrive at such reliable observation? We cannot, in my judgment, expect an answer by following any scheme which ignores the observational demands set by the character of social life. To confine our observation to the physical act would yield us dependable data, but we would have to ask, "data for what?"; seemingly, not for the problems which arise from, and are rooted in, a markedly different kind of observation, i.e., the observation of the social act. Further, to confine our observation to the simpler and easily detected kinds of social action could yield us dependable and verifiable accounts, but at the expense of the problems represented by the abstract concepts we have in social psychology. For such problems have arisen not out of the observation of such simple acts but of more complicated and more difficult kinds of observation. The answer to the problem, in my judgment, is to come not by changing the character of observation or by narrowly reducing the range of observation or by lowering its level but by improving the kind of observation that has to be made to handle the problems represented by our abstract concepts.

This last remark is something more than a mere platitude. For it means the need for an enrichening of experience which will make it possible for observers to form more dependable judgments in those

observations which give us our trouble. I don't think that there is any short-cut way of arriving at the formation of such judgments; it has to be done in the slow and tedious manner of developing a rich and intimate familiarity with the kind of conduct that is being studied and in employing whatever relevant imagination observers may fortunately possess. The improvement in judgment, in observation, and in concept will be in the future, as I suspect it has been in the past, a slow, maturing process. During the process the concept will continue to remain imprecise,<sup>5</sup> but it should remain less so as observation becomes grounded in fuller experience and in new perspectives. Even though imprecise, the concept will serve, as it does at present, to help direct the line of observation and to help guide the forming of judgments involved in that observation. That there is risk and danger that the concept may coerce the judgment and determine what is seen cannot be ignored; under such conditions there can be no effective interaction between concept and empirical observation. But we will have to run this risk—necessarily so great in the observation of human conduct—and seek to safeguard ourselves by viewing concepts as hypothetical and by widening our experience in the field to which they apply.

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<sup>5</sup> In view of the nature of our problems, our observations, and our data in social psychology, I expect that for a long time generalizations and propositions will not be capable of the effective validation that is familiar to us in the instance of natural science. Instead they will have to be assessed in terms of their reasonableness, their plausibility, and their illumination.

## URBANISM<sup>1</sup>

CHARLES E. MERRIAM

### ABSTRACT

A survey of the interrelations of the social research organization in Chicago with various other like but broader enterprises, followed by a forecast of urban research in the governmental field. Types of future research in urbanism are suggested, including (1) the place of concentration and diffusion of population in modern societies, (2) the reorientation of municipal organization, (3) the reconsideration of city planning, (4) the reorganization of municipal intercommunication on the intellectual level, and (5) municipal finance.

Urbanism deals with a cross-section of society, western urbanism with a cross-section of western civilization. Based on the physical factor of agglomeration in a limited area and the social advantages of community life, the urban community from place to place and from time to time must deal with the complications arising from heterogeneity of population, from new occupational groupings, from technological devices in engineering, communication, organization, and industry, and from the accommodation of ways of life often differing widely in cultural origin and in capacity for adaptation and adjustment, with widely different values and techniques.

The variety of urban types and the tempo of urban change are from one point of view confusing, as compared with a primitive and more stable society, but, on the other hand, the urban society offers unparalleled opportunities for observation of the social and political process in action from many different approaches and for insights and conclusions regarding social behavior.

In the work of the Local Community Research Committee since 1923 we have undertaken a wide variety of types of inquiry. I shall not undertake an appraisal on this occasion of methods and results, but content myself—and probably you will be more contented—with a conspectus of some of the features of the landscape. We have made elaborate collections of basic data, of maps, of census tracts, later to be described. We have organized a study of the history of

<sup>1</sup> This paper was read at the tenth anniversary celebration of the Social Science Research Building, University of Chicago, December 1-2, 1939.

Chicago, endeavoring to break ground in the elaboration of method and in direction of inquiry in a long-neglected field. This study, under the skilful guidance of Dr. Pierce, has not yet been completed, but it seems likely to give an interesting and original approach to the processes of history in urban areas.

We have undertaken a wide range of studies in the field of urban ecology, starting with the Gold Coast and the Ghetto and ramifying through a series of detailed inquiries into the intricate patterns of mores in an urban environment. In more recent times we have begun to deal with the application of anthropological methods in modern communities, under the leadership of Professor Warner, who came to us from Harvard, and Dean Redfield. We have conducted intricate background studies of urban population, growth trends, and characteristics. We have occupied ourselves with significant phases of public welfare organization, administration, and underlying problems. We have undertaken the analysis and measurement of phases of political behavior. We have analyzed the organization and procedure in a special form of municipal propaganda. We have given especial attention to the organization and interrelations of municipal functions—health, water, education, justice, recreation, taxation, reporting—in the widespread metropolitan area of Chicago.

For various reasons the local economic history, trends, processes, and techniques have not been as carefully explored as others in our joint enterprise of community examination, although Marshall, Herr, and Palyi have contributed studies of significance in financial history, Millis in labor, and Leland in taxation.

Obviously time does not permit, if hospitality did not forbid, any detailed analysis of our methods or of our results, either practical or technical. We are in process of preparing our final volumes of analysis and interpretation of our various researches, which will contain a log-book perhaps useful to others—what we learned and how: our confessions of sin and weakness, rivaling those of Rousseau; our areas of invincible ignorance; exhibits of our offspring; what we think we learned, and what general value this might have.

Our local community research proved, however, to be not merely a *terminus ad quem*, but a starting-point in research. There developed a series of relationships, first of all with the Research Com-

mittee of the International City Managers, who came here to be near a research center. They were followed by a procession of seventeen other associations of responsible governing officials, now allied with the Public Administration Clearing House and associated in the Public Administration Service. They proliferated into the present structure on East Sixtieth Street known as "1313." In 1932 we embarked on a special program of administration and research, and this again flowered into the President's Administrative Management Committee.

Our Local Community Research Committee was, in a fashion, caught up in the Urbanism Committee of the National Resources Board, which conducted a long and elaborate inquiry into the role of cities in the American economy. With the co-operation of many important groups in Harvard, Michigan, and elsewhere, this undertaking was completed in 1938. It was not our study, but it was not without us—Wirth, Lepawsky, Brownlow, and Merriam.

In 1930 the Local Community Research Committee was broadened out to include social science in the broadest sense of the term. I shall not go into this extra-urban field except to say in passing that we ranged over a broad field of approaches, from Plato and his precursors to Pareto and his post-prandial admirers. We analyzed and synthesized; we integrated and disintegrated; we added, subtracted, multiplied; we co-ordinated, correlated, and co-efficientated; the bewildered facts fled in defeat.

Fortunately we were able to find a home in this building, the tenth anniversary of which provides the occasion for bringing us together today. But again we were caught up in the task of reviewing recent social trends (1929-33). This undertaking absorbed a great part of the time and attention of Professors Ogburn and Merriam and extorted contributions from many of our local colleagues. This was, of course, an enterprise of national scope, involving the co-operation of students from all parts of the country. We were not it, but we were in it. This inquiry led over into the National Resources Planning Board, and the voyages and opportunities of Ulysses began all over again.

Looking now at the future of research in urbanism I may say that I see the following types of problems and approach in the urban

area. I shall deal more particularly with some problems of organization, commonly called political, but in reality reaching down to the roots of human association. Not one of the questions posed here can be answered from political data alone.

What has research to say regarding the following?

1. *The place of concentration and diffusion of population in modern societies.*—What are the technical and material advantages and disadvantages of living in highly concentrated and in more widely diffused communities; and what are the more elusive values related to each way of life?

How far and in what ways is it possible under modern conditions to unite these advantages in new forms of association? Modern transportation of persons, goods, power; modern communication; modern air conditioning; modern plant growth—all these are involved.

We may find that “urban” and “rural” do not conform to the exclusive pattern expressed by “either/or.” It is not necessary to decide which way of life is superior—the urban or the rural—but to develop a clearer view of the underlying problems. Nor is it our present task to say whether we should encourage large cities or strive for smaller ones, but rather to indicate how varying sets of areas may be brought into the best possible relations, given the ends desired.

If the level of living conditions and the base of mass purchasing power are raised, as modern technology and modern organizing power permit, many of what were long thought to be exclusive advantages of city dwellers or country dwellers will tend to be accessible to all.

The development of rapid transit and communication has destroyed the isolation and loneliness of many rural communities, while, on the other hand, the growth of city planning and zoning and the rise of modern sanitation have made possible in our day the abolition of the urban areas of congestion commonly called slums. Not only is this true, but the advantages both of rural and of urban life may now be shared more freely under modern conditions by many persons moving from one area to the other. With better organization and a more determined drive in this direction, vastly greater interchange of rural-urban facilities might now be brought about.

For a few, these double advantages have long been commonplace. For the many, they are just now beginning. Urban research may not show the way, but part of the way at least.

2. *Reorientation of municipal organization.*—

a) One of the oldest of this cluster of problems is that of the relationship between the city and the state. This remains unsolved, partly because of the slow development of effective state administrative agencies, partly because of rural-local antagonisms, and again partly because of urban inertia and lack of moral challenge.

Now that some cities have flowed over into more than one state, the difficulty of determining the appropriate area of local autonomy becomes all the greater. But in a national state, and especially in a democracy, it is of the highest importance that the necessary role of local self-government in matters that are really local should be protected and preserved. Nor is this a question local to the United States. It is the common problem of the modern political state. What patterns can invention based on research bring forth?

b) Another problem is that of the interrelationship of the several communities within the urban area—also a common problem of modern nations. What happens here is the outflow of population until there are more citizens outside the city walls than within, with confusing consequences at times. The reconciliation of the various values desired in technical inventions of form and function constitutes one of the outstanding fields of constructive inquiry.

c) The relations between the city and the national state are everywhere pressing in their demands, particularly with the relative weakening of the provincial, departmental, or other intermediate organization between city and national state. We cannot anticipate in the light of recent trends the rise again of the old-time city-states, but we may reasonably look forward to new types of understandings and practices in the field of urban-national relations. In our special system the interrelations between the city, the county, the state, and the nation constitute a tangled complex which challenges the ingenuity of inventors to develop ways and means of simplification, or, at least, of understanding.

d) Broader in geographical reach and slower in time, perhaps, is the development of means of interchanging urban experience, tech-



niques, and ideals through the international association of cities. The International Union of Local Authorities has already gone some distance in this direction but is still far from the goal. We have just been entertaining at "1313" our Pan-American colleagues from Pan-American cities.

I have often observed that cities do not irritate one another as do nations, and often the urban problems may be quietly discussed when national questions would inevitably arouse the emotions and the anger of the conferees. Cities are not so eager to show either their flags or their teeth.

The International Union of Local Authorities brings together the representatives of a considerable portion of the world's population and wealth for the consideration of the essential problems of urbanism. In the League of Nations a delegate once objected to the official recognition of the International Union of Local Authorities on the ground that it might one day become more powerful than the League.

e) One of the most significant factors of urban life is that of the interrelationship of various forms of government both public in character and private in their scope and method. I have often wished to study the government of universities—except Chicago of course—for they illustrate many of the patterns described in my *New Democracy and the New Despotism*. The government of industry, the government of labor, the government of the churches, illustrate many of the situations closely parallel to government and closely interwoven with political processes and problems. The past, present, and future of the urban community are impossible of understanding except in the light of these intricate interrelationships between competing forms of social control. The consent of the governed in all these diverse social groupings must be studied if we are to comprehend the facts and principles of association in the urban community. Limitations of space preclude my dwelling further upon these topics.

3. *Reconsideration of city planning.*—The old-time city planning was largely the planning of physical arrangements. The new planning will include, along with physical accommodations, a wide range of social and cultural adjustments. The city of course is limited by its local powers, but no one enjoins it from taking the initiative in research in the larger field of problems affecting vitally the city, as

in the case of living and working standards. Rural planning has far outstripped urban planning in the past few years, and the rural planners have come up to the fringe of the urban communities with reasonable expectancy that they will be met halfway by the urbanites.

The new type of urban planning will not omit, as did the earlier, such fields as promotion of sound industrial development, municipal justice in its many phases, municipal housing, municipal working and living conditions, the health of the citizens, full educational opportunity, responsibility for the unfolding lives of flaming youth on the city streets, and leisure-time opportunities under new conditions with shortened hours of labor. The once uncomfortable leisure of the unemployed now becomes the leisure-time opportunity of the whole community, and plans are possible for its full utilization in life-opportunities.

New forms of city planning rooted in the realities of modern social and economic life are within the range of possibilities—even more, are inevitable. The New York City Planning Commission seems to be on its way. But the way is long, and the road must be built by research and invention, searching and persistent. Primers of the new city planning are as necessary as Wacker's early primer of physical planning in Chicago. The new urban planning will be the acid test of urban research and invention.

4. *Reorganization of urban intercommunication.*—I do not mean by this merely the reorganization of urban physical transportation, desirable as that may be, and important as it is; but the reorientation of the communication of ideas, techniques, ideals, basic in the urban area. With this latter in mind there loom up several important possibilities. It is doubtless too much to hope for very close co-ordination of institutions of learning. There might be a University of New York or a University of Chicago in which all institutions of higher learning were at least brought together closely enough to have a bowing acquaintance with each other. It is possible to co-operate without consolidation, but not without association. I do not even suggest this, however.

a) But some city might set up an urban research council in which the researchers of the community might be brought together;

from the institutions of higher learning, from the various governments—local, state, national—from industries, or elsewhere for the purpose of interchanging experience, techniques, results of research, programs, and projects pointed toward the widening of knowledge.

The purpose of such a council would be, in general, the promotion of the most favorable conditions for creative research in the region. This council would inventory and clear research projects—academic, governmental, industrial, or otherwise—in the region; suggest ways and means of closer co-operation between research groups or individuals; suggest and advance improvements in facilities for creative research in the region; administer any research funds intrusted to it; prepare and publish an annual report summarizing the progress of research in the region and interpreting the meaning of these scientific advances to the people of the region; co-operate with research councils of any other regions.

I am not unmindful of the admirable achievements of national councils in Boston, New York, Philadelphia; but I refer now to local councils or academies. Such a council might acquaint the community with the methods and purposes and results of research, and, above all, with its spirit. The research resources of any country and city are among its very greatest resources.

Our cities know the valuation of property in dollar signs and the amounts of money on deposit, but not the intellectual resources on which the value of gold depends. The basic currency is not in full circulation. Chicago burned but rose again; this building might fall, but if its occupants escaped, it would rise again. And, of course, the mechanism of a research council would mean little if it were not the symbol of an idea and the warning of a will.

b) The organization of a center of interchange of municipal research in Washington or elsewhere seems appropriate and convenient. The farmer who looks to Washington may readily find what is known about his problem. But the urbanite is far less happily equipped. Yet, without great expense, the results of urban research might be made available for consideration and such guidance to millions of city dwellers. Under private auspices we still look in vain for an institute of urbanism comparable to that of Paris.

5. *Municipal finance*.—Among many functional problems press-

ing for examination I refer to only one of outstanding significance to the future of urban communities, namely, the domain of public finance in cities. Urban public finance is an emerging problem of vast proportions. In the recent depression urban areas pouring millions into the national treasury were forced to pass the hat, begging for financial support. The anomaly of the situation is the fact that the forty-eight state governments which determine the local systems of taxation are, from the standpoint of total expenditures, only one-half as important as all the local governments they must control. Our largest cities alone, New York, Chicago, Boston, and Detroit, have larger budgets than the states which contain them. The problem of municipal finance is becoming even more complicated with the extension of federal and state taxation to support the newer services. We face a reorganization of municipal finance, itself, however, an inescapable part of state and national finance.

The unparalleled growth of cities has been accompanied by uncontrolled subdivision and speculative practices and by the most fantastic real estate booms which have meant dramatic profits to a few but tragic personal losses to others and burdensome delinquent properties to the community; and this on a scale affecting the economic situation of the entire nation. The history of the recent industrial depression cannot be written without an account of the role of unsound financing and of speculation in real estate, which at times became mere gambling. We are now faced with the problem of arriving at a rational urban land policy which, while affording private owners and developers adequate opportunity for wise and profitable land uses, will curb the forms of speculation that prove calamitous to the investing and the tax-paying public.

In conclusion, I know that there are those to whom urbanism is an abomination—a continuing Sodom and Gomorrah. I know that literature is filled with curses upon the ugliness and sinfulness of great centers of population and that there are those who would scatter and destroy them all, perhaps not leaving one stone upon another. Their only urban research would be the discovery of the appropriate circle of hell for the city. I cannot share their emotional outbursts. I have read about the tower of Babel and about Sodom

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and Gomorrah; but I have also read Revelations. Nor does my intelligence follow their reasoning and their conclusions.

To me it seems that the faults of our cities are not those of decay and impending decline but of exuberant vitality crowding its way forward under tremendous pressure—the flood rather than the drought. The city is both the great playground and the great battleground, at once the vibrant center of hectic amusement lovers and also the dusty, smoldering, and sometimes reddened arena of industrial conflict. It is the cities that must meander the ambiguous and shifting boundaries between recreation and vice, not only for their own citizens, but for some of their visitors as well. It is the cities that must draw the tragic border lines of order and justice in bitter industrial struggles.

If the assets of an urban-industrial civilization are not always set forth as fully as its liabilities, this does not mean that there are not substantial gains in the highly specialized activities of the cities, in the advantages of association, in the vast expansion of productive power, in the growth of centers of science, medicine, education, invention, religion, in high levels of attainment in artistic and cultural achievement.

Certainly no one, looking at American cities, or at the rural areas either, can say "Lo, the dawn is here." But there are many signs in the sky that may be construed to forecast a day of hope in which our sprawling cities may find better patterns of community structure, wiser plans and programs of action, and higher levels of material and spiritual prosperity. The municipal history of the past generation, if scarred and terrifying here and there, is not without its triumphs in human achievement. The city has its own forms of magnificence, its own broad sweep of grandeur, its own shrines and temples of science and art, its own life-ways, many of them priceless in value to personality and to society. There is democracy in the scattered few, but there is also democracy in the thick crowd with its vital impulses and its insistent demand for a just participation in the gains of our civilization. There is fertility and creation in the rich soil of the broad countryside, but there is also fertility and creativeness in forms of industry, art, and personality, emerging even from the city streets and clutching upward toward the sky.

The development of urban communities on which the ways of life for millions depend is conditioned upon careful and persistent research into the underlying forces, upon discovery of urban behavior patterns and the modes of their conditioning, and upon the dissemination of research results throughout the community as a basis for consideration and action.

The urban association, complex and delicate as it is, rests upon intelligence evidenced in analysis, technology, science, invention—upon tested knowledge that carries with it social wisdom. And above all there must be urban values that make men exclaim as of old, "I am a citizen of no mean city!"

Perhaps the most complex of associational phenomena, the modern city is not fettered by its past or enslaved by iron traditions and vested survivals, but freely looks to a future finer and richer in the desiderata of life. What seem to be weaknesses of cities—that is, their disintegrated character—may be the open way to readier reconstruction, if our social intelligence can frame and form our resources in construction patterns.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

## THE FOLK SOCIETY AND CULTURE<sup>1</sup>

ROBERT REDFIELD

### ABSTRACT

Differences in concept, problem, and field procedure between anthropology and sociology are in part functions of differences in their usual subject matters: the primitive societies as contrasted with the urbanized societies. Awareness of this fact has been developed by studies made of peasant societies and of primitive peoples changing under urban influence. There results a conception of an ideal primitive or folk society. The urbanized, peasant, and tribal society may be compared in part in terms provided by Maine, Durkheim, and Tönnies. The concept of "culture," developed by anthropologists, reflects the integrated body of conventional understandings corresponding to a self-sufficient community, as observed in folk life. Other characteristics of anthropological analysis of society, as contrasted with sociological, similarly expressive of the nature of folk society, are the disposition to represent the society and culture in terms of "pattern" or "structure"; the relatively small development of problems of sampling, the emphasis on formalized kinship institutions, and certain emphasis of meaning in such words as "status" and "class." These considerations lead toward a recognition of opposing or complementary processes: that by which the ultimate values of a society develop an organization and consistency which gives a group moral solidarity; and the expansion of the technical and economic system with consequent impairment of the moral organization.

The familiar oriental fable of the blind men and the elephant ends just at the point where it becomes interesting to students of scientific method. If the man who approached the animal through a consideration of the legs later compared his results with those achieved by the special investigators of ears, trunk, tail, and body, it is likely that the combined and reconsidered results gave an excellent understanding of elephant nature and of the role played by each of the principal organs. There may be an advantage in studying something first as if it were a whole in itself and then coming to see it as a part or aspect of a larger whole.

Without stressing the unfortunate infirmity of these oriental investigators, I propose an analogy between the course of their investigations and those that have been carried on by the anthropologists and by the sociologists. So far as these two groups of students have not been distracted by the operation of museums or bureaus of marital advice or by other secondary enterprises but have been concerned with learning about the nature of society they have, by

<sup>1</sup> This paper was read at the tenth anniversary celebration of the Social Science Research Building, University of Chicago, December 1-2, 1939.

reason of accidents of subject matter, dealt with contrasting aspects of a whole. The whole is society. Anthropologists in studying primitive life have been concerned with aspects of society which are there emphatically present; while sociologists, in dealing chiefly with modern urban peoples, have especially made known to us other and contrasting characteristics of human association. The two disciplines, as far as they are social sciences at all, are in method alike: they attempt, by dealing with all of social life as organized wholes, to describe its nature in general terms. Their differences are largely functions of their different subject matters. They have developed corresponding differences of concept, problem, and field procedure. But, put together, their methods and results give a larger understanding of the nature of society. The very contrast between society seen in terms of the primitive groups, on the one hand, and society seen in terms of the industrialized city, on the other hand, evokes new problems and gives better understanding of old ones. The suggestion here made is that anthropology and sociology are not so much parallel as they are complementary. To bring problems and concepts of the two disciplines into the same field of discussion is to take a step in the direction of a unified science of society.

This is an appropriate platform from which to report something of the contribution to social science that is resulting from the joint study of primitive cultures and urban civilizations. For over forty years on this campus anthropological and sociological research have been carried on in the same or in closely related departments. The convergence of anthropological and sociological interest on this campus found an early recognition in the publication in 1918-20 of W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki's *Polish Peasant*.<sup>2</sup> For a dozen years vigorous programs of field research have been maintained here with the joint knowledge and supervision of anthropologists and sociologists. The retiring chairman of the department of sociology, Ellsworth Faris, spent years with primitive peoples and took the lead in bringing about a renewal of anthropology in the teaching and research programs of the university. The present chairman of that department wrote a first book<sup>3</sup> which was received even more

<sup>2</sup> Boston: Richard C. Badger, 1918-20.

<sup>3</sup> William F. Ogburn, *Social Change* (New York: Viking Press, 1928).



enthusiastically by anthropologists than by sociologists. One member of the department of anthropology received his training in part in the one field and in part in the other, and another member holds appointment in both departments. For five years members of the two departments have maintained a joint seminar for the study of problems of racial and cultural contacts.

The essential identity of anthropology and sociology is becoming ever more apparent. In England and on certain campuses of the United States the contribution to this single enterprise from the study of the primitive societies is rediscovered under such names as "social anthropology" or "comparative sociology." Sociology continues its development from a speculative to an empirical discipline, and sociologists seek to do field work even with primitive peoples. When Wissler hailed the Lynds' *Middletown*<sup>4</sup> as an application of anthropological method to modern society, he did not mean that at last one sociologist had discovered or achieved strong and secret tools of research that had before been in the control of anthropologists alone. It was rather that in that case a sociologist was reporting human behavior in terms of the entire community in which it occurred. The unit of investigation was society seen as a whole and studied through intimate and intensive acquaintance with its members. Anthropology and sociology have converged.

My purpose here is to point out some illumination shed upon society through a comparison of the experiences of the students of primitive societies with those of students of urbanized life. It seems to me that this illumination appears when one deals with groups that do not clearly belong either to the category of the primitive or to that of the urbanized. As this has been my own experience, I venture to make it the point of departure. Professor Warner brought here from Harvard a way of combining anthropology and sociology by studying first the Australian aborigine and then the New England industrialist. While he has been playing both ends against the middle, some of us have been playing the middle against both ends by concerning ourselves especially with peoples intermediate between tribe and city or with primitive groups changing under urban influence.

<sup>4</sup> Robert S. and Helen Lynd (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1929).

These intermediate and marginal peoples are critical in this connection. They call our attention to a picture by failing to fit it. Even Lewis H. Morgan, many years ago, felt a difficulty in the fact that the Iroquois Indians, modified by the white man's civilization, did not retain their ancient culture and presented a practical problem as to what to do with them. The last chapter of *The League of the Iroquois*<sup>5</sup> is perhaps the first of American "acculturation studies." Many years later Rivers pointed out some of the effects of civilization upon certain Oceanic peoples.<sup>6</sup> He attributed the depopulation of certain areas in part to the loss of the will to live. He found that in parts of the islands where head-hunting and pagan religion were preserved "the old zest and interest in life" persisted and the people were "still vigorous and abundant." But where European influence was strong "the people were deprived of nearly all that gave interest to their lives." If culture, as Benedict has said,<sup>7</sup> provides the individual with goals and with reasons for existence, then Rivers was discovering that those Melanesians were experiencing not simply a change in their culture but a loss of culture. The changing tribe does not fit the picture of a typical primitive society; to a less extent does it have culture.

Twelve years ago I made a study of a Mexican village,<sup>8</sup> having in view the primitive societies described by my anthropological teachers and also in mind the urban societies with which the sociologists were chiefly concerned. There resulted an account which suggested respects in which that village combined features characteristic of modern city life with characteristics of the primitive tribe. The life of that village, furthermore, turned out to include a double world: one group of natives lived in terms of the local folk tradition, while others saw themselves and their fellows in relation to conceptions held by the city dweller. In that village the two groups, folk people

<sup>5</sup> Lewis H. Morgan, *League of the Ho-dé-no-sau-nee or Iroquois* (New York: Dodd 1904).

<sup>6</sup> W. H. R. Rivers, "The Psychological Factor," in *Essays on the Depopulation of Melanesia*, ed. W. H. R. Rivers (Cambridge: University Press, 1922).

<sup>7</sup> Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934), p. 46.

<sup>8</sup> Robert Redfield, *Tepoztlán: A Mexican Village* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930).

and urbanized class, bore different names and so clamored for separate investigation. A comparison of the two distinctive ways of thinking and acting—there present within the same community—called attention to a process which might turn out to be recurrent and widespread: the process whereby the primitive man becomes a civilized or urbanized man.

Since then a number of investigators originating here have made studies of intermediate societies with this interest in mind. Miner<sup>9</sup> studied a French-Canadian village where the folk community is articulated with the urban and international world in large part through the Catholic church. Embree has recently reported on a village of Japanese peasants,<sup>10</sup> where a local folk society is managed and directed by a national state in such a way as both to preserve the local culture and also to serve the national purpose. It appears that a society may be, under certain circumstances, literate and yet essentially primitive and stable.

It now appears that the peasant society (which might in a narrower sense be spoken of as folk society, as a terminological alternative to the use of "folk" to denote both tribal and peasant societies together) allows us to recognize a societal type, relatively stable, intermediate between primitive society and urban society. The peasant, like the tribesman, "lives in terms of common understandings which are rooted in tradition and which have come to form an organization."<sup>11</sup> The sanctions that control conduct are likely to be pre-vaillingly sacred. The familial organization is strong. There is little disorganization and little crime. On the other hand, the peasant "participates in money economy, produces a surplus for sale in city markets, pays taxes, sometimes goes to school, votes and otherwise participates in a wider economic and political structure which includes not only the peasant but the townsman."<sup>12</sup> The peasant makes some use of literacy, while the aborigine does not. The peas-

<sup>9</sup> Horace M. Miner, *St. Denis: A French-Canadian Parish* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939).

<sup>10</sup> John Embree, *Suye Mura: A Japanese Village* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939).

<sup>11</sup> Robert Redfield, "Introduction" to Miner, *op. cit.*, p. xiii.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xv.

ant makes some use of "machine technology, while the primitive man does not. Moreover, peasant and city man constitute one single society that is organized in terms of status. . . . It is the nature of the peasant that he accords prestige to the city man and to the sophisticated members of his own group. The peasant may, through education, enter the world of the city, while the city man has kinsmen among the peasants."<sup>13</sup>

The significance of these interstitial societies appears when they are considered from the point of view of antitheses suggested to us by certain earlier students who also tried to see primitive and civilized society within a common framework. Maine compared earlier forms of Greek, Roman, and East Indian society with later forms.<sup>14</sup> In his terms the peasant society represents a balance between familial and territorial society; it is a compromise adjustment between a society of status and a society of contract. In Durkheim's<sup>15</sup> terms the peasant society forms a special type of relatively stable compromise between the social segment and the social organ. It is the adjustment of local culture to the civilization of cities. The solidarity of the tribe is preserved in conjunction with the market and within the nation. And, as Ferdinand Tönnies<sup>16</sup> would have put it, the peasant group is a form of society in which neither *Gesellschaft* nor *Gemeinschaft* is strongly present at the expense of the other; both are to be observed in a condition of equilibrium.

Thus once again we are reminded of that interaction between concept and new particular fact which is the mainspring of advance in social science. Maine and Durkheim, studying certain more ancient or more primitive societies with an eye to modern life, hit upon ways of describing the differences which were apparently widely applicable. Later students, aware of these formulations, make more intensive studies of societies that stand midway between the antithetical extremes proposed. They are thus led to generalize upon their materials so as to enlarge the classification of societal types

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xv.

<sup>14</sup> Henry Maine, *Ancient Law* (London: J. Murray, 1861) and *Village-Communities in the East and West* (7th ed.; London: J. Murray, 1895).

<sup>15</sup> Emile Durkheim, *De la division du travail social* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1932).

<sup>16</sup> *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (Leipzig, 1887).

and so as to raise questions as to the forms of compromise that may occur and as to the processes of change from one form to another. This in turn leads to a reconsideration of the subject matter of anthropology as compared with that of sociology. The hints given us by Maine, Durkheim, and others may now be assembled and made more explicit. There results a characterization of primitive society as an ideal type of society, never completely realized in fact but approximated in the experience of the anthropologist.

This society is, as Sumner put it, composed of "small groups scattered over a territory."<sup>17</sup> The population of any one group is homogeneous in that in race and custom any individual is much like any other. The group is isolated from others. The technology is simple. The community approaches economic self-sufficiency. The division of labor is simple; activities appropriate to the sexes are sharply distinguished, but activities carried on by any one member of a sex-and-age group are much the same as those carried on by others of that group. There is little or no use of writing, or if writing is used it is a mere adjunct to oral tradition and, like the latter, serves to conserve the local heritage. The habits of members of the society tend to correspond with customs. The society is relatively integrated in that the component groups are closely interdependent and the ways of life are correspondingly interrelated and consistent with one another. Change in the society is slow. The prevailing forms of control are informal and traditional, and control to the members of the society appears in large degree spontaneous. The intimate and primary institutions, such as the family and the local group, play relatively large parts in that organization of the groups and institutions which make up the society. Many objects, conceptions, and forms of control partake of those qualities of unquestionable power and prestige which we denote as "sacred."

This is the implicit conception of society which follows from a study of the primitive or folk societies, because, seen in comparison with the results of study of modern urbanized societies, it is a distinguishing generalized description of all of them. In so far as the anthropologist studies more complex societies or more changing societies his results may be expected to depart from this ideal type.

<sup>17</sup> W. G. Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1907), p. 12.

In West Africa he will find societies with a well-developed and pervasive familial organization combined with commerce, legal tribunals, and something approaching a national policy. Such groups as these lead the investigation—still guided by the general concepts—into the formulation of more special questions capable of less imprecise answers. In Guatemala, Tax,<sup>18</sup> another student associated with this university, is comparing societies, with the result that he is brought toward a conclusion that a local folk culture may remain relatively stable although associated with commercialism and an individualistic habit of mind but that there may be a necessary or natural connection between commerce and money, on the one hand, and individualism and decline in the importance of familial organization, on the other hand. If these investigations continue as they are going, we may determine some of the extensions of application of propositions suggested by Simmel and Sombart and some of the limitations upon them. In the meantime, still influenced by these considerations and in association with other workers, I have been comparing four communities in Yucatan in an effort to learn something of the necessary or likely interrelations among elements as a primitive society becomes more urbanized. These investigations, still unpublished, also give some small degree of understanding of the manner in which, under conditions of isolation, a society, after receiving influences from the outside, may build up a new culture and thereby revert toward the type of the ideal primitive society, only again to face the disorganizing influences of modern civilization.

I return now to the statement I made earlier in this paper to the effect that anthropology and sociology have developed different problems, concepts, and methods because of differences in subject matter. The point here is that these differences, as between the two things the two disciplines talk about, are to be understood in part as recognitions of the differences between the primitive society, on the one hand, and urban society, on the other. Put together, they widen our understanding of society in general.

Perhaps the central fact here is the development of the concept of culture at the hands of anthropologists rather than of sociologists.

<sup>18</sup> Sol Tax, "Culture and Civilization in Guatemalan Societies," *Scientific Monthly*, XLVIII, No. 5 (May, 1939), 463-67.

The students of primitive societies were making general use of the term for a generation before it became of great importance in sociology. To the anthropologist "a culture" implies an integral. The phrase has reference to organized, traditional ways of life in which all members of a self-sufficient, continuing, and complete society participate and which are adequate for all recurrent needs of the individual from birth to death and of the community through successive generations. Justification for this concept is to be found in the manner of living of isolated primitive peoples rather than in the big city. I remember how queerly the word "culture" fell upon my ears when, coming back from an Indian society where the organized ways of life provided those goals for existence of which Benedict speaks, I heard certain students here speak of two Chicago districts, Woodlawn and Englewood, as different "culture areas." A further point exists in the fact that anthropologists commonly use the terms "community," "society," and "culture" interchangeably; while the distinctions among these concepts may be of significance in dealing with the modern urbanized and industrialized society, in using them with reference to the primitive societies there is often no need felt to make them, for the reason that there the group of people who live physically together are the same people who share those common understandings we call culture, and they are very nearly the same people who produce and consume their own goods. Spatial, personal, and economic relations tend to coincide.

The same difference between culture as an organization or system as seen in the folk societies, on the one hand, and culture or society seen as an agglomeration of individuals and institutions, on the other, as seen in the city, may be recognized in comparing either the written products of anthropology with those of sociology or in considering differences in their methods of achieving those products. It is the anthropologist, not the sociologist, who characteristically presents the social relations and the values and institutions of society in the form of a diagram. The student of the city may diagram ecological order or economic organization but hardly the relations of family life to ritual. (In so far as Warner's forthcoming works belie this remark, we shall be further enlightened.) It is the student of the folk who uses words like "pattern," "configuration," and

"structure." It is the anthropologist who sets out to produce a "rounded picture of the society." The same degree of "roundness" is not possible in studying Chicago or even Middletown. The conception of a unified and comprehensive analysis-synthesis of a society so that every part is seen in relation to the whole has thus naturally developed in anthropology.

A related circumstance is that while the students of urbanized society have been engrossed with matters of special procedure, ethnologists, until very recently, have not attempted to formulate systematically the ways they have of getting facts and of analyzing them. Excellent descriptions of primitive life have appeared in which the writer says much about the customs of the group he studied but little about how he determined that these were indeed the customs. In such works we may find no more clue of how the trick was done than the mere mention of the names of the anthropologist's principal informants. In dealing with an isolated and relatively stable folk society the problem of sampling may be almost ignored or at least treated in a common-sense and casual manner. What one adult male knows is enough like what the others know to make it possible to learn much about the whole society from no more than a single case. Also it is true that, by beginning with a single individual and considering all the connections he has with others, most of the total primitive society can be laid bare. A student of Chicago or even of some special area such as the near North Side could not hope to approach success by dealing solely with, let us say, a single rooming-house occupant. In studying urban society the necessity early appears of defining the aggregate studied and of fixing upon ways systematically to sample it and to standardize information obtained from the samples. The student of primitive societies comes to this kind of problem much later when he is concerned with the less formalized aspects of culture, such as, to mention one example, the way in which the demands of adult life are met by adolescents or when he is studying acculturative change. On the whole, anthropological research into community life lays its emphasis upon direct and personal participation in the life of the community, because to know a few people well and directly yields results, while the sociological students of the city make much



greater use of census, schedule, questionnaire, and formal document, not only because such are available, but because a wider range of behavior must be considered and must be properly sampled.

This paper must be brought to an end without more than mentioning many other respects in which the problems and concepts of the two disciplines have been differently shaped by the difference between folk culture and urban civilization. The student of a primitive society is likely to begin with the kinship institutions and to describe them as a system. Perhaps the greatest advance in the determination of valid compendent general propositions as to the nature of society yet reached by anthropologists has been attained in the field of kinship institutions and terminologies. In urban societies kinship institutions have a far less systematic character and do not occupy a corresponding place of central importance; the student of the city is concerned with the political, economic, and ecological aspects of the community rather than the familial. When the sociologist studies the family, he characteristically begins with the family in so far as it is affected by social problems such as divorce and juvenile delinquency, just as he studies not religion but the church or the failure of the church. Where the anthropologist is concerned with religion, with myth, and with ritual, the student of the city is concerned with the church, with reading habits, and with the law. These differences reflect the fact that in the folk societies it is the sacred and undeliberate aspects of society that are important, whereas in the urbanized societies more important are the secular and deliberate forms of control. The very language of social science has different shades of meaning, depending on whether the usage has grown up with reference to the one kind of society or to the other. The different connotations of "culture" have already been mentioned. The word "status" suggests to the student of primitive peoples the social system as it is implicit in the role and evaluation accorded any one individual. In the city, however, a man's status is less a reflection of a system into which he is born and more a matter of his individual and unique experiences. Similarly, to a student of primitive society a "class" is a persisting status group, including both sexes and all ages, and articulating in amiable equilibrium with one or more corresponding status groups. The word

does not suggest a conflict group; the "class" of "the class struggle" is a phenomenon of urbanism.

What I have attempted chiefly to say is that the convergence of anthropology and sociology, as a unified way of studying societies as wholes, which has been occurring in method—speculative sociology becoming empirical while fact-collecting anthropology comes to develop a conceptual apparatus—is also occurring in the establishment of a common subject matter. If all the "vanishing peoples" of the world should indeed vanish, we would still have to study the acculturated people, the folk people changing under the impact of urban growth. In these changing people and in the intermediate peasant societies we have abundant materials for the study not only of societal types but of social process. A study of the differences between the folk societies and the urban societies directly, and not merely as indirectly represented in the differences between anthropology and sociology, and a study of the intermediate societies give promise of developing better knowledge of this process. I think we shall come to see in many instances of social change the operation of two opposing tendencies. By one of these the ultimate values of a society develop an organization and consistency which gives a group moral solidarity. By the other the technical and economic system expands, while the moral organization is correspondingly impaired. In so far as the latter process gains at the expense of the former, we recognize the general and apparently irreversible historic process of civilization. In the various forms of social equilibrium we may see varying adjustments of these two tendencies. The church offered in the Middle Ages one solution of the problem of combining the two aspects of society in a single system; and in the totalitarian societies of recent times we may be able to recognize another attempted solution, this time, however, under the deliberate demand of secular government.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

# THE (URBAN) SOCIETY AND CIVILIZATION<sup>\*</sup>

LOUIS WIRTH

## ABSTRACT

By placing the understanding of the city into the center of social science research interests at the University of Chicago we have acquired a perspective for the comprehension of the salient problems not only of urban civilization but of contemporary society as a whole. The urban community offers an economical field for social science research and a suitable platform from which to view the two poles of human existence: the civilization which has grown up in cities and the culture of folk societies. The methods appropriate to these two phases of social life differ for reasons inherent in the data themselves. The use of statistical techniques, representative samples, and personal documents is largely confined to urban societies. The Chicago studies have profited by the older theories concerning social structure but have relied predominantly upon empirical evidence. The studies which have been given a systematic framework through Park's 1915 paper on "The City" have ranged from the ecological and economic to the cultural and political aspects of the metropolis. These research enterprises have yielded a wealth of knowledge about Chicago and about cities and modern civilization. They have, in addition, helped significantly in advancing the theoretical and methodological phases of empirical social science research.

Those who seek to advance knowledge of the social world through the assiduous accumulation of facts may be no less mistaken than those who have an eye only for cosmic generalizations. We cannot discover a fact without first postulating both a frame of reference within which it has a place and a set of criteria by which we identify it and distinguish it from fancy. Neither can we arrive at any valid generalization that has any relevance to actual human problems without proceeding from some prior generalizations which we modify so that they take account of the specific new facts of experience which we discover. Advance in social science, as in other fields of knowledge, is most likely to come by looking at what appears to be a miscellaneous collection of facts from some relatively novel point of view, or by widening and differentiating our perspectives in such a way as to embrace the recalcitrant facts which had hitherto resisted rational analysis within the existing perspectives. In this way we raise some relatively new questions and perhaps advance toward some new answers. Give us a favorable place to stand and we may hope to understand—if not to move—the world.

<sup>\*</sup> This paper was read at the tenth anniversary celebration of the Social Science Research Building, University of Chicago, December 1-2, 1939.

By placing the urbanization of the Western world in the center of our perspective, there is some promise that novel understandings will emerge. Lest it be thought, however, that I am proposing that we indulge merely in a scientific parlor game of peek-a-boo in which one perspective has no better claim than another, let me suggest that there are substantial reasons for selecting the platform of urbanism for our analysis of the contemporary social scene. What we call civilization as distinguished from culture has been cradled in the city; the city is the center from which the influences of modern civilized life radiate to the ends of the earth and the point from which they are controlled; the persistent problems of contemporary society take their most acute form in the city. The problems of modern civilization are typically urban problems.

While some could be persuaded that it is legitimate enough to advance urbanism as the central theme of a good share of current social science interests, they might be disposed to argue that this, after all, would constitute merely one among many possible points of view, and much that is vital and interesting about human social life would be left unaccounted for and much more would be distorted. But this would probably be equally true of any alternative conception designed to integrate the highly specialized and far-flung interests of social scientists. The fact, however, that the population of the present-day world is so largely urban and that the process of urbanization and the mode of life congruent with it has radically transformed the whole of the occidental world in so short a time suggests that almost every significant proposition that can be advanced about contemporary society contains urbanism as one of its causal terms. Furthermore, almost every proposition designed to explain the problems which involve our cultural values must necessarily include the modern urban social structure—either as the independent or as the dependent variable. Conversely, the attempt to understand the city inevitably leads to the major facets of civilization.

Perhaps these comments will impress some as mere rationalizations concocted after the fact to justify what was done through accident. I would not minimize the fact that in developing this perspective the social scientists in this university were challenged by

the throbbing life of the exuberantly growing metropolis in which they live, and were inclined, if only for the sake of economy in research, to formulate their problems in such a way that they could utilize the observations from their very doorsteps to answer them. They, and other social scientists elsewhere, however, soon discovered that the concrete and immediate social problems of Chicago and the processes underlying them were, in their essential features, the problems and processes of every city; that they were, in fact, typical of the whole of our industrialized, urbanized world, and if properly analyzed would expose what this twentieth century cosmos (or chaos) is and how it came to be.

The study of the city has suggested itself as crucial not merely for the scientific understanding of the city itself but also for understanding and coping with the contemporary social order in some of its broader ranges. Despite the intellectual and practical challenge of the great city in which they lived, the small company of social scientists that were assembled here in the nineties might, of course, have continued in the well-beaten paths of the traditional scholarship and learning as practiced at the time by European and American universities generally. It happened, however, that this university was founded at a time when this phenomenally growing city was still very young and when the social studies, and especially sociology and political science, were just beginning to seek an empirical base instead of bowing to the prematurely formulated grandiose systems which had formerly dominated them. Almost from the very inception of the university, therefore, the social science group here turned to the homely but interesting problems that had broken out on the body domestic, economic, and politic of the city of Chicago. They had one eye cocked to the traditional theory, while the other was busy observing the living city before them. From the very beginning of our short life as an academic institution, theory and empirical investigation have never been divorced but have enriched each other.

Only two years after the university opened its doors, there appeared two documents by members of its social science faculty which, while they may well appear to us as curiosities today, were indicative of an early and abiding interest in the study of urban life.

One was a *Catechism for Social Observation*<sup>2</sup> by Charles Richmond Henderson, and the other an account of an American city<sup>3</sup> by Albion W. Small and George Vincent. The work of Charles Zueblin on municipal problems and government followed shortly thereafter, and by the beginning of the first world war a whole generation of graduate students in economics, politics, and sociology had already been initiated into the mysteries of research on the urban social structure. It was not until 1915, however, that there appeared some evidence that a concerted program of investigation was emerging, for in that year Robert E. Park published a paper entitled, "The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in the City Environment"<sup>4</sup> which was designed to call attention to the opportunities for empirical research and to offer a systematic body of hypotheses for the would-be social scientist who could be lured from the library long enough to look urban life square in the face. The intellectual ferment stirred up by this (at that time unconventional) paper by a sociologist with a flare for news, or rather a newspaperman disciplined by a wide and thorough training in philosophy and social science, did not really begin to take shape until the end of the war. Meanwhile a host of Doctor's dissertations, ranging all the way from descriptions of social problems in the Stock Yards to "A Study of the Higher Life of Chicago,"<sup>5</sup> had appeared. They were, on the whole, modeled after the pioneer studies of American communities begun at Johns Hopkins University in 1883 under the editorship of Herbert B. Adams, but were distinguished from these by the fact that they were based upon firsthand observations of life rather than the perusal of books. Not that the studies at Chicago were oblivious of what had gone before. There is ample evidence that these budding social scientists were familiar with the classic work of Sir Henry Maine, of Tönnies, and of Durkheim. Charles Booth's *Life and Labour of the People in London*<sup>6</sup> was still news; the studies of the Webbs and of James Bryce were very much in the minds particularly of

<sup>2</sup> Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1894.

<sup>3</sup> *An Introduction to the Study of Society* (New York: American Book Co., 1894).

<sup>4</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, XX (1915), 577-612.

<sup>5</sup> Thomas James Riley (Ph.D. thesis, Chicago, 1904).

<sup>6</sup> New York: Macmillan Co., 1903.

those who followed the scent of politics in the city. The muckraking literature was avidly read and feebly imitated, and the more prosaic, though perhaps more scientific, social survey had already come into its own.

What was lacking, however, and what Professor Park's stimulation supplied, was a coherent body of concepts which would furnish a suitable optic for the formulation of problems and the selection, description, and systematic interpretation of facts. In this, the categories in which the polar concepts were status and contract, symbiosis and consensus, community and society, mechanical and organic solidarity proved themselves useful enough as general orientation points. No student of the American urban scene, moreover, during the first three decades of this century, could be oblivious to the fact that what was challenging public attention in the form of urban turmoil was in part a symptom of the growing-pains of an order that had taken the leap from a simple agrarianism to a complex urban industrialism in the short span of a few generations. The facts of this development were well enough known and were even statistically documented by such works as that of Adna F. Weber's *The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century*.<sup>7</sup> But the fundamental factors responsible for the emergence of urban civilization in America and a method adequate to comprehend the strange new forms that social life was taking in the urban centers were still wanting.

Fortunately the financial assistance of foundations served not merely as the catalytic agent at an opportune moment to crystallize the research interests that were evolving in the minds of men like Park and Merriam into co-ordinated research programs which had hitherto been made contingent upon modest support which was not always forthcoming, but it served also to bring into being an organization, unprecedented in academic history, designed for the special purpose of facilitating social science research. This was the Local Community Research Committee, which undertook to explore the *terra incognita* of the city of Chicago. But while Chicago was the main center of operations, the outer limits fortunately were never specified. In the period from 1923, when the Committee got under way, until 1929, when this building to house its activities was dedi-

<sup>7</sup> New York, 1899 (Columbia University Ph.D. thesis).

cated, a series of pioneer studies were completed which were reported on a decade ago in the volume by T. V. Smith and L. D. White, entitled *Chicago: An Experiment in Social Science Research*.<sup>8</sup>

In the ten years that have elapsed, some notable advances have been made. What was then regarded as an experiment has resulted in a body of organized knowledge which in its implications far transcends the local scene, and in research methods which have found acceptance by social scientists in all parts of the world.

One of the most striking contrasts between the urban and the rural mode of life suggested by the literature is the difference between societies based upon kinship as distinguished from those based upon territory. The recognition of the significance of this difference has led to a preoccupation with the spatial order of urban life arising from the dense concentration of large masses of people into a compact territory, and with the manner in which men and institutions arrange themselves under these conditions. In the past decade or so what amounts to a new discipline within the social sciences, human ecology, has emerged and has become widely disseminated. Through the studies of Park, Burgess, McKenzie, and others<sup>9</sup> the physical structure and the ecological processes of concentration, dispersion, segregation, and succession of men, institutions, and cultural characteristics as between the various natural areas and communities that make up the physical framework of the urban world have been revealed through indices which are quite precise, quantitative, and adaptable to comparison as between cities. The dominance of the city over its hinterland has been revealed through the ever widening range of influence in economic, political, and cultural affairs. It has been shown that not only do our political units within the city proper often show great variance from the ecological and cultural areas, but the city, given the proper sustenance, eventually develops into a metropolis, since its actual orbit of life tends to spill over legally established, static boundaries. As a result we get on the periphery of every growing city a no man's land of social control which accounts for much of our waste, our disorder, and our problems. Con-

<sup>8</sup> Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929.

<sup>9</sup> For these and other references see James Quinn, "Topical Summary of Current Literature on Human Ecology," in a forthcoming issue of the *Journal*.



cretely this expresses itself in the maze of governmental units and correspondingly numerous, overlapping, and conflicting services and powers. Among studies of this type that have been carried out here are those of health organization, taxation, marketing, transportation, policing, education, water supply, judicial agencies, the political and administrative implications of which have been treated by Charles E. Merriam and associates in their volume on *The Government of the Metropolitan Region of Chicago*,<sup>10</sup> and which we are now engaged in synthesizing with the economic and sociological investigations into a volume designed to furnish a basis for a comprehensive plan for metropolitan Chicago.

In recent years, as these issues have taken acute form in the Chicago area, we have shifted our emphasis from the minute analysis of the local communities within the city to the larger sectors and zones in the metropolitan region. The concept of the metropolitan region has been sufficiently well established, in part through our labors here, so that many of the baffling problems arising out of the growth of the city and its interrelations with the hinterland have become amenable to analysis and treatment. The orderly presentation of the data on urban areas and growth, on a regional scale, has already proved indispensable in the practical problems of land utilization, housing, transportation, public services, and planning. The hypothesis upon which these regional studies have been proceeding is that the metropolitan region of Chicago is, in fact, an economic and social unit to which due political and administrative consideration has not been given owing to the relative inflexibility of legally established boundaries. A problem of statesmanship in this region, to the solution of which we have been attempting to contribute, is how to extend into politics and administration the unity which already exists in the economic and social spheres. Through a fortunate coincidence of interests we have seen our own local and regional studies projected on a national scale through collaboration with the National Resources Committee which has resulted in the series of publications on urbanism,<sup>11</sup> and which in turn have come to be regarded as a

<sup>10</sup> Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933.

<sup>11</sup> *Our Cities: Their Role in the National Economy* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937); and *Urban Government* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939).

model of research by many countries touched by the magic wand of urbanization. In this way we have aided in the recognition of the strategic significance of the city for the weal or woe of national life.

The city is not merely the point at which great numbers are concentrated into limited space, but it is also a complex of human beings exhibiting the most extraordinary heterogeneity in almost every characteristic in which human beings can differ from one another. In this respect the city represents perhaps the most striking contrast to the social entities that we call primitive, folk, and peasant societies. Consequently, the methods adapted to the understanding of the population of the metropolis are strikingly different from those suited to simpler and more homogeneous societies. This accounts for the fact that in attempting to understand the city we have had to resort to extensive statistical inquiries to determine the human elements of which it is composed. They differ, as do all societies, in sex and age, but they show peculiar distribution of age and sex groups and great variations in these respects as we pass from area to area. They differ widely from one another in occupation, in view of the more extensive division of labor which the growth of the market has made possible. They differ in wealth and in income, ranging from the extreme of affluence to the depths of the direst poverty and insecurity. The city, moreover, by virtue of its focal position in the complex of capitalistic civilization, has attracted within its confines the racial and ethnic stocks of all the world and has more or less amalgamated them and blended their traits into a new aggregate of hybrids, here mingling with one another and there segregating themselves from one another, here collaborating and there at war, but in any case building a complex of cultures unprecedented in human history. This heterogeneity of the human materials in the city is at once a source of the ferment and stimulation, and of the frictions and conflicts that characterize modern society.

To comprehend this aggregate, so imperfectly welded into a social unity, we have resorted first to a minute analysis of all those characteristics accessible to research in which the inhabitants of the city differ from one another. Chicago was one of the first cities to make available to the students of social science the rich and hitherto unexplored census materials in a form in which they lent themselves

to rigorous analysis. The Social Science Research Committee, through the efforts of Burgess and his associates, has built up a treasury of basic materials which have been exploited not only for theoretical but for practical purposes as well. In our forthcoming monograph on the population of the metropolitan region of Chicago, we have extended the description and classification, developed on the basis of minute census tracts and local communities, to the larger sectors and zones that comprise the metropolitan region, and we have projected it forward in time on the basis of experience and the contingencies that account for the slackened rate of growth and the redistribution of the people from the center to the periphery. It is clear that only the impersonal language of statistics was capable of dealing with such imposing mass phenomena.

For a more intimate knowledge, however, of the population of the city, knowledge which cannot be expressed in indices such as birth- and death-rates, sex ratios, median rentals, citizenship, literacy, educational status, occupational affiliation, racial and ethnic origin, and the like, it is not possible, and with our modern knowledge not necessary, to study everyone. In lieu of this we resort to the analysis of representative samples, a procedure which does not have to be resorted to in smaller numerical aggregates and less heterogeneous communities such as those with which the anthropologists are accustomed to deal. But the social scientist, since he deals with human beings in their interrelations, and with societies, i.e., a network of claims and expectations among men, as distinguished from a mere numerical aggregate, is compelled also to invent methods suitable to the exploration of these phenomena which are social as distinct from physical and which have inner as well as outer aspects. This requires communication, questioning, the interview, and what have come to be known as human documents. From the days of W. I. Thomas' study of *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*<sup>12</sup> to the present, our social science studies have attempted to cope with the problem of how to make these human documentary materials amenable to scientific treatment. A long series of volumes combining the statistical, the case study, and field observation procedures attest to the progress that has been made in the perfection of a method which

<sup>12</sup> Chicago: University of Chicago, 1918; New York: A. A. Knopf, 1927.

would at the same time be as precise as possible and yet not confine itself to the externals of human life but be adequate to the understanding of meaningful conduct and of social values.

One of the most striking contrasts between the urban world of today and the rural and primitive prototype out of which it has developed is to be seen in the divergent social structures characteristic of these two ideal-typical poles of existing and historical societies. The anomalous situation symbolic of urban life consists in the presence of close physical proximity coupled with vast social distances of men. This has profoundly altered the basis of human association and has subjected the traits of human nature as molded by simpler social organizations to severe strain.<sup>13</sup>

The mere survival of concentrated millions far removed from tillable soil presupposes a vast technological apparatus which is the triumph of modern natural science and engineering skill. These technological innovations which have made cities possible are also continually remaking our cities. As steam, for instance, has herded us together, so electricity has the potentialities of redistributing and dispersing us. The technological revolution which underlies the development of urban civilization out of preindustrial folk society is by no means at an end. The complicated and highly efficient machines upon which modern society depends bring with them benevolent as well as disorganizing influences. In the study of the social aspects of invention and technology, probably no social scientist has done more than has William F. Ogburn. The family, for instance, which in a simple society is truly the social microcosm has, as Ogburn has shown, been transformed in its structure and in its functions by the impact of modern technology. Indeed, the study of the family in the city is not so much a study in family organization as in the process of disorganization. Burgess and his students Mowrer, Frazier, and others have explored these implications of urban life in great detail and have supported their conclusions with imposing bodies of evidence empirically derived from the family types as they are found in the different racial, national, and economic worlds of the city of Chicago.

<sup>13</sup> Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIV (July, 1938), 1-24.

We have just recently begun a series of systematic studies of the socioeconomic stratification of urban society. Here we find that the economic, social, and political superstructure that has built itself upon the ecological and technological base substantiates the older hypotheses that in the course of the urbanization and industrialization of the Western world a new form of social organization, a new social structure, is emerging, characterized by impersonal relations and in which the pecuniary nexus is the most significant cohesive bond. Instead of kinship and tradition, interest and ideology come to serve as the cement that binds human individuals into effectively working groups. Relationships between men tend to be depersonalized, so that no one literally counts in the city except as his voice can speak for an organized group. The studies of Millis and his students in trade-unionism and collective bargaining document this generalization vividly, and the studies of our political scientists show the same tendency in the realm of politics. Merriam and Gosnell's studies of the electoral process and of political leadership indicate the painful process of transition involved in making our representative democratic forms, born in the New England village, work in modern polyglot cities.

Our sociologists, however, have been preoccupied not only with the family but with other social institutions and structures. They have sought to understand such professional groups as the medical and legal professions, the real estate men, churches and denominations, recreational and cultural agencies, and bodies organized for every purpose that corresponds to a conceivable human interest in order to find effective expression for the needs and aspirations of urban man. Over a hundred years ago an understanding Frenchman, De Tocqueville, already pointed to the flowering of voluntary organizations of all kinds in American life.<sup>14</sup> On the basis of our own studies today we find that one of the great problems of the city arises from the fact that people are interested in objectives which a disinterested spectator would conclude are not to their interest. Despite the complex network of voluntary associations that develops in the city, however, there is always a residue of fluid unorganized masses who can

<sup>14</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. Henry Reeve (rev. ed.; New York: Colonial Press, 1899), II, 114.

fall prey to dynamic leaders and fascinating slogans and who can be buffeted about by assertive pressure groups stimulated by the modern agencies of opinion-making, no longer primarily the school and the pulpit but rather the newspaper, the motion picture, and the radio. If the studies in which we are now engaged on socioeconomic stratification and on voluntary organizations in the city turn out as successfully as we hope they will, we shall be able to furnish a more reliable account than has hitherto been given of the genesis of our problems of collective action in modern urban society, of the factors that control them, and of the adjustment in our institutional life necessary to deal with them. Many of these new forms of social organization have already been analyzed: the stock exchange, the credit market, private and public corporate enterprise, the professional organization, the sect, the club, and the political party. The studies of White on public administration, particularly on public personnel administration, and those of Leland on public finance indicate a growing body of scientific knowledge derived from the empirical study of the effect of the new urban mode of life upon the functioning of the body politic.

Not only the basic processes, however, but also the practical problems arising at the point where traditional institutions and controls break down under the stress of urban life, have systematically come under the scrutiny of our social scientists. The studies of Burgess and his students on delinquency, crime, insanity, suicide, and family disorganization, the studies of Douglas on unemployment, the political scientists' studies of graft, bossism, and corruption, and the numerous contributions made by the faculty of the School of Social Service Administration to the techniques of dealing with the ills that beset man in his as yet unaccustomed urban setting, have raised our methods of dealing with social problems from the level of magic closer to those involving rational procedure.

All these characteristically urban phenomena have been dealt with on the basis of material which formerly was largely unavailable or neglected because it was not considered amenable to scientific treatment. In the attempt to collect the material, new techniques have been developed which frequently have been found adaptable to wider uses. We have not generally been able or willing to continue with the collection of routine materials where no

further scientific purposes could be served by them or where this function could be transferred to other agencies with more adequate resources and direct responsibilities. Thus, for instance, the experimentation with the registration of social statistics begun by McMillen and Jeter was carried out far enough until it commended itself to a governmental agency and was taken over as a regular function of government. The same applies to the costly publication of census materials with which we experimented. In the pioneer *History of Chicago*<sup>15</sup> project under the direction of Miss Bessie L. Pierce a similar pathfinding venture is at stake. It is carried out to demonstrate the possibilities of exploiting the data of local history by means of the techniques of modern historical analysis. Its findings will be important as a background for all our other social science studies, but its importance transcends the historical information which it will furnish us. Especially in the most recent periods of Chicago's history, it will only sketch the major outlines of urban development, leaving to other scholars the task of filling in the monographic pieces which will ultimately compose the mosaic. It will be another demonstration that the history of civilization can be written in terms of the history of cities, and that our American cities, like modern cities everywhere, constituting as they do the frontier of civilization, are parts and products of the expansion of Europe.

It is characteristic of revolutions that they are not recognized until they are in their final dramatic stages. This applies to the revolution in social life which has transformed the world in which we live from a relatively isolated series of local, simple handicraft, static, caste societies into a single interdependent complex, technological, dynamic, and internally highly differentiated cosmos. Our cultures are still many, but our civilization is one. The city is the symbol of that civilization. We will either master this ominously complicated entity or perish under it. The common life for a noble end, of which Aristotle spoke, probably can, as human experience seems to show, be better lived in cities. To this end, which calls, as a first prerequisite, for a scientific understanding of the basic processes of this new mode of life, our studies are directed.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

<sup>15</sup> Vol. I (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1937).

## SOCIAL TRENDS<sup>1</sup>

WILLIAM F. OGBURN

### ABSTRACT

The term "social trends" came into use in connection with statistical measurement of trend lines, but it was quickly used to describe movements not statistically measured, as, for instance, the trend in the growth of an institution. Much work has concerned the measurement of deviations from trend lines, as in the study of business cycles, but the measurement of the trend itself is important. A major objective in the study of trends is to give some indication of the future as well as to describe the past. Trends are thus projected forward. The error in prediction increases with the extent of the extrapolation. It is quite necessary to study the factors affecting a trend—how they are correlated with it. It is also important to know the trends of these factors. Much of the research work done in the Social Science Research Building at the University of Chicago has been research in this field.

Research in social trends is an outgrowth of several research movements. First may be mentioned history, one of the earliest of scholarly undertakings, and I think more useful today than ever. History, however, was largely a record of the sequence of unique events and was little concerned with general processes. Another contributory movement, strange to say, was biology, which achieved spectacular success in charting the process of evolution. Out of the union of history and biology came the study of social evolution. After a half-century of social evolution there was little of scientific value ever achieved, despite the great minds associated with the movement. The social evolutionists relied too much on concepts borrowed from biology; they were weighted down with moral ideas of progress and suffered from an absence of suitable data.

Their legacy was a more modest study of social change, divorced from the bias of religious conceptions and adapted to the utilization of data which were being collected in larger and better samples. The numerical data indicative of social change were increasingly recorded for regular intervals of time. Thus we arrive at the idea of trend. Starting in social research as a statistical term, the word "trend" has come to have broader use and is now applied to a general course of change in any institution or type of social behavior, whether it be measured in quantitative terms or not.

<sup>1</sup> This paper was read at the tenth anniversary celebration of the Social Science Building, University of Chicago, December 1-2, 1939.



Thus a dozen or more monographs sponsored by our Local Community Research Committee on changes in institutions are trend studies, though there are relatively few numerical time series in the volumes. Frazier's *The Negro Family in Chicago*,<sup>2</sup> Hughes's *The Chicago Real Estate Board*,<sup>3</sup> Merrill's "The Chicago Stock Exchange,"<sup>4</sup> and Palyi's *The Chicago Credit Market*<sup>5</sup> fall in this category. Robert E. Park has called studies of this type *natural* histories of institutions, to contrast them with the type of history that is a description of particular events with little attempt to depict stages and to describe general processes, as is done in Miss Pierce's series of volumes on the history of Chicago,<sup>6</sup> sponsored by the same committee.

Such descriptive trends are not confined, of course, to institutions; trends may occur in any part of culture—associations, organizations, customs, or groups. Indeed, at the inception of the Local Community Research Committee in 1923, studies were planned to record the trends in individual industries, and monographs were completed on men's clothing, light and power, furniture, bakeries, and pottery. These were followed by William Mitchell's *Trends in Industrial Location in the Chicago Region since 1920*<sup>7</sup> and by Edward A. Duddy's *Agriculture in the Chicago Region*.<sup>8</sup>

No special methodologies were developed in this early basic work, unless the "natural history of institutions" be so considered. However, distinct contributions to method were the outcome of some of the behavior studies. For instance, Shaw's much-heralded work in delinquency among youth was a landmark in the growth of the

<sup>2</sup> E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932).

<sup>3</sup> E. C. Hughes, *The Chicago Real Estate Board* (Chicago: Society for Social Research of the University of Chicago, 1931).

<sup>4</sup> Francis E. Merrill, "The Chicago Stock Exchange" (University of Chicago dissertation, 1937).

<sup>5</sup> Melchior Palyi, *The Chicago Credit Market* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937).

<sup>6</sup> Bessie L. Pierce, *A History of Chicago*, Vol. I: *The Beginning of a City* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1937).

<sup>7</sup> Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933.

<sup>8</sup> Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929.

study of human ecology,<sup>9</sup> a field greatly advanced by MacKenzie.<sup>10</sup> Shaw found that delinquency decreased as one progressed outward in concentric circles from a central point in the city. He measured the decrease in gradients. The explanation was found in ecological trends. Miss Cavan's study of suicide<sup>11</sup> and Faris and Dunham's investigation of the distribution of insanity<sup>12</sup> carried on with the same methods.

The quantity of basic descriptive work needed on trends in a city like Chicago is enormous. In addition to the studies in economics and sociology already mentioned, a comparable amount was done also in political science by Merriam, White, Lepawsky, Gosnell, Parratt, Smith, Lasswell, and Woody. In 1933 there appeared the dramatic volume by Merriam and his colleagues on *The Government of the Metropolitan Region of Chicago*,<sup>13</sup> in which there was traced the growth of some sixteen hundred local governments in the Chicago region up to 1930. Add to these Leland's work on taxation,<sup>14</sup> Millis' on labor organization,<sup>15</sup> Mowrer's on the family,<sup>16</sup> Steadman's on public health,<sup>17</sup> White's on the water system,<sup>18</sup> and Vieg's on the government of Chicago schools,<sup>19</sup> and it becomes clear why Chicago is frequently spoken of in social science research circles, rightly or

<sup>9</sup> Clifford R. Shaw *et al.*, *Delinquency Areas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929).

<sup>10</sup> R. D. MacKenzie, *The Metropolitan Community* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1933).

<sup>11</sup> Ruth Shonle Cavan, *Suicide* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928).

<sup>12</sup> Robert E. L. Faris and H. Warren Dunham, *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939).

<sup>13</sup> Charles E. Merriam, Spencer D. Parratt, and Albert Lepawsky, *The Government of the Metropolitan Region of Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933).

<sup>14</sup> Simeon E. Leland, *State-Local Fiscal Relation in Illinois* (to be published).

<sup>15</sup> H. A. Millis and R. E. Montgomery, *Economics of Labor* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1938).

<sup>16</sup> Ernest R. Mowrer, *The Family: Its Organization and Disorganization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932).

<sup>17</sup> Robert F. Steadman, *Public Health Organization in the Chicago Region* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930).

<sup>18</sup> Max R. White, *Water Supply Organization in the Chicago Region* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).

<sup>19</sup> John A. Vieg, *The Government of Education in Metropolitan Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939).

wrongly, as the most thoroughly and widely studied large city in the world.

The study of social trends attained a nation-wide scope in the report in 1933 of the Research Committee on Social Trends appointed by President Hoover<sup>20</sup> three years earlier. This work is not so closely related to the building which is now being commemorated as were the studies previously cited, in that the *Recent Social Trends* studies were not financed directly from the University research funds. Yet the chapters and volumes in this report by Breckinridge, Judd, Merriam, Ogburn, Steiner, Sutherland, White, and Woody were written in this building. The research for which this building is a symbol is not restricted to research done within these walls or even within the city of Chicago. University scientists not only may use for research today the facilities and funds provided directly by the University budget but may also avail themselves of facilities provided, for instance, by the federal government. In this sense, it may be argued that the research influence of this building and of the research workers it houses has reached outward as far as the national capitol. I think it not unfair to claim that much of the research done by the National Resources Planning Board stems directly from Charles E. Merriam, an influential member of the Board and former chairman of the Local Community Research Committee of the University of Chicago.

The methodological values of the work of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends were several. Like the researches previously mentioned, it combined the nonquantitative description of trends with statistical measurement of series. The methodological lesson learned was that of describing a nonquantitative process without drawing conclusions and interpretations not based on scientifically treated data. For the historian the problem of adhering to the facts is not difficult, except as he is lured into the bypaths of interpretation or enticed away from scholarly standards by allurements of literary style. The person who deals with a statistical series should have no great difficulty in resisting the temptation to depart from the data in drawing conclusions. But for those who would generalize about processes without adequate measurement,

<sup>20</sup> *Recent Social Trends* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1933).

but with a good deal of descriptive data, the hazards to scientific conclusions are great. Hence, if one is to keep out impression and opinion in a generalized account of trends, the discussion must follow closely the factual data presented, even though important parts of the subject are omitted, objectionable as this is to the intellectual who loves systematization.

The word "trend" suggests measurement. Many series show, when tabulated, irregular variations from period to period. When plotted, they reveal a general upward or downward movement with fluctuations around the general trend. Thus the monthly price of eggs from 1927 to 1933 was downward, but the movement was irregular. One reason for the irregularity is the seasonal nature of the price of the particular commodity. When the trend is eliminated, higher prices are found every year in December than in June. Hence, it early became apparent that some measure should be made of the trend of a time series which would be freed from the diverse seasonal, cyclical, and other fluctuations. This was apparent in the volume on business cycles by Wesley Mitchell (then of the University of California), the most comprehensive study of trends that had been made up to 1913.<sup>21</sup>

In the Chicago studies the most extensive use of measurement has been in the various series on the growth of institutions. Wirth's forthcoming volume on *Population Trends in the Chicago Metropolitan Region*<sup>22</sup> consists largely of this type of work. Paul Douglas' *Real Wages in the United States*,<sup>23</sup> which appeared in 1930, was a heroic attempt to build backward series on wages and costs of living for the various industries and to combine them into a composite series.

In the Chicago studies one of the earliest attempts to measure trends was by Jeter and Monk, who applied the logistic curve to population growth in the Chicago area.<sup>24</sup> In this they followed the lead of Raymond Pearl, of Johns Hopkins, who, under the auspices of the Russell Sage Foundation, used this method for the New York region. These devices were for the purpose of measuring the trend

<sup>21</sup> *Business Cycles* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1913).

<sup>22</sup> To be published by the University of Chicago Press in 1940.

<sup>23</sup> Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1930.

<sup>24</sup> H. R. Jeter and Ardis Monk, *The Logistic Curve and the Prediction of the Population of the Chicago Region* (Chicago: American Statistical Association, 1928).

alone and not for measuring deviations from the trend. Another extensive trend study was that by Homer Hoyt on *One Hundred Years of Land Values in Chicago*.<sup>25</sup> For a decade also the *American Journal of Sociology* published every year a special issue on social trends, including a wide variety of time series in both economics and sociology.<sup>26</sup>

In all this work every researcher ran up against the difficulty of inadequate data. This is an almost universal experience in trying to deal with statistical time series. Trends cannot be measured unless the data are collected. The United States is a favored country in this respect, owing in part to its wealth. Still there is a long way to go, if needs are to be met. In a number of instances research workers have had to collect their own series, large though the undertaking was. The collection of masses of data is much better done by the government than by a university. However, McMillen and Jeter of this University, with the aid of the Association of Community Chests, collected privately for several years from the cities of the United States twenty-four schedules dealing with such social statistics as mothers' pensions, aids to aliens, probation, juvenile courts, care of children, employment service, service to transients, institutional care of adults, medical care, psychiatric social service, and visiting teachers. In their last volume three hundred and fifty tables were required to publish the material.<sup>27</sup> In 1930 this service was taken over by the Children's Bureau of the United States Department of Labor, and these series are now published regularly by this bureau. In initiating the collection of these social statistics, the University of Chicago paid 50 per cent and the Community Chests the other half. To collect these figures it was necessary to stimulate a rivalry in cities in improving their statistics, much as was done by the census in setting up registration states and cities for vital statistics. Even birth statistics for the United States as a whole did not exist until 1917, and they are none too good even in

<sup>25</sup> Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933.

<sup>26</sup> XXXV (1930), 869-1096; XXXVI (1931), 863-1066; XXXVII (1932) 855-997; XXXVIII (1933), 825-940; XXXIX (1934), 729-808; XL (1935), 713-828.

<sup>27</sup> Helen R. Jeter and A. W. McMillen, *Registration of Social Statistics for the Year 1928* (Chicago: Joint Committee of the Association of Community Chests and Councils and the Local Community Research Committee of the University of Chicago, 1930).

1939. This building-up of statistical series is a big part of trend work at its present status.

It may not be known that the very important uniform crime reports issued by the United States Department of Justice had a similar origin at the University of Chicago. Donald Stone, working with the National Association of Chiefs of Police, instituted the collection of statistics on crimes known to the police, a service later taken over by the Department of Justice. Prior to this time the best national indices of crime available were of prisoners in institutions, which are inadequate measures of crimes committed.

About this time the Local Community Committee, under the leadership of Burgess, perfected a special technique, at some considerable cost it may be said, for dealing with one problem in trend analysis. This technique was that of recording urban data for very small area units, now called census tracts, of which there are 935 in Chicago. These data could be correlated with other series, could be added up to give an adequate sample for, let us say, vital statistics, or could be compounded in varying degrees to fit, for instance, the political data of precincts. The idea is simple but the practical importance is very great, especially when it is recalled that economic shadings vary from block to block in a city. Since the economic factor, as measured, let us say, by rent, is very important, it is highly desirable to obtain social data from homogeneous economic areas. This census tract amounts to an invention. This invention led to a large number of correlations of social data of great value.

The origin of this invention should be credited to the work of Laidlaw in New York City, though Chicago should be given credit for its greater development. The data in census-tract form now exist for Chicago for 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1934 and will soon be available for 1940. Recording statistics by census tracts has now spread to a large number of cities and has become a regular practice of the United States Bureau of the Census for certain cities.

One of the uses of census tracts was the assembly of data for larger local communities within Chicago. In a great metropolis there are cities within cities. Chicago is probably the second largest Polish city in the world. Thus many local community studies were pos-

sible, and now in 1939 appears Wirth's *Local Community Fact Book*.<sup>28</sup> The device of census tracts has made possible the work of Clifford Shaw showing gradients of juvenile delinquency and the significance of succession in a given area. Gosnell's correlation of votes with other factors was made possible by the census tracts.<sup>29</sup> In further consideration of censuses and the initiation of trend series, it should be noted that in the 1934 census of Chicago,<sup>30</sup> directed not by the Bureau of the Census at Washington but by Lang and Newcomb of our research staff, there were new questions on mobility and education which are being placed for the first time on the regular decennial census of 1940 for the whole country.

The measurement of trends for the purpose of determining numerically the deviations of the actual data from the trend lines was developed, in the main, elsewhere than at Chicago. The use of these deviations has been primarily to describe and forecast the business cycle and to correlate business cycles with social and political phenomena. This method is undoubtedly one of the most important features of trend research. R. H. Hooker of England had in 1901 correlated such deviations from the trend lines of foreign trade and marriage-rates.<sup>31</sup> In 1916 Warren M. Persons, of the University of Colorado, used the deviations to construct from several series a single

<sup>28</sup> Louis Wirth and Margaret Furez (eds.), *Local Community Fact Book*, 1938 (Chicago: Chicago Recreation Commission, 1939).

<sup>29</sup> Harold F. Gosnell, *Negro Politicians: The Rise of Negro Politics in Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935); *Machine Politics: Chicago Model* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937); "How Negroes Vote in Chicago," *National Municipal Review*, XXII (May, 1933), 238-43; "The Chicago 'Black Belt' as a Political Battleground," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXIX (November, 1933), 329-47; "An Analysis of the 1932 Presidential Vote in Chicago," *American Political Science Review*, XXIX (December, 1935), 967-84; Harold F. Gosnell and M. J. Schmidt, "Factorial and Correlational Analysis of the 1934 Vote in Chicago," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XXXI (September, 1936), 507-18; "Relation of the Press to Voting in Chicago," *Journalism Quarterly*, XIII (June, 1936), 129-47; "Factorial Analysis of the Relation of the Press to Voting in Chicago," *Journal of Social Psychology*, VII (November, 1936), 375-85.

<sup>30</sup> Charles S. Newcomb and Richard O. Lang, *Census Data of the City of Chicago, 1934* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).

<sup>31</sup> G. Udny Yule, *An Introduction to the Theory of Statistics* (London: Griffin & Co., 1911), p. 201.

curve for the business cycle and later, by lagging the deviation, correlated it with a forecast curve.<sup>32</sup>

There have been a number of business-cycle studies at the University of Chicago, but few used this particular technique, though it was employed by Ogburn and Jaffe in studying the effect of good times and bad times in elections.<sup>33</sup> Stouffer and Lazarsfeld, in their monograph on the depression and the family,<sup>34</sup> were restricted largely to the phase of one cycle, as was R. Clyde White in dealing with social work during the depression of the 1930's.<sup>35</sup> Similar limitations existed for the Cavan-Ranck study of the hundred families during the depression of the 1930's.<sup>36</sup> The Burgess-Shanas investigation of the effect of depressions on insanity was for only a ten-year period.<sup>37</sup> Hauser's inquiry into the depression influence on births and deaths covered a shorter period and was for the purpose of comparing different income classes and racial groups.<sup>38</sup> The work at Chicago has been more concerned, though, with trends than with deviations from trends.

We now come to a most important feature of trend work which will concern us for a large part of the remainder of this paper. It is the use of the projection of the trend line for prediction purposes. Some of the earlier trends were measured by moving averages which do not allow extrapolation. But the use of an algebraic equation for that purpose does permit it, as is illustrated by the logistic curve used by Jeter and Monk to predict the future population of Chi-

<sup>32</sup> "Construction of a Business Barometer Based upon Annual Data," *American Economic Review*, VI, No. 4 (December, 1916), 739-69.

<sup>33</sup> William F. Ogburn and A. J. Jaffe, "Business Conditions in Presidential Years," *American Political Science Review*, XXX, No. 2 (April, 1936), 269-75.

<sup>34</sup> Samuel A. Stouffer and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Research Memorandum on the Family in the Depression* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1937).

<sup>35</sup> R. Clyde White and Mary K. White, *Research Memorandum on the Social Aspects of Relief Policies in the Depression* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1937).

<sup>36</sup> Ruth Cavan and Katherine Ranck, *The Family and the Depression* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).

<sup>37</sup> Data of this study are in the files of the Social Science Research Committee of the University of Chicago. See also A. J. Jaffe and Ethel Shanas, "Economic Differentials in the Probability of Insanity," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIV (January, 1939), 534-39.

<sup>38</sup> Philip Hauser, "Differential Fertility, Mortality, and Net Reproduction in Chicago, 1930" (University of Chicago dissertation, 1938).



cago. Such projection has a very large error, becoming greater the farther forward the projection is extended.

The reason for this increasing error is due to the fact that the course of a trend line is shaped not only by forces from within the data being measured but also by forces coming from without. The trend line is thus only a starting-point for prediction, for the various forces that bear upon it must also be reckoned. Thus, for instance, to extend forward from 1930 the trend line for the percentage married, without considering other factors, would not yield as good an estimation as it would if the force of the business cycle were taken into the reckoning. Thus the percentage of young persons married has been increasing every decade since 1890. The trend is upward. Its projection forward to 1940 will show a marked increase in the marriage of the young. But, when it is recalled that marriage-rates and the business cycle have a correlation of about .7, it seems probable that the extrapolation of the trend line of marriages through the depression years of the 1930's will mean a prediction of a larger percentage married than the census of 1940 will show. Indeed, the depression was so severe that there may be a decrease in the percentage of young married in 1940. Furthermore, we know that the percentage of young married couples cannot go on increasing indefinitely because the age factor will force it to slow up. So the age and depression factors, together with the trend line, will give a better approximation than the trend line alone.

Hence there arises a new method in the study of social trends (common enough in other research), namely, the correlation of causal factors. The work of Burgess and Cottrell, in measuring forty-one factors affecting marital happiness, though undertaken with no reference to social trends, is nevertheless of value in using trend lines of marriage.<sup>39</sup> Ogburn and Jaffe accounted for more than 50 per cent of the causes as to why one city has more crime than another, and this knowledge is of value in working with trends in crime.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>39</sup> E. W. Burgess and L. S. Cottrell, Jr., *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939).

<sup>40</sup> William F. Ogburn and A. J. Jaffe, "Factors in the Variation of Crime among Cities," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XXX, No. 189 (March, 1933), 12-34.

Schultz similarly made precise measures of factors affecting prices of a long series of agricultural commodities, which are helpful in predicting the price of cotton, wheat, corn, hay, sugar, potatoes, oats, barley, rye, and buckwheat. Thus the measurement of correlations in social phenomena is of great value in extrapolating trend lines.

Prediction is what the scientist qua scientist least wants to do. It is the supreme test. He cultivates the habit of suspending his judgment as long as possible in the hope that he may make his research more accurate and test it further. On the other hand, the demand for prediction may be considerable, particularly in an age of great change, when history does not repeat itself. A changing society tends to force the attitude of looking ahead in order to be warned of dangers to come and to take advantage of emerging opportunities. All businessmen have to practice looking ahead, even if social scientists do not. Governments are forced to plan, even though it be in opposition to the prevailing philosophy of laissez faire. Indeed planning is inevitable in an age of change. This being so, the pressure on social scientists to contribute to provision as August Comte called it, is likely to be great. They will be forced to respond to the best of their ability, even though as scientists they will not want to do so.

However, two memorable pioneer studies in prediction have recently been made. Both are by Burgess. And may I add that pioneering is the tradition at this new University, since the days of President Harper; if one does not pioneer here, he does not belong, as Eugene O'Neill, in *The Hairy Ape*, phrased it. The first of these prediction studies was a long investigation in the violation of parole and resulted in the construction of a table of values for different character and experience factors of a prisoner for the use of a parole board in granting paroles to a particular individual.<sup>41</sup> The information collected about any prisoner being considered could then be filled into this table, and the probability of his breaking parole could be determined. The method was improved here and there by Vold of Minnesota and the Gluecks of Harvard; Sutherland and Redden

<sup>41</sup> E. W. Burgess, A. W. Bruce, and A. J. Harno, *The Workings of the Indeterminate-Sentence Law and the Parole System in Illinois: A Report to Honorable H. G. Clabaugh—Chairman of Board of Parole* (Chicago: Association for Criminal Justice, 1928).

extended the method to predicting embezzlement, but the method remains essentially as Burgess and his collaborators developed it.

The dynamic Burgess then decided to tackle a prediction usually considered to be the exclusive right of the fortune-teller, namely, the outcome of marriage.<sup>42</sup> It has been said that the mores prevent research being done on sex; but this did not deter Burgess. He first had to construct an index of marital adjustment, a large undertaking itself, which became also the springboard for the work on marriage, of Terman of Stanford. Then Burgess with Cottrell correlated a list of personal characteristics, background factors, and sex experiences with his happiness-in-marriage index and was able to get a multiple correlation of .61. This does not show so large a percentage of the variance as we would like, but for so difficult an undertaking and for a pioneer research it is a distinct success. The life-table has long been used as a method of predicting death by the very practical business of life insurance, though the life-table is based on only the two factors of age and sex. However, it is supplemented in its use by knowledge of death-rates by specific diseases. The monumental work of the late Henry Schultz was a study in the prediction of prices.<sup>43</sup>

Some prediction of practical value may be undertaken, even though the data are not statistical and measurable in trend lines. The sole reliance on statistical data in predicting is, I think, unsatisfactory, as the experience with forecasting business fluctuations shows. Unless the correlation of the forecast curve with the business-cycle curve is unity, this must necessarily be so. Now I have never known two series of cultural phenomena to have a correlation of 1, and I think the theoretical analysis indicates that it will not occur. Hence, it is not well to trust mechanically to measurement data alone, but it should be supplemented with other knowledge, even though it be not measurement. In this way prediction may be improved.

But some prediction is possible without any measurement at all. Thus Thomas Edison at the beginning of the century predicted a

<sup>42</sup> Burgess and Cottrell, *op. cit.*

<sup>43</sup> *The Theory and Measurement of Demand* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).

number of social changes following from the use of a new construction material—concrete. The effect of the automobile on railroads might have been foreseen, and the influence of short-distance transportation on the planning of metropolitan regions might yet be looked into. The effect on family size and organization of two very different inventions, steam power and contraceptives, might also have been foreseen. The method is much the same as in statistical work; trends are projected forward, and then the modifying influence of factors is taken into account. Without statistical measurement it is difficult, however, to predict the degree and time of change. Nonquantitative prediction is nonetheless real and may be of great value.

A little experience in this field has shown the very great importance of mechanical invention and discovery in applied science in forecasting social changes. Even mechanical invention itself can be predicted, as was done successfully by Gilfillan a quarter of a century ago.<sup>44</sup> Since inventions require about twenty-five years to be developed from their earliest beginnings, and perhaps a somewhat longer time to exert their wide influence over social institutions, it is seen that, for those who would outline the changing form of society, technology is a good field in which to work.

These were the ideas back of the volume on *Technological Trends and National Policy*, published in 1937 by the National Resources Committee, in which chemists, engineers, physicists, transportation specialists, and experts in the field of communication predicted the inventions and scientific discoveries in their fields that would have great influence during the next quarter of a century. In this same volume Ogburn, Gilfillan, Stern, and others were concerned with the social effects of inventions.

Prediction in social science is still crude. Indeed much of it is art, not science. Yet it may be that we are witnessing the birth of a great movement in social science. Certainly, a changing society is the reason why we study social trends, and the scientific study of social trends flows logically into predictions of the future. Indeed, extrapolation of social trends would seem to be the natural instru-

<sup>44</sup> See S. C. Gilfillan, "The Prediction of Invention," in *Technological Trends and National Policy* (New York: National Resources Committee, 1937).

ment for making an attack on changing social conditions that are ahead. But this type of extrapolation is of little value without a knowledge of causal factors. This point is clearly emphasized in the great significance of technology for social science. Indeed the modern emphasis in the cultural approach to social science is the interrelation of the different parts of culture, evidence of which is the usefulness of the phrase "culture pattern."

The importance of work on social trends rests in its very great usefulness rather than in any intriguing methodological appeals or challenging intellectual complexities, though it contains an abundance of both. Thus the rewards of social-trends work lie in a greater knowledge of what changing technology is doing to us and to our institutions. The rewards are a greater understanding of institutional shifts of function, such as those producing the totalitarian state. The work here has stressed, owing to anthropological influence in contributing the cultural approach, the great value of trend studies in the great sectors of culture and of work not based upon statistical time series.

The work on social trends, however, would proceed much better if the data, especially in fields other than economics, were more adequate. If we could have a larger, more scientific personnel working at the projection forward of social trends in more fields, with more articles in scientific journals, the usefulness of the work would be greatly increased. It is not an accident that government and business have sponsored work in social trends. Indeed the immense practical value of this work is the confident assurance of its continuance. For social science goes forward by the pressure of problems of contemporary civilization as well as by pure curiosity unsullied by practical considerations. The relations of the university to the outside institutions of business and government is a theme of all these meetings and of the work in social science at the University of Chicago. Perhaps another ten years in the life of this building will show a much greater advance in the study of social trends and all the rich rewards that it means for our civilization.

### CELESTIN CHARLES ALFRED BOUGLE: 1870-1940

Professor Celestin Bouglé, professor of philosophy and director of the Ecole normale supérieure, died in Paris on January 25, 1940. Although Professor Bouglé has been identified with the Durkheim school, he has been critical of Durkheim on several issues, particularly of the theory of the "group mind." Together with Maurice Halbwachs and the late François Simiand, Professor Bouglé exerted his influence to develop the orientation of French sociology toward research. The more recent results of his efforts were reflected in the publications of the Centre de documentation sociale de l'Ecole normale supérieure.

Among his important writings are *Les Idées égalitaires* (1899), *La Sociologie biologique* (1900), *Essais sur le régime des castes* (1908), *Leçons de sociologie sur l'évolution des valeurs* (1922), an English translation of which appeared in 1926, *Qu'est ce que la sociologie* (1925), and *Le Bilan de la sociologie française contemporaine* (1935). Professor Bouglé was a contributor to the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*.

Professor Bouglé was an honorary member of the American Sociological Society, and was awarded the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws at Columbia University in 1938 and at the University of Chicago in 1929 at the time of the dedication of the University's Social Science Building. On that occasion he was cited as "efficient administrator in L'Ecole normale supérieure; distinguished contributor to the development of modern sociology, especially in its relation to other social sciences; organizer of social research in France."

## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

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In the interest of encouraging presentation of divergent views, the editor invites comment on the articles and book reviews appearing in the *Journal*.

### MEASUREMENT OF SOCIAL STATUS<sup>1</sup>

Zeleny in his article on "Measurement of Social Status" has proposed two measures: the "social-status ratio" and the "social-status score." He applies the second to a set of data and finds the rank order of the social status of twenty-nine persons. However, no use is made of the "social-status ratio," although it is claimed that it is "a mathematical equation . . . used to indicate the degree of status attained by a person in a clearly defined group." A natural question arises as to why the author did not use this other measure, and why he proposes two measures at all. It is of some interest to examine these measures in some detail.

Although the author's footnote 1 is quite ambiguous, apparently the average intensity of acceptance,  $I$ , is obtained when the "acceptances and choices are added and divided by the number of persons giving them," rejections not considered. Thus,

$$I = \frac{N + C}{P}, \quad (1)$$

where  $I$  is the average intensity of acceptances,  $N$  is the number of acceptances,  $C$  is the number of choices, and  $P$  is the number of persons giving acceptances. From this definition of  $I$  it can be shown that the "social-status ratio" ( $S_r$ ) and the "social-status score" ( $S_s$ ) are related in the following manner:

$$S_r = \frac{N}{PT} (S_s + R), \quad (2)$$

where  $N$  and  $P$  are as above,  $T$  is the total possible acceptances which might be received, and  $R$  is the number of rejections received. From the knowledge of the fact that the "ratio" is not defined in terms of the rejections while the "score" is, and as is shown in equation (2), it is evident that a given value of  $S_s$  does not uniquely determine a value of  $S_r$ . Hence, two individuals having the same "score" will not necessarily have the same "ratio," as can be seen in the case of persons Nos. 6 and 29 in the author's Table 1. The converse is also true, as can be seen in the case of persons Nos. 1 and 29.

<sup>1</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, XLV (January, 1940), 576-82.

Since the two measures are not related, it is desirable to examine the characteristics of each one separately. The "ratio" is defined by the author as

$$S_r = \frac{N \times I}{T}. \quad (3)$$

Substituting the value of  $I$  in equation (1), we have

$$S_r = \frac{N(N + C)}{PT}. \quad (4)$$

It can be demonstrated that this measure has the limits 0 and 2. In the extreme case, when no person in the group accepts the given individual,  $N = 0$ , and hence,  $S_r = 0$ . At the other extreme, when all the persons in the group both accept and choose the given individual, then the following identities must hold:  $N = T$ ,  $C = T$ , and  $P = T$ . Substituting these values in equation (4), the upper limit of the function is obtained, namely, 2. These limits show the possible range of variability of  $S_r$  and constitute the theoretical answer to the question implicit in the author's statement that "experimental studies with many kinds of small groups can show the possible variabilities in social-status ratios." An objection to this measure is that it does not in any way take into account the rejections of the given individual by the group. The author recognizes the importance of the rejections in the design of the Group Preference Record and then apparently discards this information in constructing his ratio.

Turning to the "social-status score," we have Zeleny's definition

$$S_s = N + C - R, \quad (5)$$

where all the terms are defined as above. It is apparent that the maximum value of  $S_s$  occurs when all the persons of a group both accept and choose a given individual. The rejections  $R$  become zero, and  $N = C = T$ , or, under such conditions  $S_s = 2T$ . The minimum value of this measure occurs when all the persons of a group reject a given individual, whence  $R = T$ , and  $N = C = 0$ , or,  $S_s = -T$ . Thus, the theoretical range of this measure is  $3T$ . But  $T$ , it is remembered, is the total possible number of persons making acceptances or rejections, being one less than the number of persons in the group, since the individual being rated does not rate himself. Hence at the maximum point  $S_s = 2(n - 1)$ , where  $n$  is the number of persons in the group, and at the minimum point  $S_s = -(n - 1)$ . This particular measure has the advantage of including the rejections which are, no doubt, important to the measurement of social status. But certain very serious difficulties are apparent, namely:

1. The limits of this measure are not independent of size of group. That is, they are a function of the size of group being dealt with. This is a distinct disadvantage. It means for one thing that the "score" cannot be used in sampling problems. For example, consider Zeleny's data. One could secure the scores within each of the six groups, the groups to be considered as samples from the



total community of twenty-nine persons. But actually these can never be samples from such a population, since in the total community the theoretical range of  $S_s$  is from  $-28$  to  $56$ , while in the samples of five each, the theoretical range is from  $-4$  to  $8$ .<sup>2</sup> Hence, at no time can any of the individuals in the samples have scores ranging from  $-28$  to  $-4$  or from  $8$  to  $56$ , or 72 possible scores out of a total of 85 in the parent population will never be secured in the sample.

2. It may be contended that the author is only interested in the "scores" for the total population, since it is only these which he compares in his Table 2. It can be shown that the number of different combinations of acceptances, rejections, and choices (not including the number of ways each combination can be secured) which go to make up a particular score vary in a symmetrical fashion about the mean score, when the following necessary conditions are observed: (i)  $N + R$  must not exceed  $T$ , since each person either makes an acceptance, a rejection, or is indifferent; and (ii)  $C$  must not exceed  $N$ , since logically there cannot be a choice without an acceptance (see Table 1, person No. 26, who seems to give choices without acceptances, an illogical situation). For example, in a population of five, the number of different and distinct ways in which the three factors can be combined to give each score is shown below.

Score.....	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
No. of combinations	1	1	2	3	4	4	5	4	4	3	2	1	1

This is an unsatisfactory condition, since it is evident that the possibility of getting any one score, on the basis of chance alone, depends upon whether the score is near the mean or one of the limits. But a more important question can be raised as to the equivalence of two scores obtained by different combinations of the three factors. For example, a person having two acceptances, no choices, and no rejections has a score of 2. Another person having two acceptances, two choices, and two rejections also has a score of 2. The first person is mildly accepted by two of the five in the group and regarded indifferently by the other two. The second person is regarded very highly by two of the group members and actively disliked or rejected by the other two. Are these situations equivalent? Do these persons in fact have the same social status? It would be interesting to learn whether the author's experience with this kind of data has led him to any sort of conclusion about this problem.

In view of what has been said it is perhaps with a certain reserve that we accept the author's plea for the use of these measures in the analysis of social status.

ROBERT DUBIN

*Chicago*

<sup>2</sup> In samples of five the scores of each individual will be based upon the ratings of the other four and not upon the ratings of the other twenty-eight in the population.

### THE SOCIOMETRY OF MORALE AND THE MEASUREMENT OF SOCIAL STATUS

Professor Zeleny in his two recent articles<sup>1</sup> purports to measure "morale," defined as "the 'shared feeling of like' among the members of a group," and "social status," defined as "the degree of acceptance of a person by his associates in a particular group." The author appears to regard "group morale" as the collective counterpart, expressible as a mean, of individual "social statuses."

To take a commonly used term, such as "social status" or "morale," and to define it by algebraic symbols, as Professor Zeleny does, is quite in conformity with the current vogue in sociology which calls itself "operationalism." The operationalist does not address himself to the problem of making his definitions conform with those generally used. This is well illustrated above, since in the general usage "group morale" would be tautological, and "status" is torn loose from its usual connotation, here being defined ultimately in terms of "like-indifferent-dislike."

Conceding the arbitrary definition of terms, however, the major peril in operationalism—reification—is not so widely taken into account as it is appreciated. For instance, Professor Zeleny says, "If group morale is related to individual happiness, then perhaps happiness itself can be measured and controlled."<sup>2</sup> If the reader is willing to overlook the *non sequitur* involved in "controlling happiness," he is still faced with the problem of choosing between two alternatives: (1) If "group morale" is here regarded, as at first seems evident, in terms of its usual connotation, he must impute to the author a reification of his concepts, the *bête noire* of operationalism. (2) If "group morale" and "happiness" are to be regarded as operational terms, he must regard the statement as an exposition of the obvious, since anyone could "operationally" define happiness and proceed to measure it. (Merely let *H* equal any arbitrarily selected mathematical expression whose factors have arbitrarily designated referents and perform the indicated operations.)

The crucial justification and reason for operationalism, we are told by one of its most articulate and energetic proponents,<sup>3</sup> is to be able to learn something about processes or relations not otherwise discoverable. The considerations raised above and by Mr. Dubin aside, we come finally to the question of what Professor Zeleny has discovered that was not obvious before. To the best of this writer's judgment he has shown only that subjects will fill out forms and register differential feelings toward other subjects—hardly "man bites dog" stuff.

ROBERT F. WINCH

#### Chicago

<sup>1</sup> "Sociometry of Morale," *American Sociological Review*, VI (1939), 799-808; "Measurement of Social Status," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLV (1940), 576-82. The definitions appear on the first page of each article.

<sup>2</sup> "Sociometry of Morale," *op. cit.*, p. 807.

<sup>3</sup> G. A. Lundberg, *Foundations of Sociology* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1939), esp. Part I, pp. 123-26 *et passim*.

## REJOINDER

The discussions of Winch and Dubin explicitly or implicitly support my main thesis—that human interactions can be measured and expressed in terms of mathematical formulas and ratios. Their discussions are wisely directed at certain limitations in the interpretation of the measured interactions. Winch's caution concerning reification should be considered; nevertheless, it is quite possible that mutual acceptance is actually correlated with morale otherwise defined. Winch apparently overlooked the .70 correlation I had shown between the morale quotient and a second criterion of morale.<sup>1</sup> His statement that the term "social status" was "torn from its usual connotation" is an exaggeration. Compare my definition of status, "the degree of acceptance of a person by his associates in a particular group," with the Park and Burgess definition, "The status and social position of any individual inside any social group is determined by his relation to all other members of that group and eventually of all other groups,"<sup>2</sup> I can see little difference. It appears to the writer that the operational definition of status (and adjustment) is very similar to that in common use. Thus neither of Winch's criticisms is vital.

Likewise, Dubin's remarks in no way weaken the major thesis of my papers. In asking why I had not done more with ratios, Dubin was unaware of my published study, "Sociometry of Morale," in which I had carried on considerable experimental work with ratios. The work with ratios had proved satisfactory, and I explored the possibilities of the social-status score in the article on the "Measurement of Social Status." I made no claim that the social-status score measured the same thing as the social-status ratio.<sup>3</sup> This was because one included rejections and the other did not, as Dubin pointed out. However, I think Dubin is right in pointing out that the social-status score has decidedly limited value as a means of interpreting the measured interactions. In my opinion, thanks to Dubin, the ratio is much to be preferred. It may be possible in the future to devise a ratio which will include both "indifferents" and "rejections" as well as "acceptances." The present trouble is to obtain reliable rejections and different intensities of rejections. On paper this looks easy; in experimental work it is very difficult.

In Table 1 in the article on "Measurement of Social Status" the data for person No. 26 was incomplete. I pointed out the incompleteness of the table in a footnote.

Dubin's query about the equivalence of the same social-status scores obtained by different combinations of factors is well taken and raises many problems. The only suggestion I can make at present is that a sociogram accompany each score. This would make the actual situation graphic and show the com-

<sup>1</sup> "Sociometry of Morale," *American Sociological Review*, December, 1939, pp. 805-6.

<sup>2</sup> Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), p. 36.

<sup>3</sup> A recently computed correlation between twenty-seven social-status ratios and scores gave  $r = .276 \pm .124$ .

plete relationship. It seems to me that the problem could be taken care of somewhat better with the use of the ratio which now seems to be the most promising means of interpretation.

Avoiding the danger of reification and disregarding the social-status score, I should like to point out what, in my opinion, the two articles have established. It was demonstrated, largely experimentally, that the degree of (1) mutual acceptance, (2) individual acceptance (social status), and (3) reciprocal individual acceptance (social adjustment) in a group could be measured and expressed symbolically with a mathematical formula and ratio. One basic ratio underlies all three measurements. When  $T$  = the total possible number of acceptances,  $N$  = the actual number of acceptances;  $I$  = the intensity of acceptance; and  $R$  stands for  $MAR$  (mutual acceptance, perhaps also degree of association) or  $SR$  (social-status ratio) or  $SAR$  (social adjustment ratio), depending upon which is used, then

$$R = \frac{N \times I}{T} \text{ (basic operational ratio) .} \quad (1)$$

In practice the writer has used the following formula for calculating intensity of acceptance. When  $C$  = the number of choices counted as extra units of intensity of acceptance,

$$I = \frac{N + C}{N} \text{ (ratio of intensity of acceptance) .} \quad (2)$$

Then, substituting the value of  $I$  in the basic formula, as I have done in practice and as has been suggested by Dubin, we have

$$R = \frac{N(N + C)}{TN} \text{ (practical operational formula) .} \quad (3)$$

The evidence presented indicates that these formulas measure the degree and intensity of the following forms of social interaction (when properly applied in each case): (1) mutual acceptance ( $MAR$ ); (2) individual acceptance ( $SR$ ); and (3) reciprocal individual acceptance ( $SAR$ ). Thus, within defined limits, a mathematical expression of three kinds of social position has been established. Further experimentation is the only way to test the ultimate validity of these formulas and conclusions.

LESLIE DAY ZELENY

State Teachers College  
St. Cloud, Minnesota

#### REVIEW OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Let me thank you for this opportunity to state my protest against the Dr. E. B. Reuter review (November, 1939) of *Social Problems*,<sup>1</sup> by Professors Murray and Flynn of Notre Dame University. In a scant two and one-half lines the Iowa sociologist dismisses that serious work (the only Catholic social prob-

<sup>1</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, XLV, 499.

lems text and hence important even as an authoritative exposition of the Catholic social mind) with the very obviously theological—not sociological—dictum that it is merely an “effort to perpetuate archaic beliefs and medieval patterns of thought.” Of course, no one at all familiar with the doctor’s views is surprised at that sort of critique. In his teaching at the University of Iowa he has thought it necessary to remark that only through abandoning Catholic philosophy can one hope to become a sociologist. In his work on population he has imputed Catholic opposition to contraception to an ecclesiastical lust for power. And if one had no other index to his mind than his textbook, *The Family*,<sup>2</sup> the doctor’s theological bias would still be quite evident.

Users of *The Family* will recall that in that book of readings Dr. Reuter purports to give “an introduction to a serious study of family life”; the book brings together, he tells us, a considerable percentage of the “significant” work that has been done. He gives there two readings dealing with the influence of the Catholic church upon the family; both are hostile in authorship and tone—one the work of Dr. W. G. Sumner, at least an agnostic, the other and more objectionable the work of Theodore Schroeder, a Socialist. Mr. Schroeder’s degree work was done in law and engineering, but Dr. Reuter cites him as though he were a competent and responsible social historian. Dr. Reuter then makes verification of the anti-Catholic indictments impracticable for what he calls “the occasional student who will wish to trace the source of the statements” by omitting all documentation; although the original articles, he assures us, were “rather heavily documented.” A perusal of the original Schroeder article will show the injury done to fairness by that omission: the omitted documentation includes a mass of cullings from such sources as no self-respecting scholar would use; there is not an original source in the lot.

Dissatisfied with such treatment of the Catholic church, I personally wrote Dr. Reuter, listing a dozen or so factual charges for which I asked proof. He thought\* it enough to refer me to the weird documentation of the original article, adding that he printed the articles found in his book merely as “exemplifying various points of view towards the family institution.” This despite the fact that both reprints concerned with the Catholic influence on the family were hostile, as said, in authorship and tone.

It was against such instances of theological animus in writings purporting to be sociological that the American Catholic Sociological Society in its December, 1939, conference made protest. In the conference the opinion was widespread that it is difficult for an impartial reader to save both the honesty and the scholarship of too many American writers of what purport to be sociological appraisals of the Catholic religion. Hence such a reader is forced to pass on certain American sociologists the judgment passed by the learned Dr. Adolph Harnack on the graduates of German universities: that of the Catholic church “they know absolutely nothing, and they indulge in its regard

<sup>2</sup> E. B. Reuter and Jessie R. Runner, *The Family* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1931).

in wholly trivial, vague, and often directly nonsensical notions." Dr. Bernard Iddings Bell, too, may well have had some of our sociologists in mind when he wrote, "I have heard more astonishing absurdities about Christianity from grave dons in faculty clubs than in any other place where men and women of intelligence meet together. They were not with malice attacking Christianity. They were only talking ignorant nonsense about it."

In conclusion, let me ask that there be less animus shown by sociologists in references to things Catholic and that readers of the *American Journal of Sociology* be saved further reviews of Catholic books by such men as Dr. Reuter.

J. E. COOGAN, S.J.

*University of Detroit*

#### REJOINDER

Professor Coogan's letter seems to contain only two items relevant to the review. It expresses the opinion (1) that the review was too brief inasmuch as the book was dismissed "in a scant two and one-half lines" and (2) that the characterization of the book as "an effort to perpetuate archaic beliefs and medieval patterns of thought" was "an obviously theological . . . dictum."

The objections seem to arise out of misunderstanding: the first, from a misunderstanding of the function of a critical review; the second, from a misunderstanding of the distinction between objective description and personal conviction. The two objections may be met in a single brief statement.

The volume in question expounds a "Catholic Sociology" which frankly assumes the "authority of religion," "adheres to Christian principles," "includes all the basic tenets of religion and morality," "revolves around fixed values," has the "sound spiritual and ethical values interwoven" within it, and "the remedies proposed . . . will also be based on and guided by the moral law of the Church." Such being the case, the book is admittedly a propagandistic document, an exposition designed to indoctrinate students in a particular sectarian ideology—in "the old truths which have characterized the teachings of the Church and the lives of the Saints in every age." As such the book scarcely merits the space it received; it calls for no more attention from scholars than would a doctrinal report of a board of Methodist bishops, a brochure applying the philosophy of the chamber of commerce, an official statement of the Nazi doctrine of the Third Reich, or other bodies of rationalizations arising from existing statutes and institutional practices.

To point out that a body of ideology is something to be dissected and explained, not something to be used as a valid principle of explanation, is not to express a theological bias; it is simply to recognize the difference between accepting and expounding a dogma and analyzing and understanding its nature and practical utility. To imply, as the closing paragraph of the letter seems to do, that bodies of ideology should be examined only by the indoctrinated members is to skate dangerously near the outer rim of absurdity.

E. B. REUTER

*University of Iowa*

## NEWS AND NOTES

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### RESEARCH NEWS

*American Youth Commission.*—"What are the effects, if any, upon the personality development of Negro youth of their membership in a minority group?" This was the problem selected in 1937 by the Commission for a special study intended to deal with the status and distinctive factors in the experiences of Negro youth. The results of this two-and-a-half-year project are now being made ready for publication in seven printed and three mimeographed volumes.

The first publication going to press early this year, *In a Minor Key: Negro Youth—a Preface in Story and Fact*, is a preliminary volume prepared by Ira de A. Reid, Atlanta University, assembling the available statistical data regarding Negro youth. *American Children of Caste*, written by Allison Davis, Dillard University, and John Dollard, Yale University, now ready for publication, is the first of four reports on the field research. Bearing the subtitle, "A Study of the Personality Development of Negro Youth in the Urban South," this volume treats the central problem of what it means to be born and reared a member of a minority race whose status in relation to the majority race has come to be regulated by custom, mores, and law.

In this study the main approach is made through intensive personality analyses arrived at by thoroughgoing interviews over an extended period of time. Over 200 Negro adolescents were interviewed on relationships with white people—the ultimate problem of the study. Of these, 123, whose social position was identified, were studied for family and school controls upon behavior. Finally, 30 girls and boys between the ages of twelve and sixteen were chosen for more intensive study of personality development. These were individually interviewed at regular intervals for periods of time varying from four to seven months, and pertinent information on each was secured from members of their families, their own friends, their schoolteachers, and others. Medical examinations and Stanford-Binet intelligence tests were given to each. The sample chosen for presentation in this report includes both sexes in equal numbers and represents two main groups: four youngsters of the lower classes, born to similar conditions and deprivations, and four of the upper strata, where the main drive is for the maintenance or improvement of social status. The forthcoming

300-page volume will contain a theoretical analysis of the staff's method of personality analysis, a report on the principal social controls operative in the Negro society of New Orleans and Natchez, and the data and analysis on eight selected cases.

*Negro Youth at the Crossways: A Study of the Personality Development of Negro Youth in the Middle States*, by E. Franklin Frazier, Howard University, is based upon data secured principally from Negro communities in Washington, D.C., and Louisville, Kentucky. Against a background summary of Negro "border-states culture" drawn from existing reports and newly secured community data, the interracial experiences of 268 Negro young people are analyzed.

Because of the general orientation of the study, the interview material is organized around the chief social institutions of the community. After dealing with the ecological pattern of the Negro community in the border city and with the questions of stratification, social movements, social pathology, and the interracial relations of the Negro community, Dr. Frazier then organizes the personality data around youth's experiences in the family, the neighborhood, the school, the church, and employment. Following the analysis of interview material Dr. Frazier offers two more complete case studies, one of a boy reared in middle-class circumstances and one of a girl born to a lower status. The author adds to his own interpretation of the cases a memorandum prepared by Harry Stack Sullivan, psychiatrist.

*Color and Personality: A Study of the Personality Development of Negro Youth in Chicago*, directed by W. Lloyd Warner, University of Chicago, gives special attention to the part played by dark pigmentation and other negroid physical characteristics in the social adjustment of youth living in a northern metropolis. For the community background, stated both in terms of ecology and in terms of social organization, the study draws upon the materials resulting from a two-year W.P.A. analysis of the Negro community in Chicago, sponsored by Mr. Warner and conducted by Mr. Horace Cayton, co-author of *Black Workers and the New Unions*, of which two volumes have just been published (cf. note on University of Chicago).

With the assistance of Dr. Walter Adams, Mr. Buford Junker, and interviewers, Professor Warner next organized the case materials from a sample of 407 men and 398 women according to criteria, the relevancy of which had been established in the preliminary study. The cases were arranged on the basis of sex, place of birth and early childhood, degree of negroidness, and social class position in the Chicago Negro community. For each subgroup resulting from this classification the question was



asked: "What are the typical patterns of adjustment which characterized these Negro youths' reaction to their minority racial status?"

Although the Davis-Dollard report and the Warner study are similar in their conceptual outline of Negro society and in their combined cultural and psychological approach to their interpretation of personality development, the two volumes will tend to supplement rather than to duplicate each other. The Warner study stresses the systematic arrangement of interview materials according to the above-mentioned criteria and in so doing presents a new scheme of case analysis. On the other hand, Davis and Dollard do not so much attempt to systematize all of their interview material under the outline as to give in detail the developmental picture of selected individuals.

*Southern Rural Negro Youth*, prepared by Charles S. Johnson, Fisk University, constitutes the fourth volume. Its findings are based upon community, family, neighborhood group, and individual interview material secured through a statistical sampling of six southern rural counties. Dr. E. S. Marks, the staff psychologist, prepared an elaborate battery of tests designed to yield comparable data regarding intelligence and various personality traits. Several of the tests are particularly concerned with those social attitudes of Negro youth that are related to matters of color, race, and discrimination. The test results were interpreted against the background of the community data and through the more personal insights revealed in the individual and family case studies. In order to compare the experiences of rural youth with those living in the cities, the Johnson study also includes, in addition to a tabulation of the two thousand rural cases, approximately the same number for youth residing in the urban communities where the other research projects were located.

Besides the four principal reports, four lesser studies have been conducted in other communities to provide a means of checking the findings of the main project. E. Franklin Frazier is writing a brief volume on the Harlem community in New York City; J. Howell Atwood has prepared a summary about Negro youth in Galesburg, Illinois; Donald Wyatt is organizing data on Greensboro, North Carolina; and Joseph A. Pierce, through the assistance of the colored division of the National Youth Administration in Atlanta, Georgia, has assembled data on that community.

A volume summarizing the findings of the field studies and stating their implications for educational and social planning will be written by Robert L. Sutherland, associate director of the Commission in charge of the studies of Negro youth, and will be ready for publication during the summer.

*American Law Institute.*—A research report prepared for the Institute by Thorsten Sellin, criminologist, University of Pennsylvania, presents the findings of a two-year investigation into the crime problem in the United States among youth from sixteen to twenty-one and into current prison, court, and correctional procedures for handling youth offenders. The report is now in the hands of the Committee on Criminal Justice—Youth of the Institute, of which William Draper Lewis, director of the Institute, is chairman, for final consideration and recommendations for whatever changes are found necessary in the field of criminal administration.

*University of Chicago.*—The first two monographs of a series of studies of the Chicago Negro community under the direction of W. Lloyd Warner and Horace R. Cayton have been released in mimeographed form. The first monograph, by Mary Elaine Ogden, entitled *The Chicago Negro Community: Statistical Description*, presents a compilation of statistical data, a description of the various natural areas in the Negro community, and a comparison of the Negro community with other districts throughout the city. The second volume, entitled *Occupational Changes in the Negro Community*, by Estelle Hill Scott, describes the changing occupational structure of the Negro community from 1890-1930. Two other monographs to be released later are "Associations and Churches in the Negro Community of Chicago" by St. Claire Drake and "Migration and Mobility among Negroes in Chicago" by Elizabeth Dewey Johns. Requests for monographs, available at one dollar a copy, should be addressed to Horace R. Cayton, Good Shepherd Community Center, 5700 Prairie Avenue, Chicago.

*Division of Research, Work Projects Administration.*—Tabulations from the study of the experiences of urban youth in a depression labor market, conducted on a sample basis in seven representative cities, are now being completed, and analyses of the basic data are being made. Plans have been drawn up for the preparation of separate reports on the following subjects: (1) the social and economic characteristics of youth in July, 1938; (2) the employment experiences of youth; and (3) the relationship between vocational training and success in finding employment. It has been found that about 95 per cent of the youth who left school subsequently entered the labor market and that, of those who were in the labor market on July 1, 1939, approximately 20 per cent were unemployed.

*American Council on Education.*—The Council has received a grant to conduct an exploratory study of the needs of American educational insti-

tutions in the present international crisis. Francis J. Brown, New York University, editor of the *Journal of Educational Sociology*, has joined the Council staff as a special assistant to work on this problem.

*Judge Baker Guidance Center.*—The Center has recently published *Treatment and What Happened Afterward* by William Healy and Augusta F. Bronner, a study of the later adjustments of four hundred cases treated five to eight years ago.

#### NOTES

*Social science meetings.*—During the Christmas holidays the different social science associations held meetings in as widely separated places as Philadelphia, Washington, and Chicago. Meeting in Philadelphia, the American Economic Association and the American Statistical Association report a combined registration of 1,865, and the American Sociological Society had an attendance of 566. The American Political Science Association reports 1,235 registrants at its annual meeting in Washington, and the American Historical Association had a registration of 1,071. In Chicago the American Anthropological Association had a registration of over 200, and the American Catholic Sociological Society reports an attendance of approximately 450. The present membership of the social science associations which have representations in the Social Science Research Council are as follows: American Anthropological Association, 1,101; American Economics Association, 2,066; American Historical Association, 3,532; American Political Science Association, 2,442; American Psychological Association, 2,738; American Statistical Association, 2,502; and American Sociological Society, 999. The places chosen for the 1940 annual meetings of the associations are as follows: Chicago by the American Political Science Association, the American Statistical Association, and the American Sociological Society; New Orleans by the American Economics Association.

*American Sociological Society.*—The outstanding emphasis of the annual meeting was on the subject of social disorganization. This theme was effectively presented by Edwin H. Sutherland, Indiana University, in his presidential address on "The White Collar Criminal," in which he analyzed crime in its cultural context in American society. The concept of social disorganization was further treated in its ideological aspects by Louis Wirth, University of Chicago; in its historical emergence by Floyd N. House, University of Virginia; and in its institutional forms by J. F. Cuber, Kent State University. Other divisional and sectional meetings treated of rural population increase and social disorganization; the dis-

organization and reorganization of community life; governmental programs in the field of labor relations; patterns of political control and international organization; ecological and social psychological studies of mental disorder; and religion and social organization.

Interesting demonstrations of new methods of planning meetings were provided by the section on criminology, Donald Taft, University of Illinois, chairman, where papers were sent to discussants in advance, and by the section on educational sociology, Francis J. Brown, New York University, chairman, where papers on teaching sociology in college by Read Bain, Miami University, and Lloyd A. Cook, Ohio State University, were printed in advance of the meeting in the *Journal of Educational Sociology*. Interest in the 1940 census was emphasized by a census-tract conference under the chairmanship of H. W. Green, Cleveland Health Counsel, which discussed the 1940 census schedule, housing-data schedule, and table forms of data by census tracts for census-tract cities, and a joint meeting of the section on social statistics with the American Statistical Association on statistics of family composition and type of household by Barkev Sanders, Social Security Board, and Leon E. Truesdell, Bureau of the Census.

Unusual interest in the business meeting centered about the proposition to reorganize the Society by establishing a new grade of members to be known as "fellows," with annual dues of \$10 and with representatives of regional societies upon the executive committee of the Society. A discussion of this plan is to continue through the pages of the *American Sociological Review* before a mail ballot is taken in the autumn.

The officers of the American Sociological Society for the year 1940 president, Robert M. MacIver, Columbia University; first vice-president Stuart A. Queen, Washington University; second vice-president, James H. S. Bossard, University of Pennsylvania; secretary-treasurer, Harold A. Phelps, University of Pittsburgh; elected members of the executive board, J. K. Folsom, Vassar College, and Robert S. Lynd, Columbia University; editor, Read Bain, Miami University; and assistant editors, Donald Young, University of Pennsylvania, and Pauline V. Young, University of Southern California.

*American Statistical Association.*—The high point of the meeting of the Association was the centenary celebration program with presidential address by Raymond Pearl, Johns Hopkins University, and papers by Albert L. Dunn, Bureau of the Census, on "Census—Past and Future," W. F. Ogburn, University of Chicago, on "Recent Statistical Trends," and Joseph S. Davis, Stanford University, on "The Next Hundred Years

of the American Statistical Association." Other meetings of the Association were upon statistical studies of business cycles, lag effects in statistics and economics, the role of consumer-financing in the economic organization, analysis of the annual prison report, problems of building costs, preserving competition versus regulating monopoly, financing and marketing a residential building, problems and progress in the study of statistics, unemployment compensation, contributions, benefits and reservations, health security progress, employment, wages, and the cost of living; effects of the war on American business; and a session on public sentiment with papers by Elmo Roper, New York City, Hadley Cantril, Princeton University, and Herbert H. Marks, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. The final meeting of the session was, as usual, devoted to forecasts for the year 1940. Leonard P. Ayers, Cleveland Trust Company, predicted an increase in the national income of two billion dollars, in spite of a moderate and considerable downward trend of industrial production from the present level. Lionel D. Edie saw no basis for painting a very alarming picture of the decline and pointed to bright spots in the war industries. James F. Hughes, Smith Barney and Company, expected the first six months of 1940 to be better than the last six months of 1939, but feared that 1940 might end in a depression.

*Rural Sociological Society.*—The society held its annual meeting in Philadelphia during the holidays. At the first of two joint sessions with the American Farm Economics Association, M. L. Wilson, Department of Agriculture, presented a paper on the problem of poverty in agriculture, and, at the second joint session, discussion was held on farm labor in a control-conscious world. Other sessions of the society centered upon questions of social security for farm people, the theory of human conservation, and action programs for the conservation of rural life and culture. One period was given over to round tables and committee reports in the fields of extension, research, teaching, and welfare activities and programs. The following officers were elected for the current year: president, John H. Kolb, University of Wisconsin; vice-president, Charles E. Lively, University of Missouri; secretary-treasurer, T. Lynn Smith, Louisiana State University; other members of the executive committee, Howard W. Beers, University of Kentucky, and Carl C. Taylor, Department of Agriculture.

*American Historical Association.*—Of unusual interest to sociologists was the fifty-fourth annual meeting of the Association held in Washington, December 28–30, in the session on the technique of cultural analysis. Papers were delivered by Geoffrey Gorer, Yale University, on "The Con-

cept of Culture and Group Ethos," and Helen M. Lynd, Sarah Lawrence College, on "The Concept of Culture as a Tool for the Study of History." The industrial city was discussed by Leon S. Marshall, Westminster College, and Ralph E. Turner, Social Security Board. The session on population studies in history included papers by Frank Lorimer, American University, on the "Historical Context of Population Study" and Rupert Vance, University of North Carolina, on the "Population Factor in the South." Other sessions were given over to the study of American local history, agriculture, and democracy, liberalism, cultural patterns in modern European history, neglected sources of social history, cultural conflict, American industrial relations, international relations, and what documents do not tell concerning the war in Europe and American policy.

*American Political Science Association.*—In its thirty-fifth annual meeting the Association held two types of simultaneous sessions. The sectional meetings were designed to present the latest developments in each of the major fields recognized as constituting the study of political science. Eight such sections met simultaneously for two sessions in the fields of political parties and public opinion, international relations, the state and the individual, governmental research, public administration, state and local government, teaching of the social sciences in the high schools, and comparative government. Formal papers were read by recognized authorities, and comments were offered both by selected discussion leaders and from the floor. Eleven round-table sessions were organized which had no formal papers or speeches but which were opened in each instance by persons especially invited because of their interest in and competence to handle a given topic. Outstanding addresses at luncheon and dinner meetings were "Administration, Foundation of Government," by Charles A. Beard, Columbia University, "Emerging Problems in Public Administration," by Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture, "The Maintenance of Free Trade within the Borders of the United States," by Thurman Arnold, Assistant Attorney-General, and "The Need for Historical Perspective in Politics," by T. V. Smith, University of Chicago.

*American Anthropological Association.*—The annual meeting was held at the University of Chicago, December 27-30, under the presidency of Diamond Jenness, Canadian government anthropologist. Of direct sociological interest were the two symposiums on "Present Status of Social Anthropology" and "Method and Theory in Ethnology." In his paper on "The Nature of Social Anthropology," Robert Redfield, University of Chicago, distinguished social anthropology from other social sciences by its greater use of general hypotheses and formal concepts

designed to facilitate discovery of the general properties of society and culture rather than mere historical fact. C. M. Arensberg, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and W. Lloyd Warner, University of Chicago, read papers on "Social Anthropology and the Methods of Studying a Social Group" and "The Present Condition of Studies of the Individual in Relation to Society," carrying this theme farther by discussing particular hypotheses and objectives. M. J. Herskovits, Northwestern University, in his article on "The Present Condition of Studies of Acculturation" pleaded for a greater interest in the study of actual current acculturation resulting from contacts between various native cultures and between natives and European.

"The Present Status of Evolution in Social Anthropology" and "The Evolutionary Approach" were the topics presented by Alexander Lesser, Brooklyn College, and L. A. White, University of Michigan, who insisted upon the usefulness of the concept of evolution in describing the development of culture, due account being taken of the earlier error of using this concept as an explanation of all things. Bronislaw Malinowski, Yale University, restated his principle in "The Functional Approach" that individual items of culture are best understood in terms of their relations to the total social system of which they are a part rather than in terms of their historical origin. In "The Psychoanalytical Approach" A. Kardiner, New York City, reported on some studies carried out in connection with Ralph Linton, Columbia University, in which an attempt was made to relate cultural changes to changes in the basic personality complexes.

*The American Catholic Sociological Society.*—The second annual conference of the association was held in Chicago, December 27–28. Sessions were held on the following subjects: social-economic problems, problems of adjustment, the family, labor problems, rural sociology, sociology and social action, sociology and social origins. Sectional meetings were held on sociology and social work, high-school sociology, college sociology, social theory, and criminology. In addition there were a student session and a banquet meeting at which the Reverend Raymond C. Murray, University of Notre Dame, gave the presidential address.

*The Pacific Sociological Society.*—The Society held its eleventh annual meeting at the State College of Washington and the University of Idaho, December 27–29. Two sessions were held with the Pacific Coast Economic Association.

Papers were: "The Radio as a Social Institution," Martin H. Neumeyer, University of Southern California; "Sociological Analysis of the Concept of News," Carl F. Reiss, State College of Washington; "Certain Psychological Processes in the Life-History of Welfare Agencies," S. H. Jameson, University of Oregon; "Political Movements in the State of Minnesota," Calvin F. Schmid, University of Washington; "Emile Durkheim's Contributions to the Problems of Social Control," John M. Foskett, University of Idaho; "Democratic Ideologies in the Sociology of Ward and Cooley," Elton Guthrie, University of Washington; "The Sociology of War," George M. Day, Occidental College; "Voting Characteristics of American-Born Japanese," Forrest LaViolette, University of Washington; "The Mennonites of Yamhill County," William C. Smith, Linfield College; "Capital Punishment," R. H. Dann, Oregon State College; "Occupational Structure and the Relationship between Jews and Non-Jews in Detroit," Henry Meyer, State College of Washington; "Teaching Sociology in Our Secondary Schools," Duane Robinson, Whitman College; "Migratory Farm Labor," Paul H. Landis, State College of Washington. Papers will be published in the *Proceedings of the Pacific Sociological Society*.

Officers elected for the year 1940 are: president, Martin H. Neumeyer, University of Southern California; vice-presidents, Glen Carlson, University of Redlands, J. V. Berreman, Stanford University, and Robert H. Dann, Oregon State College; secretary-treasurer, Paul H. Landis, State College of Washington; and members of the advisory council, William C. Smith, Linfield College, and Glenn E. Hoover, Mills College.

*District of Columbia Sociological Society*.—Officers for the current year are: president, Irene B. Taeuber, Princeton University; vice-president, Harold F. Dorn, United States Public Health Service; secretary-treasurer, Andrew J. Kress, Georgetown University. Other members of the executive committee are Richard O. Lang, Bureau of the Census; T. J. Woofert, Jr., Farm Security Administration; and Bennett Mead, Bureau of Prisons. Speakers at recent monthly meetings have been Kimball Young, Division of Farm Population; Calvert L. Dedrick, Bureau of the Census; and E. Franklin Frazier, Howard University.

*International Congress of Sociology*.—Dimitrie Gusti, president of the Congress, urges American sociologists to submit papers to be read at the next congress. The American representation is much smaller than that of European countries. Papers should be received by March 31 and will be printed according to their subject matter in one of the five series of the proceedings of the Congress: village, city, village and city, methodol-



ogy, and research possibilities and teaching of the social sciences. Papers should be addressed to Professor Gusti, 6, Piața Romană, Palatul Academiei Comerciale, Bucharest III, Rumania.

*American Association for the Advancement of Science.*—The section on "Social and Economic Sciences" of the Association held one session on the effects of science on human beings, with the following papers: "Biological Effects," Alan Gregg, Rockefeller Foundation; "Social Effects," Isaiah Bowman, Johns Hopkins University; and "Cultural Effects," Lawrence K. Frank, New York City. Two significant papers given at general sessions were "The Public Relations of Science," by Wesley C. Mitchell, Columbia University, retiring president of the Association, and "Science, War, and Reconstruction," by Julian S. Huxley.

*White House Conference on Children in a Democracy.*—At its final meeting in Washington, January 18–20, the Conference adopted with few alterations the general report as drafted by the committee of experts headed by Homer Folks, New York State Charities Aid. Among the chief recommendations were a demand for immediate ratification of the federal child labor amendment; assistance to boys and girls in work projects to include those on parole from reformatories or on probation; opening of membership rolls of the C.C.C. which have been closed to such youths; adoption by the federal government of a policy of continuing and flexible work programs; co-operation of state and local government to provide work for parents among the needy unemployed; improving family dwellings and the housing situation; practical steps to make available better religious instruction for all children; realignment of school units to assure the best possible education for all children and a fair method of assessing taxes for education; proper supervision of health and extension of facilities for medical care and protection with emphasis on maternal and infant care. In its summary of the recommendations made, which will be incorporated into a program of action for the next ten years, the Conference stated that it had no misgivings about this nation's "capacity to face unpleasant facts, its will to take on new responsibilities, and its readiness to accept great burdens."

*The National Conference on Family Relations.*—The Conference held its second annual meeting in Philadelphia, December 26–27. The program was organized around the central topic, "The Role and Functions of the Family in a Democracy," with papers by Adolf Meyer, Johns Hopkins University, president of the Conference; Sidney Goldstein, New York State Conference on Marriage and the Family; Una Bernard Sait, Clare-

mont College; Carle C. Zimmerman, Harvard University; Lawrence K. Frank, New York City; Max Rheinstein, University of Chicago Law School; Karen Horney, New York City; Carl G. Hartman, Johns Hopkins University; and William F. Cgburn, University of Chicago. The subject and chairmen of the meetings of the Conference committees, which held two sessions each, were "Economic Basis of Family Life," William Hodson, New York City Commissioner of Public Welfare; "Education for Marriage and Family Living," Ernest R. Groves, University of North Carolina; "Eugenics and the Family," Frederick Osborn, American Eugenics Society; "Marriage and Family Counselling," Mrs. Stuart Mudd, Marriage Counsel, Philadelphia; "Marriage and Family Law and Its Administration," Max Rheinstein; "Marriage and Family Research," Joseph K. Folsom, Vassar College; and "Youth and Its Problems," Oliver M. Butterfield, New York City. The officers elected for 1940 were: president, Adolf Meyer; vice-president, E. R. Groves; and secretary, Ernest W. Burgess.

*Birth Control Federation of America.*—The annual meeting was held January 23-25 at the Hotel Roosevelt, New York City. Among the participants in a discussion of "Race-building in a Democracy" were Sidonie M. Gruenberg, Child Study Association, Frederick Osborn, American Museum of Natural History, Karl Menninger, Topeka, Kansas, and Henry P. Fairchild, New York University.

*Ecological Society of America.*—A symposium on the Human Situation, with Charles C. Adams, New York State Museum, chairman, included papers on "The Relation of Plant Ecology to Human Ecology," Homer L. Shantz, United States Department of Agriculture; "The Relation of Geography to Human Ecology," C. W. Thornthwaite, United States Department of Agriculture; "The Relation of Regional Planning to Ecology," Benton MacKaye, United States Department of Agriculture; "Human Society and Human Ecology," Robert E. Park, University of Chicago, and A. B. Hollingshead, Indiana University; and "Ecology and the Integration of the Sciences," E. C. Lindeman, New York School of Social Work.

*American Documentation Institute.*—The Committee on Scientific Aids to Learning, President James B. Conant, Harvard University, chairman, has made a grant to cover the cost of making a microfilm master negative of sets of volumes of scientific and learned journals, which enables the Biblioform Service to supply microfilm copies at the positive copy cost, namely, one cent per page for odd volumes or one-half cent per page for journals available in ten or more consecutive volumes. Further informa-

tion may be obtained by writing the Institute, 2101 Constitution Avenue, Washington, D.C.

*Committee on Cultural Relations with Latin America.*—Under the direction of Hubert Herring, a mid-winter institute was held in Mexico City, February 7–24, which included lectures on arts, economics, and current developments in Mexico and several trips to provincial villages and towns.

The fifteenth annual seminar in Mexico is scheduled to be held July 5–25, and the Committee's second institute on Inter-American affairs will be held in Argentine and Brazil during the coming summer. For further information write Hubert Herring, director, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

*Field courses in American social problems.*—In an attempt to vivify classroom teaching of the social sciences, The Open Road will offer during the coming summer five field courses in teacher education on the graduate level, which aim to acquaint Americans with the lives and problems of the population of their country. Summer courses have been worked out with the following institutions: a sociological field course in southern conditions, Teachers College, Columbia University; a workshop in social and economic factors influencing education in New England, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University; problems of American youth as exemplified in certain urban and rural communities of the Middle West, School of Education, Northwestern University; life-problems on the Great Plains and in the Rocky Mountain area, Colorado State College of Education; and field seminar in the sociology of the Tennessee Valley region, School of Education, New York University. Enrolment is limited in each case to between twelve and fifteen qualified students. Fees are based on actual costs in the field. Inquiries may be addressed to the institutions or to The Open Road, 8 West Fortieth Street, New York City.

*Le Play House.*—Since the outbreak of war Le Play House, 35 Gordon Square, Bloomsbury, W.C. 1, London, has been closed. A wartime center has been established at Le Play House, Albert Road, Malvern. Until further notice all communications for the Institute of Sociology, for the Le Play House Press (including the editorial and publishing departments of the *Sociological Review*), and for other organizations associated with Le Play House, Bloomsbury, should be sent to the Malvern address.

The Institute of Sociology is offering a prize of £100 for an essay on the following subject: (1) a critical account of contributions to the sociological and psychological study of propaganda and of its effects and (2)

an attempt to frame hypotheses relating to propaganda and suggestions for further investigations to test the validity of these hypotheses and their practical value. No limit on the length of essays submitted has been fixed, but writers should bear in mind the advantages of a condensed treatment with the possibility of publication in view. Essays should be typewritten, and they should be sent by registered mail to reach the Institute of Sociology not later than July 31, 1940. Envelopes should be marked "Prize Essay." For further information address the general secretary, Institute of Sociology, Le Play House, Albert Road, Malvern.

*Osborne Association.*—Austin H. MacCormick, formerly New York City Correction Commissioner, has been appointed executive director of the Association.

*Russell Sage Foundation.*—Arthur H. Ham, vice-president and executive officer of the Provident Loan Society of New York, has been elected a trustee for a term of three years.

*Columbia University.*—Arthur E. Bestor, Jr., historian, is engaged in the preparation for publication of the original records of Brook Farm and wishes to solicit the aid of librarians, scholars, and collectors in locating manuscripts that may not have come to his attention, particularly letters written from Brook Farm or diaries kept by members of the community. Any material addressed to Dr. Bestor (Box 386, Teachers College) will be promptly returned by registered mail and full acknowledgment will be made in the published volume.

*Cornell University.*—Ralph Linton, Columbia University, delivered a public lecture on November 6 on "Culture and Personality."

*Fordham University.*—The third annual congress sponsored by the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences and held January 27-29 was devoted to the theme "Labor Law: An Instrument for Social Peace and Progress."

*Harvard University.*—During the summer session Clifford Kirkpatrick, University of Minnesota, will offer courses in introductory sociology and social psychology.

*Howard University.*—Kelly Miller, former dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and professor emeritus of sociology, died December 29 at the age of seventy-six. Professor Miller graduated from Howard University in 1886 and received the A.M. and LL.D. degrees from the university in 1901 and 1903. Among his works are *Race Adjustment* (1908) and *Out of the House of Bondage* (1914).

Harry J. Walker, who taught at Fisk University from 1932 to 1937 and did graduate work at the University of Chicago from 1937 to 1939, has been appointed instructor in sociology.

*University of Illinois.*—Florian Znaniecki, recently of the University of Poznan, Poland, and co-author with W. I. Thomas of *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, is visiting professor of sociology for the second semester.

*Louisiana State University.*—Harper and Brothers has published *The Sociology of Rural Life* by T. Lynn Smith.

*University of Michigan.*—Max S. Handman, economist, sociologist, and authority on economic phases of Latin-American problems, died December 26 at the age of fifty-four. Professor Handman came to the United States from Rumania in 1903, received the A.B. degree from the University of Oregon in 1907 and the Ph.D. degree from the University of Chicago in 1917. His academic career included appointments in sociology at the University of Chicago, University of Missouri, and the University of Texas, and in economics at the University of Texas and the University of Michigan. He served on numerous research and study committees, including the United States inquiry on terms of peace in 1918, and made a report on "Nationality and Delinquency: The Mexican in Texas" for the National Commission on Law Observations and Enforcement. Several years ago King Carol conferred upon him knighthood in the Decorated Order of Cultural Merit.

*New York University.*—Modern Age Books has published *Economics in the Million* by Henry Pratt Fairchild.

*Northern Illinois State Teachers College.*—The American Book Company has published *Students' Manual for Introductory Sociology* by Charles E. Howell and Paul Meadows, which follows the outline of Young's *Introductory Sociology* and aims to clarify concepts and to suggest projects and experiments.

*Queens College.*—Kimball Young, University of Wisconsin, who is on a leave of absence this year, in special research for the United States Department of Agriculture, has been appointed professor of sociology. George Simpson, Office of Radio Research, Princeton University, has been appointed instructor of sociology for the current semester.

*Temple University.*—An outlined study of the university's joint course on marriage and family relationship by J. Stewart Burgess has just been

published in mimeographed form. It contains an analysis of this joint undertaking by five departments, the history and development of the course, outlines of lectures, and students' reactions. Also included is a brief description of seventy-three courses given in the American colleges, an extensive bibliography, and a classified list of students' questions. A copy may be secured at cost for seventy cents from J. S. Burgess, Temple University, Philadelphia.

*University of Toronto.*—Under the sponsorship of the departments of political economy and social science, a series of weekly lectures in sociology has just been finished. Among those participating were Robert E. Park, University of Chicago, Robert M. MacIver, Columbia University, Talcott Parsons, Harvard University, C. A. Dawson, McGill University, and C. W. M. Hart, University of Toronto.

*Vanderbilt University.*—McGraw-Hill Book Company has published *Criminal Behavior* by Walter C. Reckless.

*University of Washington.*—William F. Ogburn, University of Chicago, will offer courses during the summer session on "Technology and Social Change," "Future Social Trends," and a graduate seminar on "Methods and Quantitative Sociology." In addition he is to speak before the Fifth Annual Institute of Government, sponsored by the bureau of governmental research of the department of political science, the latter part of July and before the northwest resources and education workshop of the department of education there.

### PERSONAL

Karl Mannheim, lecturer in sociology at the London School of Economics and formerly professor of sociology at the University of Frankfurt-am-Main, arrives in the United States this month and will be available for lectures. Professor Mannheim is the author of many books, the best known of which are *Ideology and Utopia* and *Man and Society*. Further information regarding Professor Mannheim's lectures may be secured from Louis Wirth, University of Chicago.

At a dinner in Washington, December 1, arranged by the Smithsonian Institution, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the *Scientific Monthly*, Julian S. Huxley delivered an address upon lessons which social science can learn from natural science.

The University of Pennsylvania Press has recently published *Tangier Island*, a study of an isolated group, by S. Warren Hall III.

## BOOK REVIEWS

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*Foundations of Sociology.* By GEORGE A. LUNDBERG. New York: Macmillan Co., 1939. Pp. 556. \$3.50.

I am in complete agreement with Professor Lundberg in that the most important need of contemporary sociology is a clarification of its referential principles and methods. Lundberg's book is devoted to this problem and aims to present an "explicit statement of the postulates from which contemporary social science proceeds or of the logic by which generalizations in these sciences are derived" (p. vii). For this reason the book deserves our attention. It merits it doubly for attacking the task from a definite standpoint and with a definite method. His thesis is that sociology must be built along the lines of physics and the exact sciences and must follow their method. If it does so, the result will be an elevation of sociology to the level of the exact sciences, with a "corresponding reward in our power of control." In brief, regardless of my subsequent criticism, the book is a valiant effort to attack one of the most difficult problems of any science without dodging it. As such it teaches us by either its success or its failure. In either case it contributes to our knowledge; therefore it is to be welcomed heartily.

If now we ask: How well does the author succeed in his task? How consistently throughout his work does he carry his *profession du foi* of an enthusiastic partisan of sociology built along the lines of the physico-chemical sciences? How convincingly does he demonstrate the fruitfulness of such a method and the scientific superiority of such a sociology? The answer is in the negative: the book contributes mainly through the failure and not through a successful solution of these problems. It demonstrates, first, that the intended approach is not and cannot be carried through consistently; second, that it is largely fruitless and gives a "mess" instead of a scientific sociology.

Lundberg's failure to carry through his *profession du foi* is demonstrated in many ways; first, in an inadequate knowledge and distortion of the main principles of mechanics, physics, mathematics, and other natural sciences. For instance, his notion of equilibrium (pp. 208 ff.) has hardly anything in common with either D'Alembert's, Lagrange's, Hoff's, Le Chatelier's, Ostwald's, or W. Gibbs's, or any other concept of equilibrium

in mechanics, physics, or chemistry. It is something bizarre, reminding one of the Aristotelian notion of the tendency of the heavy bodies to fall down and of the light bodies to go up—a humorous situation for an author who declares Aristotle antiquated. Lundberg's definitions of time, space, velocity, motion, force, and energy are again different from the clear and excellent definitions of these given in any rational mechanics (see chap. iv *et passim*). His conception of a "system" again has little in common with W. Gibbs's precise definition of a physicochemical system. Lundberg's statements about the nature of mathematical propositions are hardly shared by any prominent mathematicians from Poincaré up to Birkhoff. Lundberg's crudest "electron-proton" ontological metaphysics certainly deviates enormously from the metaphysics of R. Avenarius, E. Mach, H. Poincaré, Duhem, Pearson, M. Planck, and practically any prominent methodologist of the natural sciences of the end of the nineteenth and of the twentieth centuries. In brief, what Lundberg claims to be the concepts and methods of the exact sciences is not their concepts and methods at all. They are but Lundbergian homemade distortions of these. For this reason only, if sociology follows the Lundbergian recommendations it cannot become an exact science or even more exact than it is now.

Second, the failure discussed manifests itself further in a remarkable inconsistency of the author. At the beginning of almost each chapter he parades as *l'enfant terrible* of the "old-fashioned" sociology who condemns it *in toto* and proclaims his intention to build sociology on the same principles and methods on which mechanics and physics are built: to derive it from time-space-force-motion and other referential principles of these disciplines. When, however, one follows what "operationally" Lundberg does in the constructive part of each of these chapters, one is surprised at the remarkable traditionalism of the author: instead of being a revolutionary, he shows himself such a good Rotarian in sociology that even a Dies' committee in sociology cannot doubt his old-fashioned traditionalism and patriotism. All the old-fashioned concepts, principles, classifications, and categories condemned in the opening pages of the chapters are honorably reinstated, without practically the slightest innovation whatsoever (see chaps. v–viii *et passim*). Under the revolutionary heading "Mechanisms of Behavior" one finds the familiar old-fashioned "tropisms, reflexes, habits, folkways, customs, traditions, mores, institutions." So also in other chapters. Such inconsistency and failure to carry through the proclaimed principles are certainly instructive.

The same inconsistency is shown in many other forms. Lundberg declares himself a pure empiricist. In his book, however, there is hardly any



important proposition backed by relevant facts or by any empirical investigation of such facts. Most of the propositions turn out to be purely speculative armchair philosophy. Although unlimited quantitativism is proclaimed loudly, hardly any quantitative data or propositions are given in the whole book. Behaviorism and operationalism are pompously manifested; but little, if anything, of these is found in the whole work. "The non-ethical nature of science" is reiterated, but a series of good sermons is preached throughout the book. Semantic liberation of thought is consistently mutilated by the most unlimited tyranny of words.

This brings us to the next shortcoming of the book: its poor logic dominated indeed by words (as is the case with almost all the semantic liberators from the tyranny of words). In the first chapters of his book the author berates the obsolete character of Aristotelian logic (or what he thinks is Aristotelian logic) and makes a firm stand for the new, non-Aristotelian logic exemplified by such "great logicians" as Stuart Chase, Korzybski, and Co., and by some of the partisans of symbolic logic. How good his "new logic" is can be seen from a few examples. Being a duly registered behaviorist he naturally finds such a term as "fear" reprehensible, and he wants to replace it by a more scientific—"operational and behavioristic"—definition. So the behavior of paper flying before the wind and of a man fleeing in fear from a pursuing crowd are defined as the "behavior of an object of specified characteristics reacting to stimulus of specified characteristics within the specified field of force" (pp. 12-14). Does it not sound scientific? No, it does not. One word "fear" gives to all of us a much better, fuller, and more precise knowledge of the phenomenon designated by the term than the whole "deaf-mute" definition given above. If one did not know that the author was talking of fear, one never could guess it or the behavior of the man fleeing in fear from this perfectly empty definition. Another example: On the one hand, Professor Lundberg states, "All assertions about the ultimate 'reality,' 'nature,' 'essence,' or 'being' of 'things' or 'objects' are unverifiable hypotheses, and hence outside the sphere of science" (p. 9). On the other hand, on the same page he postulates "the responses of organisms-in-environment," "the external world," "symbols," that all phenomena of scientific concern consist of energy transformations within the physical cosmos, and that "the structure of matter (and of behavior) is a function of its electron-proton configuration" (pp. 203-4). So with one hand Lundberg expels all "things," "objects," "essence," "nature," "reality"; with the other he at once reintroduces "electron-proton" (is it not a "thing," "object," or some kind of "reality"?), "matter," "organism," "responses," "symbol,"

and a great deal more: practically everything and any kind of reality and objects dealt with by philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists. He banishes "mind," "thought," "feeling," etc.; and he makes "symbol" and "symbolic response," "symbolic adjustment" to "symbolic stimuli," the fundamental terms in all his discussion. He seems to think that symbol is something more "operational" and "behavioristic" than "meaning" without which, as a matter of fact, the term "symbol" cannot have any meaning. On pages 203 and 204 he states that energy and its transformations are what all phenomena, all motions and changes, consist of. On page 205 he asserts that "energy is not an entity, or an attribute of substance, but a name for the amounts of changes in relationships." These two statements are hardly reconcilable. When further I put operationally this second definition of energy into his statement, "the conversion of energy into human behavior takes place through the well-known metabolic process of combustion of fuel," or into the statement; "a person may dissipate a given amount of energy in chaotic movements," I receive: "a person may dissipate an amount of change in relationship in chaotic movements" or "the conversion of amount of changes in relationship into human behavior takes place," etc. I confess this does not make any sense. Frankly, I prefer decisively the allegedly antiquated Aristotelian logic.

These remarks show why I regard the work a failure, either in carrying its principles through or in showing the fruitfulness of the method proclaimed. The fault is not, however, Lundberg's. It is the fault of the way and method he chose. Anybody who has done that, from all the representatives of the Mechanistic School up to Pareto and P. W. Bridgman (in his *The Intelligent Individual and Society*) similarly were swamped in a similar maze of blunders and inconsistencies. Since Lundberg unfortunately started along this road of a distortional imitation of the natural sciences he could not escape being caught by the consequences of such a position. I am in complete sympathy with the brave effort he undertook, but the solution of the problem of systematization of the referential principles of sociology lies along quite a different road from that chosen by Professor Lundberg.

PITIRIM A. SOROKIN

*Harvard University*

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*The Negro Family in the United States.* By E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939. Pp. xxxii+686. \$4.00.

The American Negro population provides an opportunity for fundamental scientific study that is not excelled, probably not equaled, by any

other group in the modern world. The population is sufficiently large to provide an abundance of primary data and is near at hand, and the materials are easily accessible. Students, however, have been slow to profit by the situation. There have been innumerable publications on the Negro and the Negro problem, but, with the exceptions of a few scattered papers and monographs, the Negro materials have been little used in serious social analysis.

The unique value of the Negro people as a sociological laboratory is an accident of historic circumstance. They were brought to America in small consignments from many parts of the African continent and over a long period of time. In the course of capture, importation, and enslavement they lost every vestige of the African culture. The native languages disappeared immediately and so completely that scarcely a word of African origin found its way into English, owing to the dispersion, to the accidental or intentional separation of tribal stocks, and to the suppression of religious exercises. The supernatural beliefs and practices completely disappeared; the native forms of family life and the codes and customs of sex control were destroyed by the circumstances of slave life; and procreation and the relations of the sexes were reduced to a simple and primitive level, so with every element of the social heritage.

In the circumstances the Negro people were very close to a cultureless level. During the long period of their slavery the more unfortunately placed groups were kept at the status of work animals. To all intents and purposes their assimilation had its beginnings after the destruction of the institution of slavery. But slavery was not everywhere the same. In the areas where slaves were few and the master-slave relationship was mild and personal, the Negroes came easily and early into possession of the white culture heritage. On the physical side the extensive cross-mating with the whites and Indians increased the biological heterogeneity of the racial stock.

Almost from the beginning, therefore, and increasingly with the succession of generations, the Negro population has been biologically and culturally differentiated. At the one extreme are individuals culturally, and often racially, indistinguishable from the members of the intellectual and pampered white classes; at the other extreme are individuals little removed from the primitive level. The population presents a cultural continuum from the most simple to the most sophisticated and a color graduation from the black to the white.

In this population, if anywhere, it is possible to define and validate empirically the natural history of human culture and social organization.

What must elsewhere be reconstructed from historical records and remains, or be speculatively inferred from statistical analyses, may here be observed in the course of growth and change.

Professor Frazier's volume is limited to the study of a single institution—the Negro family in the United States—which he seeks to define and understand as an inevitable development from, and an expression of, the social and cultural factors operating in the American situation. The initial chapter sketches the transplantation of the Negro from Africa to America and the complete loss of the African heritage. The second shows the beginning and differentiation of Negro personality in America in the association with fellow-bondsmen and differential assimilation into the white household. Chapters iii and iv present the slave woman as the mother of her own children, the foster-parent of the master's children, and as the mother of her own and her master's mulatto offspring. In the chapters in Part II, "In the House of the Mother," "Dr. Frazier describes a pattern of familial human relations more primordial and more 'natural' in the sense of being less influenced by convention and tradition than those of any so-called 'primitive' peoples studied by the anthropologist" (p. x). The four chapters in Part III, entitled "In the House of the Father," show the decline of the early Negro matriarchate and its partial displacement by the more definitely paternal types of family organization. It was only with freedom, male ownership of property, and the economic subordination of women that the Negro family achieved an institutional form that incorporated the father as an integral part of the structure. The somewhat divergent development of family life and organization of the free Negroes and mulattoes is described in a separate chapter, as are the "Racial Islands" (isolated communities of mixed Indian, Negro, and white ancestry) and the "Black Puritans" (small and scattered Negro and mulatto elements of the population that have maintained a stable family life and conformed strictly to the conventional family norms). In Part IV, "The City of Destruction," the author presents the migration and urbanization of Negro people in relation to family disintegration and individual and personal demoralization. The final part of the volume describes the current trends in Negro family life and organizations that result from urbanization, occupational differentiation, and the clash of standards and traditions.

With complete objectivity and with a mass of concrete material Dr. Frazier has described and analyzed the various social and cultural situations in which Negroes have moved, and with equal care and insight he has recorded the Negroes' adjustment to the environing conditions. With-

out at any point forcing the historical data into a preconceived framework, he shows how the diverse types of sex behavior and family relationships are expressions of the social situations in which they flourish.

Three appendixes, occupying nearly one-third of the volume, present a carefully selected group of family-history documents, a series of supplementary statistical tables, and a classified bibliography.

As a full-bodied monograph on the Negro family in the United States, Mr. Frazier's study is alone in the field. But the volume is more than a description of the Negro family; it is, though largely by implication, a natural history of the family institution. This contribution is explicitly recognized in the Editor's Preface.

It is in periods when institutions and persons are most subject to the vicissitudes of social change and when disorganization and reorganization are taking place that the dynamic motivations of conduct become clear since they are less complicated by surface and secondary factors. Accordingly, this natural history of the Negro family not only differentiates types of families but also makes possible generalization about the family in general [p. xi].

The analysis of the Negro family as such necessitated the incidental presentation of a wealth of material on other aspects of Negro life and social organization and on the relationships of the races in America. The volume is, in consequence, of real and permanent value to all students of race relations, not only to those concerned with family research.

From the point of view of scientific procedure in sociological research, the volume is a model of excellence. It exemplifies a method of research that leads to valid generalization and opens the door to new problems and further research. It is an important volume—one of the very few significant sociological publications of the decade.

E. B. REUTER

*University of Iowa*

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*The American Race Problem.* By E. B. REUTER. Rev. ed. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., 1939. Pp. xiii+430. \$3.00.

This is a revision of Dr. Reuter's well-known and popular textbook on the Negro in the United States. It has been entirely reset, increased nearly 20 per cent in content, and in many cases has had its statistical data brought up to date. The Preface to the second edition makes plain the nature of the changes:

A new chapter on the background of the present day race relations has been added; the previous chapter on the accommodation and assimilation of the Negroes in the American situation has been expanded into separate chapters on

accommodation and assimilation. Various minor verbal changes designed to clarify the presentation have been made throughout the volume. But there have been no developments in racial research in the recent years that necessitate any major shift in the position occupied.

This last sentence brings up the reader sharply. For surely there is no more dynamic aspect of American life than that which deals with the stresses that have developed between various groups in our population, and of these stresses none are more kaleidoscopic than those which arise out of the tensions between Negroes and whites. Is it possible that students actively concerned with research into such a situation all stand on the same position they took in 1937? Have "no developments" in method or point of view resulted from the enormous number of studies on every phase of Negro life and Negro-white relations that have been published during this period?

Has Dr. Reuter not heard of the position of those sociologists who, led by Young, regard the study of the Negro as but one aspect of research into the general problem of American minority groups? Does Dr. Reuter really believe that his fifty-word discussion of the interracial commissions (p. 411), carried over intact from the 1927 edition, represents all that is to be said of these groups today? Has Dr. Reuter not discovered that new techniques of psychological testing have been developed in the last ten years which show with far more clarity than was possible in 1927 the invalidity of tests of "racial intelligence" (pp. 72 ff.)? Should not students of the Negro, using Dr. Reuter's text, at least have some of these studies described rather than be left with the 1927 commentary on the Army tests as their sole guide to the problem of assessing racial differences; should they not, for example, find in their reference list (p. 85) a citation to Brigham's important retraction of his position as well as its original statement? Is Dr. Reuter totally unfamiliar with the ethnological and historical works that, appearing since 1927, have made for a drastic revision of concepts as to the complexity of the West African cultures marking the societies from which slaves were principally drawn? Certainly there is little reason for a scholar, writing a textbook wherein the historical background of the American Negro is presumably to be discussed, to plead that "scientific and dependable studies are mainly local and of somewhat limited tribal application" (p. 199). That these ethnographic data, or the rich store of historical documents that have been published, for example, in Miss Donnan's magnificent monograph on the slave trade, have not as yet been predigested cannot condone the perpetuation of the vicious caricature offered of the cultural endowment of

the African ancestors of New World Negroes, something which the authority of this textbook must reinforce in the minds of the students who use it.

Other instances of the disregard of recent developments in the field which this book treats might be given—new concepts in psychology, history, and anthropology, or new techniques and theories of race relations—that to an even greater degree than indicated here invalidate the claim made in the last sentence of the Preface to this “revised” edition. But, if this were not enough, we also find that data on which the conclusions rest are full of lacunae. Imagine, if one can, writing in 1938 of the Negro worker and failing to mention the interracial policy of the C.I.O.! Or imagine writing of Negro farm tenancy in 1938 and failing to mention the movement to organize the share-croppers into unions whose membership disregards the historic color line! Is it fair to students using this book to repeat the dictum of ten years ago that, as regards Negro education, “the institutions of secondary, normal and college grade, with but few exceptions, carry on work of inferior quality” (p. 292) while failing to make these exceptions explicit so as to indicate the distinction that has been attained just during this past decade by Howard, by Fisk, by Atlanta, by Dillard? Should it not be recorded that in the last ten years it has been suspected that the 1920 census figures for proportion of full-blood and mixed Negroes are subject to revision (pp. 52–57)? Is it defensible, in discussing the free Negroes, to omit all mention, in text and bibliography, of the painstaking work of C. G. Woodson and of the long series of studies in the *Journal of Negro History* on the subject?

The list of omissions, misinterpretations, and misstatements continues. I do not know of anyone, any more, who holds that Negro songs are “America’s only indigenous music” (p. 303). All our folk music is derivative; the current controversy regarding Negro songs that has developed in the last ten years concerns only the extent to which they are African, or European, or a blend of these. Erskine Caldwell and William March are only two of the writers not mentioned when “recent attempts to treat the Negro seriously as literary material” are presumably assessed. Do the words of the 1927 edition, repeated unchanged (p. 297), refer to these writers: “Unfortunately, most of these efforts do not rank high when evaluated as literature”? Evaluated by whom? Is it not unfortunate that the name of Sterling Brown is omitted from the list of Negro poets (p. 301)? James Weldon Johnson’s outstanding autobiography is not named in a section given to Negro biography (p. 299); neither Arna Bontemps nor Richard Wright, the literary merit and vigor of whose

stories and novels have earned high critical praise and substantial scholarship recognition, is included in the section dealing with Negro writers (p. 302).

In the chapter entitled "The Growth of Race Consciousness" one finds almost no word that was not there ten years ago. There is no mention, for example, of the recent Communist party "line" regarding the future of the American Negro as exemplified by James Allen's book—which, whatever its merits or lack of merit, has been widely discussed. No race conflicts are cited as having occurred during the last ten years—but should not the student know that the riots of East St. Louis and Chicago and Washington have been continued in the serious disturbances, for example, in Harlem? The figure for N.A.A.C.P. membership of 1916 is repeated intact from the earlier edition (pp. 412-13)—and this is cited without any later figures, merely to show that this organization "had a small membership during the first two decades of its existence." Is not the only conclusion the student can draw that militant attempts by Negroes to help themselves are to be dismissed as of no consequence?

It is apparent that this book has been so carelessly "revised" that it must be regarded as inadequate for serious teaching purposes. Perhaps this carelessness is why it so impresses one as a work of confusion, the more regrettable since confusion in a textbook is disastrous. How can one reconcile, for instance, the statements regarding the docility of the Negroes under slavery (pp. 111-12) with the discussion of slave revolts and slave discontent given a few pages later (pp. 115-16)? No one can deny that Dr. Reuter is well intentioned; his categorical assertions of the unproved nature of theories of racial inferiority demonstrate this clearly. Yet I know of no work wherein a more positive and persuasive presentation is given those assumptions which, in unrecognized form, underlie racial prejudice in this country. If the cultural background of Negroes can be shown to be that of the savages and this background can also be shown to have been so weak that it at once gave way before the impact of European civilization, this mere fact must inflate the ego of the members of the dominant element in our population and confirm current beliefs regarding Negro insufficiency. That was why, earlier in this review, the caricature-like nature of Dr. Reuter's discussions of African culture was stressed. That he apparently does not realize either how unjustified is the picture he draws or how broad and unfortunate are the implications of such false descriptions only makes the matter the more disturbing.

MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS

*Northwestern University*



*Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage.* By E. W. BURGESS and LEONARD S. COTTRELL, JR. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939. Pp. xxiii+472. \$3.25.

It is only about a decade ago that the senior author of this model monograph presented his pioneer paper on the possibility of applying actuarial methods in the prediction of success or failure of parole. The suggestion at once created deserved and widespread interest and was followed by a large number of attempts to apply the technique to various other problems, principally in the field of criminology. In the present monograph Professors Burgess and Cottrell further vindicate in a striking manner an approach which is in its broader aspects perhaps the most important yet developed in sociology. They turn their backs upon a whole list of obsolete and irrelevant academic questions about social research and proceed with the serious business which every science faces, namely: (a) a careful inquiry into the conditions under which stated events occur; (b) the correlation of these conditions with variations in the given events; and (c) a statement of the probability of given events under stated conditions.

These authors did not, for example, feel constrained to answer in advance such questions as (a) what is the "real nature" of human happiness; (b) whether it can be measured; (c) whether people who say they are happy, and who behave as if they were happy, "really are" happy. Instead, the authors secured from 526 couples of young, preponderantly nonneurotic, middle-class, native-white, urban Americans their own estimate of the degree of their marital adjustment as represented by their own meaning of the word "happiness" (checked and corroborated in various ways). Second, the authors devoted themselves to finding what factors present at the time of marriage are significantly associated with stated degrees of success of the marriage. From these data, results for the 526 couples are given and conclusions are drawn as to the possibility of devising a method of predicting before marriage the probability of its outcome in marital happiness or unhappiness.

Some of the results of the study, especially as regards the couples studied, are already quite widely known through previous partial reports in scientific journals and in the press. For this reason, and also because I believe that these data, although of great interest, are nevertheless the least important contribution of the study, I shall not here attempt any review of the results. Stated as they are in terms of degrees and with many reservations, any brief summary of the results would be likely to misrepresent the findings. I hesitate, for the same reason, to attempt a

summary of the very large number of factors considered and the very careful methods employed. These can be appreciated only through a reading of the whole book. Incidentally, it is one of the most readable research monographs I have ever seen—a great triumph in this respect alone. All questions of sampling and analysis of the data, furthermore, have been so thoroughly considered and so competently handled that there is also in this respect no occasion for discussion except possibly to point out that here the true relationship between case studies and statistical methods including partial correlation and factor analysis is exhibited. All these methods are utilized with rare discrimination. The general unreliability of the practical conclusions, in view of the small and circumscribed sample and subsamples upon which most of the results rest will be apparent to everyone. But the authors have so carefully qualified all their statements of conclusions and so fully recognized the limitations of the study at all points that there is no occasion for the reviewer to elaborate upon these subjects. In short, the whole study has been conducted with such competence as to leave no occasion for criticism even of details.

The major immediate importance of this monograph lies in its demonstration of the applicability of actuarial methods to a field and to a set of questions which until recently have quite generally been regarded as approachable only by intuitive “insights” and “understandings” of poets, priests, psychoanalysts, novelists, newspaper women, philosopher-aesthetes and other plumbers of the human heart. The methods exhibited in this monograph, if comprehensively carried out, would unquestionably throw more scientific light on the conditions determining marital happiness than all the existing “literature” on the subject. That is important. But the by-products of this type of study, when extensively carried out, in the way of yielding systematic knowledge of the conditions that determine attraction and repulsions in human relations in general, are likely to be far more important. This will become all the more true as marriage becomes an “informal personal affair with less and less traditional control” (p. 10). Finally, and above all, the application of this method of approach to other fields should be strongly stimulated by this brilliant example.

The book concludes with a well-warranted appeal for the establishment of an institute for conducting similar research systematically, continuously, and in an integrated fashion. The inadequacy of present sporadic, noncomparable, and haphazard research in sociology, however brilliant may be the individual contributions, should be clear to everyone. If a small fraction of the funds now squandered on “surveys” could be

sequestered for systematic research which would yield cumulative results both in contents and in methods, sociology could be advanced more in one generation than in three hundred years by present procedures.

As a model of clearness and completeness in definition of the problem, discrimination in the use of all relevant methods, and lucidity in exposition of methods and results, this monograph deserves the respectful attention of all students and researchers. The book will stand for a long time as a bench mark of competent research in sociology.

GEORGE A. LUNDBERG

*Bennington College*

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*Scientific Social Surveys and Research.* By PAULINE V. YOUNG (with chapters by CALVIN F. SCHMID). New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939. Pp. xxix+619. \$3.00.

The growing predilection among sociologists for working with data and the demands made upon them for objective research and surveys have given rise to more and more courses in research techniques. It is unfortunate, therefore, that Dr. Young's presentation of this timely subject is confused and gives evidence of hurried preparation.

To the reviewer it appears that scientific sociology has emerged from exploratory case analyses followed by quantitative studies of association. The procedures in these two types of investigation differ at fundamental points. The investigator making a case study begins with a general hypothesis or hunch, selects a few cases which he hopes are typical, collects all the information he can find, and finally develops from the data which appear relevant types or classes and further hypotheses or tentative generalizations concerning interrelationships of the characteristics of the phenomena under observation. The investigator who employs the quantitative method, however, begins by limiting his problem with a specific hypothesis, defines his terms and classes in advance, and, finally, collects and analyzes only those data called for by the restricted hypothesis. His conclusions have predictive value because he obtains a known sample of the universe, because he defines his terms objectively, because he employs control groups and other devices for holding certain factors constant, and, finally, because he measures the degree of association between variables.

Dr. Young seems to have a vague awareness of the latter rigid procedure of natural science but fails to recognize that qualitative and quantitative analysis represent different procedures and that they lead to different ends. In chapter iii she outlines the steps in natural science

research, quoting appropriately from Lundberg, Westaway, Pearson, Poincaré, and others. Yet in every subsequent treatment of the subject of data collection it is assumed that the student will proceed in accordance with case-study technique and assemble all the information on which he can lay his hands. In the same chapter she paraphrases others to the effect that the problem is stated and the units and classes defined as the initial phase of research, but in her last chapter she advises the student that the preparation of an outline and the development of classes will take place after the data are at hand—again the essence of the case-study method.

Part II of the book, devoted to techniques and methods of social research, includes chapters on the case-study and historical methods. There is no chapter on the statistical method as a scientific procedure, although there is one which identifies certain statistical concepts. In this chapter its author, Dr. Schmid, is permitted to say that "the development of any science is marked by the extent to which exact quantitative data and techniques have superseded mere speculation and qualitative impressions." Dr. Young's impression of statistics is that its only usefulness lies in exploration leading to identification of areas in which case studies are required. Nowhere is it pointed out what the statistician does with such data once they are at hand. The whole chapter on the case study (chap. x) is written from the viewpoint of one who feels that he has something which requires defense; indeed, part of the chapter is an outspoken defense of the case-study procedure as a device for reaching scientific generalizations.

The lack of maturity of thought evident in this treatment crops up also in other places. In chapter iii the author states that clarity of definition is a scientific requisite and then undertakes to differentiate social survey, social research, and social investigation. The distinction between survey and research is excellent, but the definition of social investigation is almost the equivalent of that of social survey (pp. 56-57). Several other terms, as "social discovery," "social exploration," and "social inquiry," are mentioned, but there is no effort to define them, although the author indicates that they overlap one another. Similarly, the case-study and the historical methods are treated separately. Yet the definitions given on pages 207-8 and 230 appear to be practically identical in meaning and, sometimes, even in wording.

Although the section on methods and techniques is obviously the most important part of the book no distinction is made between method as a collection of techniques used in research and technique as a specific way

of obtaining, evaluating, or analyzing data. Use of the term "method" is further confused by inclusion of a chapter on "The Ecological Method," thereby placing ecology in the category of a method along with the case-study and historical methods. This is probably an oversight, however, for there are no chapters on the social psychological or the cultural methods.

On pages 122 and 128 Dr. Young states that note-taking is an instrument of controlled observation, and by implication, at least, she indicates that absence of note-taking characterizes uncontrolled observation. Yet as examples of uncontrolled observation she mentions Anderson's *The Hobo* and the Lynds' *Middletown*. In connection with her discussion of methods of controlled observation no mention whatever is made of the painstaking studies of Dorothy Thomas and of others using highly developed techniques in the observation of the behavior of children.

The care with which scientific classification must proceed is discussed on page 68, on pages 512 through 518, and elsewhere. Yet in no place, is there any mention of the principles of definition, of the problem of mutual exclusiveness, of the optimum number of categories, of the proper disposition of unknown cases and of the scattering of cases which do not fit into major categories. All these problems are of vast importance to anyone actually doing research.

The rules for interviewing which are given in chapter vii are well stated and indicate that the author has had extensive experience in the use of this technique. In contrast with this chapter the discussion on the use of the schedule, the questionnaire, and direct observation are extremely superficial. No mention whatever is made of data recorded by means of registration as a source of material for research.

The chapter on statistical techniques prepared by Calvin Schmid is clear and concise. It is so concise that the reviewer feels that it would better have been omitted. A beginning student can scarcely be expected to acquire much from a sixty-page treatment of material ordinarily covered in a two-semester course. Chapters vii and viii contain many ideas for research papers on community problems; presumably these will be stimulating for undergraduate and even graduate students. The bibliography at the end of the book is second to none which the reviewer has seen on this subject. It appears to contain practically all the important references, and they are usefully classified. There is at least one indication, however, that the selection has not been particularly careful. Pages 569-70 contain a list of references purporting to be examples of scientific and literary case studies. Some of these examples are neither scientific

studies nor literary studies but analyses of cases from the therapeutic viewpoint. Indeed only four of the twenty-three studies listed appear to be scientific case studies in the sense that attempts are made to generalize from them. The reviewer can testify to the difficulty of finding case studies in which an attempt is made at generalization.

The conclusion must be, as was indicated above, that the author has grasped the tail of something which she does not fully comprehend, that had she restricted the book to a discussion of the case-study method she might well have made a contribution, but that, in trying to apply the procedure of statistics to case analysis and that in trying to do it all in a hurry, she leaves the student in a more confused state than he was in before he encountered the book.

CLARK TIBBITTS

*University of Michigan*

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*Black Folk—Then and Now.* By W. E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1939. Pp. ix+401. \$3.50.

Because of his vigorous and stimulating style of writing and his long and well-established reputation for scholarship, secured chiefly from his studies of the history and culture of Negroes and Negroids, anything which Dr. du Bois has to say about black folk is certain to be worthy of careful consideration. This work will not disappoint in that respect.

Although there is an excellent section on the origin of Negroes and Negroids and the cultural history of ancient Africa, major emphasis is laid upon the history and present status of attempts to Europeanize and exploit black folk—especially in Africa. Some consideration is also given to other areas such as the West Indies, South and Central America, and the United States, where culture contacts between black and white peoples have given rise to race problems. The latter half of the book dealing with land policies in Africa, the African laborer, political control of Africa, and education in Africa consists of a topical discussion of these social phases in each of the African colonies, mandates, and protectorates.

The author's main thesis is that the goal of industrial democracy toward which the masses of white laborers in Europe and America are striving must include not simply Europe, but black Europe—that is Europe in Africa—for "The proletariat of the world consists not simply of white European and American workers but overwhelmingly of the dark workers of Asia, Africa, the islands of the sea, and South and Central America."

Twenty-six years ago Dr. du Bois began one of his books with a statement that the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line. That statement concludes his present book.

CHARLES S. JOHNSON

*Fisk University*

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*The Mennonites in Iowa.* By MELVIN GINGERICH. Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1939. Pp. 419. \$3.00.

This book which marks the hundredth anniversary of the coming of the Mennonites to Iowa adds another volume to the rapidly growing literature on sects in the United States which has been contributed by the various state historical societies. Like other volumes of its type, it presents a mass of historical and descriptive material upon which the sociologist may draw for an understanding of the sectarian process as it works to produce, on the one hand, "these small islands of distinctive culture in a sea of standardized American civilization" (p. 7), and, on the other, personality types just as distinctive. Unlike most of the other books on sects, however, this one has been written by a Mennonite, himself a member of one of the eight Iowa Mennonite communities he describes. Although one looks in vain for a hint of that appreciation of a peculiar inheritance which pervades such a book as *My Father's House* by John Humphrey Noyes, at the same time there are accounts of documents, letters, and historical episodes which help to illuminate the inner working of a sect as well as to give an accurate historical account of its institutional features and the changes occurring within them which would scarcely have been available to a nonmember of the group. The author first locates the followers of Menno Simon historically in Europe as a part of the Anabaptist movement and describes the Amish schism over "shunning." Incidental references to continuing conflict with the world over sectarian principles and disruptive tensions within the group over matters of church doctrine add interest to the rather prosaic historical account of each of the Mennonite congregations in Iowa. General descriptive chapters on religious and social customs follow, the best organized of these being the one on the relation between church and state. Besides furnishing good source material for the study of social movements, the book preserves for the four thousand Mennonites in Iowa a history of a hundred years of faith and fortitude.

GRACE E. CHAFFEE

*State University of Iowa*

*Introduction to the Study of Public Administration.* By LEONARD D. WHITE. Rev. ed. New York: Macmillan Co., 1939. Pp. xiii+611. \$4.00.

Public administration as a distinct area of intellectual concern has emerged from its swaddling clothes, if the mixed metaphor be allowed; and the present author has contributed substantially to the maturing process. In this, the revision of a definitive text first issued in 1926, Professor White demarks, defines, and philosophizes upon the concept and fact of administration in all its protean forms in municipal, county, state, and federal governance.

Here we have what is at once a science and an art with phases related to operative process as such and to operating staffs in their roles as persons—members—of both a democracy and an administrative arm of that democracy. And the dual phases are here clearly elaborated and the margin of unsolved problems posed. As befits a textbook, no one topic is emphasized out of scale; yet the total view attained is highly significant in both the detail supplied and the statesmanly grasp of the problem posed.

It is to be hoped that the volume will accelerate study, at the college level, of the meaning and value of the administrative process. For these United States have suffered unconscionably from the pioneering notion that administration in all its necessary elaboration is a necessary evil and a fussy, mechanical expertizing of relatively simple relationships. The opposite is of course true, as Professor White so competently shows. Indeed the truth that a modern, large-scale democracy literally stands or falls by the success of its administrative skill, both in its inner integrity and by that token in satisfactions it can yield to its members, is one that has to be persuasively disseminated. It is a truth that promising young people have to be trained to carry into effect—a truth that citizens have to be taught is worth paying the price. Finally, it is a truth which requires far more research as to its ways and means than has thus far been done.

On all of these counts this book performs an indispensable service. It stands as a comprehensive introduction, realistic yet idealistic, democratic in flavor yet efficacious in the procedures set forth. It might easily have been more hortatory. The fact, as sloganized by the English civil servants' organization, that all public employees may proudly say, "We Serve the State," offers a patent appeal for forensics. But temperate and factual as the author is, he succeeds in suggesting the size and the dignity of the emotional appeal of the task he so well describes. The modern state



is a service institution, and the management of that service has become a major industry and a major social duty. This book tells why and shows how.

ORDWAY TEAD

*New York City*

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*Watling: A Survey of Social Life on a New Housing Estate.* By RUTH DURANT. London: P. S. King, 1939. \$2.00.

Although European housing experience has been extensively studied as an aid in the planning and construction of American housing enterprises, there has been little attempt at appraisal of the social experience of those who have exchanged their old dwellings for residence in a new housing project. The social effects, needs, and problems of the communities created through the construction of housing projects are little known.

This study of the British housing estate of Watling thus comes with special interest to American students of social relationships and community institutions. There are, of course, certain aspects of the British housing problem which distinguish their developments from the American, e.g., the greater sharpness of British class lines, the assumption of greater permanence of residence, the relative absence of automobiles, the differences in employment practices and opportunities, and the greater ethnic homogeneity of the population. The Watling housing estate, moreover, has distinctive characteristics of its own. It is a large community of twenty thousand, located within a middle-class area that is in the process of being transformed into a residential and industrial suburb. But many of the considerations in this study are entirely relevant to other projects in the United States as well as in England.

This study has as its central interest the question of the type of social organization and social life that is developing at Watling. It uses two quite different points of focus: first, the question of whether the estate is developing into a "community"; second, the question of what is the specific role of the community center in the life of the project. As the author notes in the Preface, these two questions led to inquiries on two quite different planes.

The analysis of Watling raises a number of questions with respect to the social aspects of housing projects. Should the projects be so designed as to permit continuous residence in the project after the conditions laid down for admission have changed for the individual family? At Watling, old people whose children had grown up and moved away had to leave, for there were no smaller quarters to house them and they were not per-

mitted to take lodgers to share the rent. Married children could not settle on the project because there were no apartments suitable for them. Should a housing project constitute an entity in itself or be integrated socially and institutionally with the surrounding territory? Watling is in more than one political jurisdiction, Watling children share schools on and off the project with children from outside, and parish lines do not coincide with project lines. Some of the implications of these facts are explored for Watling and, by inference, the relative desirability of this as against the alternative of institutional boundaries coinciding with those of the project. What facilities and social services should be established on the project, and how soon after its initiation? By focusing specific inquiry on the community center which came as a late development after trends growing out of the early absence of such a center had developed, this study brings out the importance of timing in the relation between settlement and the provision of facilities for institutional development. By considering life on the project from the point of view of different age groups, the respects in which institutional arrangements serve certain groups well but fail to meet the needs of others, particularly adolescents, are brought out. The study as a whole will prove very suggestive to those concerned with the social aspects of the development of new communities in America.

CAROLINE F. WARE

*American University*

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*Methods of Statistical Analysis.* By C. H. GOULDEN. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1939. Pp. vii+277. \$3.50.

Two facts are seldom recognized by teachers of statistics and writers of statistical texts—the different nature of sampling in experimental and observational data and the different methodological needs of the experimentalist in contrast to the consumer of routine statistical data.

The author of the present volume, a competent research technician, recognizes this difference by directing his presentation essentially toward those who can experiment. Further, he writes only for those with previous statistical training. His book is, therefore, unsuited for most social and economic statisticians but is of value to biometrists, to anthropometrists, to some psychologists, and in particular to agronomists.

Since the author is essentially a disciple of R. A. Fisher, the volume is an attempt to present the theories and techniques of that great statistician in a form suited for classroom needs. It is a briefing and rearranging of the materials of the two works of Fisher, synthesized with the publications of Snedecor and other of Fisher's followers.

It should be a fair guide to these other volumes and a helpful handbook for certain procedures. The text lacks the detail and definition essential to clarity. Many of the problems are all too lacking in explanation for any but experienced readers of statistics. The tables appended are quite inadequate for the scope of the text.

FRANK ALEXANDER ROSS

*Syracuse University*

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*American Social Problems.* By HOWARD W. ODUM. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1939. Pp. vii+549. \$3.00.

Professor Odum's distinctive contribution in this book rests with the fact that he has dared to defy the "mores for the writing of social problems texts." He has made a pioneer effort to meet the need for a fresh, realistic interpretation of the phenomena which we call social problems.

The author breaks with the stereotyped presentation of other books on the subject in the following respects: (1) He does not clutter up his pages with the customary abstractions concerning social disorganization, cultural lag, social control, conflict, etc. His emphasis is not concept rehashing or concept manufacturing; rather, it is the American people and their behavior, their social values and philosophies, their aspirations and defeatisms. (2) Such theoretical interpretation as the work does contain suggests a new and important approach to social problems. For instance, Professor Odum does not assume that all that is necessary in the solution of social problems is an objective appraisal of the facts. (This he calls the "scientific" phase of the social problem.) He does recognize that solutions involve the manipulation of the attitudes and philosophies which people take toward such facts. (This he calls the "ameliorative" phase of the social problem.) He proposes that we attempt an answer to certain key questions: First, what are the facts? Second, what of it? Third, what to do about it? Fourth, what will happen if we do what about it?

He holds that if we are to come to realistic grips with social problems we must analyze not only the phenomena which constitute the scientific facts involved, e.g., Are Negroes as a race biologically inferior to whites? Do Jews have a corner on the American banking system? We must also analyze the value judgments which people make about the "supposed" or "apparent" facts. And after the scientist has given the people and their political representatives the scientific facts, what then are they going to do about the situation?

The only regret the reviewer has is that Professor Odum seems to have "tacked on" this important theoretical analysis to the rest of his book

after most of it is completed. It could well have been made the frame of reference for the earlier descriptive and factual chapters of the volume.

From a technical standpoint the book is interestingly put together. In the mechanics of illustration, full-page statistical pictures are used which supplement suggestive photographic presentations. This adds to the readability of the work, although the reviewer does not feel so charitably inclined toward the exclusion of footnote references from the body of the book and their relegation to the final pages.

RICHARD C. FULLER

*University of Michigan*

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*Styles in Crime.* By CHARLES E. STILL. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1938. Pp. 366. \$3.00.

This is an anecdotal account by an old-time New York police reporter of the highlights of organized crime and racketeering in New York since it was a colony of the Dutch. A mention of some of the chapter headings serves to illustrate the author's purpose: "Sixth Avenue Tougher than the Bowery," "The Haymarket Dance Hall," "Badger Game," "The Sawdust Game," "Horse Poisoning and Horse Trading," "Sam Parks—Labor Graft," "Stock Swindlers," "The Policy or Numbers Racket," "Politicians," "Colorful Characters," etc.

Going back through the files of the *New York Sun*, and on the basis of his many years of experience as a reporter and editor, Mr. Still gives a popular account, with names, dates, and places, of the alliance between gangs, the police, and politicians. One finds a vivid description of the changes in modes of criminal operation with changes in the technology of urban life. Horse-poisoning of the cable-car nineties turns to highjacking of the twenties; the rope, knife, garrot, and slit gullet of pre-Civil War days are soon displaced by the bullet, with the invention of the Colt revolver. With increased knowledge of chemistry, poison murders begin to spread beyond quinine and jalap. With the World War comes the widespread gang use of the Tommy Gun. The "green goods" games have given way to the numbers racket. The "dip" and "peterman" have been largely displaced by other argot among groups of pickpockets and burglars. In short, this easy-reading book shows how criminal methods have changed with changes in types of weapons, and how criminal neighborhoods and criminal types have changed with the growth of the city and with changes in methods of punishment and law enforcement.

NATHAN BODIN

*Chicago*

*A History of Criminal Syndicalism Legislation in the United States.* By ELDRIDGE FOSTER DOWELL. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1939. Pp. 176. \$1.50.

This is a fully documented, thought-provoking study of a type of legislation which swept through the United States after the World War. It relates to punitive measures placed on the statute books of twenty-three states, mainly in 1919 and 1920—medicine prescribed after the illness. These laws were stimulated by pressure from the press and aimed at the suppression of the Industrial Workers of the World and the alleged sabotage tactics of the I.W.W. The most pertinent features of the study include: (1) role of the press in stirring public opinion; (2) manipulation of the press by industrialists; (3) exploitation of red-baiting hysteria by the politicians; (4) phrasing of the laws to injure other labor groups than those ostensibly aimed at; and (5) later difficulties that arise when these laws are applied to situations not embraced by the original purpose of these laws.

NELS ANDERSON

*Section on Labor Relations*  
*Works Progress Administration*  
*Washington, D.C.*

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*New Horizons for the Family.* By UNA BERNARD SAIT. New York: Macmillan Co., 1938. Pp. xiii+772. \$4.00.

The author, recognizing the close relation of family patterns to economic stages and social organization, draws heavily on the data supplied by cultural anthropology. The second division of the book includes several chapters dealing with education and child welfare—material of value but more closely related to social work than to problems of the family.

The changing status of women is fundamental to the author's philosophy of family organization. The present problem is the "coordination of women's new interests and new opportunities for self-fulfilment and social service with their enduring functions as wives and mothers." Involved are such problems as careers for women, equal pay for equal work, and part-time work—subjects which require careful study and attention. In reviewing the changing rights of women abroad, the author speaks of Germany and Italy as states organized primarily for military purposes. In other respects, however, the discussion is well balanced.

The book deals with most of the subjects usually discussed in texts of this type, but gives sparse attention to prerequisites for successful mar-

riage, to desertion, to family allowance, to medical certification for marriage, and to companionate marriage. The broad philosophy presented is helpful and constructive and will enhance the value of the book as a text.

GEORGE B. MANGOLD

*University of Southern California*

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*The Family Meets the Depression: A Study of a Group of Highly Selected Families.* By WINONA L. MORGAN. ("Child Welfare Monograph Series," No. 19.) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1939. Pp. x+126. \$2.00.

The method of the study is interesting in that it is a follow-up of a study made in 1927. The author therefore had available material on the families prior to the depression and comparative material for 1933. Since most of the material was secured through questionnaires, it tends to be of a formal, factual type.

The chief finding with reference to the depression is that the group of families was very slightly affected. Falling chiefly in the business and professional groups, the families in 1933, with few exceptions, had adequate incomes, although half had lower incomes than in 1927. Adjustments to lowered income were of a minor character and only 9 per cent of the families felt that the depression had had an unfavorable effect on the family life.

The study makes little or no attempt to touch the more intimate reactions and relationships that might have been affected by the depression.

RUTH SHONLE CAVAN

*Rockford, Illinois*

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*The Problem of Retail Site Selection.* By RICHARD U. RATCLIFF. ("Michigan Business Studies," Vol. IX, No. 1.) Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan, 1939. Pp. 95. \$1.00.

The data presented in this small volume are of real value to the human ecologist and urban sociologist, although the study is concerned ostensibly with the practical problem of setting up standards for the selection of retail sites. The author has gathered an interesting body of statistical data to demonstrate that the internal organization of the central shopping district is expressed in an orderly pattern of land use which is determined by basic economic processes. The hypothesis is advanced that the "outgrowth of the market process of competitive bidding for sites among

the potential users of land is an orderly pattern of land use spatially organized to perform most efficiently the economic functions which characterize urban life." After describing the nature of the structure of the central business district, which is admittedly imperfect as a result of real-estate speculation, long-term leases, errors in site selection, and ceaseless technological, economic, and social changes, an attempt is made to describe the buying habits of consumers that account for the emergence of the existing pattern. It is impossible to determine the permanency and importance of the spatial clustering of economic functions which the author describes, because the study lacks a time perspective and because no attempt was made to analyze differences in the patterns of the central business district of the twenty-four cities examined or to develop and verify suggestive observations regarding the buying habits of consumers.

RALPH H. DANHOF

*University of Michigan*

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*Personnel and Labor Relations.* By DALE YODER. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1938. Pp. xix+644. \$5.35.

This is an unsatisfactory attempt to present the entire field of personnel and labor relations in one volume. The subject is treated in such a way that the book is, in many respects, little more than an elaborate catalogue of the many aspects of the field. Various statistical tools are emphasized, and formulas and methods appear in many chapters of the book. There is, however, no adequate explanation of the way in which these tools can be used in dealing with actual problems in the field. While apparently intended to serve as a textbook for courses in industrial relations, the usefulness of this book is limited by the superficial treatment of the subject.

B. B. GARDNER

*Chicago*

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*Psychology of Child Development.* By PAUL L. BOYNTON, in collaboration with JUANITA CURRY BOYNTON. Minneapolis: Educational Publishers, Inc., 1939. Pp. ix+519.

While heredity and environment are called equally important in personality, adolescence is discussed as a physical development, and the psychopathies are seen as "definitely structural." In one place heredity and environment are called "integrated variables," in others they are "definite and specific." Child development is not always seen in a frame of reference that makes it a dynamic interactive relationship between

organic and social factors. When this is done, heredity and environment are never seen as absolutes but as abstractions apart from the experiences of individuals. There is a good selected bibliography at the end of each chapter.

L. GUY BROWN

*Oberlin College*

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*Social Research.* By MANUEL CONRAD ELMER. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939. Pp. xvi+522. \$3.00.

This text is designed to introduce the beginning student to the various methods and techniques of social research; "to present to the student the trends in the development of social research, the outstanding experiments in developing particular types and methods, and their application to the analysis and explanation of social causation." It is not intended as a handbook to teach students skill in the use of the research techniques and concrete research procedures. The presentation covers in a simple way a wide range of research methods and explains the numerous items to be considered in the use of each.

E. B. REUTER

*University of Iowa*

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*Social Security.* By MAXWELL S. STEWART. Revised and enlarged ed. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1939. Pp. 398. \$3.50.

*Social Security* covers a field which includes social insurance, public assistance, social problems, and a discussion of some of the present-day utopias. The book is divided into four parts: Part I, "The Challenge of Insecurity"; Part II, "First Steps toward Security"; Part III, "Europe's Experience with Social Insurance"; and Part IV, "New Horizons in the United States." Mr. Stewart has written a book from a leftish viewpoint that is not a textbook, and yet it has considerable factual material for general circulation. He sometimes uses terms in loose or ambiguous ways. The short chapters on "Criticisms of the Act" and "Social Security and Economic Stability" are well written.

R. CLYDE WHITE

*University of Chicago*

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*The Urban Negro Worker in the United States, 1925-1936, Vol. I: Statistics by Regions.* By IRA DE A. REID *et al.* Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938. Pp. vi+127. \$0.25.

This is the first of a series of volumes dealing with the occupational composition and problems of the Negro in the United States. By means



of schedules data were gathered from over 300,000 urban Negroes in regard to education, employment status, occupation in 1925, 1930, and 1936, usual occupation, and income, as well as age, sex, marital status, etc. Volume I is concerned only with a presentation of the data; Volume II, it is promised, will present an interpretation and analysis of these data.

Of particular interest to the sociologist are the cross-tabulations of persons by occupation in 1925 and 1930 and in 1930 and 1936. Such data are useful for the study of differential depression effects, both between various occupations and between Negroes and whites.

A. J. JAFFE

*Chicago*

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*Amusements and Sports in American Life.* By ROBERT B. WEAVER. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939. Pp. xiii+195. \$1.00.

This publication is one of a series of pamphlets prepared in the Laboratory Schools of the University of Chicago. We should not expect to find it an exhaustive or profound treatment of the subject. One might, however, hope for something less pedantically written. Young people are not likely to take great interest in reading about sports that are referred to as "recreational activity." Moreover, a mass of facts, even when lightened by the inclusion of some interesting source materials, remains something to be remembered for a few minutes only, if there is no point of view to illuminate and give meaning to them. All history must be in some sense an interpretation if the past is to be understood at all. For matter-of-fact statements with regard to the rise of football, for example, the student does not need this pamphlet: he has access to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.

MARGARET PARK REDFIELD

*Glenview, Illinois*

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*What It Means To Be a Doctor.* By DWIGHT ANDERSON. New York: Public Relations Bureau, Medical Society of the State of New York, 1939. Pp. 87.

This booklet is obviously meant primarily as a piece of propaganda on the part of "organized medicine" in its battle against "socialized medicine." It is interesting to the sociologist mainly in two respects: as an example of propaganda technique and for the sentiments relative to medical practice to which it directs its appeal. It is, in medical parlance, a

"sugar-coated pill." The bulk of it is a rather highly idealized account of medical training and the process of getting established in practice, with remarks on the beneficent activities of medical societies thrown in. This is elementary, and could be informative only to the person almost entirely unacquainted with the situation. Only in the last chapter does the author come to the real point. His main argument is one already made official by the American Medical Association's Bureau of Medical Economics, that medical practice is a personal service, not a commodity, and cannot be treated in economic terms. This succeeds, from a scientific point of view, primarily in evading issues, but is probably an effective propaganda slogan.

TALCOTT PARSONS

*Harvard University*

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*American Medicine Mobilizes.* By JAMES RORTY. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1939. Pp. 358. \$3.00.

Mr. Rorty's book is an interesting and valuable account of the recent history of the problem of organization of medical services and of the activities of the various factions involved in the controversies over this problem, written from the "liberal" point of view. It is not, in any proper sense, a sociological study but, rather, a high grade of journalistic report, which statement is not meant to be derogatory in the least. It is packed full of interesting and important factual information, but no attempt is made to subject the material to any sort of theoretical analysis which transcends the level of common sense.

Mr. Rorty makes no attempt to conceal where his own sympathies lie, and his language is at times vigorous. But the book is far more than a mere manifestation of the author's own sentiments. It contains one of the best and fullest accounts known to the reviewer of the organization of the American Medical Association, particularly the role of its *Journal* and the sources of its income. It also brings together in one place most of the important facts about the history of the controversy over socialized medicine and gives an account of a number of the more important incidents. It describes the more important experiments in organization which have departed from the orthodox private practice, individual fee-for-service basis. Finally, it reprints, in full or in summary, a number of the important documents of the field. In short, it is one of the best of the available secondary sources for the study of an interesting and important social phenomenon. Like any such source which may be colored with partisanship, it needs to be used with caution.

The controversy which has developed over the organization of medical services is a phenomenon in many ways meriting the attention of sociologists. There is practically nothing in the literature which could be called an attempt at sociological analysis of it or of its underlying factors. Most of what there is falls into one of two categories: fact-finding studies, of which the long series of publications of the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care form the outstanding example, and immediately polemical writings aiming at the advocacy of one or another of the currently discussed solutions.

TALCOTT PARSONS

*Harvard University*

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*The Politics of the Balkans.* By JOSEPH S. ROUCEK. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1939. Pp. xv+168. \$1.50.

This volume is a happy blending of sociological and political interpretation of the fundamental problems of the Balkan region. The author analyzes the political situation in Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, and Bulgaria within their ethnic, economic, and environmental setting, and also includes a chapter on Macedonia which is a "political problem rather than a geographical entity." With the handicaps of heterogeneity, cultural retardation, and centuries of misrule and foreign oppression, the various Balkan states have fallen far short of evolving an adequate form of government. Political relationships are power relationships, and government conforms to the pattern of personal leadership, with a travesty of parliamentarianism and with violence and rebellion long-accepted methods and universally esteemed. Military dictatorship is more in harmony with national tradition than is constitutionalism. The situation is not unlike that in certain countries of Central and South America. Politics in the Balkans is dominated by the intelligentsia—to whom it is a chief source of livelihood—whose interests conflict with those of the masses—ignorant and backward peasants. This is but a phase of the ancient urban-rural conflict. Though long the "Cockpit of Europe," the Balkans are today more of an objective than a battleground of European power politics. "Europe's current nightmare is not the Balkans, as before the World War, but rather their big neighbors—the powers of the Berlin-Rome axis. These powers are eyeing the Balkans as a potential hinterland, and if the plans of Hitler mature, the proverbial 'Balkanization of Europe' will be reversed into the 'Europeanization of the Balkans'—much to the misfortune of the latter."

This study will be welcomed as reading in political sociology and also

will be found useful in immigrant backgrounds. Though well written and readable, it would be still more attractive and serviceable if accompanied by maps.

MAURICE R. DAVIE

*Yale University*

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*Syphilis, Gonorrhea and the Public Health.* By NELS A. NELSON and GLADYS L. CRAIN. New York: Macmillan Co., 1938. Pp. xvii+359. \$3.00.

The rare insight into our mores afforded by the genitoinfectious diseases is enhanced by this treatise, chiefly because it is thorough and accurate. Written from a public-health point of view, it does an excellent job of setting forth the history, biology, diagnosis, treatment, and communicability of syphilis and gonorrhea. The exposition is fresh with new information and ideas. The latter half of the book deals with the control of these diseases, presenting a progressive program that is realistic, practical, and fully aware of all the impeding cultural conditions. It deals exhaustively with the relations between the health department, the medical profession, and the nurse and social worker; with the charlatan; with methods of case finding and case control; and with the kinds of education needed. In addition to being comprehensive and authoritative, the book is well organized and carefully written. It is not dramatic or moralistic. It is written not so much for the general public as for persons actively involved or interested in the control of syphilis and gonorrhea. It is likely to remain the outstanding treatise in this field for many years.

KINGSLEY DAVIS

*Pennsylvania State College*

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*Syphilis and Its Accomplices in Mischief: Society, the State, and the Physician.* By GEORGE M. KATSAINOS, M.D. Privately printed at Athens, Greece, 1939. Pp. 676.

A definitive, multivolumed work on syphilis would deal, perforce, not only with the medical aspects of the disease but with its economics, its sociology, its politics. Such a book might well turn out to be, in effect, a study of Western civilization since the landing of Columbus.

Whoever essays this monumental task will find among his source materials this strange, chaotic, but not unimpressive, production by Dr. Katsainos, in which medicine, sociology, economics, and politics are all jumbled together, lavishly adorned with Greek classical references, and enlivened by a running fire of polemics. The present volume reprints parts of the author's *On Syphilis*, published in Greek in 1922, and includes the treatise on *Marriage and Syphilis*, issued separately in English in 1924. Students of what Dr. Katsainos calls the "asyphilon" (social taboo) surrounding syphilis will be interested in the Epilogue of the present volume and also in the Appendix, which reproduces evidence of the Greek emigrant doctor's controversies with his Boston colleagues. Fifteen years ago the New England Watch and Ward Society considered Dr. Katsainos' *Marriage and Syphilis*, in which he declares that syphilitics should not marry, a sermon and pushed its sale. Whereas, the *Boston Medical and Surgical Journal* declined to print a review of the book "because of the teaching that syphilis is

incurable." The present text, according to the author, "was refused by over one hundred and fifty editors; it is composed by a compositor, edited by an editor, both ignorant of the English language," and published in a foreign land. Undaunted by these difficulties, and by the fact that Athens lacks a medical library, Dr. Katsainos announces cheerfully that he is engaged on two other equally ambitious works.

JAMES RORTY

*Flatbrookville, New Jersey*

*Texas' Children: The Report of the Texas Child Welfare Survey.* Austin, Tex.: Bureau of Research in the Social Sciences of the University of Texas, 1938. Pp. 885.

This voluminous report on the welfare and legal status of children in Texas began as a work-relief project under the Texas Relief Commission, but before it was completed eight different agencies had participated. Finally, responsibility for the analysis of the data and the compilation of the report was assumed by the Bureau of Research in the Social Sciences of the University of Texas.

The report covers the following aspects of the problems of child welfare: "Guardianship," "Children Denied Guardianship in Texas: 'Delinquents,'" "Making Guardianship Effective: Public Welfare Services Available to Children in Need of Guardianship," "Services Not Amounting to Guardianship: Problems of Infant and Maternal Hygiene, Health, Mental Hygiene, Public Assistance, Education, Child Labor," and "Summary of Needs, Provisions and Costs of Child Welfare Services in Texas." It should be a useful compendium for the administrators of the new co-ordinated Department of Public Welfare which has just been created by the Texas legislature.

R. CLYDE WHITE

*University of Chicago*

*The Boys' Club.* By R. K. ATKINSON. New York: Association Press, 1939. Pp. 186. \$1.75.

This book is of interest, coming at a time when the Boys' Clubs of America are embarking on an expansion program under the professional leadership of Sanford Bates, former head of the federal prison system. The author was associated with the movement for many years as educational director, and this book shows the results of his practical experience in the field, revealing at the same time an extensive acquaintance with the literature of sociology and social work.

Except for a short chapter on the history of "The Boys' Clubs of America" as a movement, the book deals with the various aspects of the contemporary program, as indicated by the chapter headings: "Membership," "Staff," "Games Room," "The Library." Stress is placed on the nonsectarian nature of the Boys' Clubs as contrasted with boys' work in the Y.M.C.A., and on the unstandardized programs and autonomy of the Boys' Clubs as compared with the prescribed program of the Boy Scouts and national-office domination of their local units.

The book shows the extent to which social work agencies are borrowing the language and ideas of sociology—"natural leader," "deteriorated areas," "boys' world." While biased in favor of Boys' Clubs, the book should be of value to workers in other group-work agencies.

CHARLES H. YOUNG

*San Francisco*

*Child Psychology: A Bibliography of Books in English Annotated and Classified under Child Study; Children, Abnormal and Backward; Children, Management; Education of Children; Juvenile Delinquency; Parent and Child.* Compiled by FLOYD HARDIN, EULALIA DOUGHERTY CHAPMAN, and LETHA BELLE HILL. Denver: Bibliographical Center for Research, 1938. Unpaged.

Assembled as a W.P.A. project, this bibliography includes 640 titles. Although most of the publications listed are recent, some go as far back as twenty-five years. The titles cover the fields adequately; there are, however, some serious drawbacks in the method of presenting the titles.

The headings under which the titles are classified are too broad; this is especially true of the first heading, "Child Study." To find books on adolescence, motion pictures, preschool children, or any other special subject, it is necessary to go through 277 titles, since these books and many other types as well are all listed alphabetically by author under "Child Study." A finer classification would greatly have increased the usability of the bibliography. Also, the headings are not mutually exclusive and there is much overlapping, especially between "Child Study" and "Child Management." A third defect lies in the annotations, which are quotations from book reviews. These tend to be favorable, rather than critical, reviews; also, one may question the value of reviews written in 1914 on books current at that time, since points of view have changed greatly since then, and a book receiving a favorable review at that time might be more critically reviewed now in the light of newer information on child psychology.

RUTH SHONLE CAVAN

*Rockford, Illinois*

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*The Human Factor in Business.* By B. SEEBOHM ROWNTREE. 3d ed. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1938. Pp. xx+244. \$1.75.

This is an interesting discussion of the labor policies and practices in a large British manufacturing concern which has been active for over thirty years in developing better personnel relations. This concern at present includes most of the developments which are considered very advanced in the United States.

B. B. GARDNER

*Chicago*

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*The C.C.C. through the Eyes of 272 Boys.* By HELEN M. WALKER. Cleveland, Ohio: Western Reserve University Press, 1938. Pp. 94.

This pamphlet, based upon the co-operative endeavor of ten graduate students, is one of the few objective studies of the C.C.C. Interviews with boys who had been in the C.C.C. revealed not only the formal background of the boys (foreign parentage, poor neighborhoods, high proportion of broken homes, relief, or marginal status) but also the attitudes of the boys toward the C.C.C. From the material the author concludes that there should be a more careful selection of boys (to exclude unadjusted boys), and better choice of camps to which particular boys were sent; that camp personnel should be improved; that compensation to the boys should be increased; and that the C.C.C. should be interpreted to probable employers.

RUTH SHONLE CAVAN

*Rockford, Illinois*

# ABSTRACTS OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

The persons who have aided in the preparation of the material for this issue are: Hubert Bonner, John A. Clausen, Robert Dubin, and George B. de Huszar. The numerals and letters appearing after each abstract correspond to the items in the following scheme of classification:

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|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| I. THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY        | e) The State and Political Process   |
| a) Sociological Theory          | f) The School and Education          |
| b) History of Sociology         | g) Economic Institutions             |
| c) Methods of Research          | h) Voluntary Associations            |
| d) The Teaching of Sociology    | IV. POPULATION AND HUMAN ECOLOGY     |
| II. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY           | a) Demography                        |
| a) Human Nature and Personality | b) Ecology                           |
| b) Collective Behavior          | c) The Rural and the Urban Community |
| III. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION        | V. DISORGANIZATION                   |
| a) The Family                   | a) Personal Disorganization          |
| b) Ethnic and Racial Groups     | b) Social Disorganization            |
| c) Social Stratification        |                                      |
| d) The Church and Religion      |                                      |

260. *Les Tabous du mariage dans le droit primitif des romains* [Marriage Taboos in Roman Primitive Law].—Among the laws enacted by Romulus was that which decreed that a wife could not leave her husband but that a husband could dismiss his wife if she poisoned his children, absconded with the keys of his house, deserted him, or committed adultery. It further declared that, if a husband dismissed his wife, half of her wealth was to be retained by her and the other half was to be consecrated to Demeter and that the husband was to offer a sacrifice to the nether gods. The reference to the poisoning of children has been interpreted by later scholars to include unborn children and to cover abortion induced by any drug or magic potion. Abortion was a ground for divorce, not because it involved the killing of a child (the destruction of the fetus was not a murder) but because it was an offense against the husband and the family. Flight from the family with the keys of the house was a cause for divorce because the keys were the symbol of the husband's authority. Drinking on the part of women was prohibited, for it was associated in Roman custom with the type of abortion already mentioned; so that a wife's drinking was additional ground for divorce by the husband. Adultery was the type case of marriage rupture, the gravest offense against marriage, the husband, and the family. Only adultery on the part of women was serious, while that of men was of no consequence. The woman's dereliction in marriage was, further, a violation of the religious order. This fact gives meaning to the demand that the husband offer a sacrifice to the nether gods; for the wife, having sinned, needed to be purified, and the purification was effected by way of a sacrificial offering. Unchastity and adultery were basically the same: one was sexual congress with a single person or a widow; the other, with a married woman. The offense was qualified by the distinction that sexual relation with a slave was an offense against property, whereas intercourse with a manumitted slave was neither a crime nor a moral offense, for the latter was a person without a family. The explanation of these taboos can be found by means of sociological and ethnological analysis. In gentile society prior to urban Rome

woman was mana, the source of a mysterious power, the center of life. Taboos regulating contacts with her developed into moral obligations, among which the obligation of fidelity was confined to woman alone. She refrained from adultery because the introduction of foreign blood would contaminate her own and through the process of generation pollute the child to whom she would give birth and defile the family of which it was to become a part. Drinking on her part was a form of conjugal infidelity, for she thereby submitted to an outside and hostile force which, like infidelity itself, introduced a foreign ingredient that corrupted her blood. Abortion was also a pollution of the blood, for the ingestion of a drug was similar to the drinking of wine. The taboos regulating primitive Roman marriage were religious group customs in which the power of the group, rather than the authority of the city, was dominant. With the disappearance of the clan and the growth of the urban community, the sanctions supporting the taboos disappeared, and no further trace of them is found in Roman law; but the taboos themselves long persisted as familial customs.—Pierre Noailles, *Annales sociologiques* (*Collection de l'Année sociologique*), Part II (sér. C; 1937), pp. 6-34. (IIIa.) H. B.

261. *La Communauté internationale d'après les traités du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle à nos jours* [*The International Community in the Treaties from the Sixteenth Century to the Present Day*].—The idea of an international community has often been mentioned by writers, but it has hardly at all been an object of careful study based on a methodological analysis of the relevant facts. The international community is a reality, and it is this reality that the sociologist should study. While the subject is extremely complex, an initial study can be made in terms of an analysis of international treaties, which are important data for the study of the international community for three reasons: (1) they are at once facts and norms; (2) as official documents their authenticity is practically assured; and (3) they are relatively fixed and permanent and hence not readily subject to gross misinterpretation. A treaty is a mutual affirmation of agreement between states through which a harmony of interests is created between them. This may be seen not only in the many treaties from the sixteenth century to the present which bind together the various sovereignties of Europe into a "European system" but in those that bring them into closer community with the Ottoman Empire, the Near East, and the distant Orient. The international community is thus seen to be governed by a unity of dispositions having a permanent reality. Despite the apparent eclipse of the idea itself of an international community, and despite the triumph of certain nationalistic absolutisms, its development still continues. If it still appears fragile and menaced, it is because we ignore a twofold truth: the antiquity of the covenant relation between peoples and the deep-rootedness of the community sentiment.—Jean Ray, *Annales sociologiques* (*Collection de l'Année sociologique*), Part III (sér. C; 1938), pp. 1-49. (IIIe.) H. B.

262. *La Personnalité collective: notion sociologique* [*The Collective Personality: A Sociological Idea*].—Durkheim's demonstration that a group is more than the sum of its separate elements has considerable significance in the domain of law. Jurists have been obliged to admit that groups play the role of persons in legal practice. It is a well-known fact that the individual is only very slowly freed from his group and that primitive cultures form more homogeneous and indissoluble wholes. It is no exaggeration to say that throughout history the juridical or collective antedated the physical person. Although their law was fundamentally individualistic in that it posited the individual citizen as its basic datum, the Romans realized that groups are more or less different from mere collections of individuals. There are groups in the juridical sphere that behave like individuals and either have or do not have a moral personality. It is this type of collectivity that is designated by the term "collective personality." Nothing would be farther from the truth than to attribute to this concept an absolute character. It is psychologically and juridically a wholly relative concept depending on the existence of a collective will. Society has a kind of disembodied life of its own independent of the members who compose it—a new legal entity. The existence of this entity is manifested in the following facts: it has a name, an abode, a heritage. The name is an essential element of the civil society, the symbol of its personality. Its abode is different from that of the individuals: it is social, consecrated to the affairs of the group. Its heritage is exemplified in the existence of a social or collective debt. The collective personality is real in the sense the individuals composing it subordinate themselves to its ideas and



sentiments. Jurists can find in this sociological view the means of freeing themselves from the individualistic prejudice and of categorically affirming the existence of the collective personality.—Henri Lévy-Bruhl, *Annales sociologiques* (*Collection de l'Année sociologique*), Part III (sér. C; 1938), pp. 1-13. (IIb.) H. B.

263. *Le Régime féodal au Japon* [Feudalism in Japan].—While the study of Japanese feudalism is scarcely begun, a wealth of documentation is becoming increasingly available in translations. The history of Japanese institutions is intricately woven with the history of the Empire's relations with the outside world. The rupture of relations with China in the ninth century led to an economic crisis, and the central government, deprived of revenues, became incapable of maintaining order. Governors of the provinces, heads of the great temples, and other powerful persons found it necessary to recruit warriors to protect their goods and persons. These in time became vassals. While he lost both his military powers and his civil powers, the emperor remained, in name, the head of the state. In fact, he was outside the feudal system entirely. Two phases of vassalage may be distinguished. In the first the warrior was the direct personal vassal of the lord. The second phase came with the establishment of a hierarchy when, in the course of the civil wars (fourteenth to sixteenth centuries), the less powerful warriors and functionaries sought the protection of the more powerful. The feudal contract in Japan lacked the character of reciprocity and irrevocability of the European feudal contract. The Japanese vassal was a subject, his suzerain a ruler. The rights of the vassal and the obligations of his overlord remained vague. On the other hand, the vassal's obligations were well defined and, except for the period of the civil wars, were backed by strong sanctions.—André Gonthier, *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie*, XVI (1936), 71-84. (IIIg.) J. A. C.

264. *Les Liens de vassalité dans la France médiévale* [The Bonds of Vassalage in Medieval France].—Of the numerous regional varieties of the rights of fiefs, that generally prevailing in the region of Paris is here considered. In the eleventh century the oath of fealty to the king ceased to be taken and henceforth was given only to the immediate overlord. The general insecurity prevailing caused all the lords to seek vassals by multiplying fiefs. At first, the lords of vassalage were personal in character; later, they were means to the end of achieving and accumulating fiefs. The bond was formed by the performance of a solemn act consisting of the declaration of homage, the oath of fidelity, and the investiture of the fief. When a vassal had several lords, his homages to them were regulated in a hierarchy. Homage to the liege lord entailed much more strict obligations than that to other lords. The rights and obligations engendered in the vassal lien were reciprocal, the lord being bound to the same degree as the vassal, in word and in action. The lord guaranteed protection, justice, and peaceable possession of the fief; in return he was owed military service, court service, and other aid (often monetary) from his vassal. The fief remained as a form of land tenure long after the relation of vassalage was empty of all significance.—Olivier-Martin, *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie*, XVI (1936), 85-90. (IIIg.) J. A. C.

265. *Les Vertus bourgeoises, leur origine, leur signification* [Bourgeois Virtues, Their Origin and Significance].—The bourgeois virtues are a part of our pattern of social values. Svend Ranulf, a Danish scholar, investigates this problem from a sociological point of view. His leading concept is moral indignation, a disinterested tendency to inflict punishment. This tendency can be found only in societies where there is a lower middle class. The members of this class are constrained to live under conditions which lead to the curbing of their natural impulses. This repression produces resentment, or a "need for vengeance," as Max Scheler calls it. The members of the lower middle class are forced to give up all luxuries and sacrifice much of the present for the enjoyment of the future. According to Dupreel, the lower middle class rationalizes its position by maintaining that it is moral to be frugal: it makes a virtue of necessity. Ranulf believes that the latest developments in Germany and Russia are explicable by the actions of the lower middle class. He further cites evidence from eighteenth-century English history and from the history of ancient Athens in corroboration of his contention that, wherever a lower middle class existed, the disinterested tendency to punish was strong. The petty bourgeois virtues tend to disappear when the social and economic conditions of this class improve. The class becomes idle when it becomes rich.

Owing to the breakdown of tradition, it is beginning to realize that resignation is a torment and that moderation is useless.—Daniel Warnotte, *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie*, XIX (1939), 1-14. (1a, 11b.) G. B. de H.

266. *La Notion de consensus social chez Comte et la notion d'équilibre chez Spencer* [Comte's Notion of Consensus and Spencer's Notion of Equilibrium].—According to Comte, the highest development of society is characterized by consensus. Consensus is the foundation of solidarity among various social elements. Comte did not explain the meaning of consensus but only stated and described it. In Spencer's work the notion of social equilibrium becomes the first principle, the fundamental ingredient, of a perfect society. According to Spencer, the cause of social equilibrium is the coexistence of antagonistic forces in society. His notion of equilibrium stresses these antagonistic elements, the conflicts and struggles. Comte's notion of consensus stresses the functional interdependence of the element of a social system—assimilation, adaptation, and accommodation.—J. Král, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XLVII (1939), 1-11. (1b.) G. B. de H.

267. *Problèmes de classes et d'élites* [Problems of the Classes and the Elites].—The recent book of Jean Lhomme is a history of the sociological doctrines dealing with the problem of classes. Gustav Schmoller describes three causes to which he attributes the formation of classes: descent, division of labor, and the distribution of wealth. If professions are transmitted through heredity, the social order will be stable. Schmoller defines classes as groups, more or less closed, determined by the type of occupation, possession, consciousness, and often by political rights. Karl Bücher maintains that the differences in property are not the effects but the causes of the order of social classes. It is not the profession that determines possession, as Schmoller maintains, but vice versa, says Bücher. The free choice of occupation is exceptional because man is usually forced to stay in the social class into which he was born. Bücher, who has socialistic leanings, accuses Schmoller of having a theory that amounts to a conservative policy, the aim of which is to maintain the present social order. Lorenz Stein, under the influence of Saint-Simonism, developed his theory of the industrial regime. Like Marx, he maintained that the nonpossessing class is an outcast group in a bourgeois society. Schaeffle further elaborated the antagonism of social classes. A. Labriola maintains that Marx explains the differences between the classes by the division of labor. J. Schumpeter adds that Marx developed a theory of the destiny of classes rather than a theory of the formation of social classes. The term "class" is ambiguous, for it includes a subjective factor (consciousness of solidarity) and an objective factor (possession or profession). The crucial point in this problem is always the factor of class consciousness; for certain people belong to a given class without accepting the ideology of that class, while others might act and feel with a class to which they do not belong. Thus it is not sufficient to consider the economic substratum of society, but also the psychology of people, for ideology and action do not always correspond to the social situation. The proletariat, according to Marx, has become conscious of its value and is no longer dominated by feelings of inferiority, as Henri de Man maintains. The problem of classes is further complicated by the existence of the élite. The latter is a group that occupies a superior position; but, as Robert Michels has shown, economic and political superiority do not coincide with intellectual superiority. The situation of the bureaucrats and entrepreneurs in the last century was due to their initiative and competence. The philosophy of liberalism believes that inequality is the best stimulus to activity. From this point of view, the idea of the élite is based on the theory of selection which has its origin in social Darwinism. Spencer applied the idea of Darwinism to the interpretation of evolution as the differentiation of functions in society. The struggle for existence explains the superior situation of the élite. In contrast to Marx, who believed that the circulation of the élite means the rise to power of the proletariat, Pareto believes that changes in the élites are much more frequent; that, as a matter of fact, history is the graveyard of élites.—G. Salomon, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XLVII (1939), 55-65. (1a, b.) G. B. de H.

268. *René Maunier, sociologue de la colonisation* [René Maunier: Sociologist of Colonization].—René Maunier's two volumes on *Colonial Sociology* (*Sociologie coloniale*), constitute the starting-point of all theoretical studies on colonization. He

attempts to present men in society, from one point of view, in one conflict situation. He does not separate his colonial studies from social studies, believing that through the study of the man of Africa insight can be gained into man in general. Even when he studies psychology or general sociology, however, Maunier always remains a student of colonization.—Santi Nava, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XLVII (1939), 177-84. (Ib.) G. B. de H.

269. *Les Crises de civilisation: la dictature du prolétariat dans ses rapports avec la philosophie du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle et le christianisme* [The Crises of Civilization: The Dictatorship of the Proletariat in Relation to the Philosophy of the Eighteenth Century and to Christianity].—Marx was aware of the resemblance of many of his doctrines to those of the eighteenth-century French materialists. Both philosophies proclaim the original goodness of men, the equality of intelligence, the great importance of experience, education, and external influences, the significance of industry, and the idea that enlightened self-interest is the principle of all morality. Dialectical materialism is thus an alliance between Hegelianism and materialism. Hegelian dialectic permits the determinism of events in the desired direction, which in Marxist thought is the triumph of the proletariat. Marx, like Helvétius, believes in the possibility of remaking man, an illusion that recurs among the Russian bolsheviks. Individual conscience has to be transformed in such a manner as to identify private with common interests. If man is a social being, then his real nature can be developed only in society. Since society is all important, it is not man but society that needs to be reformed. Like Helvétius, La Mettrie, and D. Holbach, Marx proclaims the irresponsibility of criminals. Since the destiny of man is purely social, Marx is hostile toward religions, for they claim for man a supernatural mission. Marxism directly attacks the existing social order and is the antithesis of Christian humanism. It places economics in the highest place and thereby opposes Greek humanism which put the contemplative above the practical virtues and proclaimed that knowledge is an end, not a means. Marxism, like eighteenth-century philosophy, reacted against ascetism and Christian mysticism. Of the four principles of our civilization, Marxism rejects Christianity and humanism and conserves science, which it subordinates to the fourth, industry.—André Joussain, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XLVII (1939), 233-43. (Ia, b.) G. B. de H.

270. *Les Sociologies et la sociologie* [The Sociologies and Sociology].—Durkheim's *De la division du travail social* is an effort to dispense with psychological elements and to construct a pure sociology. His *Règles de la méthode sociologique* declares that a sociology to be really scientific has to treat social phenomena as things. In *La Suicidé* he presents a severe criticism of the theories of Tarde, particularly of the intrusion in the latter's system of psychology into the domain of social facts. In this criticism we notice a tendency in Durkheim to monopolize the sociological explanation of psychological phenomena. Without society, Durkheim believes, man would be an animal. With the aid of his concept of collective consciousness he explains religious beliefs and political, juridical, and economic institutions. This "philosophy" is the point of departure, the central postulate, of Durkheim rather than the conclusion of his researches. Durkheim does not accept Comte's theory of the three stages, the explanation of social evolution by intellectual causes, and the opposition of military to industrial societies. Comte was interested in sociology for the purpose of improving society. According to him, the essential condition of a harmonious society was the unity of beliefs. Science is the means through which such a unity might be achieved, for it destroys the variety of individual opinions. Durkheim, like Comte, was also a moralist and was preoccupied with the problem of social organization. He saw clearly the crises in the traditional values of the separation of the individual from the group. He considered the main task to be that of creating a moral order and believed that science can accomplish this task. The aim is to formulate a science of morals rather than to arrive at a system of morals through science. In this matter Comte and Durkheim agreed. They were at one, too, in their disapproval of individualism. The only end of action is the collectivity, which possesses a transcendental reality.—Achille Ouy, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XLVII (1939), 245-75. (Ia, b.) G. B. de H.

271. *Morale professionnelle (trois leçons extraites d'un cours de morale civique et professionnelle [1898-1900])* [Professional Ethics (Three Lectures from a Course in

**Civic and Professional Ethics [1898-1900]].**—Contemporary society is not sufficiently concerned with professional organizations and professional ethics. Some professions, especially those more or less connected with the state, have special agencies for the maintenance of discipline. Examples of these are found in the army, the teaching profession, the bench, and the bar. But nothing equivalent to these exists in the business professions. Inasmuch as business activities and industrial work today comprise the major part of men's professional activities, it is clear that the greatest part of the life of most men in modern society goes untouched by ethical control. This moral anarchy is associated with the evolving business corporations of the eighteenth century. In France these corporations were connected with their districts and consequently with the political structure of the nation. When the economic life extended beyond the municipal boundaries, however, the old corporation, which was ill adapted to the demands of large industry, became a harmful survival. The evil can be remedied only by the efforts of the groups involved to ally themselves with the political organizations of the nation. Two conditions determine the role of such organizations: fitting the individual into his proper trade and the integration of this trade with the social whole. It is necessary for the individual to enter into his appropriate professional group. Employers and workers alike must become members of such groups. Legislation regarding the professions should be only a particular application of general legislation, just as professional ethics can be only a form of public morals.—**Emile Durkheim** (ed. **M. Mauss**), *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, XLIV (1937), 527-44, 711-38. (IIIg, h.) H. B.

272. **Vom Werden des deutschen Sozialismus [The Rise of German Socialism].**—The National Socialist order is not based on a theory but grew out of the struggle for the liberation of the German spirit from foreign domination and for the mental and spiritual rehabilitation of the German people. It is the matrix of the German will-to-live. It has its origin in neither the social nor the economic sphere, nor does it derive its strength from science. Three phases in this development stand out: (1) the seizure of power and the supersession of Marxist liberalism by National Socialist rule in 1933; (2) the organization of the German Labor Front in 1934; (3) the fusion of political economy and social philosophy. The term "socialism" no longer means Marxism or bolshevism, for these are forms of pseudosocialism. National Socialism is a "radical" socialism. It eschews the materialism of the Marxists and bases itself firmly on the highest ethical subject matter through its emphasis on blood, race, and nationality. It is in the true sense a revaluation of values in the whole realm of social and economic science. The revolution of the spirit which the German people are experiencing justifies the break with the past and the intense striving toward a new order. German political economy has the task of teaching this German socialism in its pure form.—**Friedrich Völtz**, *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, XCVI (1936), 1-48. (Ia, IIIe.) H. B.

273. **Die Krise des französischen "Systems" und das Ringen um eine neue Staatsautorität [Crisis in the French "System" and the Struggle for a New State Authority].**—"Crisis in France" is an old and well-known byword. It may symbolize an overthrow of the government, a street demonstration, or civil strife. Since every political system is based on a world-view, a crisis may be taken as a sign that the world-view is beginning to weaken. This is especially true of the crises in contemporary France. The Third Republic is the spiritual child of the French Revolution in which individual liberty is the basic right. The state is sociologically conceived, an institution or organ of society, and is accepted as a necessary evil for the protection of individual interests. Government means rule by committees, not by a leader; for rule by the latter is conceived in this system as the negation of individual freedom. Not even a minister is a leader of his ministry, but an individual who is delegated by his people to perform specific tasks; and the president of the council is merely one minister among others. The citizens desire peace and detest war. A weak government cannot wage war and is therefore necessarily pacifistic. In emergencies it is too weak to act; and a financial crisis creates a parliamentary crisis during which it is frequently necessary to make recourse to rule by decree. The entire history of the Third Republic is a long chain of recurring crises. The French democratic system is politically strong only as long as an authoritative politician like Clemenceau stands at the top; but the nature of the political system is such as to weaken his leadership and to bring into authority such men as Cachin or Blum. Many critical Frenchmen like Tardieu, Franklin-Bouillon, and De la Rocque have a clear under-

standing of the nature and causes of crises, are keenly aware of the provisional nature of rule by decree, and realize that eventually either a return must be made to parliamentary rule or a forward step taken in the direction of authoritarian government. Since the beginning of 1934 basic reforms have failed to take place, and the whole period has been characterized by fruitless compromises. What France needs is the overthrow of the ideology of 1789, the creation of a new way of life, an *homme nouveau*. Who will be able to effect this change? Tardieu had the answer: "We have urged for a long time that what we need is a leader, a dogma, a method, a mystic."—Karl-Heinz Bremer, *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, XCVI (1936), 112-48. (1a, IIIe.) H. B.

274. *Staatsidee und Wirtschaftsrecht* [The State and the Economic Order].—The relation between the state and the economic order is similar to the organic relation between the state and the political order. The greatness of a political idea resides in the fact that it defines the relation of the state to the whole of life in terms of the logic and force of sovereignty. But, after the state, the economic order is the most powerful aspect of social life. The state and the economic order are merely two different sides of the same life; they belong together like man and earth. The misapprehension of this fact produces considerable conflict. It destroys the unity of social life and endangers thereby not only the existence of the whole but also the life of the specific parts. The separation of the two can never be sanctioned by political economy. The function of the latter is the harmonization of the interests of the state and the economic order, thereby contributing not only to the internal harmony but also to the external power of the nation.—Hermann Haemmerle, *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, XCVI (1936), 281-98. (1a.) H. B.

275. *Gemeinschaft und Staatswissenschaft: Versuch einer systematischen Bestimmung des Gemeinschaftsbegriffes* [Community and Political Science: A Systematic Analysis of the Concept of Community].—"Community" is a concept with many meanings. It plays an important part in every social philosophy. Even in extremely individualistic doctrine it is unconsciously assumed. In Christian thought it is synonymous with the parish community, a relation between God and the world. The absolutistic approach considers the community as a whole of which the individuals are separate parts; so that each individual reflects the cosmos and the cosmos reflects the human soul. According to the universalistic theory, community is a spiritual unity of human beings. In liberalist doctrine community is an automaton, a harmony of individually independent parts—a pseudocommunity. Marxism holds that community is possible only when the division of opposing social classes is removed from society. In this sense community is but individual equality, the *égalité* of the French Revolution. National Socialism has added to political science a new and revolutionary meaning of community, a concept which cannot be understood apart from the meaning of revolution as the establishment and maintenance of national unity. National unity is a political goal, and from this standpoint the natural function of the community consists in subordinating itself to political aims. From the point of view of National Socialist revolution the community ceases to be a "natural" community, a mere social order, and is conceived as a revolutionary movement or progressive development. It is founded not upon mind or spirit but upon race; and the will that animates it is not intellectual cultural but national political. Political science must be based upon this meaning of community. In order to understand this meaning, it is necessary to see it in the light of its origin on the battle front of the World War. The community of the battle front was neither a religious community, a community of ideas, nor a community of individual interests, but a concrete combat community. It arose out of the concrete demands of warfare which disregarded private interests and individual fortune and tolerated concern only for the needs of the fighting community. Viewed in this light the community is a blood bond of national people, an inflexible racial union.—Andreas Pfenning, *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, XCVI (1936), 299-318. (1a, IIIe.) H. B.

276. *Gegenstand und Verfahren der Gesellschaftslehre* [The Subject Matter and Method of Sociology].—Sociology has been variously conceived as the science of society, general theory of culture, the study of cultural values, and the science of single cultures and epochs. There is still very little agreement as to its subject matter. As the science of reality, in so far as it remains empirical, sociology is to be sharply separated from

philosophy but not from history. Formalistic sociology, as the science of the forms of association, on the other hand, is to be distinguished from all other social sciences, for it does not touch reality. Only unified general science bears any fruitful relation to both philosophy and history. It furnishes general metaphysics with the empirical data which it itself first analyzed on the basis of philosophical propositions. History, on the other hand, furnishes general science with the historical data which it interprets in terms of sociological concepts. This sort of reciprocal relationship does not obtain between sociology and the systematic social sciences. Basic to the structure of the social sciences is general social theory which, as a theory of formal social science concepts, establishes pure propositions regarding society. This view of sociology is very important for our revolutionary era, not in the sense that sociological knowledge is able to set up new goals or to determine the most progressive form of social co-operation, but that it may awaken in youth the realization of the creative force of social unity.—Wilhelm Andrae, *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, XCVI (1936), 525-67. (Ia.) H. B.

277. *The Urgency of Population Study from the Bio-anthropological Approach.*—"Human ecology" or "ethnogenics" must have its subject matter clearly discussed and its scope carefully indicated. The study of man in his environment, by virtue of the fact that culture is a conditioning aspect of that environment, differs only in scope from the study of animal ecology. Culture covers the study of every aspect of what is called "sociology," including economics. It is necessarily also one of the principal variable factors influencing density, distribution, and migration of populations. Thus comes into being the science of human ecology, the study of ethnic units in evolution conditioned by the total factors of the environment. It becomes the study of race-population-culture in change, for which is proposed the title "Ethnogenics." Within the scope of this conception of human ecology the relevant problems for study include the following: (1) optimum population density; (2) the relationship of optimum population density to occupational structure; (3) the balance between urban and rural populations; and (4) the conditioning influence of population growth upon economic problems.—G. H. L. F. Pitt-Rivers, *Population*, I (June, 1933), 8-22. (IVb.) R. D.

278. *The Biological Aspects of Migration.*—There are five conclusions that can be drawn from the study of animal migration. (1) A harmonious relationship generally exists between the size of a population and the conditions of its habitat. (2) If the harmony is destroyed by a disproportionate population growth, a migratory impulse may be released. This migratory impulse is a differential affecting only a portion of the total population. (3) Migrants select their new habitat so that its conditions are in harmony with their needs. (4) Should the conditions of the new habitat differ from the old, they may serve as selective agencies that may encourage the appearance of segregated genetic variants. (5) In any given habitat will be found the appropriate numbers of the different animal types that are in biological harmony with one another and with the conditions of the habitat. Reasoning by analogy, it may be said that, when the human population of a political unit or a geographical region changes the conditions of its habitat, there is a tendency for sections of the population to migrate in an attempt to restore the essential harmony between themselves and their habitat. Such biological migration is to be differentiated from imperialism, which has two aspects—colonization and exploitation. Colonization results from biological migration, but exploitation means the selection of a new environment not for its fitness but for its financial fatness. The Anglo-Saxon in the Tropics is a case of exploitation. Human migration based upon a re-establishment of harmony with the habitat may lead to the appearance and persistence of new genetic variants; and, although this seems to be happening in certain cases, it is impossible yet to distinguish between noninherited personal adaptation and true genetic dissimilarity.—F. A. E. Crew, *Population*, I (June, 1933), 34-41. (IVa.) R. D.

279. *The Effect of Rural-Urban Migration upon Death Rates.*—To test the widely held theory that there is a selective migration of the more healthy rural youths to urban centers with a resultant higher death rate in rural areas among those in the younger ages, seventy-six thousand Ohio death records for 1930 were tabulated and analyzed according to residence of the deceased. Ohio was chosen because it is known to have had a large rural-urban migration in the immediately preceding decades. The data show that the young adults in the rural regions have a higher death rate, but this can be attributed

largely to the influence of tuberculosis and accidental deaths. There is a multiplicity of factors at work to cause this differential death rate, among the most important of which is the difference in medical care and medical facilities in favor of the cities. It is not very probable that migration of the healthy from the country is important in this respect, although this study does not give a conclusive answer.—Harold F. Dorn, *Population*, I (November, 1933), 95-114. (IVc.) R. D.

280. **Research on Differential Fertility in Poland.**—This is a preliminary report on some of the results obtained by the Polish Institute for the Scientific Investigation of Population Problems in its study of differential fertility by the use of detailed questionnaires submitted to selected samples of the population. The fertility rates are computed per one hundred years of married life, with the first year of marriage considered as only six months in computing the length of marriage. It is found that the fertility rate is highest among independent peasant farmers in a relatively isolated region, and decreases in order from other independent peasants, to unskilled, to skilled, to office workers. This decrease is even more pronounced among the older women. The fertility rate decreases with increased time after marriage among the groups of women who were the same age at marriage, but the values of the rates are virtually unrelated to the age of the women, varying almost solely with the duration of the marriage. In other words, women who are twenty to twenty-four at marriage will have the same fertility rate during the first five years of marriage as women who are twenty-five to twenty-nine at marriage, etc. The conclusions derived from this study are still tentative, being based only upon small and highly selected samples.—Stefan Szulc, *Population*, I (November, 1934), 14-35. (IIIc, IVa.) R. D.

281. **Differential Fertility in the Netherlands.**—This is an investigation covering four towns and a hundred and three rural districts of the Netherlands. An extensive cross-classification of the data and computation of rates for the subclasses yields important conclusions. Between 1897 and 1927 there has been an urban-rural differential in birth and death rates, with lower rates in the urban regions and highest rates in the lowest economic classes of both regions. The urban birth rate has fallen more rapidly than the rural. In both urban and rural areas the differential birth rate between the lowest and highest economic classes is greater in 1927 than it was in 1897. The interval between marriage and the arrival of the first-born increases after the first nine months with increase in prosperity; but, where the interval is less than nine months, the lowest classes have the highest proportion of such births. The birth rate varies with the religion of the mother in the following order: Christian Reformed, Catholic, Reformed, and Jewish. There are more childless marriages in towns than in rural regions, in the upper classes than in the lower, and among the Protestants than among the Catholics. The general infant mortality rate has fallen considerably in the last thirty years, with a greater reduction in the urban areas and among the upper classes of both the urban and the rural regions. With increasing age at marriage of both husband and wife infant mortality is more favorable. The infant mortality rate is higher in larger families, the rise being progressive after the group of families with eight children has been reached. The size of completed families has decreased considerably in the last thirty years, the decrease being greater in the higher classes.—H. W. Methorst, *Population*, I (special supplement; 1935), 1-70. (IIIc, IVa.) R. D.

282. **The Problem of Differential Fertility.**—The two major aspects of the study of differential fertility include the descriptive statistical analysis of this phenomenon for different classes or groups of the population and the investigation of the assumptions that groups with differential fertility are also divided on biological grounds, along with which should go a study of the biology of the inheritance of these differential characteristics. There is a multiplicity of causes of differential fertility, varying by class and by country, while the modern pattern of family control has become widespread concomitantly with the growth of industrialization and urbanization. The use of contraceptives has only been the instrumentality of family limitation. Many writers, notably Gini and R. A. Fisher, have urged that biological causes are involved in differential fertility, the former holding to a cyclical theory of vitality, while the latter points out that the economic grading of society puts in the wealthy classes the children of relatively infertile parents, since relative infertility would play a role in enabling people to become wealthy.

Other biological approaches include the study of the relationship between intelligence and fertility (Willoughby) and biotypes (Boldrini) and fertility. Pearl holds that the superoptimal environment, which even moderate wealth is able to command, tends toward low fertility and even sterility, a point of view at variance with his logistic theory of population growth which would hardly be applicable to the wealthier classes, since they do not live under conditions of extreme density. Other work is being done on the relationship between diet and fertility. In general, the biological and physiological evidence is inconclusive, and these factors have been, if at all, only of secondary importance. Besides a differential fertility between races, nations, and classes it is exhibited in family strains within a group such that it can be shown that one-eighth to one-sixth of those born in one generation become the progenitors of the next. There is evidence to support the contention that the factors of religion, education, urbanization, and industrialization are the most important causal factors in differential fertility. The facts of differential fertility do not, unless certain unproved assumptions are made, lead to the conclusion that dysgenic influences are undermining society—the studies of the relationship between physical characteristics and social class being inconclusive. The crux of the whole problem relating to differential fertility is that dealing with the subnormal and cagogenic groups, especially the feeble-minded. It is a confusion of the problem to compare the fertility of such groups with that of the general population, since these abnormal persons seem to be distributed throughout all the social strata. In addition, these defectives tend to have a higher mortality rate and, in the case of the institutionalized, a reduced fecundity. An additional problem occurs in connection with the falling birth rate. It has been assumed by a number of sociologists (Lapouge, Sorokin) and biologists (Pearson, Snow, Lenz, Schallmayer, Ploetz) that a low birth rate accompanied by a low mortality rate means an elimination or weakening of the factor of natural selection. Such an assumption is incorrect. This general denial of the importance of differential fertility on biological grounds does not mean a denial of its importance on sociological grounds.—J. Rumney, *Population*, II (November, 1935), 3–21. (IVa, IIIc.) R. D.

283. **The Occupational Evolution of a Generation.**—To rise in the social scale is considered a normal goal. Assuming stationary population conditions, i.e., constant rates of mortality and migration between occupational classes, the age distribution within all the occupational classes at a given time would, if considered statically, show the social structure of the population at census time; and, if considered dynamically, the social evolution of a generation. When the population is divided into three classes—employers and capitalists, salaried workers, and those without employment—the percentage of the population in each of these classes by age has the following distributions: (1) employers and capitalists—an S-shaped curve; (2) salaried workers—a positively skewed, single-humped curve; (3) without employment—a U-shaped curve. Such curves were found for the populations of Italy (1931) and Germany (1925). Viewed dynamically, the highest class shows a continuous growth up to the ages of fifty-five or sixty; while the salaried class reaches a maximum at about twenty years and steadily declines thereafter. Many of this class migrate into the highest class, accounting in part for the latter's increase and the former's decrease, as a function of age. Those without employment are most numerous before fifteen and after fifty-five or sixty years. Excluding the consideration of differential mortality and considering only the increase in the highest class, owing to a net migration into this class, attention is focused upon the migration due to inheritance. On the supposition that in a stationary population all men who are sons of employers will tend to replace their father when the latter dies, it can be shown that at any given age the theoretical ratio of sons who will take the place of their father to all sons at this age will be

$$N = k \left( 1 - \frac{l_n + x}{l_n} \right),$$

where  $N$  is the ratio,  $l_n$  is the average difference in age between father and son,  $x$  is the given age of sons, and  $k$  is the highest proportion of the total population that becomes a capitalist or employer. Applying this formula to a single agricultural province of Italy, a close correspondence between the theoretical and the actual curves of the distribution of persons in the highest class is obtained. Considering three provinces of Italy which



have almost the same proportion of the total working population engaged in agricultural pursuits, it is found that the height of the curve for the capitalists and employers is inversely related to the curve of the salaried, although the shape of the curves remains as described above. This shift in the height of the two curves is a reflection of the extent of the landownership in the three provinces and shows the fluctuation in opportunity to rise to the highest class. Such factors as the emigration of young people from a population will change the structure of that population, as will a change in industrial development or type of industry.—P. Luzzatto-Fegiz, *Population*, II (November, 1935), 97-107. (IIIc, IVa.) R. D.

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## AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO THE THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

TALCOTT PARSONS

### ABSTRACT

The present paper is an attempt to formulate and illustrate a generalized approach to the theory of social stratification. This field has, in spite of its central importance, been in a notably undeveloped state. The emergence of a highly generalized conceptual scheme in social theory which has elsewhere been traced by the author suggests the possibility of a more thorough theoretical approach than has hitherto been possible. Social stratification, here regarded as the differential ranking of the human individuals who compose a given social system and their treatment as relatively superior or inferior, may be analyzed in terms of the following classification scheme: (1) membership in a kinship unit, (2) personal qualities, (3) achievements, (4) possessions, (5) authority, and (6) power.

Social stratification is regarded here as the differential ranking of the human individuals who compose a given social system and their treatment as superior and inferior relative to one another in certain socially important respects. Our first task is to discuss why such differential ranking is considered a really fundamental phenomenon of social systems and what are the respects in which such ranking is important. Ranking is one of many possible bases on which individuals may be differentiated.<sup>1</sup> It is only in so far as differences are

<sup>1</sup> Some writers (cf. P. A. Sorokin, *Social Mobility* [New York, 1927]) have distinguished what is here referred to as stratification as the "vertical" axis of differentiation of individuals from the "horizontal" axis. Correspondingly, when individuals change their status in the differentiated system, reference is made to vertical and horizontal mobility. This usage is dangerous. It states the analytical problem in terms of a two-dimensional spatial analogy. On the one hand, because stratification constitutes one important range of differentiation, it does not follow that all others can be satis-

treated as involving or related to particular kinds of social superiority and inferiority that they are relevant to the theory of stratification.

Central for the purposes of this discussion is the differential evaluation in the moral sense of individuals as units. Moral superiority is the object of a certain empirically specific attitude quality of "respect," while its antithesis is the object of a peculiar attitude of "disapproval" or even, in the more extreme case, of "indignation."<sup>2</sup>

In one sense, perhaps, the selection of moral evaluation as the central criterion of the ranking involved in stratification might be considered arbitrary. It is, however, no more and no less arbitrary than, for instance, the selection of distance as a basic category for describing the relations of bodies in a mechanical system. Its selection is determined by the place which moral evaluation holds in a generalized conceptual scheme, the "theory of action." The only necessary justification of such a selection at the outset is to show

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factorily treated as a single residual category. Thus sex differentiation, occupational differences apart from their relation to stratification, and differences of religious affiliation should not on a priori grounds be treated as if they all involved only values of a single variable with a common unit of variation, "horizontal distance." On the other hand, it is equally dangerous to assume a priori that stratification itself can be adequately described as variation on a single quantitative continuum, as the analogy of a dimension of rectilinear space suggests. There is a quantitative element involved in stratification as in most other social phenomena. This is inherent in its conception as a matter of ranking. But to assume that this exhausted the matter would be to assume that only the numbers and intervals of ranks were significant, which is by no means the case. As will appear below, there are also variations in the content of the criteria by which ranks are assigned which cannot, in the present state of knowledge, be reduced to points on a single quantitative continuum.

While of particular concern at present in relation to stratification, it may be pointed out that these considerations apply at the same time to any uncritical use of such concepts as "social space" and "social distance." The burden of proof in cases of their use should always be placed on their relevance to social facts and analytical schemes verified in the social field, not on the logic of deductions from analogies to physical space and distance.

<sup>2</sup> Perhaps Durkheim has done more than any other social theorist to make this phenomenon clear and to analyze its implications (see especially *L'Éducation morale* [Paris: F. Alcan, 1925], Part I, and *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* [Paris: F. Alcan, 1912; 2d ed., 1925], chap. iii). It is also involved in Max Weber's concept of legitimacy (*Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* [Tübingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr, 1925], chap. i, secs. 5, 6, 7). It is discussed and analyzed in Talcott Parsons, *Structure of Social Action* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1927), esp. chaps. x, xi, and xvii.

that the categories are applicable. In our ordinary treatment of social rank moral evaluations are in fact prominently involved. The normal reaction to a conspicuous error in ranking is at least in part one of moral indignation, either that a person thinks he is "unjustly" disparaged by being put on a level with those who are really his inferiors or that his real superiors feel "insulted" by having him, in the relevant respects, treated as their equal.<sup>3</sup>

Consideration of certain aspects of social systems described in terms of the theory of action shows readily why stratification is a fundamental phenomenon. In the first place, moral evaluation is a crucial aspect of action in social systems. It is a main aspect of the broader phenomenon of "normative orientation," since not all normative patterns which are relevant to action are the object of moral sentiments. The second crucial fact is the importance of the human individual as a unit of concrete social systems. If both human individuals as units and moral evaluation are essential to social systems, it follows that these individuals will be evaluated as units and not merely with respect to their particular qualities, acts, etc. Furthermore, this cannot merely be a matter of any given individual A's having moral attitudes toward any other given individual B, but it implies ranking. Unless there is to be a functionally impossible state of lack of integration of the social system, the evaluations by A and B of their associate C must come somewhere near agreeing; and their relative ranking of C and D must broadly agree where the necessity for comparison arises.<sup>4</sup> The theoretical possibility exists that not only any two individuals but all those in the system should be ranked as exact equals. This possibility, however, has never been very closely approached in any known large-scale social system. And, even if it were, that would not disprove the fundamental character of stratification, since it would not be a case of "lack" of

<sup>3</sup> An excellent recent example of this is found in the results, reported by F. J. Roethlisberger and W. A. Dickson, *Management and the Worker* (Cambridge, Mass., 1939), Part III, chap. xv.

<sup>4</sup> The concept "integration" is a fundamental one in the theory of action. It is a mode of relation of the units of a system by virtue of which, on the one hand, they act so as collectively to avoid disrupting the system and making it impossible to maintain its stability, and, on the other hand, to "co-operate" to promote its functioning as a unity (cf. Parsons, *op. cit.*).

stratification but of a particular limiting type. Stratification, as here treated, is an aspect of the concept of the structure of a generalized social system.<sup>5</sup>

There is, in any given social system, an actual system of ranking in terms of moral evaluation. But this implies in some sense an integrated set of standards according to which the evaluations are, or are supposed to be, made. Since a set of standards constitutes a normative pattern, the actual system will not correspond exactly to the pattern. The actual system of effective superiority and inferiority relationships, as far as moral sanction is claimed for it, will hence be called the system of social stratification. The normative pattern, on the other hand, will be called the scale of stratification.

Since the scale of stratification is a pattern characterized by moral authority which is integrated in terms of common moral sentiments, it is normally part of the institutional pattern of the social system. Its general status and analysis falls into the theory of social institutions, and it is in these terms that it will be analyzed here.<sup>6</sup>

Before following out the problem of the structural differentiation of systems and scales of stratification, and some of the bases and functional consequences of such variations, it is well to discuss certain aspects of the relation of the individual actor to the scale of stratification. The main factual references will be to the type of system of stratification where, as in our own, there is a rather wide scope for, in Linton's term, the "achievement" of status.

From the point of view of the theory of action the actor is in part a "goal-directed" entity. One important aspect of this orientation is to be found in his sentiments as to the moral desirability of these goals, though they may, of course, at the same time have other sorts of significance. Not only are goals as such the objects of moral sentiments but this status is also occupied by persons and their attitudes to the actor, by things and their relations to the actor, and by social

<sup>5</sup> A generalized social system is a conceptual scheme, not an empirical phenomenon. It is a logically integrated system of generalized concepts of empirical reference in terms of which an indefinite number of concretely differing empirical systems can be described and analyzed (see L. J. Henderson, *Pareto's General Sociology* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935), chap. iv and n. 3).

<sup>6</sup> The concept of institutions, like that of stratification, is central to the theory of action but cannot be analyzed here (cf. Parsons, *op. cit.*, chaps. x and xvii).



relationships. Many of the most important goals cluster about these things.

Second, any or all of these may have other types of significance to the actor than the moral. They may be sources of hedonic satisfaction or objects of affectional attitudes. The normal actor is, to a significant degree, an "integrated" personality. In general, the things he values morally are also the things he "desires" as sources of hedonic satisfaction or objects of his affection. To be sure, there are, concretely, often serious conflicts in this respect, but they must be regarded mainly as instances of "deviation" from the integrated type.

Finally, the importance of moral sentiments in action, together with the fact that action is directed toward goals, generally implies that the normal actor has moral sentiments toward himself and his acts. He either has a rather high degree of "self-respect" or in some sense or other feels "guilt" or "shame."

But this actor does not stand alone. He is, to a greater or less degree, integrated with other actors in a social system. This means, on the one hand, that there is a tendency for the basic moral sentiments to be shared by the different actors in a system in the sense that they approve the same basic normative patterns of conduct, while, on the other, the other individuals become important to anyone; what they do, say, or even subjectively think and feel cannot be merely indifferent to him.

Through the differentiation of roles there is a differentiation in the specific goals which are morally approved for different individuals. But, so far as the society is morally and hence institutionally integrated, they are all governed by the same more generalized pattern. This common pattern is applied on the judgments of higher and lower as applied to individuals which thus form a convenient point of reference for systematizing the normative pattern itself. Self-respect, which, it may be said, is in the first instance a matter of living-up to the moral norms the individual himself approves, becomes secondarily a matter of attaining or maintaining a position in terms of the scale of stratification.

This connection is reinforced by the interplay, in an institutionally integrated situation, between moral patterns and the self-interested

elements of motivation. The actor has interests in the attainment of diverse goals, in hedonic satisfactions, in affectional response, and also in the recognition or respect of others. It is a simple corollary of the integration of moral sentiments that recognition, or moral respect on the part of others, is dependent on the actor on the whole living up to the moral expectations of these others. There is, furthermore, an important tendency for recognition and affectional response to go together. Loss of moral respect for a person makes it at least difficult to maintain a high level of affection for him. Loss of either or both tends also to entail withdrawal of sources of hedonic satisfaction as far as these are dependent on the actions of others. Failure to conform with institutionalized norms thus injures the individual's self-interest by leading to withdrawal of help and satisfactions; it can easily lead further into the "negative" reactions. Instead of merely refusing to be helpful, others may positively obstruct the attainment of one's goals. They may actively run down the individual's reputation, positively hate him, and seek to hurt him. All this is further accentuated by the fact that there is a need to "manifest sentiments by external acts,"<sup>7</sup> to pass over from hostile sentiments to overt action which is detrimental to the interests of the actors. Such overt action is all the more likely where the norms in question are solidly institutionalized. For, then, other actors have built up definite "expectations" of behavior on which they count; and, when these expectations are frustrated, they not merely "disapprove" but are directly "injured" and "let down."

Finally, there is much evidence that the more important moral patterns are not simply something which we rationally "accept." They have been inculcated from early childhood and are deeply "introjected" to form part of the basic structure of the personality itself. Violation of them brings with it the risk not only of external sanctions but of internal conflict which is often of a really disabling magnitude.

It is thus not a question of whether institutional behavior is or is not self-interested. Indeed, if any given individual can be said to seek his own "self-interest" in this sense, it follows that he can do so only by conforming in some degree to the institutionalized definition

<sup>7</sup> The title of Class III of Pareto's "residues."

of the situation. But this in turn means that he must to a large degree be oriented to the scale of stratification. Thus his motivation almost certainly becomes focused to a considerable extent on the attainment of "distinction" or recognition by comparison with his fellows. This becomes a most important symbol, both to himself and to others, of the success or lack of success of his efforts in living up to his own and others' expectations in his attempts to conform with value patterns. With particular reference to self-interest, distinction itself in this sense may and often does become an important direct goal of action. Thus stratification is one central focus of the structuralization of action in social systems.<sup>8</sup>

That action in a social system should, to a large extent, be oriented to a scale of stratification is inherent in the structure of social systems of action. But, though this fact is constant, the content of the scale, the specific standards and criteria by which individuals are ranked, is not uniform for all social systems but varies within a wide range. It follows from the definition of a scale of stratification adopted here that this variation will be a function of the more general variations of value orientation which can be shown empirically to exist as between widely differing social systems.<sup>9</sup> That there are wide variations in values is an established fact. In certain particular cases and respects it has also been established in what these variations consist. It can, however, scarcely be said that knowledge in this field is sufficiently far advanced for us to have available a generalized classification of possible value orientations which can simply be taken over and applied to the special features of the field of stratification. Starting with the implications of the fact of differential ranking of individuals in value terms, it is, however, possible to build up a classification of certain of the socially significant respects in which they are differentially valued. This classification in turn can be related to the classification of value systems in that the latter will

<sup>8</sup> In the degree of its generality, "success" or "distinction" is a goal which is comparable with that of wealth or of power.

<sup>9</sup> For an empirical demonstration of this range of variation of fundamental value orientations see especially Max Weber's comparative studies in the sociology of religion (*Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* [3 vols.]; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1934). A brief summary of certain aspects of these studies is given in Parsons, *op. cit.*, chaps. xiv and xv.

supply the justifications of why discrimination in each of the respects treated here (or lack of it) is considered legitimate. The following is a classification of bases of differential valuation which, though by no means final and exhaustive, has been found to be relatively concrete and useful.

1. *Membership in a kinship unit.*—There is an aspect of differential status which is shared with other members of whatever in the society in question is an effective kinship unit. Membership in the unit may be held by virtue of birth, but it may also be by other criteria, as in the case of marriage by personal choice in our own society.

2. *Personal qualities.*—Personal qualities are any of those features of an individual which differentiate him from another individual, and which may be referred to as a reason for "rating" him higher than the other: sex, age, personal beauty, intelligence, strength, etc. In so far as personal effort may have an influence on these qualities, as in the case of "attractiveness" of women, it tends to overlap the next category, "achievements." From the present point of view, a quality is what for the purposes in hand is best treated as an aspect of what a person "is," not a result of what he "does." Concrete qualities range all the way from certain basic things altogether beyond personal control, such as the facts of sex and age, to those which are mainly achievements.

3. *Achievements.*—Achievements are the valued results of the actions of individuals. They may or may not be embodied in material objects. It is that which can be ascribed to an individual's action or agency in a morally responsible sense. Just as at one point achievements shade over into personal qualities, so at another they shade into the fourth category.

4. *Possessions.*—Possessions are things, not necessarily material objects, "belonging" to an individual which are distinguished by the criterion of transferability. Qualities and achievements as such are not necessarily transferable, though sometimes, and to a certain extent, they may be. Of course, concrete possessions may be the results of one's own or other's achievements, and control over the qualities of persons may be a possession.

5. *Authority.*—Authority is an institutionally recognized right to

influence the actions of others, regardless of their immediate personal attitudes to the direction of influence. It is exercised by the incumbent of an office or other socially defined status such as that of parent, doctor, prophet. The kind and degree of authority exercised is clearly one of the most important bases of the differential valuation of individuals.

6. *Power*.—It is useful to consider a sixth residual category of “power.” For this purpose a person possesses power only in so far as his ability to influence others and his ability to achieve or to secure possessions are not institutionally sanctioned. Persons who have power in this sense, however, often do in practice secure a certain kind of direct recognition. Furthermore, power may be, and generally is, used to acquire legitimized status and symbols of recognition.

The status of any given individual in the system of stratification in a society may be regarded as a resultant of the common valuations underlying the attribution of status to him in each of these six respects.<sup>10</sup> A classification of types of scales, or rather several of them, can then be derived by a consideration of the variation in the emphasis placed on each of these categories by a given value system, and also of variations in the particular content of each category. Attention here will be confined to a very few cases which have been of great historical importance.

One of the most general distinctions which can be easily applied to stratification in terms of this scheme is that employed by Linton between “achieved” and “ascribed” status.<sup>11</sup> The relation of this very important dichotomy to this scheme is not simple. In general the criteria of ascribed status must be birth or biologically hereditary qualities like sex and age. But, in the socially defined role which accompanies such a status, there may be very important elements of expected achievement and resulting possessions. Other possessions, of course, may be associated with an ascribed status through the in-

<sup>10</sup> It is clearly recognized that this proposition constitutes a statement of the problem, not a solution of it.

<sup>11</sup> R. Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York, 1936), chap. vii. “Status” is a term referring to any institutionally defined position of an individual in the social structure. Position in a scale of stratification is only one aspect of status. There is a certain loose tendency to make them coterminous.

heritance of property and the perquisites of office if the latter is filled by ascription rather than by achievement. The same is true of authority which may, at times, be directly inherited or may be attached to an office.

There is, however, another general relation between the six elements of stratificatory status which partly overlaps with the distinction of ascribed and achieved status but partly cuts across it. That is, in every known society membership in a solidary kinship unit is one fundamental element of the place of an individual in a system of stratification. There are, however, great variations in the way in which this takes place and in the relation of kinship to the other elements. The basic elements of all kinship structure are birth and sexual union.<sup>12</sup> An individual becomes a member of a kinship group either by birth in one or by entering into a socially legitimized sexual union, a marriage.

The kinship groups centered about birth and sexual union are always to a certain extent "solidary" not only in the sense of mutual aid and support but also in the sense that they form units in the system of stratification of the society; their members are in certain respects treated as "equals" regardless of the fact that by definition they must differ in sex and age, and very generally do in other qualities, and in achievements, authority, and possessions. Even though for these latter reasons they are differently valued to a high degree, there is still an element of status which they share equally and in respect of which the only differentiation tolerated is that involved in the socially approved differences of the sex and age status. But as actually used, the term "social class" certainly covers a great deal of the ground involved in this basic phenomenon—the treatment of kinship groups as solidary units in the system of stratification. It is, therefore, proposed to define a social class here as consisting of the group of persons who are members of effective kinship units which, as units, are approximately equally valued. According to this definition, the class structure of social systems may differ both in the composition or structure of the effective kinship unit or units which are units of class structure and in the criteria by which such units are

<sup>12</sup> See Kingsley Davis and W. L. Warner, "Structural Analysis of Kinship," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 2.

differentiated from one another. The class status of an individual is that rank in the system of stratification which can be ascribed to him by virtue of those of his kinship ties which bind him to a unit in the class structure. Kinship affiliation is thus always a basic aspect of the class status of an individual. It does not follow that his class status has always been determined by his kinship ties. Nor does it follow that the system of ranking of kinship units can be explained as derived from factors peculiarly associated with kinship.

There is a type of class structure in which class of birth is a sufficient criterion of an individual's rank in the scale of stratification throughout his life. Because of the close approach to its full realization in India, it is convenient to refer to this type as "caste." It is the case where the only relevant criterion of class status is birth and where the structure is one of hierarchically arranged hereditary groups, and no acquisition of authority, no qualities, achievements, or possessions can change an individual's rank. All hierarchical status is ascribed. From this type there is a gradual transition to an opposite pole—that in which birth is completely irrelevant to class status, the level being determined by some combination of the other elements.<sup>13</sup>

It is perhaps permissible to refer to this antithetical type as that of "equality of opportunity." But it should be noted how very formal this conception is. It says nothing whatever about either the combination of the other five elements of hierarchical status involved or the concrete content of any one. Groups of equals must, under a caste system, in the nature of the case be rigidly endogamous, for husband and wife are necessarily of the same class status. But in a system not resembling the caste type husband and wife need not be rigidly equal by birth, although they become so by marriage, and a married couple and their children, even though equals at birth, may change their class status during their lifetimes. Generally speaking, of course, the more effectively solidary the extended kinship groups, especially as between the generations, the more closely the total class system will approach the caste pole.

This approach to the analysis of social class may help to throw light on some aspects of the class structure of contemporary Ameri-

<sup>13</sup> This is the limiting type where "class" disappears.

can society. Broadly speaking there are two fundamental elements in the dominant American scale of stratification. We determine status very largely on the basis of achievement within an occupational system which is in turn organized primarily in term of universalistic criteria of performance and status within functionally specialized fields.<sup>14</sup> This dominant pattern of the occupational sphere requires at least a relatively high degree of "equality of opportunity" which in turn means that status cannot be determined primarily by birth or membership in kinship units.

But this occupational system with its crucial significance in the system of stratification coexists in our society with a strong institutional emphasis on the ties of kinship. The values associated with the family, notably the marriage bond and the parent-child relationship, are among the most strongly emphasized in our society.

Absolute equality of opportunity is, as Plato clearly saw, incompatible with any positive solidarity of the family. But such a relative equality of opportunity as we have is compatible not with all kinds of kinship systems but with certain kinds. There is much evidence that our kinship structure has developed in such a direction as to leave wide scope for the mobility which our occupational system requires while protecting the solidarity of the primary kinship unit.

The conjugal family with dependent children, which is the dominant unit in our society, is, of all types of kinship unit, the one which is probably the least exposed to strain and possible breaking-up by the dispersion of its members both geographically and with respect to stratification in the modern type of occupational hierarchy. Dependent children are not involved in competition for status in the occupational system, and hence their achievements or lack of them are not likely to be of primary importance to the status of the family group as a whole. This reduces the problem to that of possible competitive comparison of the two parents. If both were equally in competition for occupational status, there might indeed be a very serious strain on the solidarity of the family unit, for there is no general reason why they would be likely to come out very nearly equally,

<sup>14</sup> For an explanation of these terms in their application to the modern occupational system see Talcott Parsons, "The Professions and Social Structure," *Social Forces*, XVII (May, 1939), 457-67.



while, in their capacity of husband and wife, it is very important that they should be treated as equals.

One mechanism which can serve to prevent the kind of "invidious comparison" between husband and wife which might be disruptive of family solidarity is a clear separation of the sex roles such as to insure that they do not come into competition with each other. On the whole, this separation exists in our society, and perhaps the above considerations provide part of the explanation of why the feminist movement has had such difficulty in breaking it down.

The separation of the sex roles in our society is such as, for the most part, to remove women from the kind of occupational status which is important for the determination of the status of a family. Where married women are employed outside the home, it is, for the great majority, in occupations which are not in direct competition for status with those of men of their own class.

Women's interests, and the standards of judgment applied to them, run, in our society, far more in the direction of personal adornment and the related qualities of personal charm than is the case with men. Men's dress is practically a uniform, admitting of very slight play for differentiating taste, in marked contrast with that of women. This serves to concentrate the judgment and valuation of men on their occupational achievements, while the valuation of women is diverted into realms outside the occupationally relevant sphere. This difference appears particularly conspicuous in the urban middle classes where competition for class status is most severe. It is suggested that this phenomenon is functionally related to maintaining family solidarity in our class structure.

The probability of this hypothesis is increased by two sets of contrasting facts. On the one hand, in such a society as that of eighteenth-century France, where the tone was set by a hereditary aristocracy, both sexes were greatly concerned with personal adornment and charm. This may in part be due to the fact that, since status was mainly hereditary, neither was in severe competition for status in such fields as the modern occupations. On the other hand, in many rural and peasant societies neither sex seems to be oriented in this direction. This suggests that, in our urban society with its competitive atmosphere, the qualities and achievements of the feminine

role have come to be significant as symbols of the status of the family, as parts of its "standard of living" which reflect credit on it. The man's role, on the other hand, is primarily to determine the status of his family by "finding his level" in the occupational sphere.<sup>15</sup>

From the fact that kinship affiliation is the primary criterion of the class status of an individual it does not, however, follow that the class structure of a society is to be biologically explained. Rather, all the factors involved in social phenomena generally are *prima facie* important in the determination of concrete kinship structures. The same is true of class. In a caste system no individual can change his status of birth, but it does not follow that elements other than birth are not important in the maintenance of a concrete caste system, that any great change in any one or more would not result in a change of the system. When there is a more or less open class system, on the other hand, it is to some combination of these other elements that one must look for the factors which lead to change of the class status of kinship groups.

There is a very complex system of mutual symbolic references by virtue of which primary criteria of status are reinforced by secondary criteria and symbols in various ways.<sup>16</sup> For the primary criteria one must look to the general common value system of the society and its history. The secondary criteria or symbols are often much more adventitious, the result of associations formed in particular historical circumstances which have come to be traditionally upheld. The primary criteria are those things which in relation to the dominant value system are "status-determining" attributes of the individual and which are valued for their own sake. The secondary criteria are

<sup>15</sup> Thorstein Veblen in *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1899) called attention to some of the relevant features of the role of women but did not relate it in this way to the functional equilibrium of the social structure. Moreover, what Veblen meant by "conspicuous consumption" is only one aspect of the feminine role and one which is associated more with certain elements of malintegration than with the basic structure itself.

<sup>16</sup> The present distinction between primary and secondary criteria is a rough one. For many purposes it may be well necessary to refine the classification further. Besides their significance as criteria, many of the same elements may also have significance as causal factors in the distribution of individuals among statuses and in shifts in the system of stratification. It is impossible, within the limits of this paper, to enter into these complex problems.

those things which are regarded as normal accompaniments of the primary criteria or as normal effects of them.

Birth, of course, plays a prominent role among the primary criteria of class status in any system approaching the caste type. But birth is probably never alone adequate to define the social role, and hence the expected qualities, possessions, achievements, or authority of the occupant of a given hereditary status. There is, rather, a complex combination of these things ascribed to the occupant of such a status. An excellent example is the senatorial aristocracy of Republican Rome. Though not formally so, in effect this was a hereditary group, only members of the senatorial families being eligible for the kind of career which led to the higher magistracies and finally membership in the Senate. "New men," though not completely unknown, were very rare. But the young Roman of this class had to live up to a very rigorously defined pattern. He went through a career including military service and the holding of office. To be a good soldier, to run for office, to have the Roman aristocratic virtues, was compulsory for such a young man. Wealth was partly hereditary, partly an acquisition of office-holding. Far from being in a position simply to rest on the laurels of his birth the Roman aristocrat was subjected to a very severe discipline and was expected to live up to a high level of achievement. That none of the generals who led the earlier Roman conquests, first of Italy, then of Carthage, and in part of Greece and the East, was a professional soldier in our sense but an aristocratic amateur who was a soldier as part of his ascribed role as an aristocrat attests to the great power of such ascribed patterns. In certain respects the extraordinary discipline to which the Spartiates were subjected is an even more striking example. The essence of the matter is that a combination of elements other than birth becomes part of the ascribed pattern to which the incumbent of the status is socially expected to "live up."

Though birth is certainly in these circumstances a primary criterion of status, the basic "virtues" emphasized by the ascribed pattern are equally primary, and, once an individual is eligible by virtue of birth, these are the main points at which social pressure to maintain the pattern is applied. Wealth, however, is seldom a primary criterion. It may, however, play an important secondary

role in that a certain "style of living" comes to be expected of the members of an aristocracy. A minimum of wealth is a necessary means of keeping this up, while unusual wealth may be a source of extra prestige, by enabling its holder to excel in many symbolically important respects. Sometimes an economic system may change so as seriously to endanger the position of such an aristocracy, by enabling persons not qualified by birth to take on many of the symbols of aristocratic status and at the same time making it impossible for members of the aristocracy to maintain them. The steady process by which Spartiate families dropped out because of inability to make their contributions to the mess is an excellent example.

Where status is mainly achieved, the situation is quite different. Birth cannot be a primary criterion but only a practical advantage in securing a differential access to opportunities, though in this respect it is of fundamental significance in our society and one of the main mechanisms by which a relative stability of the system of stratification is maintained.

But in our own society, apart from hereditary groups at the top in certain sections of the country, the main criteria of class status are to be found in the occupational achievements of men, the normal case being the married man with immature children. Authority is significant partly as a necessary means of carrying on occupational functions, but in turn the authority exercised is one of the main criteria of the prestige of an occupational status. Authority, especially that of office,<sup>17</sup> is again important as a reward of past achievements, the general structure of the pattern being a progressive rise to greater achievements and greater rewards concomitantly. Being permitted to perform the "higher" functions and being given the authority to do so constitute recognition of past achievements and of the ability necessary for further ones. Thus authority and office become secondary, symbolic criteria of status, because of their traditional association with achievement. But, once they have gained this significance as criteria, the incumbent of an office can enjoy its prestige independently of whether he actually has the requisite achievements to his credit or not.

<sup>17</sup> Not only political office but, even more, offices held in business corporations and other "private" associations.

The case of wealth as a criterion of status in our society is somewhat more complex. In spite of much opinion to the contrary, it is not a primary criterion, seen in terms of the common value system. Like office, its primary significance is as a symbol of achievement. But it owes its special prominence in that respect to certain peculiar features of our social system. That is, with a basic ethic which emphasizes individual achievement as the primary criterion of stratification, we have developed an economic system which to a hitherto unprecedented degree rests on a "business" or "capitalistic" basis. Our society is very highly specialized occupationally. The measures of achievement are technical and specific for each particular field. Hence it is difficult to compare relative achievements in different fields with one another. To be sure, there is a very rough general scale of prestige of occupations which is at least relatively independent of income. Skilled labor ranks higher than unskilled labor; functions with an important intellectual component which require "higher education" rank high. In particular, authority over others, in proportion to its extent, ranks high.

But in a business economy the immediate end of business policy must, in the nature of the case, be to improve the financial status of the enterprise. Regardless of the technical content of its operations, the earnings of a business have become the principal criterion of its success. It is not surprising that the same has, to a relatively high degree, come to be true of individuals in business. Hence, within the broad framework of the direct differential valuation of occupations and achievements as managerial, professional, skilled, unskilled, etc., there is an income hierarchy which, on the whole, corresponds to that of direct valuation.<sup>28</sup> This income hierarchy forms a most convenient point of reference for the determination of the status of an individual or of a family. Furthermore, within any particular closely knit group, it is fairly adequate as a criterion, since the more highly valued jobs are also the best paid. But, in such a complex system as our own its adequacy is much more dubious. In particular, it

<sup>28</sup> How this correspondence comes about is an interesting sociological problem. The one thing which can be said here with certainty is that an ordinary economic explanation, though true within certain limits, is quite inadequate to the general problem. The explanation is to a large extent institutional.

is complicated by the inheritance of property, by the availability of means of making money which are of doubtful legitimacy in terms of the value system, and by the many relatively adventitious opportunities for money-making opened up by the rapid changes and fluctuations of a business system in a society which is to a high degree emancipated from the rigidities of traditionalism. Hence the same thing happens as with the case of authority. Wealth, which owes its place as a criterion of status mainly to its being an effect of business achievement, gains a certain independence so that the possessor of wealth comes to claim a status and to have it recognized, regardless of whether or not he has the corresponding approved achievements to his credit. In our society this is further complicated by the fact that there is a tradition of respect for birth and inherited wealth which has never quite been extinguished, and where the status is ascribed and the wealth naturally never regarded as an effect of its possessors' achievements.

There is a further respect in which wealth has a peculiar significance in an "individualistic" society. Where status is ascribed, there is usually a fairly well-defined standard to which people are expected to live up. For the group in question there is something like a "ceiling" of adequate achievement, even though there are naturally different degrees of attainment. With respect to achieved status, on the other hand, the situation is different. Achievement is in a different sense competitive. There is a more or less indefinite scale of degrees of excellence in any one line. Even though for a professional group, like the medical, there is a fairly well-defined minimum of competence, from this minimum upward there is a gradual transition through a widely dispersed pyramid to the "top" of the profession. The fact that money is an infinitely divisible, quantitative medium of measurement makes it a peculiarly convenient criterion to designate the various steps in such a graduated pyramidal structure, particularly where other common measures such as direct technical criteria or hierarchy of office in directly comparable organizations are not readily available. It is, in fact, quite common to speak of "\$5,000 men" or "\$25,000 men," although it is realized that this is not alone an adequate measure of their status.

As in the case of ascribed status the role of money as a criterion of

status is here strongly reinforced by the fact that its expenditure is largely for other symbols of status in turn. Though the "standard of living" of any group must cover their intrinsically significant needs, such as food, shelter, and the like, there can be no doubt that an exceedingly large component of standards of living everywhere is to be found in the symbolic significance of many of its items in relation to status. Indeed it may be said that there are two types of situations in which this is likely to be more important than otherwise—the case of an aristocracy the members of which maintain a conspicuously different style of life from that of the rest of the population and the case of a group who are involved in a highly competitive struggle for achieved status, where the status of a large proportion of them at any given time is either newly acquired or relatively insecure or both. Perhaps at no time in history have such a large proportion of a great population been "on the make" as in the United States of the early twentieth century.

One further important point is that the various items of a standard of living which are symbolic of status necessarily play their primary role in relation to class status, not to the other aspects of the status of the members of a family. This follows from the fact that income is allocated on a basis of the family as a unit. A very interesting point of view from which to conduct budget studies would be to determine the various different things which were thought necessary for each member of a family in order to maintain or to improve the class status of the family as a whole.

The difficulty of finding common measures of status when the primary criterion is occupational achievement has already been mentioned. To a certain extent we do, of course, have such common measures, above all the relatively vague scales of direct valuations and of income. But to a considerable extent this situation is met by a certain vagueness in the actual scale of stratification, so that it is only in a relatively rough and broad sense, not a precise and definite one, that a given individual or family is placed relative to others. There is a relatively broad range of the standard of living where anyone with a certain minimum of income can participate without having the question of his exact relative status raised. This is, for instance, true of many of the facilities open to the "public." In hotels,

restaurants, theaters, etc., a certain minimum of dress and manners is required beyond the mere fact of being able to pay the direct charges. But this minimum is, for a certain class of facilities, possessed by people belonging to a rather wide range of class status. This is really an instance of a broader class of phenomena, those involved in the fact that very many social contacts in our society are "partial" or "segmental" and cover only an area of interests and values which can, to a relative degree, be isolated from class status. Another instance is the relative lack of integration as between different structures within the broader society, each of which involves a pretty definite stratification within itself, such as occupational groups of persons in regular daily contact, and "communities" of people whose mutual relations are very precisely defined.

This indefiniteness, among other things, makes possible two very important things for the functioning of an individualistic social system. In the first place, when the relatively adventitious circumstances of the economic and social situation lead to discrepancies between income and occupational status as otherwise judged, within certain limits too great a strain is not placed on the system. For example, it would be generally agreed that the difference between the top range of incomes earned, on the one hand, in business and the law and, on the other, in university teaching and the ministry does not accurately measure the relative prestige of their incumbents. A world-famous scientist who is a university professor on a ten-thousand-dollar salary is not only at the top of his own profession but may be the full equal in status of a corporation lawyer whose income is ten times his own. But so long as the scientist is able to maintain a "respectable" standard of living, entertain his friends well, dress his family adequately, and educate his children well, the fact that he cannot afford the luxuries of a hundred-thousand-dollar income is a matter of relative indifference. He simply does not compete on the plane of "conspicuous consumption" which is open to the lawyer but closed to him.<sup>19</sup>

There is also another respect in which this vagueness is function-

<sup>19</sup> This is not to say that the discrepancy does not give rise to some strains which, however, are more likely to be felt by the scientist's wife and/or children than himself.



ally important in our system. If the institutional pattern which bases class status on the occupational achievements of a man is not to be severely discredited, there must be considerable room for class mobility. But this means that there will inevitably be a process of "dispersion" of the members of the same kinship groups in the class structure. In particular, there will be dispersion as between parents and children and as between siblings. A son, for instance, may rise well above his father's status, or two brothers may fare very unequally. To be sure, this is partly taken care of by the weakening of at least parts of the kinship structure itself, in that the primary unit of kinship has become the immediate family of parents and immature children. The ties of independent children to their parents and of independent siblings to one another are greatly weakened. Above all, these are not any longer normally the day-to-day "community" ties which are inevitable as between those who share the life of a common household. But, of course, this does not mean that such ties have become of negligible importance. It is difficult to see how such powerful sentiments as those developed between parents and children during the dependent period could be simply dropped at maturity without serious effects.

The fact is that they are not. The vagueness of our class structure provides a kind of cushioning mechanism. For the fact that mature children ordinarily live in independent households is associated with the further fact that they are usually, to a large extent, members of independent "communities." Their mutual relations becomes highly segmental. When one visits the other, he is, from the point of view of the latter's community relationships, an "outsider," a stranger. So long as the discrepancy is not too great, it is then unnecessary for there to be any very exact determination of relative class status, as there would have to be if both were permanent members of the same set of immediate community relationships, of the same "particular nexus." There will naturally be gossip which compares the relative status of the two, but this does not assume the same importance in the two cases. For instance, if two brothers are on the faculty of the same university, the question of their relative status is very acute. But if one is a physician in Boston and the

## BUSINESS AND THE PROFESSIONS IN LIBERAL FASCIST, AND COMMUNIST SOCIETY

N. S. TIMASHEFF

### ABSTRACT

In liberal society business and the professions are decentralized activities as opposed to public services which are centralized. In fascist society business and the professions are forced into patterns which are somewhat in between public service and the professions of the liberal society. In communist society all three patterns are merged into one. This means that fascist and communist societies are structurally less differentiated than liberal society.

There is great divergence in the ideas concerning the correlation of business and the professions in the modern Western world. Whereas there exists a tendency to think that the businessman egoistically pursues his own interests regardless of interests of others, and that the professional man altruistically serves the interests of others, there are scholars who would almost completely assimilate the professions and business. For instance, Henry E. Sigerist, of Johns Hopkins University, says that medicine in the modern Western world has gradually become a trade, that medical service is purchased by the patient and sold by the physician under a competitive system, and that the physicians today are in business, without having lost a high moral standard.<sup>1</sup>

In a well-thought-out paper Talcott Parsons<sup>2</sup> expresses the intermediary opinion that, in modern Western society, business and the professions have much more in common than is generally assumed and especially that they cannot be differentiated on the basis of pursuit of self-interest versus disinterestedness.

Professor Parsons does not identify business and the professions, and he ascribes to each of them, in modern Western society, a well-differentiated pattern. He believes, however, that they have some elements in common and that these are rationality, functional specialization, and universalism. But, of course, the most important element they have in common is structural decentralization as op-

<sup>1</sup> *Socialized Medicine in the Soviet Union* (New York, 1937), p. 83.

<sup>2</sup> "The Professions and Social Structure," *Social Forces*, XVII (1939), 457-67.

posed to the centralization of public services.<sup>3</sup> Decentralization means that a certain function is carried out by an indefinite number of independent, although interacting, agencies. The decentralization of business and the professions reveals the "liberal" character of modern society and is consistent with its general structure as manifested in the organization of the state and in the state-church relationships.

It is noteworthy that to minor variations within modern Western society there are fairly corresponding parallel variations in business and the professions; thus, for instance, there is no doubt that the Anglo-American variety of modern Western society gave rise to the highest "rugged individualism" in business and to the greatest freedom of professions.<sup>4</sup> The parallelism of fluctuations certainly forms an additional argument for the basic proposition of Parsons.

Validity can be ascribed to a generalization based on empirical study only within the scope of the material studied. But it is worth while to scrutinize whether the proposition that the structure of business and of the professions is parallel and can be related to the general structure of society is valid also outside of the modern Western world. A comparison with the newly created types of modern society—the fascist and the communist—seems to be a conclusive test.

It is characteristic for fascist society to direct business toward public service. Business continues to be based on private ownership of enterprises and on individual profit; but the activity of the owners ceases to be a "free" activity, becomes more and more managed by state agencies, and has to comply more and more with public interest as interpreted by these agencies.<sup>5</sup> The new structure seems contra-

<sup>3</sup> In this paper the term "public service" will be used in a broad sense, including the administrative machinery.

<sup>4</sup> It must be noted that in English the term "profession" can mean free occupation in a certain field, whereas in all other European languages the addition of the word "liberal" or "free" is necessary to express the same conception. Language is merely a symbol, but the use of different symbols is sometimes a very good indication of differences in the actual phenomena they manifest.

<sup>5</sup> The best presentation for Italy is W. G. Welk, *Fascist Economic Policy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1938); for Germany see F. Ermath, *The New Germany* (Washington, 1936).

dictory, for we are used to the idea that public service is carried out by men selected in accordance with their particular ability for a specified function and with the special training which they have received, whereas, in fascist society, the shift of the economic function into the number of public services has not been accompanied by a departure from the structural principle of business in liberal society according to which the economic function is carried out by individuals determined by the accident of their birth in a certain family or by success obtained in profit-making. This is not, however, entirely without historical precedent. In feudal society the exercise of public functions was combined with landownership. Moreover, in fascist society there appears a tendency to require from owners and managers the technical knowledge necessary for the particular situation, under the threat of replacement by others.<sup>6</sup> This is an additional symptom of the evolution of business toward public service.

A parallel evolution takes place in fascist society in regard to professions. The following fact is significant. In Italy the same law of April 3, 1926, which created semicompulsory associations, federations, and confederations of employers and employees, provides also for the organization of the professional classes according to the same pattern—that of semicompulsory associations. Professional men are grouped into seventeen national federations and one confederation, which exactly corresponds to the four confederations of employers, i.e., of businessmen. The associations, federations, and confederations are managed by the ruling party. What this means can be shown in the example of journalism.<sup>7</sup> All journalists have been divided into categories depending on their loyalty to the regime, and by means of a purge the members of the lower categories have been expelled and thus prevented from continuing their professional activity. According to Gaetano Salvemini, journalism under the fascist regime has ceased to be a free profession; journalists have become

<sup>6</sup> Both in Italy and in Germany this idea is actualized mainly in the field of agriculture and in some adjacent fields of economic activity. Thus, for instance, the German decrees of October 1, 1936, and January 25, 1937, demand special knowledge on the part of the managers of dairies and of enterprises trading in cattle.

<sup>7</sup> Professor Parsons never mentions this profession, but in Continental Europe it is considered as one of the most representative.

public officials controlled by the Fascist party.<sup>8</sup> This is possibly an exaggerated statement, but the trend of evolution is in that direction. In Germany, the creation on September 12, 1933, of the national chamber of culture had similar effects. Later laws introduced "authors' leaders" whose function is to "co-ordinate" the activity of journalists and of authors.<sup>9</sup> These are only examples, but, in general, in fascist countries professions are no longer decentralized activities.

The parallelism in the development in fascist society is obvious. Society has been given a new pattern manifested first of all by the new structure of the state. Both business and the professions have been affected and have been forced into patterns which, from the standpoint of modern Western society, are somewhat in between public service and professions. An interesting corollary can be drawn here: fascist society is structurally less differentiated than is modern Western society, the three patterns of business, professions, and public service merging into one.

In regard to communist society, there is no need to stress that business is almost completely abolished and replaced by public service. One of the corollaries is that the positions in economic activity depend, officially, exclusively on knowledge, skill, and efficiency, actually also on what could be called the clique pattern.

A parallel development has taken place in the organization of those social functions which, in modern Western society, are carried out by professional men. Liberal education does not exist in communist society; there is only state education completely subjected to approved programs.<sup>10</sup> Medical service has become public service; all medical men are state officers and must apply their knowledge without any remuneration from patients. Private practice has never been officially prohibited, and, although it has existed up to the present, its importance is rapidly decreasing.<sup>11</sup> Lawyers have been sub-

<sup>8</sup> *Under the Axe of Fascism* (New York, 1936), p. 81.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. R. A. Brady, *The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism* (New York, 1937).

<sup>10</sup> N. Hans and S. Hessen, *Educational Policy in Soviet Russia* (London, 1930). In regard to higher educational institutions see also N. S. Timasheff, "Die Hochschule," in a symposium *Die Welt vor dem Abgrunde*, ed. I. Iljin (Berlin, 1931), pp. 519-33.

<sup>11</sup> Sigerist, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-23 and 137. Ground for this change had been prepared by the fact that in Imperial Russia medical service in rural districts was already organ-

jected to a regimentation manifesting considerable variety in detail. The general trend is that of transforming the activity of counsels into a public service parallel to that of the prosecution.<sup>12</sup> Journalists are considered an important part of the governmental machinery for propaganda. All teachers, lawyers, medical men, journalists, etc., are organized into trade-unions. (The idea of compulsory trade-unions has been imported to fascist Italy from communist Russia.) The Russian organization presents the peculiarity that the distribution of persons among unions depends not on the personal function but on the function of the institution, so that a counsel of a textile factory belongs to the union of textile workers and that the union of medical men includes the janitors of the hospitals, etc. This is an additional symptom of far-reaching changes in the conception of activities, which men of European culture consider as belonging to the inviolable domain of professions.

Communist society presents another opportunity for testing the validity of many generalizations gained by the observation of modern Western society. In contradistinction to fascism, the advance of which was almost straightforward, communist society was built up by disconnected efforts punctuated by retreats. In regard to the subject which especially interests us, the changes in the standing of the legal profession are significant. During the period of war communism the legal profession was abolished and replaced by a public service simultaneously with the abolition of private business; the remuneration of counsels was equalized with that of judges. During the period of the New Economic Policy, when business was partly restored, some autonomy was given to the lawyers. Everybody possessing the required (very modest) training could apply for admission to the collegium of defenders; the presidium of the collegium and the local soviet could reject the application. The fees were scheduled according to the client's ability to pay and to the complexity of the case. With the shift from the New Economic Policy to the policy of the Five Year plans private business and autonomy of lawyers again

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ized according to the pattern of public service under the direction of the agencies of local self-government. Professor Sigerist calls it the first attempt to organize medicine as a public service on a large scale (*ibid.*, pp. 70-77).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. M. S. Calcott, *Russian Justice* (New York, 1935), pp. 140-58.

vanished. With the mitigation of communist methods in economics during the past few years a slight improvement in the situation of counsels has been manifested, first of all, by drastic denunciations of the counterrevolutionary activities of those who, during the previous period, had not given counsels the necessary freedom.<sup>13</sup>

Summing up, it can be said that, as regards communist society, a general parallel fluctuation of business and professional organization can be fairly well established, corresponding not only to the general trends but also to minor fluctuations within that society. This is a statement analogous to that made with respect to fascist society. The lack of differentiation established in regard to the latter is still more clearly expressed in communist society, where unification of business, professions, and public service is no longer a trend, as it is in fascist society, but an actuality.

Since in fascist and communist societies business and the professions tend toward assimilation with each other and with public service, it can be expected that the elements which they already have in common in liberal society—rationality, functional specialization, and universalism—continue to be well expressed in the new types of modern society. This expectation is amply corroborated by facts. In fascist and communist society the element of rationality is obviously stressed in contradistinction to traditionalism. The idea of functional specialization was contested by the fathers of communism,<sup>14</sup> but this has proved to be a highly utopian element in the doctrine, and the pattern of functional specialization had to be restored. The application of the principle of universalism in fascist as well as in communist society experienced a certain curb, in regard both to business and to the professions; neither business, the professions, nor their substitutes could serve racially heterogeneous elements in

<sup>13</sup> It is characteristic for the period of Five Year plans that drastic changes in societal regulation were not expressed in written law which frequently remained unchanged (cf. N. S. Timasheff, "L'Evoluzione del diritto penale sovietico," *Rivista italiana del diritto penale*, IV [1932], 174-89). Many important facts belonging to that period can be studied only at the present time when they are denounced as leftist or other "deviations." Very important for clarifying the position of lawyers are the statements in *Sovetskoiia Iustitsiia*, 1937, No. 22, pp. 20-22.

<sup>14</sup> "Every Cook Should Be Able To Rule the State" was one of the favorite slogans of Lenin.

the first case, or class enemies in the second.<sup>15</sup> But both exceptions are of the universalistic type: not persons but classes of persons are excluded, so that they serve to corroborate the principle.

An important background to the unification of business, the professions, and public service is presented by the new theory of motivation. According to the fascist and the communist doctrine, in new society there should be neither egoistic nor altruistic but solidaristic motivation serving the interests not of the actor or other individuals but those of the group considered as a unity. This solidaristic motivation is expected from every citizen in every social situation. Therefore, there can be no different institutional or normative patterns corresponding to the patterns of business, professions, or public service in modern Western society. This is another symptom of the decreasing differentiation in those societies as compared with the latter.

The cursory review of some facts which can be observed in the world surrounding us allows the assumption that the basic proposition which Professor Parsons very cautiously formulated for only modern Western society is valid in a wider field. Freedom in business and freedom in the professions, characteristic for that society, depends on the general type of social organization. With changes in this type parallel variations both in business and in the professions seem to take place. That it is so is probably *a priori*. But it is sometimes worth while to verify by facts the validity of common-sense propositions.

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<sup>15</sup> During the past few years restrictions against the members of "hostile classes" have been gradually removed in the Soviet Union; this, of course, manifests a trend toward universalization. This trend, however, is displayed in a society which is no longer an entirely communist society but presents a compromise between communist and "bourgeois" patterns.



## A NEGLECTED ASPECT OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

RALPH LINTON

### ABSTRACT

Students of "primitive" societies have devoted much time and attention to the analysis of those aspects of social organization which were associated with family relationships while largely ignoring the aspects associated with formal recognition of age and sex differences. While membership in a family establishes the individual's relations with a limited series of other individuals, membership in an age-sex category establishes his relations with the total society and his participation in a particular sector of its culture. A simple method is suggested for the graphic presentation of social structure in terms of the statuses derived from factors of age and sex with or without other determinants. Two classless societies, the Tanala and Comanche, are presented as examples of the use of the method. It is suggested that the technique would be equally applicable to small, well-integrated units within our own society such as rural neighborhoods or villages. Whether it can be used for larger and more heterogeneous units can only be discovered by experiment.

One of the most fertile sources of misunderstanding between sociologists and anthropologists is the variety of meanings which the two disciplines may attach to the same terms. It seems best, therefore, to make clear at the very outset what will be meant in this paper by the terms "society" and "social system." I believe that I am in agreement with the ordinary usage of American anthropologists when I define a society as a tangible group of individuals organized into a functioning whole by mutual adaptations in their attitudes and behavior. I believe that I am also in agreement in drawing a distinction between such an organized group and the configuration of patterned, predictable attitudes and behavior stereotypes responsible for its organization. This configuration I will refer to as the social system. When such a system is treated without reference to the individuals who compose a society, it must be considered as an abstraction of the same order as the concept of a culture. In fact, the social system of any society must be considered as an integral part of its total culture: that part of the culture which provides the individual with techniques for interaction with other members of his society, just as another part provides him with techniques for coping with his natural environment.

It is obvious that a social system cannot exist without a group of

individuals to exercise and perpetuate its component patterns. At the same time both societies and social systems have a superindividual quality. The society and its system are continuums extending through time. The individuals who compose the former and act according to the latter are also continuums, but continuums extending over much shorter time intervals. Perhaps the relations of a society, a social system, and the individuals who compose the society can be made clearer by an analogy. A rope can be analyzed into its component strands with respect both to its total length and to its content at any point in that length. Its structural pattern can also be ascertained by observing the spatial relations of the various strands at a series of points along its length. This pattern will persist in spite of the termination of certain strands and the introduction of others and will bear little relation to the individual qualities of the various strands—such things as their exact length, thickness, or color. It can be described in the abstract and compared with the structural patterns revealed by other ropes. A society, in its extension through time, can be likened to a rope braided from the short strands of individual lives. By studying the social relations between individuals and observing the repetitive situations, it becomes possible to deduce the structural pattern of the society. This pattern tends to persist in spite of the steady turnover in the society's content and bears little relation to the special qualities of the various individuals who occupy places in the society at various times. It can be described in the abstract and compared with the structural patterns of other societies.

Although the structures of societies bear little relation to the special qualities of individuals, they bear a very close relation to the general qualities of our species. In all social systems certain basic physiological and psychological factors have to be taken into account. Thus the processes of human reproduction impose certain limits upon the ways in which a self-perpetuating group of individuals can be organized. Similarly, the differing capacities of persons of different ages and sexes impose certain limits upon the possible patterns of organization. In both cases a wide range of organizational forms is still possible, but there are ultimate realities, firmly fixed at a subcultural level, which can be utilized in various ways but not escaped.

The institution of the family, in all its wide variety of forms, has emerged out of one set of physiological factors and must operate within the limits which these impose. This institution has received a tremendous amount of attention from social scientists, partly because of our own society's obsession with everything connected with sex, partly because of the early development of tools for presenting and analyzing family structure. Methods for charting family relationships have been in common use for many years, providing in themselves a stimulus to further study. At the same time, the influence of age and sex differences upon social structure has been largely ignored. It is obvious that such differences are linked with differing potentialities for social function and that all societies accord them recognition in their formal patterns of organization. However, direct information on the role of age-sex categories in the structure of various societies is surprisingly scanty. No ethnological report is considered complete without a list of relationship terms and a chart of family structure, yet few reports trouble to list the age and sex categories recognized by the society or the various positions for which membership in particular categories of this sort are prerequisites.

Actually, age and sex categories are probably more important for the understanding of the operation of most societies than are family systems. Family relationships control and stereotype individual interactions to a considerable degree. They form a web of reciprocal rights and duties connecting the individual with a series of other individuals of both sexes and all ages, but they do not place him with relation to the total society and its culture. His position with respect to these is determined by his membership in a particular age-sex category or by his occupation of a more specialized place for which membership in such a category is a prerequisite. The age-sex categories and their derivatives are the building blocks of the society. They determine the individual's impersonal relationships with the society's other members and the sectors of its total culture in which he will participate.

The current neglect of this aspect of social organization is no doubt due in part to its deceptive appearance of simplicity. The existence of age-sex categories is so obvious that their importance to social

structure is likely to be overlooked. However, the neglect has also been due, in part, to the lack of techniques for the graphic presentation of the social structures derived from a combination of these categories with other culturally established status determinants. The present paper is offered as an experiment in the development of such graphic techniques.

A few general statements should precede the explanation of the charts. Both of the societies presented lack castes or even clearly defined social classes, thus greatly simplifying the problems of presentation. In the case of class-organized societies it might be necessary to draw up a separate chart for the recognized positions within each class and then correlate these in somewhat the way that the male and female systems of statuses have been correlated in the cases shown. In the accompanying charts male statuses have been marked with triangles, female ones with circles. Age levels are indicated by the long crosslines. The vertical lines passing through either triangles or circles indicate, by their length, the total age range of individuals occupying the status. The position of the triangle or circle with relation to the total length of this line does *not* indicate the mode of age distribution among the individuals occupying the status, although this refinement could easily be introduced in cases where vital statistics were available for the society. The horizontal lines connected with circles or triangles indicate the range of prestige among individuals occupying the status. Similarly, the horizontal organization of the entire figure is based on the relative prestige of the various statuses represented. Thus in the chart of Tanala male statuses (Fig. 2), Status 12, that of household head, exceeds in prestige Status 11, that of the young married man, and is exceeded in turn by Status 16, that of heir apparent.

The objections which attach to the use of prestige as a determinant of position in such charts are fully recognized. Prestige is not measurable in exact units, and the arrangement of statuses on this basis is certain to be influenced by the observer's subjective judgment. At the same time, it is one of the few qualities which is a common denominator of the statuses in any social system and one of the easiest to ascertain, in relative terms, from informants. Any member of a society can tell the investigator whether men rank

women, old people rank young people, or doctors rank carpenters in public estimation. Moreover, such statements can be checked by observations of behavior since prestige ranking will be reflected in patterns of respect and also in the influence which members of various categories can exert in conflict situations.

Although all the statuses represented in the charts have particular factors of age and sex as prerequisites for their occupation by individuals, most of them have additional determinants. These determinants will differ both with the status and with the society, but they usually are not very numerous. Thus Status 16 in the Tanala chart, that of heir apparent, requires for its occupation male sex, young adult age level, priority of birth, and membership in the family of a lineage head. It would be easy to express such constellations of determinants in the form of pseudoequations, substituting letters, numbers, or symbols for the various factors, but I feel that, at the present stage of development of these charts, it is better to avoid this. Pseudoequations of this sort are likely to derive a certain dignity from their superficial resemblance to genuine mathematical equations, while actually they are constructs of a different and much lower order.

It will be observed that the statuses shown in these charts are arranged in series, the individual passing from those in lower to those in higher age levels. At particular points in such series there are usually alternatives, i.e., the individual having reached this point can move to any one of two or more statuses, and this selection will limit the range of statuses which may be occupied thereafter. Thus in the Tanala female series (Fig. 1) the adolescent girl, Status 2, may become either a head wife, Status 6, or a second wife, Status 3. From Status 6 she may move to Status 7 or to Status 8, the selection depending on additional factors, but she cannot move to Statuses 4 or 5. Similarly, from Status 3 she can move to Statuses 4 or 5 but not to Statuses 6, 7, or 8 except under certain unusual circumstances, i.e., the death of the head wife before the head wife has borne a child. Such selection points in the status series are usually stress points in the life-cycle of individuals and are frequently connected with conditions of competition or rivalry which do not exist at higher or lower age levels.

## TANALA SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The Tanala are one of the more archaic tribes of Madagascar. Their society lends itself readily to the present system of charting since its organization is comparatively simple with well-marked prestige differentials for the various statuses and relatively little individual variation in prestige among the holders of any given status. Figure 1 represents the arrangement of female statuses. Number 1




FIG. 1.—Tanala female statuses

is that of a girl infant; No. 2, that of an adolescent girl, a status of brief duration, approximately from the age of fifteen to that of eighteen. The progress of the individual from infancy through childhood is so gradual that I have hesitated to assign a separate status between Nos. 1 and 2. From childhood to Status 2, on the other hand, the transition is rather abrupt, symbolized by the transfer of the girl's residence from the parental house to the young people's house and by the assumption of courting behavior. These statuses have only sex and age determinants. From Status 2 the individual must advance to either Status 3, that of a second wife, or Status 6, that of a head wife. This selection depends partly on personal attractiveness, partly on the skill of the family in arranging a marriage. If

taken as a second wife, she continues in this status with little change in prestige until about the age of forty. The woman's children, if she is fertile, will be well grown by then, and her dominance over them will place her in a higher prestige position, Status 5. If barren, she will lose prestige progressively and after forty will rank very low, below even the adolescent girls (Status 2). Her position is shown by Status 4.

If taken as a head wife, Status 6, the woman will retain prestige superior to that of a second wife even though barren, but, if she has children, her prestige will be greatly augmented after they are adult. She will even rank young married men, as indicated in Figure 3. The only other status open to a living woman is that of *ombiasy* or medicine man, a worker with the supernatural. Although this status, No. 8, can, in theory, be achieved by any adult woman, in practice it is largely limited to barren head wives of middle age. Women with children rarely aspire to it, while barren second wives are of such low prestige that the authenticity of their claims of having supernatural helpers is sure to be questioned.

One of the striking features of Tanala society is the direct incorporation of the ancestral spirits. These also have status differences. From any of the life-statuses the individual normally goes to Status 20, that of a mere ghost or unnamed ancestor, with only incidental participation in the ancestor sacrifices or in the affairs of the living. However, the individual may announce his or her intention of answering prayers after death in return for personal sacrifices. Such spirits, Status 21, rank well above the ghosts, their prestige being determined by their proved ability to reward their worshipers. The female claimants for this posthumous honor are drawn almost exclusively from the older age levels of Statuses 5, 6, and 7; and mainly from 5 and 6. Women in Status 8, *ombiasy*, very rarely become helpers of this sort although they may become controls for other *ombiasy*. Status 22, that of a named ancestral spirit, is the highest available to a woman in the Tanala system. To achieve it one must be not only a fertile head wife, Status 7, but the wife of a lineage head. As indicated in Figure 3, the rank of women even in these posthumous statuses is uniformly inferior to that of men.

If we turn now to the male statuses in the Tanala system (Fig. 2),

we find new factors of primogeniture and family affiliation operating as status determinants. The eldest son of a lineage head, Status 15, is set aside from other males from the moment of his birth. Certain adult statuses are strictly reserved for him, while he is excluded from certain others which carry considerable prestige and profit. To make this clear we may begin with Status 10, that of an ordinary male infant, and follow through the series of statuses open to such an individual.




FIG. 2.—Tanala male statuses

Here, as in the case of females, it might be justifiable to insert a distinct boyhood status covering the levels between approximately eight and eighteen years, but the transition from infancy to adult status is even more gradual for males than for females. Submission and dependency on the father are complete until marriage, Status 11, for most Tanala males. Even after marriage the average younger son, or son of other than the leading household within a lineage, remains dependent first upon his father and later upon his eldest brother or the lineage head. When his own sons are grown, he passes automatically from Status 11 to Status 12, that of household head, and from here to the postmortem obscurity of Status 20, an unnamed



ghost. At most he may become a helper, Status 21. The significance of these spiritual statuses has already been explained in connection with the female organization of the society.

To the younger sons whose personalities are unfitted for a lifetime of submissive security the culture offers two alternatives. They may become warriors, Status 13, or *ombiasy*, Status 14. The title of warrior is gained more by success in cattle-raiding than by courage in the field, and its significance to the native is the opportunity which it provides for the rapid accumulation of wealth. Warriors may be recognized as young as eighteen and rarely function as such after thirty-five. From the status of warrior the only moderately successful individual reverts in later life to that of simple household head, No. 12, and passes from there to one or the other of the postmortem statuses open to family heads, i.e., 20 or 21. The successful warrior, i.e., one who has accumulated many cattle by his raiding, is able to increase his household establishment and above all to buy a piece of land in the village, thus becoming the founder of a new lineage. In this status, No. 17, he will rank somewhat below hereditary lineage heads, owing to the fact that his newly established lineage will be comparatively small, but he will be equated with them for all ordinary purposes. He will be debarred, however, from the two highest statuses open to the living—those of village chief, No. 18, and of village ancestor priest, No. 19. The former presupposes a large lineage able to support the chief's authority and the expenses of the office, while the latter goes automatically to the head of the oldest lineage in the village. In compensation, the lineage-founder passes, after death, to the status of a named ancestor, No. 22, and elevates his head wife to a similar position. In this status he will receive individual worship as long as the lineage endures and will exercise a large measure of control in its affairs.

The status of *ombiasy*, No. 14, can be acquired either by instruction, which has to be bought, or by manifesting the psychic peculiarities which indicate that an individual is under spirit control. The funds necessary to obtain instruction can only be obtained from a father, so the early careers of the *ombiasy* of instructed type are much like those of other younger sons. *Ombiasy* of the possessed type do not manifest possession before puberty and frequently not

until much later. The two types are completely equivalent in native estimation, and neither begins practicing before about thirty or continues practicing after becoming aged or infirm. This status is the most lucrative which an individual can achieve, but it usually entails settlement in a village other than the one in which the *ombiasy* was born. The course of the *ombiasy* in later life is the same as that of the warrior. If unsuccessful, he returns to his own village, assumes Status 12, and passes after death to Status 20. Although he may, theoretically, assume Status 21, spirit-helper, his failure while alive will tend to discredit his ability after death. If successful, he passes to the status of lineage head, No. 17, but in this is subject to the same limitations as the warrior and for the same reasons. Statuses 18 and 19 are barred to him, but after death he occupies Status 22, that of a named ancestor, and may also be an *ombiasy* control spirit, a variant of Status 21. He will not become an ordinary spirit-helper, since as a named ancestor he will receive abundant sacrifices.

The career of the eldest son of a lineage head follows a quite different course. His superior prestige is indicated in special treatment from his infancy, Status 15, and at marriage he assumes Status 16, that of heir apparent. In this status he is systematically built up by his father through gifts and delegation of authority. At his father's death he assumes Status 17, that of lineage head, and may become village chief, Status 18, as well. If his lineage is the senior one in the village, i.e., closest to the direct line of descent through eldest sons from the common ancestor of all the village lineages, he will automatically assume the status of ancestor-priest, Status 19; but, in practice the chieftainship and the priestly office are very rarely held by the same individual. Both offices are usually surrendered when their incumbents become infirm through age. After death the lineage head becomes a named ancestor, Status 22.

The pattern of Tanala society as a whole reveals certain significant features (Fig. 3). The dominance of sex and age factors as prestige determinants is clear from the massing of male statuses to the right and from the general slanting of the figure toward the right through each of the ascending levels. It is also plain that there are few points in the life of the individual where he is brought into competition with other individuals for status. In the female life-cycle

there is only one, the competition between girls in Status 2 for the status of first wives, Status 6. For males there may be rivalry between occupants of Status 13, warrior, or Status 14, *ombiasy*, but no real competition since the number of persons who can occupy either of these statuses is not culturally limited. The same considerations hold for Status 17, that of lineage head. Status 18, village chief, is open to competition, but the field is so strictly limited by considera-




FIG. 3.—Tanala social structure

tions of size of lineage, etc., that there is rarely any real struggle for the office. Competition between men and women is possible in only two statuses, those of *ombiasy*, Status 8 female and Status 14 male, and in Status 21, the postmortem one of spirit-helper. The whole picture is that of a society in which the individual progresses smoothly upward in prestige with age, with no sudden transitions in responsibility from one age level to another and with little competition or conflict.

#### COMANCHE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The Comanche present a striking contrast to the Tanala in the structure of their society. They are a tribe of the southern plains, famous for their warlike character. Family organization in this group

was of minimal functional importance, and status depended almost entirely upon combinations of age, sex, and individual ability or preference.

Figure 4 shows the arrangement of female statuses. From Status 1, that of infant, the individual might pass to Status 2, girl, or to Status 3, that of honored child. This status was limited to girls and was imposed by the family, who might select one of their daughters and "treat her like a boy." This meant giving feasts in her honor, re-




FIG. 4.—Comanche female statuses

turning gifts made to her with greatly increased values, etc. The honored-child institution was a mechanism for elevating the prestige of the girl's family and was not connected in any way with the qualities of the girl herself. The special treatment and consideration tapered off rapidly after the girl's marriage, so that individuals in both statuses, Statuses 2 and 3, passed to the same higher status of married woman, Status 4. In this status there was great spread in individual prestige based on individual abilities and personality, but no clearly marked or formal distinctions. A head wife was slightly more important than a second wife but did not occupy a distinct status as among the Tanala. The next great transition in the female life-cycle came with the menopause, which removed women's disabilities in

dealing with the supernatural. At this time the individual might pass from Status 4 to Status 5, the position of an innocuous old woman, doing most of the work and caring for her grandchildren, or to Statuses 6 or 7. Status 6, which I have termed "painted lady," requires a word of explanation. In this tribe there were various women who embarked on careers of heightened sexual activity in later life. They were much hated by the younger women with whom they seem to have competed on more than equal terms. They avoided the ordinary household activities of old women and deserve to be classed as a distinct group in the society. Medicine women, Status 7, represented the highest point in prestige which women could attain. This post could only be assumed after the menopause. It might be acquired either through instruction and transfer of power by a husband who was a medicine man or by individual supernatural experience. In either case the medicine woman was treated like a man of comparable age, and individual medicine women ranked individual medicine men in prestige. In extreme age the holders of Statuses 6 and 7 reverted to the low prestige level and domestic activities of Status 5.

Figure 5 shows the arrangement of male statuses, beginning with the male infant, Status 10. Birth order was of no significance for male status at any period of life, and the honored-child institution was limited to girls. The boy, Status 11, was treated much like the female honored child and was built up by the parents, the process culminating in a brief adolescent period, Status 12. At this time the boy was given a tepee of his own—to isolate him from the secular influences of the regular household—and was assisted in every way in obtaining the supernatural powers which would be useful to him in later life. This was his last period of safety before embarking on the career of warrior with a high expectation that he would be killed. From Status 12 the individual passed automatically to Status 13, that of warrior and young adult male, the two being synonymous in this society. This was a highly competitive status, as indicated by the long spread in prestige. At the upper end of the range lay a distinct status, that of war-leader, Status 14, which could be occupied by only two or three men in any band and which had to be validated by constant success. A warrior, Status 13, might increase the supernatural powers which all warriors were supposed to have in some measure and apply them

to healing, thus becoming a medicine man, Status 15. A war-leader, Status 14, would not aspire to hold this status, which was lower in prestige than his own.

Comanche male society was organized on the expectation of death in action, and the man who escaped this and lived to the period of waning physical powers faced a serious loss of prestige and also the necessity for revising much of his behavior and attitudes. The




FIG. 5.—Comanche male statuses

good man, when he felt his physical powers waning, surrendered his supernatural powers and dropped back to Status 16, that of old man. In this status his social functions were mainly those of a mediator, attempting to adjust the disputes of the rivalrous men of warrior age, and he was supported by his children in terms of charity. He might, if especially successful in this aged role, be given the post of peace chief, Status 18, the main requirement for this being to be "good to women and children." Peace chiefs were normally drawn from men who had been rather unsuccessful in Status 13, that of warrior, and who had never occupied Status 15, that of medicine man. There could be only one peace chief in a band. In distinction to this normal status series, the bad old man refused to relinquish his

supernatural powers and in fact built them up, becoming a sorcerer, Status 17. As such he occupied a higher prestige level than any other old men except the peace chief and might even exceed many of the younger medicine men, although he would still rank far below a war-leader. However, his position was a precarious one, and the attitudes toward him were decidedly hostile. If a young man became ill, some old sorcerer was usually suspected of having attacked him through jealousy, and after two or three such episodes the old man was usually killed. It is significant of Comanche attitudes that the old sorcerers competed with one another in magic and sleight-of-hand exhibitions somewhat as warriors competed with one another in war deeds. Men in Status 16, on the other hand, took pride in complete abstinence from competitive behavior.

Figure 6 shows the pattern of Comanche society as a whole. It will be noted that, in comparison with Tanala society, the spread of prestige with respect to any single status is vastly greater. It will also be noted that, while Tanala society shows a steady prestige progression with age, the high prestige point for Comanche men comes between thirty and forty; that for most women, between about sixteen and forty. For both sexes life after forty tends to be an anticlimax with a steady loss of prestige as the age level increases. It will also be noted that there is only one postmortem status shown on the chart. With the exception of certain occupants of Status 15, all Comanche dead went to a land in the west which was even more shadowy than the Greek Hades and from which there was no return. However, a few famous medicine men were buried on high places, and the living repaired to their graves to obtain power from them through visions. This position is shown as Status 19. Such ghosts were simple givers-of-power and did not otherwise interfere in the affairs of the living.

The descriptions of statuses in these two societies have been, of necessity, exceedingly brief. To have described them fully would have been to give a complete account of the culture. Each status has associated with it a constellation of culture patterns which are mutually adjusted and more or less interdependent. Such status constellations form smaller configurations within the total culture con-

figuration. The recognition and delimitation of such status configurations is of particular importance in connection with personality studies since each configuration provides a frame of reference within which the individuals who occupy the status at a particular point in time can be studied and compared. It is also of importance in connection with studies of culture change, since new elements tend to be integrated into some but not all of status configurations and also




FIG. 6.—Comanche social structure

tend to diffuse from high prestige statuses to lower prestige ones rather than in the opposite direction. It is believed, therefore, that the analysis of cultures in status-configuration terms will lead to significant results.

No modern American society has been included among the examples given for the simple reason that I have never made an intensive study of a society of this sort and prefer to deal with actual rather than hypothetical cases. The technique would, however, appear to be as readily applicable to small, well-integrated social units in our own society as to "primitive" societies. The analysis and presentation of the structure of rural communities and villages by this meth-



od should present no difficulties. Experiment has also shown that the structure of class-organized societies can be presented in this way, although the resulting charts are of much greater complexity than those reproduced here. However, large heterogeneous social units such as the modern city are too complex to be handled by this technique in its present form. For the present the main value of the method lies in the facilities which it provides for presenting a neglected aspect of social organization in concrete visual form and thus drawing attention to its significance.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

## A COMPOSITE RATE OF SOCIAL BREAKDOWN

BRADLEY BUELL AND REGINALD ROBINSON

### ABSTRACT

A composite rate of social breakdown has been established in order to focus the attention of the community on social disorganization and to help provide a more systematic program of social treatment for families which are actual or potential problems. This rate was established originally in Stamford, Connecticut. "Social breakdown" was used to mean the presence of social pathology in the family. Seven types of social disorder are included in the composite rate: crime, delinquency, mental disease, divorce, child neglect, unemployability, and mental deficiency. The family was used as the unit. The composite rate of social breakdown for Stamford for 1936 was 42.6 families per thousand, and for 1937 it was 40.8 per thousand. This is a measure of the social problems that have become sufficiently serious to demand official action on the part of the community; it does not measure the full extent of the broad and more intangible area of family maladjustment in the community. In Stamford there has been instituted a program reaching in two directions: to prevent families from experiencing social breakdown and to control social disorganization in families already involved. Some caution will have to be exercised in using the trend in the social breakdown rate to evaluate the results of the service program. The data collected for the purpose of establishing the social breakdown rate are useful for classifying families with respect to the extent of disorganization present. Many families had a prior record in the same category or in other categories of breakdown; some families had had long records of social disorder of different kinds. From these records should come more accurate knowledge of the nature of family disorganization, and from the clinical analysis of families can come the beginnings of more definitive diagnostic classifications.

### THE PROBLEM

Behind the effort to establish a rate of social breakdown are two needs felt by those responsible for community programs of social welfare. The first need is for some way to focus the attention of the community on the real nature and extent of social disorganization among its own members. Programs designed to prevent and control social disorganization need an informed public behind them. The second need is for a more systematic program of social treatment for families which are actual or potential problems in the community. Weaknesses in the program of service to these families have been revealed in a series of prior studies.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bradley Buell and Staff, *The Hartford Survey: A Study of the Several Services Financed by the Hartford Community Chest, Inc., and Their Relationship to the Social and Health Program of the Community* (New York: Community Chests and Councils, Inc., 1934); *The Providence Survey: A Study in Community Planning* (New York: Community Chests and Councils, Inc., 1936); Thomas Devine and Staff, *The Stamford Survey: A Study of the Social Work Program in Stamford, Connecticut* (New York: Community Chests and Councils, Inc., 1938).

Communities have attempted to focus the attention of the public on specific types of social disorder. They have taken account of the incidence of crime, juvenile delinquency, admissions to hospitals for mental disease, etc. Rates computed from these data indicate only the extent of these specific disorders. They cannot be used to describe the general state of the community's social health. Those responsible for public health programs, however, have long used mortality and morbidity rates in developing the program for the prevention and control of disease. These rates have served to describe the general state of physical health in the community.

A composite rate of social breakdown with subclassifications of as wide a variety of social disorder as could be defined and classified systematically appeared to be a way to focus public attention on the social needs of the community and to help establish more systematic service to persons showing evidence of social disorganization. In 1938 Community Chests and Councils, Incorporated, and the Stamford, Connecticut, Social Work Council undertook a co-operative study to explore the possibilities of establishing such a composite rate of social breakdown for Stamford. This paper is a report of that experience.

#### ESTABLISHING THE RATE

*Social breakdown defined.*—In the Stamford study social breakdown was used to mean the presence of social pathology in the family. Family situations and behavior were considered pathological when they did not conform to currently accepted standards of satisfactory social adjustment. The community has indicated what it considers to be social pathology by requiring its official bodies to take action with respect to persons who violate accepted standards. Official agencies take action on crime by prosecuting offenders; on mental disease, by committing mentally ill persons who need hospitalization; and on parents who neglect children, by forcing them to provide better care or by removing the children from the home. In this study only those types of social pathology which receive official recognition from the community through legal or administrative action were included as forms of social breakdown. Thus the conception of social breakdown came from the mores and not from the laboratory.

Seven specific types of social disorder were included as component

parts of the general classification, "social breakdown." These seven categories are listed below with a brief note on the nature of each item and the source of the official record.

*Crime.*—Persons convicted of all crimes and misdemeanors except motor-vehicle law violations were included.

*Delinquency.*—Both official and unofficial cases of juvenile delinquency were included. Cases which receive court hearings are classified as official. Other cases are dealt with unofficially.

*Mental disease.*—Records of persons committed or admitted on a temporary basis to state hospitals for mental disease were secured.

*Divorce.*—Divorce records of Stamford residents were obtained from the superior court.

*Child neglect.*—Children brought into the juvenile court because of parental neglect constitute this series. As in the case of delinquency, both "official" and "unofficial" cases were included.

*Unemployability.*—The term "unemployability" is used to describe a family situation rather than the condition of a particular person. Any family in which the logical breadwinner was unable to work or where there was no logical breadwinner was considered an unemployable family for the purpose of this study. Families which applied to the town welfare department for relief and were classified by the department as unemployable and families on widow's aid made up the unemployable category. Families in which the only logical breadwinner was over sixty-five and unemployable because of old age were not included.

*Mental deficiency.*—Facilities at the State School and Hospital for Mental Defectives are inadequate, and accordingly few commitments and admissions from Stamford were carried out. These few were included plus the Stamford persons on the official waiting list which is made up of cases found eligible for admission.

It should be pointed out that the several categories making up the composite rate are not considered causes of social disorganization. Rather, they are considered pathological conditions in many of which the causal factors have not been completely isolated and identified. As other such pathologies are defined, classified, and systematically recorded by official agencies, they may be included in such a composite rate. In some communities such classifications as illegitimacy, cases before the domestic relations court, or police juvenile aid cases might be used.

*A family unit.*—It has been common practice in many communities for the appropriate official agency to keep a count of the individuals who have committed crimes, become delinquent, or appeared

in other categories. Sometimes an annual rate is computed for each category. For the purpose of establishing a composite rate, the use of the individual as the unit to be counted appeared to be impracticable. Instead, the family has been selected as the basic unit, and the resulting rate is based on the number of families experiencing social breakdown.

The decision to use the family rather than the individual as the unit in the rate is based on experience in the early stages of the study when the records were being secured and cleared against one another. In some of the categories of breakdown the records are with respect to individuals, but in others (divorce, child neglect, unemployability) all or several members of the family are directly involved. In these instances no individual member can be considered separately and described as having experienced a social breakdown. It is the family as a unit which has failed to make an adequate adjustment. In other instances several members of a family appear separately in the same category of breakdown. Again, members of the same family are found in different categories. Such cases appeared in sufficient volume to suggest the consideration of the family as a statistical unit as well as a social unit.

*The rate for Stamford.*—It was relatively simple in Stamford to get the names of the individuals and families that had appeared in the several categories in 1936 and 1937, to secure identifying information about the family membership, and to set up a family card on which could be consolidated the record of the members who had appeared in any one of the categories.

By taking the number of families reported for Stamford in the 1930 census and using the Board of Health estimates of population increase, it was estimated that there were 14,641 families in Stamford in 1936 and 14,851 in 1937. From this basis the rates of social breakdown were computed as shown by Table 1.

The composite rate of social breakdown for 1937 was 40.8 families per thousand families in Stamford. Some perspective on the size of this group of families is provided by comparing it with the death rate for the same year. If each death recorded in Stamford in 1937 had occurred in a different family, this would have meant deaths in 40 out of every thousand families as compared with social breakdown in 41.

Although the majority of the families appear in the crime and delinquency categories, a substantial number of families appear in every other category except mental deficiency. A lack of institutional facilities to care for mental defectives in the state of Connecticut explains why there are not more families in this category.

The social breakdown rate of 40.8 families per thousand families is a measure of the social problems—the individual and family breakdowns—that have become sufficiently serious to demand official

TABLE 1  
ANNUAL RATES OF SOCIAL BREAKDOWN AMONG  
STAMFORD FAMILIES

CATEGORY OF BREAKDOWN	FAMILIES			
	Number		Rate per 1,000 Families	
	1937	1936	1937	1936
Delinquency.....	209	239	14.1	16.3
Crime.....	195	165	13.1	11.3
Mental disease.....	97	105	6.5	7.2
Divorce.....	72	83	4.8	5.7
Unemployability.....	40	24	2.7	1.6
Neglect.....	27	41	1.8	2.8
Mental deficiency.....	11	9	0.7	0.6
Unduplicated total.....	606	624	40.8	42.6

action on the part of the community. That in itself is significant. It is in respect to these that the community is most concerned and more nearly unanimous as to harmful and undesirable results.

This rate does not measure the full extent of the broad and more intangible area of family maladjustment in the community. The problems of many individuals and families are not sufficiently acute to require community action. A substantial proportion of the population of any community is likely at some time to experience social difficulty of varying degrees of seriousness—insufficient earnings, overcrowding, marital conflict, mental disorders, behavior difficulties, etc. Lacking clear-cut definitions, no statistical procedure can measure the extent of this general area of social difficulty.

USES OF THE SOCIAL BREAKDOWN RATE  
IN COMMUNITY PLANNING

The social breakdown rate was developed primarily to serve the purposes of community organization. Citizens of a community need to have accurate and understandable evidence of the extent of social disorganization if they are to be aroused to the necessity for doing something about it. Specialized social agencies need concrete common objectives if they are to work together in a co-ordinated preventive program.

Evidence that the rate is serving these and other practical purposes in community planning is found in the fact that Stamford already is working out a plan for more systematic service to families showing signs of social disorganization. The plan calls for a program reaching in two directions: to prevent families from experiencing official social breakdown and to control social disorganization in families already involved.

In the area of prevention, services are so organized that they reach out to discover family difficulties in earlier stages—problem children at school and in group-work agencies, disintegrating families known to the town welfare department, social problems in families known to the visiting nurse. Service to these families is planned in terms of the needs, the circumstances, and the problems of the whole family. The primary responsibility for continuous service to these families is carried by the private case-work agency. The public agencies co-operate on many cases in accordance with the plan of treatment formulated by the generalized case-work agency.

The control phase of the program calls for a different organization. Because of the official breakdown, some public agency already has an official responsibility toward some member of the family. The important point is to determine what agency, public or private, should have primary responsibility for the general family situation. The Stamford plan makes this decision a collective responsibility, through a case committee of the council of social agencies to which all social breakdown families are reported. Represented on the committee are all the public and private agencies giving service to people in their own homes. This committee assigns each case to some one agency which takes the responsibility for diagnosis and treatment of

the whole family. Other agencies provide specialized service where it is required.

Also incorporated in the plan in Stamford is provision for systematic evaluation of the results of this service program. It is in this area that experimentation with the rate of social breakdown will come. The trend in the rate of social breakdown reflects annual variations in the extent of family disorganization. Where there is a systematic effort to prevent or control social breakdown, variations in the annual rates may reflect the effectiveness of this service.

Whether the rate can be used in this way depends somewhat on the extent to which it is affected by major factors beyond the control of a program of social treatment for families. Basic economic changes creating unemployment on a vast scale, for instance, might have such a violent effect on family life in a community that no program of social treatment could cope with the results. There are some changes in administration and policy in official agencies which might affect the social breakdown rates. The reorganization of a juvenile court may change the volume of work which such a court can handle and thus tend to alter automatically the number of persons it serves annually. A change of policy to provide for unofficial cases may make its total load larger but tend to reduce the number of official court hearings. Intermittent police drives on particular phases of crime may swell the number of convicted offenders out of proportion to other years. Changes in the policy of federal relief agencies may effect changes in local definitions of unemployability. Changes in the divorce laws of a state may stimulate or retard the granting of divorces. Added facilities in mental-disease hospitals or in schools for mental defectives may allow more freedom in committing persons to these institutions and automatically increase the commitment rate. The usual statistical safeguards would have to be applied to rates. The difference between the Stamford rates of social breakdown for the two years 1936 and 1937 is 1.8. The probable error of this difference is 1.6, giving a critical ratio of 1.13.

These various qualifying factors have been suggested here to show that the social breakdown rate should be used cautiously and that it is still in the experimental stage. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that, with proper care in its interpretation, the trend in the social breakdown rate can be helpful as a test of the effectiveness



of a community's program of social treatment. A falling rate of social breakdown may indicate an increasingly effective treatment program, and a rising rate may reflect failure to help families make better adjustments to their life-situations.

#### THE NATURE OF FAMILY DISORGANIZATION

Although the first purpose of the social breakdown rate is to implement community organization, it is hoped that the routine collection of these data will throw added and needed light on the

TABLE 2  
FIRST-BREAKDOWN AND RECIDIVIST FAMILIES, 1937

CATEGORY OF BREAKDOWN IN 1937	FAMILIES				
	Number			Percentage	
	Total	First Break- down	Recidi- vist	First Break- down	Recidi- vist
Delinquency.....	209	93	116	44.5	55.5
Crime.....	195	62	133	31.8	68.2
Mental disease.....	97	45	52	46.4	53.6
Divorce.....	72	54	18	75.0	25.0
Unemployability.....	40	25	15	62.5	37.5
Neglect.....	27	10	17	37.0	63.0
Mental deficiency.....	11	4	7	36.4	63.6
Unduplicated total....	606	293	313	48.3	51.7

fundamental nature of family disorganization. The traditionally accepted categories of social disorder are descriptive of symptoms rather than causes. "Crime," "delinquency," "divorce," "unemployability," and "neglect" are terms describing a particular type of behavior or a special set of circumstances which, however, give no real clue to the causes which brought them about. There is great need for the development of diagnostic classifications by which the causal factors underlying these weaknesses in family life can be identified more readily.

The data collected for the purpose of establishing the social breakdown rate made possible certain rough groupings which have significance for a diagnostic and treatment program. These data led to

broad classifications of the families with respect to the seriousness of the family situation rather than to the cause which brought about the breakdown. The histories of the 606 families identified in 1937 were traced back ten years in the files of the official agencies. As a first step, therefore, it was possible to classify the families as either "first breakdown" or "recidivist" with respect to the ten-year period.

The family had already been adopted as the basic statistical unit. Accordingly, the term "recidivism" was used to apply not to an individual's repeated appearance in any category but to the repetition of any sort of official difficulty through any member of the family. As shown in Table 2, 51.7 per cent of the 606 families with social breakdowns in 1937 were found to have had prior records in some category. First-breakdown families accounted for the remainder—48.3 per cent. The table also shows by category of breakdown in 1937 how many families had had prior breakdowns.

There was considerable variation in the extent of recidivism in each family. Some families had had only one prior record in any category of breakdown; others had had many records during the previous ten years. One family had had as many as twenty-two official records of breakdown. Thirty families had more than ten records each, and 92 families had more than five recorded breakdowns (Table 3). Such facts as these, showing the number of families that seem to be in relatively advanced stages of social disorganization, raise important considerations in planning systematic social treatment.

On the other hand, the number of official records in each family is only a rough indication of the extent of disorganization in that family. Frequent appearances in categories may be indicative of progressive deterioration, but the number of appearances alone cannot be taken to measure the extent of the deterioration. The family with three records in a single category is not always more disorganized than the family with two such records. Families with the same number of records in different categories may not be in equal stages of social disorganization. To use an extreme example, a record of delinquency in a family could not be assigned the same weight as a record of divorce. Although no effort has been made as yet to weigh these qualifying factors, the routine collection and analysis of the data about these families may make that possible eventually.

Further light on the seriousness of disorganization is shown by the two subclassifications within the group of recidivist families (313 in 1937). These are (1) families with prior records in the category of their 1937 breakdown only and (2) families with prior records in other categories (Table 4). Over one-third of the families in the study had appeared previously in another category. The appearance of families in more than one category suggests more serious compli-

TABLE 3  
NUMBER OF OFFICIAL BREAKDOWNS OF 1937  
SOCIAL BREAKDOWN FAMILIES, 1928-37

NUMBER OF OFFICIAL BREAKDOWNS PER FAMILY	FAMILIES	
	Number	Percentage of Total
1.....	293	48.3
2.....	100	16.5
3.....	67	11.1
4.....	30	4.9
5.....	24	4.0
6.....	20	3.2
7.....	15	2.5
8.....	12	2.0
9.....	9	1.5
10.....	6	1.0
More than 10.....	30	5.0
Total.....	606	100.0

cations in the situation than do repeated records in the same category. All the categories are given the same weight in this classification, and accordingly it is dangerous to draw many conclusions from the data.

One way to control some of these variables is to consider the number of breakdowns per family in conjunction with the number of different categories in which the family has appeared. This method of classification distinguishes between the families with long records in one category and families with many records in several categories. Generally speaking, families found to have experienced both repetition of breakdown and a variety of types of breakdown might be expected to be the most pathological families in the group. Repetition of breakdown within one category would indicate the presence

of a particular problem in the family; single breakdowns in several categories would suggest a spread of problems affecting several members of the family and probably of a complex nature. Distribution of the 1937 breakdown families by the number of categories and breakdowns per family is shown in Table 5. The 51 families appearing in more than two categories and having more than two breakdowns are probably the more seriously disorganized families.

TABLE 4  
SHOWING 1937 BREAKDOWN FAMILIES WITH PRIOR APPEARANCES IN THE SAME AND OTHER CATEGORIES

CATEGORY OF BREAKDOWN IN 1937	1937 BREAKDOWN FAMILIES		FAMILIES WITH PRIOR APPEARANCES IN	
	Total	Recidivist	Same Category*	Other Category*
Delinquency.....	209	116	83	75
Crime.....	195	133	113	82
Mental disease.....	97	52	28	39
Divorce.....	72	18	1	18
Unemployability.....	40	15	0	15
Neglect.....	27	17	2	17
Mental deficiency.....	11	7	4	7
Unduplicated total.....	606	313	216	208

\* The same family may appear in both columns.

A somewhat different index of seriousness was found in a special study of the families appearing in the delinquency and crime categories. As was to be expected, these difficulties were closely associated in families. Fifty-two families with delinquency in 1937 had appeared previously in crime; 56 families with crime in 1937 had prior records in delinquency. In many cases where records of crime and delinquency are found in the same family, they indicate that both older and younger generations are in trouble, and these families may present more serious problems than those in which the disorders are confined to one generation.

The data collected routinely to establish the social breakdown rate will throw light on the degrees of seriousness in family situations, but they will not lead directly to better understanding of

causal factors. Better diagnostic classifications can be worked out only through systematic clinical analysis of the family. This is part of the plan in Stamford which provides for a systematic social diagnosis of each family. It also calls for periodic review of changes in the family situation and progress in treatment. This analysis will be the responsibility of the case committee of the council of social agencies.

TABLE 5  
SHOWING 1937 BREAKDOWN FAMILIES BY THE NUMBER OF DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF BREAKDOWN AND THE NUMBER OF OFFICIAL BREAKDOWNS PER FAMILY, 1928-37

OFFICIAL BREAKDOWNS PER FAMILY	FAMILIES					
	Total	Categories per Family				
		1	2	3	4	5
1.....	293	293	.....	.....	.....	.....
2.....	100	53	47	.....	.....	.....
3.....	67	21	33	13	.....	.....
4.....	30	11	11	6	2	.....
5.....	24	5	14	4	1	0
6.....	20	2	12	5	1	0
7.....	15	4	10	1	0	0
8.....	12	2	8	0	2	0
9.....	9	1	6	2	0	0
10.....	6	1	3	0	2	0
More than 10....	30	1	17	10	1	1
Total.....	606	394	161	41	9	1

Case histories will be assembled by a psychiatric social worker, and the preliminary analysis will be made by the case committee of agency executives in the fields of probation, case work, relief, health, education, group work, and mental hygiene. As this committee develops systematic procedures in its primary function of the allocation of each case to the service best designed to treat it, the committee will be compiling records of the diagnosis of each family and the subsequent developments in the family situation. Out of these records should come more accurate knowledge of the nature of family disorganization and the beginnings of more definitive diagnostic classifications.

NEW YORK CITY

# METABOLISM INDICES AND THE ANNEXATION OF AUSTRIA: A NOTE ON METHOD

E. Y. HARTSHORNE

## ABSTRACT

"Social metabolism" refers to shifts in the personnel composition of groups; "social mobility," to the movement of individuals from one group or status to another. The first lays emphasis on the group, with its fluctuating personnel; the second, on the individual, with his varying statuses. This distinction is recognized in economic literature as that between "turnover" and "mobility" of labor. Despite the generally recognized importance of social metabolism, in various empirical fields, no satisfactory statistical ratio has been found which expresses all the essential relationships involved. The three "turnover rates" proposed by economists (separation, replacement, and flux) all have their shortcomings, as do similar rates used by sociologists. A new compound turnover index and its converse, a stability index, are here proposed. Their descriptive utility is illustrated in a brief analysis of personnel changes in Austrian university faculties before and during the process of Nazification.

The annexation of Austria by Germany in March, 1938, brought with it a revolution in the Austrian universities paralleling, in briefer compass, that which had been taking place in the universities of the older Reich during the preceding five years. In the course of a single year (1937/8-1938/9) the University of Vienna lost a greater proportion of its faculty than the twenty-three universities of Germany, as a group, had lost in the first four years of Hitler's rule. If, as has been suggested by Sorokin and Anderson,<sup>1</sup> institutional continuity or stability varies inversely with personnel turnover, then obviously the loss of almost half (49.5 per cent) of its faculty members in the course of one year indicates a drastic, perhaps even catastrophic, shock to the stability of university policy. The following data, obtained by comparing faculty lists in successive University of Vienna catalogues, describe the change:

Years Contrasted	Original Staff	Losses	Re-mainder	Gains	New Staff
1936/7-1937/8.....	617	32	585	30	615
1937/8-1938/9.....	615	304	311	14	325

<sup>1</sup> P. A. Sorokin and C. A. Anderson, "Metabolism of Different Strata of Social Institutions and Institutional Continuity," *Metron*, X (1932-33), 319-48.

Despite the exceedingly simple relationships existing between these ten figures describing personnel changes in a university faculty over two consecutive periods of one year each (measured from the beginning of one academic year to the next), there appears to be no accepted method of summarizing them statistically; and the two methods which have been used thus far by sociologists<sup>2</sup> are not wholly satisfactory. The present paper aims to discuss the nature of metabolism indices and their uses; to survey the literature in the field, especially the contributions of students of labor turnover in industry; to criticize certain inadequacies in previous sociological studies of metabolism in institutions of higher learning; and, finally, to propose certain standards and methods to be used in future work. These proposals are then applied to a test case, the Nazification of the Austrian universities.

# I

The use of the term "social metabolism" as applied to intra-institutional mobility was, so far as the present writer is aware, first suggested by Sorokin in 1931, as was the application of metabolism analysis to educational institutions.<sup>3</sup> A study of the literature fails to reveal any significant treatment of the problem of turnover indices before 1916.<sup>4</sup> The phenomenon of labor mobility was well

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* and W. A. Lunden, *The Dynamics of Higher Education* (Pittsburgh, 1939), chap. xxxiii (cf. the present writer's review of Lunden's book in *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XXXIV [December, 1939], 781-82).

<sup>3</sup> Lunden's researches were begun as a graduate student under Sorokin, and the main body of his recent book (*op. cit.*) is contained in his doctoral dissertation at Harvard University (1934). Even the monumental statistical investigations on the development of the German universities by Johannes Conrad (*Das Universitätsstudium in Deutschland während der letzten 50 Jahren* [Jena, 1884]) and by Franz Eulenburg ("Die Frequenz der deutschen Universitäten von ihrer Gründung bis zur Gegenwart," *Abh. d. phil.-hist. Kl. d. kgl. Sächs. Ges. d. Wiss.*, XXIV [1904], 1-323, and *Die Entwicklung d. Univ. Leipzig in den letzten hundert Jahren* [Leipzig, 1909]) fail to make use of this approach. Volume III of the "University of Chicago Survey" has a section devoted to "faculty turnover," but all the data are given in terms of length of service rather than in the categories here considered (F. W. Reeves *et al.*, *The University Faculty* [Chicago, 1933], pp. 60-66).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. F. S. Crum, "Computation of the Percentage of Labor Turnover" (to which is appended "A Partial Bibliography of Recent Articles on Labor Turnover"), *Quarterly Publication of the American Statistical Association*, XVI (June, 1919), 361-73. Professor Crum refers to the "statistical chaos" then existing in the field and states: "At present

known before the war of 1914-18, as evidenced, for example, by the excellent studies of the Verein für Sozialpolitik; but no special indices were developed.<sup>5</sup> The emphasis throughout these studies, as their title indicates, is on the career of the individual worker, not on the stability of the organization in which he works; these are studies in the mobility of labor (*Berufswechsel, Ortswechsel, Stellenwechsel*), but the implications for institutional continuity of this mobility are not drawn, nor is the analysis couched in these terms.

The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, which publishes yearly data on labor turnover, has changed its method of presentation as recently as 1929. The *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich* publishes no figures on labor turnover; other European countries which do so employ the current American method. A fairly recent Dutch book on the management of labor relations in the United States refers, in discussing turnover computation, to American sources alone, thus suggesting, together with the absence of references by American scholars to European sources, that analysis of labor turnover in the sense indicated is essentially an American contribution to social science.<sup>6</sup>

Now, since "social metabolism" and "labor turnover" (and, to a certain extent, migration and other demographic phenomena) are essentially similar processes, it will be advisable to adopt a common terminology before entering upon a discussion of statistical indices to be used in their analysis. We are dealing in both instances with

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... there is no universally or even generally recognized method of calculating labor turnover" (p. 367). Paul H. Douglas, writing at the same time, refers to "the recent discovery of the extent and costs of labor turnover" which had "brought with it varying methods of computation" ("Methods of Computing Labor Turnover," *American Economic Review*, IX [June, 1919], 402). See also Douglas' article, "Labor Turnover," in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. Cf. further P. F. Brissenden, "Labor Turnover—a Selected Bibliography," *Monthly Labor Review*, XXIV (April, 1927), 188-203.

<sup>5</sup> Six studies appeared altogether, constituting Vols. CXXXIII-CXXXV (1910-12) of the *Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik*, on the topic "Untersuchungen über Auslese und Anpassung (Berufswahl und Berufsschicksal der Arbeiter in den verschiedenen Zweigen der Grossindustrie)."

<sup>6</sup> G. Eyskens, *De Arbeider en de Bedrijfsleiding in Amerika* (Brussels, 1931), chap. viii: "Die Stabilität van de Onderneming." A Russian work on scientific labor management fails even to discuss the turnover problem (O. A. Ermansky, *Naootschnaya Organizatsia Trooda* [3d ed.; Moscow, 1923]).



the relationship between the functioning of a group, association, organization, or other social aggregate over a period of time and with changes in the personnel composition of the aforesaid aggregate. The effect of the personnel changes on the functioning may be said to constitute the problem of the significance of social metabolism; the measurement and description of the personnel changes the statistical problem. It is with the latter, narrower problem that we are concerned here.

In the following discussion we shall be dealing with five basic items: the magnitude of a social aggregate at some point in time before any change of membership shall have taken place (the original group or staff, size at the beginning, etc., or, symbolically,  $G_0$ ); the same group (i.e., presumably or at least nominally the same) after a certain lapse of time, during which it may have lost some of its old or original members and gained some new ones, or in extreme instances may have disappeared altogether or have remained unchanged in any single member ( $G_x$ ); the sum of original members who have been "lost" ( $L$ ), referred to as the "separations" in the economic literature; the sum of new members who have been added ( $A$ ), called the "accessions" in labor turnover discussions; and, finally, the residue of the original group who have survived the period of change and therefore constitute a remainder ( $R$ ). Clearly, then, the following relations hold by definitions

$$G_0 - L = R = G_x - A.$$

The statistical problem of social metabolism arises when it becomes desirable to express the changes affecting these five quantities in the simplest possible way consistent with the essential nature of the process and at the same time in a manner which is readily understandable. Instead of indicating in each instance all the separate items in absolute numbers, as we have done for the University of Vienna above, it would be less cumbersome to summarize the significant relationships in a series of relatives, ratios, or, best of all, in some one index figure, if such can be agreed upon as satisfying all the requirements.

The great majority of metabolism indices proposed by writers on

labor turnover have taken the form of ratios between either the total number of workers on the pay roll or the equivalent number of full-time workers (making allowances for absentees), and the total number of losses (separations), or of additions (accessions), or of losses and additions taken together, or of replacements (equal to whichever of the two items, losses or additions, is the smaller), the former being the denominator and the latter the numerator in the ratio. The various methods may be reduced to three basic types, which consider the "turnover index" to be the separation rate, the replacement rate, or the flux rate (flux equals losses plus gains), respectively.<sup>7</sup>

1. *Turnover as separation*.—In its simplest form this index defines turnover as the percentage which losses constitute of the average size of the group throughout the period:

$$T = \frac{2L}{G_0 + G_1}.$$

First proposed by the National Conference of Employment Managers, meeting at Rochester, May 9-11, 1918,<sup>8</sup> it was officially adopted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and used in their periodical official reports until 1929, when it was abandoned as a result of widespread criticism.<sup>9</sup>

A further refinement of this method of calculating turnover is the subdivision of "separations" into those which are "avoidable" and

<sup>7</sup> B. Emmet ("Nature and Computation of Labor Turnover," *Journal of Political Economy*, XXVII [February, 1919], 105-16) suggests a variant from the general tendency—namely, that turnover be expressed as the percentage which the excess of workers actually employed above the equivalent number of full-time workers (defined on the basis of three thousand work-hours per year) constitutes of the number of workers actually employed. This suggestion has not, so far as the writer is aware, been followed. It appears to confuse absenteeism with turnover, and it is evidently cumbersome to use in calculation.

<sup>8</sup> *Monthly Review of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics*, VI (June, 1918), 172.

<sup>9</sup> D. Yoder, *Personnel and Labor Relations* (New York, 1938), p. 212. The "separation basis" was also accepted by S. H. Slichter, *The Turnover of Factory Labor* (New York, 1919), pp. 1-15, and by O. Tead and H. C. Metcalf in their standard work *Personnel Administration* (3d ed.; New York, 1933), pp. 258-61, who state: "The separation rate puts the emphasis where it belongs, on the worker who leaves: this indicates the source of the problem in personnel management."

those which are "unavoidable."<sup>10</sup> While the aim of distinguishing departures over which the employer has control from those over which he has no control is commendable, it has been found impracticable to apply because of the difficulty in agreeing on a definition of terms. In studying university faculty losses care should be taken to isolate those resulting from death, disability, resignation, dismissal, or transfer to another institution, wherever it is possible to obtain the necessary information.

The main objection to the use of losses alone as an indication of turnover of labor within an industrial organization is that it fails to distinguish between an absolute drop in the level of employment in a plant and the replacement of some workers by others.

2. *Turnover as replacement.*—To measure this process, Douglas and Crum<sup>11</sup> have proposed an index on the basis of turnover as replacement:

$$T = \frac{2 (L \text{ or } A \text{ [whichever is the smaller]})}{G_0 + G_1}.$$

But this formula overlooks the problem of absolute changes in level of employment as well. If there is an excess of separations over accessions, there will be a net decrease in staff employed; if an excess of accessions over separations, there will be a net increase,

<sup>10</sup> G. S. Watkins and P. A. Dodd, *The Management of Labor Relations* (New York, 1938), pp. 229 ff. This distinction was probably first suggested by R. A. Feiss, "Personnel and Management Problems," *Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science*, LXV (May, 1916), 27-56. W. A. Berridge ("Quantitative Analysis: Some Applications to Personnel Problems," *Journal of Personnel Research*, IV [August-September, 1925], 166-72) has suggested the "quit rate" (rate of voluntary departures) as the most significant index of industrial dissatisfaction.

<sup>11</sup> *Op. cit.* and P. H. Douglas, "Computation of Labor Turnover: A Rejoinder," *American Economic Review*, X (March, 1920), 106-8. H. G. Hayes, however, insists that "turnover," whether in regard to men or merchandise, is generally taken to mean "the complete use of capital invested" and hence has nothing to do with replacement ("Computation of Labor Turnover," *American Economic Review*, IX [December, 1919], 903-5). It may very well be, as S. H. Nerlove has suggested, that the separation rate best measures the "instability of jobs" (due to factors beyond the control of the individual worker or even of the individual employer), while the replacement rate measures the "instability of workers" (due to inefficiency or voluntary withdrawal) ("The Time Element in Labor Turnover Computation," *Journal of Political Economy*, XXIX [December, 1921], 828-32).

both of which indicate changes in the level of employment. Neither of these charges, according to the "replacement" definition, is included in "turnover." That this procedure leads to anomalous results can easily be seen if we compute the replacement rate in the faculty of the University of Vienna for the two one-year periods described above:

	Replacement Rate (Per Cent)
1936/7-1937/8.....	4.9
1937/8-1938/9.....	3.0

In other words the "turnover" in a year when the university lost almost half its faculty (49.5 per cent) was less (three-fifths) than it was in a year when the university lost only a twentieth (5.2 per cent) of its faculty. Whatever may be its advantages in the field of labor studies—and even there it has not been adopted—the identification of turnover with replacement appears to be inadvisable in the study of higher educational institutions, where the magnitudes are much smaller and the composition of personnel more differentiated, so that net increases and decreases in size of staff have at times great significance in institutional metabolism.

3. *Turnover as flux.*—Because of the inadequacies of the two preceding indices, P. F. Brissenden, one of the foremost writers in the field, has proposed an index on a basis of "flux," which is taken to mean the sum total of all personnel changes, whether by loss or by addition:

$$T = \frac{2(L + A)}{G_0 + G_1}.$$

Brissenden, however, is careful to use as his denominator not the average size of the two groups (as the formula implies), which in his opinion would introduce a considerable error by including men listed on the pay roll but actually absent from work because of sickness, bad weather, and other "acts of God," but prefers what he calls the "equivalent number of full-time workers," a figure derived by dividing the year's total work-hours by three thousand. Since this method of computation is applicable only to industrial situations, his index is here expressed in more general terms suitable to the present context. In the study of university metabolism the

problem of whether to include professors who are "on leave," "emeritus," etc., is a very real one and must be considered in relation to the meaning of these various statuses in the institutions under examination.<sup>12</sup> The "flux rate" thus gives a summation of the separation and accession rates. It is, in fact, rather meaningless apart from them, and its author never uses it alone. This practice approximates that of the Bureau of Labor Statistics at the present time, which lists only the separation rate (itemized according to "quits," on the worker's initiative; "layoffs," on the employer's initiative but without prejudice to the worker; and "discharges," on the employer's initiative with prejudice to the worker) and the accession rate, but no more complex "index," not even the "flux rate."<sup>13</sup>

Given the two rates of which it is compounded, however, there is a more crucial objection to the "flux rate" than its being superfluous—namely, that it is statistically misleading. From the formula it is clear that 0 per cent turnover occurs whenever  $L + A = 0$ , which is quite in keeping with common sense. It is also clear that 100 per cent turnover occurs whenever  $L + A = \frac{1}{2}(G_0 + G_1)$ . If, for example, the original group is 100, losses 50, gains 50, and the new group 100, there is, according to the formula, 100 per cent turnover; but this is clearly not what is ordinarily understood by

<sup>12</sup> Brissenden in his first writings on the subject tended to restrict the use of the term "turnover" to "replacement," speaking of the above ratio as the "labor flux rate" (cf. "The Measurement of Labor Mobility," *Journal of Political Economy*, XXVIII [June, 1920], 441-76, and "The Mobility of Labor in American Industry," *Monthly Labor Review*, X [June, 1920], 35-56); but in his book, *Labor Turnover in Industry* (in collaboration with E. Frankel [New York, 1922]), he states: "This flux or total labor change rate is believed to constitute the best single index to the general stability situation in any plant or group of plants and in subdivisions within individual establishments" (p. 23). But, he adds, the accession rate and the separation rates "should be shown separately in order to reveal the whole stability situation" (*ibid.*).

<sup>13</sup> This method of presentation, either in tabular or in graphical form, may be seen in the monthly mimeographed releases of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (e.g., No. 7571, March, 1939: "Labor Turnover in Manufacturing Establishments"). The procedure used by the Bureau in collecting and analyzing monthly turnover data from five thousand manufacturing establishments employing approximately two million workers is given in the 1936 edition of the *Handbook of Labor Statistics* (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Bull. 616), pp. 801-11. Summaries of the data also appear every month in the *Monthly Labor Review*.

the term, which implies total replacement. The error is introduced by taking the sum rather than the arithmetic mean of the losses and additions as the numerator of the index. For these reasons the "flux rate" cannot be accepted as a satisfactory measure of metabolism.

The curious result of the whole development, then, from the "statistical chaos" noted by Professor Crum in 1919 down to the current practice of the United States government, is that, although many "indices" have been proposed, none has been accepted. Instead, the data are presented in terms of the two basic rates of accession and separation. No single ratio has proved sufficiently satisfactory to establish itself in general usage. From this fact sociological investigators of "metabolism" rates might perhaps have learned to be cautious in using compound indices. But such is not the case. In the following discussion current practice by sociologists will be criticized and further possibilities in the realm of compound metabolism indices will be explored.

## II

The index used by Sorokin and Anderson in their study of metabolism rates in the faculties of four American universities is a variant of the flux rate of Brissenden. Like the flux rate, what the authors call the "index of total turnover" has as its numerator the sum of the losses and additions, but where the index used by Brissenden employs as a denominator a figure which amounts to an average of the sizes of the group during the period under consideration, the Sorokin-Anderson index contents itself merely with the size of the group at the beginning of the period. Their index thus expresses the percentage which the sum of the losses and additions constitutes of the original group:<sup>14</sup>

$$\text{Total turnover} = \frac{L + A}{G_0} \times 100.$$

Whenever there are no changes at all—whenever, that is,  $L + A = 0$ —there is no turnover: total turnover = 0 per cent. This is logical and accords with common sense. At the other extreme, however, like the flux rate, this index is unreliable. If all the members

<sup>14</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 325.

of a group leave and are replaced by an equal number of new members, one can legitimately speak of 100 per cent turnover. That is, whenever  $R = 0$  or  $L = G_0$  and  $A = G_1$ , then the turnover is 100 per cent. But, in terms of the Sorokin-Anderson formula, turnover is 100 per cent whenever  $L + A = G_0$ , which is patently absurd, since it states that any sum of losses and gains which happens to equal the size of the original group, regardless of the size of the new group, constitutes 100 per cent turnover. Thus, if we start with an original group numbering 100 members, lose 85, leaving a remainder of 15, add 15, giving a new group of 30, there is, according to the formula, 100 per cent turnover. Reverse the figures of losses and additions, leaving a remainder of 85 and giving a new group of 170, and the index remains exactly what it was. When one numerical index purports to describe two such different situations, it is clear that something is wrong. The trouble with this index is that it overlooks the size of the group resulting from the changes. It contains the further error noted above in connection with the flux rate of taking the sum rather than the average of the losses and gains. As long as the total size of the group fluctuates only slightly, and as long as the "total changes" are small in comparison with the size of the group, this index appears to be a fairly reliable reflector of group metabolism, since the error introduced by neglecting the size of the new group is concealed; but, in the absence of these conditions, its descriptive value is considerably diminished.

A second form of social metabolism index is that used by Lunden.<sup>15</sup> This writer, building on the basis of the replacement rate, takes as his index the percentage which the losses or the additions, whichever is the smaller, constitutes of the original group:

$$\text{Turnover} = \frac{L \text{ or } A \text{ (whichever is smaller)}}{G_0}$$

Here again, it will be noted, a sociologist has taken over an index from the field of labor turnover but has so modified it as to destroy most of its usefulness. Why has Lunden, like Sorokin and Anderson, reduced the denominator of his ratio from the average of the

<sup>15</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 371, n. 2.

group size throughout the period to merely the size at the time of beginning? The replacement rate even as used in its original form had certain distinct limitations as an index of metabolism, as indicated above, but Lunden's modification intensified rather than diminished these limitations. In terms of his formula 0 per cent turnover occurs whenever either  $L$  or  $A$ , or both, are equal to zero. This means, however, that the group might double in size, without concomitant losses, or might halve, or disappear altogether, without concomitant additions, and still have "0 per cent turnover." This may correspond with the literal meaning of the term "turnover," but it hardly seems appropriate in connection with an index the main usefulness of which is to indicate relative degrees of continuity and discontinuity in the life of groups. The significance of the concept "100 per cent turnover," in terms of this formula, appears to be equally questionable, for it occurs whenever the losses are equal to, and the additions are equal to or greater than, the size of the original group. The replacement idea is valid, but the neglect of the size of the new group leads to anomalous results. For example, according to Lunden's method of reckoning, if the original group has 100 members, and they are all lost, the turnover is 100 per cent if the additions are 100 or more, even if they be 1,000 or 10,000. The fact that only one of the two items—losses and additions—is considered, leads to very misrepresentative results when there is any great degree of divergence between them. If, again, the original group has 100 members, and they are all lost, and 2 are gained,  $T = 2$  per cent; but "turnover" would also be 2 per cent if only 2 members out of the original 100 were lost and then replaced. For these reasons Lunden's metabolism index must certainly be rejected.<sup>16</sup>

### III

This paper has thus far surveyed the development of a theory of metabolism indices in one of the fields of economics and the at-

<sup>16</sup> These remarks concern, of course, only that section of Lunden's work which deals with "horizontal mobility." It is unfortunate, however, that so much time and effort were spent in expressing data (from more than forty different higher educational institutions) in so unrevealing a statistical form. Lunden may also be criticized for failing to present any of the original, absolute data in his discussion of this subject.



tempted application of the theory by three sociologists to another set of data. The economists, after twenty years of experimentation, had apparently abandoned the use of compound indices, favoring the presentation of the separation and accession rates separately, together with the original data. The sociologists, two of whom were writing ten, and one twenty, years after the discussion originated, attempted to employ compound indices (Sorokin and Anderson also use simple indices), which are open to serious criticism. Is this all that there is to be said about the theory of metabolism indices, or are there further possibilities? Before closing this part of the discussion, the writer would like to propose one further variant, which, so far as he is aware, has neither been used nor suggested before.

Obviously, one way to state the essential changes in group membership would be to indicate in each instance the percentage which the losses constitute of the original group and the percentage which the additions constitute of the new group. For example, in the case given, the percentage of new members added to the staff of the University of Vienna between the academic years 1936/7 and 1937/8 was 4.9, and between the years 1937/8 and 1938/9, 4.3; but the percentage lost in the same two periods was 5.2 for the first period and 49.5 for the second. The latter two figures indicate significantly and accurately one aspect of the change in metabolism from one period to the next. The use of each group separately as denominator rather than an average of the two (as in the labor turnover accession and separation rates) also has an obvious advantage in the field of university faculty metabolism, where the personnel changes are, as a rule, intermittent rather than continuous, occurring en bloc between academic years. But this still leaves two rates rather than one.

The common-sense theory of a turnover index is that it should accurately reflect the percentage which both the additions and the losses constitute of the average of both the groups. This sort of index would be built on the same basis as that used by Sorokin and Anderson but would avoid its major weakness, the omission of the new group. It would further employ an average of the gains and

losses rather than their sum total, which again seems more in keeping with common sense. If this reasoning is correct, then

$$\text{Turnover} = \frac{L + A}{G_0 + G_1}.$$

Total absence of turnover, according to this formula, would require that the sum of the losses and additions should be equal to zero, which is just what 0 per cent turnover implies. On the other hand, 100 per cent turnover could exist only if the sum total of losses and additions exactly equaled the sum total of the sizes of the two groups, that is, only when all the membership was replaced and no more than replaced. At this value, turnover would be identified with replacement. Any further increase of the group beyond full replacement would push the turnover index above 100 per cent (which is not the case with a simple "replacement index"). In this formula, therefore, as in none of the others, there is a complete correspondance between common-sense expectation and algebraic description. In the Vienna case, turnover (in this sense) increases from 5.1 per cent during the last pre-Nazi year to 33.9 per cent for the critical year that followed.

Since the aim in employing turnover indices is the analysis of institutional stability and continuity, it is possibly more meaningful to think of the process of change, not in terms of the losses and additions of membership, but rather in terms of that group which survives the period of change, the stable remainder. The percentage which the remainder constitutes of the average size of the two groups indicates literally the stability of the group throughout the period of change, that is, the extent to which the membership remains unchanged. We may call this percentage a "stability index":<sup>17</sup>

$$\frac{2R}{G_0 + G_1} \times 100.$$

From the standpoint of common sense this stability index tells the same story as the previous turnover index, but from the opposite

<sup>17</sup> The term "stability" has, of course, been used in this connection before; the writer is unaware, however, of this particular formulation. Lively and Beck, in their study of

approach. If the turnover index of any group is  $X$ , the stability index will be  $100 - X$ . In other words

$$\frac{2R}{G_0 + G_1} + \frac{L + A}{G_0 + G_1} = 1,$$

since, multiplying through by the denominator, we have

$$2R + L + A = G_0 + G_1,$$

which simply states that the total size of both groups, taken together, is equal to twice the remainder common to both of them plus the losses and the additions, which is correct by definition. The stability index also meets the tests applied to the previous indices, since 0 per cent stability (i.e., 100 per cent turnover) exists only when  $R = 0$ —in other words, when all members are replaced—and 100 per cent stability (i.e., 0 per cent turnover) exists only when  $R = G_0 = G_1$ —in other words, when there are no losses and no additions. To return once more to the Vienna case, the stability index, which had during the preceding six years fluctuated at a very high level between 94.2 and 96.0, dropped in the seventh year, when Hitler marched into Vienna, to 66.1.

This index, expressing metabolism in terms of stability rather than turnover (the ambiguities of this term have been indicated above),

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the mobility of the open-country population in Ohio, introduce what they call an "index of stability," defined as "the ratio of the number of households which had always lived in the area in question to the number of households who had not always lived in the area" (C. E. Lively and P. G. Beck, *Movement of Open Country Population in Ohio. I. The Family Aspect* [Ohio Agricultural Experiment Station Bull. 467, November, 1930], pp. 24-25). In the terminology used in this discussion this is equivalent to taking the ratio of the remainder to the additions, a wholly different conception from that suggested above. The suggestion has also appeared in the labor-turnover discussions that a "continuance rate," consisting of the ratio of the men on the pay roll all through a given period to the men on the pay roll at the beginning, be substituted for any of the various turnover indices. This differs from the stability index here suggested only in taking the original group rather than the average size of the group throughout the period as the base. This "continuance rate" stands to the "separation rate" in the same relation as the turnover index proposed above stands to the stability index: the sums in each case equal unity. The continuance rate, therefore, suffers from the same drawbacks as those discussed above in connection with separation rate. (The continuance rate is proposed in F. E. Baridon and E. H. Loomis, *Personnel Problems* [New York, 1931], p. 135.)

meets all the requirements of a suitable index of the continuity of a group in terms of personnel maintenance. This does not mean, however, that it alone is adequate to describe all the significant aspects of the metabolism process. It is the considered opinion of the present writer that the stability index is the most satisfactory single indicator but that any description of the process should give as well the percentages which the losses constitute of the original group and which the additions constitute of the new group, together with at least one of the three items,  $G_o$ ,  $R$ , or  $G_i$ , since from any one the other two can be derived if the above ratios are given.

## IV

The following remarks are to be taken as illustrations of a technique of statistical description rather than as constituting an exhaustive analysis of an empirical situation.<sup>18</sup>

TABLE 1  
METABOLISM IN AUSTRIA'S THREE UNIVERSITIES  
1936/7-1937/8 AND 1937/8-1938/9

UNIVERSITY	OLD AND NEW STAFFS				PERCENTAGE LOST		PERCENTAGE ADDED		STABILITY INDEX	
	1936/7	1937/8	1937/8	1938/9	1936/7- 1937/8	1937/8- 1938/9	1936/7- 1937/8	1937/8- 1938/9	1936/7- 1937/8	1937/8- 1938/9
Vienna.....	617	615	615	325	5.2	49.5	4.9	4.3	94.9	66.1
Innsbruck.....	133	134	134	102	7.5	19.7	8.2	5.9	92.1	81.4
Graz.....	168	160	160	126	10.7	23.7	6.2	3.8	92.5	85.2
All.....	918	909	909	553	6.5	41.8	5.6	4.3	94.0	72.3

As a first step toward understanding the incidence of Naziism on Austrian university faculties we may examine the changes in the three universities comparatively and together (see Table 1). Summarizing these changes in terms of the net increases or decreases of the size of the staff and in the three basic indices, we have Table 2. Here we see depicted, in terms of faculty metabolism differentials,

<sup>18</sup> For an approach to this latter aspect of the problem see the writer's "Faculty Metabolism and Social Change in German Universities" (forthcoming), and "The German Universities and the Government," *Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science*, CC (November, 1938), 221-22 ff. A comparative study of faculty metabolism at Harvard is also under way. The writer wishes to express his indebtedness to the Harvard Committee on Research in the Social Sciences for material aid in the compilation of all these data and to Mrs. Paul Alexander for technical assistance.

the effects of a political revolution on the staffs of three universities: the total sizes of the teaching bodies decrease by more than a third (between 1937/8 and 1938/9), the separation rates increase more than sixfold, the accession rates<sup>19</sup> decrease, and the stability indices

TABLE 2  
NET CHANGES IN METABOLISM, AUSTRIAN UNIVERSITIES  
1936/7-1938/9 AND 1937/8-1938/9

University	Size of Staff	Percentage Lost	Percentage Added	Stability Index
Vienna . . . . .	- 290	+44.3	-0.6	-28.8
Innsbruck . . . . .	- 32	+12.2	-2.3	-10.7
Graz . . . . .	- 34	+13.0	-2.4	- 6.3
All . . . . .	-356	+35.3	-1.3	-21.7

TABLE 3  
METABOLISM, UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA, 1928/9-1938/9

Year	Old and New Staffs	Percentage Lost	Percentage Added	Stability Index
1928/9-1929/30 . . .	662-667	3.6	4.3	96.1
1931/2-1932/3 . . .	674-654	5.5	2.7	96.0
1932/3-1933/4 . . .	654-658	5.8	6.4	93.9
1933/4-1934/5 . . .	658-639	6.8	4.1	94.6
1934/5-1935/6 . . .	639-624	6.7	4.5	94.5
1935/6-1936/7 . . .	624-617	6.3	5.2	94.2
1936/7-1937/8 . . .	617-615	5.2	4.9	94.9
1937/8-1938/9 . . .	615-325	49.5	4.3	66.1

fall off by almost a fourth. It is clear, moreover, that the change has been felt much more severely in Vienna, situated in the socialistic capital of the country, than in the smaller provincial universities, where sentiment favorable to National Socialism was already strong before the annexation. Table 3 shows the relatively catastrophic effect of the changes on Vienna in contrast to the preceding years, which were none too serene in themselves.

<sup>19</sup> Note that the terms "separation rate" and "accession rate" are here used as equivalent to "percentage lost" and "percentage added" as defined, and not in their current meaning in labor-turnover discussions, the only difference being that here the denominators are the original and new groups, respectively, rather than their average.

Now, in order to show the differential rates of change for the various departments of the faculty, as well as for the two largest rank groups, the staff sizes and the several rates for 1937/8-1938/9, together with the arithmetic means of the staff sizes and the medians of the several rates for the preceding six years are shown in Table 4. Beneath the medians are given the range of fluctuation of the rates in the series of which the median rate is given. Finally, the net increases or decreases in rates are shown.<sup>20</sup>

In general, Vienna is revealed as an institution in the process of violent change. A few trends may be noted in passing. The great increase in percentage "lost" is not shared equally by the various divisions of the faculty. Law shows the greatest increase, with medicine also well above the other two, "philosophy" (i.e., arts and sciences) and theology. The rank of *Privatdozenten* shows a much greater increase than that of the ordinary professors. The accession rates are all low. The university is contracting rather than expanding. The almost complete absence of new appointments is in all probability only temporary. The greatest decrease in stability is registered by the law faculty.

## V

The new method for the analysis of turnover of personnel here indicated, while it does not attempt to rely on the descriptive merits of any one index, does not, at the same time, eschew the enormous advantages gained in having some single compound ratio which expresses in all essentials the processes under scrutiny. By presenting some of the absolute figures, together with the revised forms of the separation and accession rates and with the summarizing stability index, all relevant aspects of the metabolic situation can, it is believed, be expressed.

While the above discussion has dealt with two fields of empirical study only—labor turnover in industry and faculty metabolism in universities—it should not be supposed that the applicability of metabolism indices is restricted to these alone. So remote a topic as the fluctuations of legal attitudes as reflected in successive codes of

<sup>20</sup> The use of the median in this connection is recommended by W. A. Berridge, "A New Set of Turnover Indexes," *Personnel Journal*, VI (1927-28), 1-14.

TABLE 4  
DIFFERENTIAL METABOLISM RATES, UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA, 1931/2-1937/8 AND 1937/8-1938/9

FACULTY OR RANK	ORIGINAL AND NEW STAFFS		PERCENTAGE LOST (SEPARATION RATE)			PERCENTAGE ADDED (ACCESSION RATE)			STABILITY INDEX		
	Mean, 1931/2-1937/8	1937/8-1938/9	Median, 1931/2-1937/8	1937/8-1938/9	Net Change	Median, 1931/2-1937/8	1937/8-1938/9	Net Change	Median, 1931/2-1937/8	1937/8-1938/9	Net Change
Vienna.....	644-634	615-325	6.0 $R=1.6$	49.5	+43.5	4.7 $R=3.7$	4.3	-0.4	94.55 $R=2.1$	66.1	-28.45
Theology.....	22-21	21-13	4.8 $R=16.0$	38.1	+33.3	2.25 $R=9.5$	0.0	-2.25	96.3 $R=6.4$	76.5	-19.8
Law.....	76-75	73-26	5.9 $R=9.0$	65.7	+59.8	4.15 $R=5.5$	3.8	-0.35	94.5 $R=4.1$	50.5	-44.0
Medicine.....	318-311	294-145	5.55 $R=3.5$	52.4	+46.85	3.4 $R=3.8$	3.4	0.0	95.15 $R=1.7$	63.9	-31.25
"Philosophy".....	229-227	227-141	5.7 $R=6.2$	41.4	+35.7	5.8 $R=4.2$	5.7	-0.1	94.35 $R=4.0$	72.3	-22.05
Ordinary professor	97-95	92-59	9.35 $R=12.9$	39.2	+29.85	4.55 $R=6.6$	5.1	-0.55	92.4 $R=6.7$	74.1	-18.3
Privatdozenten....	478-478	470-244	5.55 $R=3.5$	50.0	+44.45	4.45 $R=5.2$	3.7	-0.75	94.75 $R=1.8$	65.9	-28.85

law has been studied by Sorokin and Timasheff, using an approach which in many respects resembles that outlined in this paper: here it is the codes which are the "groups" and the laws which constitute the fluctuating "personnel."<sup>21</sup> Here and there among the studies of migratory movements one finds a similar approach. Students of population growth, whether of bacteria, insects, animals, or human beings, have only to think of births and in-migrants as "additions" and of deaths and out-migrants as "losses" to find themselves confronting essentially the same problem. The epidemiologist studying the incidence of a disease, and the sociologist tracing the appearance, growth, and disappearance of religious sects, political parties, clubs, business organizations, associations, and societies of any sort, can both perhaps clarify their problems by thinking in the categories of metabolism analysis.

These few references suffice to suggest that the field of potential applicability of the concepts and descriptive devices discussed in this paper is at least as broad as the whole area of the demographic sciences.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

<sup>21</sup> See P. A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (New York, 1938), Vol. II, chap. xv: "The Fluctuation of Ethicojuridical Mentality in Criminal Law," in collaboration with N. S. Timasheff. Even the terminology of metabolism analysis is employed, but the method is not identified as such.



# LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

## THE PROBLEM OF THE CONCEPT

In Blumer's article "The Problem of the Concept in Social Psychology"<sup>1</sup> he suggests two purported limitations of the procedure of the Committee for Conceptual Integration in the American Sociological Society: (1) it undertakes no study of the empirical field denoted, but instead considers the usages of terms; (2) the empirical or denotative item enters only as it may happen to have been covered by previous experience of the student making the critical analysis, or as it appears in the discussions of usages which are being scrutinized.

The Committee's criticism of Blumer's article might be that whereas he proposes proper study of the empirical field he shows little evidence that he would profit adequately from long accumulations of others' studies of the empirical field that are revealed in their definitions and usages. The Committee does not propose to make this error. In fact, the existence of the Committee would be amply justified even though past experience were depended upon entirely, for an enormous amount of very useful refining of present concepts can be done merely by co-operatively capitalizing upon the past experience of the sum total of sociologists that has not yet been couched in disjunctive concepts. And, as to Blumer's first criticism, it should be obvious that a good deal of cleverness would be required to develop implications of all the existing definitions of terms and still to avoid taking into consideration the so-called empirical field of new experience. The fact is that from the start the Committee has proposed to study all existing definitions and usages in connection with the empirical field. At the outset of the project it is timely to stress the analysis of existing definitions and usages. When a great mass of confusion has been eliminated we can commence to give more emphasis to the so-called empirical field. To do the latter alone without attempting to profit to a maximum practicable amount by the former would be folly.

The above points have been developed clearly in statements about the Committee. Blumer could easily have ascertained the facts had he tried.

ALBERT BLUMENTHAL

*State Teachers College  
Maryville, Missouri*

## REJOINDER

I regret any misrepresentation that I have made of the position of the Committee on Conceptual Integration. Seemingly, I have erred in identifying the program of the Committee with the kind of work that Dr. Blumenthal has done in his series of discussions of the concept of "culture."

HERBERT BLUMER

*University of Chicago*

<sup>1</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, XLV (1940), 707-19.

## NEWS AND NOTES

### RESEARCH NEWS

*The Census Bureau and the Social Sciences.*—The taking of the sixteenth decennial census calls attention to the function of the Bureau of the Census in securing social data basic to a wide range of research and to the rapid development, particularly in the Division of Population, of personnel drawn from the fields of the social sciences. A series of three supplementary questions appearing on the official schedules is expected to uncover valuable information regarding population trends: (1) Has this woman been married more than once? (2) Age at first marriage? (3) Number of children (excluding still-births) ever born?

The last effort by the Board of the Census to secure concrete facts on the number of children borne by each woman was made in 1910. The questions asked at that time were virtually the same as those in the current schedule. The same or similar questions were asked in the censuses of 1890 and 1900, while as early as 1875 the commonwealth of Massachusetts asked in its state census: How many children have you ever had?

Tables to be published following the 1940 census will include most, if not all, of the following classifications: number of children ever born according to age of mother; length of married life; education of parents; color; native or foreign born; income or occupational groups; rental or owner's valuation of home. Further breakdown will list these classifications according to geographic regions (United States as a whole, state, counties, cities, and type of community—rural, farm or non-farm, urban).

—Leon E. Truesdell, Ph.D., Robert Brookings Graduate School, 1928, first came to the Census in 1911 and has been chief statistician for Population since 1925. Dr. Truesdell, who is president of the Population Association of America, has the chief responsibility for the organization and conduct of the population census. The present organization of the Census Bureau, enlarged by the recent appointment of a number of doctors of philosophy and others with advanced degrees in the social sciences to the staff of the Division of Population, indicates the different types of specialists required for the population census.

Philip M. Hauser, Ph.D., Chicago, 1938, has been made assistant chief statistician for Population. Previously he directed studies for the Federal Emergency Relief Administration and Work Projects Administration and

served as assistant chief statistician on the National Unemployment Census, 1937.

W. Edwards Deming, Ph.D., Yale, 1928, is on loan from the Department of Agriculture. At the Census Bureau, as mathematical advisor to the chief statistician for Population, he is experimenting with sampling methods for the 5 per cent sample survey to be made as a supplement to the 1940 census.

A. Ross Eckler, Ph.D., Harvard, 1934, comes to the Census Bureau from the Work Projects Administration, where he was assistant director of research. As chief of the Unemployment and Income Statistics Section, he will direct the compilation of income- and employment-status data in the 1940 census.

The position of chief of the Housing Statistics Section has been assigned to Howard G. Brunsman, M.A., Ohio State University, 1929. He comes to the Census Bureau from the Federal Housing Administration, where he had been associate director of the Division of Economics and Statistics since 1935. He was associate director of the Financial Survey of Urban Housing conducted by the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce in 1934.

Richard O. Lang, Ph.D., 1936, University of Chicago, who heads up the family statistics unit, comes to the Census Bureau from the Central Statistical Board.

Henry S. Shryock, Jr., Ph.D., Wisconsin, 1937, recently research associate in the School of Public Affairs at Princeton University, will be in charge of the statistics relating to internal migration and will also direct the making of population estimates.

Paul C. Glick, Ph.D., Wisconsin, 1938, has been appointed to assist in the planning and analysis of general population and family statistics.

The job of administrative officer, which in census work carries with it many technical responsibilities, is assigned to Glen S. Taylor, M.A., Wisconsin, 1932. Mr. Taylor will be responsible for the planning and the execution of the various technical instructions relating to coding, editing, and result work, and for efficient and rapid production.

Edward P. Staudt, M.A., Columbia, 1936, who has directed housing surveys for the F.E.R.A. and W.P.A., is assisting in the planning and conduct of the Housing Census. A. J. Jaffe, assistant social science analyst on population problems, M.A., 1938, University of Chicago, was engaged in social research at the University from 1934 until his recent appointment.

John Durand, A.B., Cornell, 1933, has returned to the Census to as-

sist on unemployment studies. He was with the Bureau from 1933 to 1936, working on population estimates, and since 1936 had been with the Princeton University office of population research.

James L. McPherson, Ph.B., University of Chicago, 1930, has been appointed to assist in planning tabulation techniques. From 1936 to 1938 he was with the United States Public Health Service, where he worked on the health survey as population analyst and in charge of coding and tabulating.

Ernest J. McCormick, B.A., Ohio Wesleyan, 1933, has been appointed to assist Dr. Alba M. Edwards on occupation statistics. Mr. McCormick was with the United States Employment Service from 1935 to June of this year and with the N.R.A. Cotton Garment Code Authority in New York City from 1933 to 1935.

Jack B. Robertson, B.A., University of Texas, 1934, formerly director of the Dallas study of the American Youth Commission from 1936 to 1938, has been appointed assistant social science analyst.

The Bureau will again have the services of Dr. Alba M. Edwards, statistician with the Census Bureau since 1909, who will be chief of the Occupational and Industrial Statistics Section as in three other decennial censuses.

*Institute of Pacific Relations.*—The Institute announces for early publication *War and Welfare: The Effects of the Sino-Japanese Conflict on American Social and Missionary Enterprise in China*, edited by Galen M. Fisher; *Native Welfare in the Pacific Islands* by Felix M. Keesing, University of Hawaii; *Chinese of Siam* by Kenneth P. Landon, Earlham College; *Far Eastern News in the American Press*, by Chilton R. Bush, Stanford University; also a study of the Japanese press by two Japanese sociologists and a study on foreign news in Canada by Carlton McNaught, Canadian Institute of International Affairs; *Agrarian China: Selected Source Material from Chinese Authors*, with an introduction by R. H. Tawney, London School of Economics. Under way and also likely to be published this year are: *Standards of Living in the Pacific Area*, Carl L. Alsberg, University of California; *Cultural Adjustment and Social Policy in Guam*, Laura Thompson, University of Hawaii; a combined edition of D. K. Liou's various studies of *Social and Economic Conditions in Silk-producing Regions in Eastern China* (with chapters on the social consequences of industrialization); and the first volume of Karl August Wittfogel's *Social and Economic History of China*. Publication office of the Institute is at 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

*The Twentieth Century Fund.*—The Fund has announced a study of housing needs as they present re-employment opportunities to be conducted under the direction of Miles L. Colean, who has resigned his post as assistant administrator of the Federal Housing Administration. The purpose of the investigation is to determine how residential construction can be stimulated, with a view to contributing substantially to the restoration of a higher level of employment and to meeting the recognized need of more adequate housing.

#### NOTES

*Eastern Sociological Society.*—The annual meeting of the Society, whose central theme was the sociology of war, was held at Asbury Park, New Jersey, April 27–28. An administrative innovation of the meeting was the issuing to all members invitations to submit reports of their research and an allotment of time for the various papers on the basis of the interests of the members. Robert M. MacIver, Columbia University, president of the American Sociological Society, delivered an address at the luncheon meeting April 27.

*Michigan Sociological Society.*—The Society met in conjunction with the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts and Letters, March 15, at the University of Michigan. The morning session was devoted to papers on religious groups by J. J. Burns, Nazareth College, Henry Ryskamp, Calvin College, and Paul Honigsheim, Michigan State College. The afternoon session was devoted to papers by C. R. Hoffer and D. L. Gibson, Michigan State College, on cultural resistance and a study of Father Coughlin by Eleanor Paperno, Wayne University.

*Southwestern Sociological Society.*—The Society met jointly with the Southwestern Social Science Association, March 22–23, at the Baker Hotel, Dallas, Texas, with papers by R. H. Bolyard, Southwestern Louisiana Institute; J. L. Charlton, University of Arkansas; Kenneth Evans, East Texas State Teachers College; Leo A. Haak, University of Tulsa; J. K. Johnson, East Texas State Teachers College; Ernest Manheim, University of Kansas City; Henry L. Pritchett, Southern Methodist University; J. J. Rhyne, University of Oklahoma; Mapheus Smith, University of Kansas; C. W. Strow, Oklahoma State College; Walter T. Watson, Southern Methodist University; Fred G. Watts, Oklahoma Baptist University; Joseph Werlin, University of Houston; and Kurth H. Wolff, Southern Methodist University. A round table under the leadership of William S. Bernard, University of Colorado, was held on the

topic of the responsibilities of departments of sociology for offering courses in training for marriage.

*American Academy of Political and Social Science.*—The theme of the fourth annual meeting held in Philadelphia, April 12-13, was "The United States and Durable Peace." The officers for the current year are: president, Ernest M. Patterson; vice-presidents, Herbert Hoover, Carl Kelsey, and Clarence A. Dykstra; secretary, J. P. Lichtenberger; treasurer, Charles J. Rhoads; assistant treasurer, Davis L. Lewis; counsel, Clinton Rogers Woodruff, and librarian, James T. Young.

*American Council on Public Affairs.*—The Council is now concentrating its efforts upon the sponsorship, publication, promotion, and distribution of scholarly studies and papers in the social sciences and is interested in examining manuscripts in these fields suitable for publication in book or pamphlet form. In its choice of publications, the Council is concerned with authoritativeness, significance, responsibility of the author, and timeliness. Manuscripts may be sent to the Council at 1721 Eye Street, Washington, D.C.

*American Scientific Congress.*—The eighth congress is being held at the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., May 10-18. The purpose of the Congress is to advance scientific thought and accomplishment and to assist in celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Pan American Union. Harold G. Moulton, Brookings Institute, is chairman of the section on economics and sociology, and Stuart A. Rice, Central Statistical Board, is chairman of the section on statistics.

*American Statistical Association.*—The Association has announced that subscriptions to the Centenary Sustaining Fund from three hundred and thirty-five members amount to over \$10,000. The Fund is to be expanded during the next five years in developing the Association's activities in directions that seem from time to time most appropriate.

*International Phenomenological Society.*—Richard H. Williams, assistant professor of sociology and anthropology at the University of Buffalo, has recently been elected secretary and treasurer of the Society, which was founded in New York, December 26, 1939. Its purpose is to further the development and understanding of phenomenological inquiry as inaugurated by Edmund Husserl. The Society plans to issue a quarterly journal beginning in the fall of 1940. This publication will present original contributions of research in phenomenology in its widest significance, including its application to the social sciences and psychology. Dr. Wil-

liams will be interested in hearing from sociologists of their interest in his project.

*Laguna Conference on Cooperative-Collective Farming.*—The second annual conference, to be held July 4-7 at the Hotel Casa Blanca, Torreon, Coahuila, Mexico, will hear peasants, doctors, teachers, co-operative leaders, and agricultural engineers describe their work and tell of their experiences in helping peasants recently released from slavery build a new pattern for Mexican rural life. There will also be field trips to collective farms, clinics, new housing districts, women's league headquarters, schools, and peasant groups.

*National Council of Parent Education.*—The Council is launching publication of a bimonthly, *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, whose function is defined as a clearing-house service including news and abstracts, emphasizing important research and insights regarding the family and family-life education. The *Bulletin* may be obtained with or without membership in the Council. Further information may be obtained by writing to Joseph K. Folsom, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, New York.

*New England Conference on Family Relations.*—The Conference, to be held at Harvard University, July 24-26, will be attended by many leading specialists and authorities on the family and child problems. Meetings and round tables will be open without charge to all officially registered in the Harvard Summer School. Those interested in participating in the program may write to Carle C. Zimmerman, chairman of the New England Conference on Family Relations, 200 Emerson Hall, Harvard University.

*Phylon.*—This is the title Atlanta University has given the publication of a *Review of Race and Culture*. The leading article of the first issue is "The South Adjusts—Downward?" by Arthur T. Raper, Agnes Scott College, and Ira De A. Reid, Atlanta University, managing editor of *Phylon*. W. E. B. Du Bois, Atlanta University, is editor-in-chief of this new publication, and Allison Davis, Dillard University, is a member of the editorial board.

*Psychodramatic Institute (Beacon, New York).*—During the summer months the Institute, under the direction of J. L. Moreno, will offer training courses in the technique of the psychodrama, with particular consideration of such problems as educational guidance, marriage counseling, mental disorders, social maladjustments, and research in psychodrama

and sociometry. Further information may be obtained by writing to the Institute at 259 Wolcott Avenue, Beacon, New York.

*Recovery Association.*—The Association was founded November, 1937, by thirty patients who were discharged as recovered from the Psychiatric Institute of the Illinois Research and Educational Hospitals. The Association has a double purpose: (1) to provide the reassurance that comes from membership in an organization; and (2) to educate the community to remove the stigma from mental disease and to substitute facts for superstition and ignorance.

With the aid of faculty members of the Northwestern Law School, the Association has drafted a new commitment statute to abolish court action and to eliminate the "court record period." Under the new plan, a patient, after proper certification by two officers, will be admitted to a state hospital without petition, writ, or trial. The hospital staff will be required to make an examination within ten days after admission and to send a report to a state board of supervisors composed of officers, lawyers, and lay people.

*Russell Sage Foundation.*—The Foundation has announced publication of *Migration and Social Welfare* by Philip E. Ryan, copies of which may be obtained at fifty cents each from the Foundation, 30 East Twenty-second Street, New York City.

*Sumner Centennial.*—Arrangements are being made by the following three clubs of Yale men to celebrate the centennial of the birth of William Graham Sumner: the newly established undergraduate sociology club, Raymond C. Jopling, president; the graduate sociology club, Keyes Fenton, president; and the William Graham Sumner Club, composed originally of the former students of Sumner, Julius C. Peter, Detroit, president.

—Among the names of one hundred and forty-three distinguished men and women who have been nominated for the ninth quinquennial election to the Hall of Fame for Great Americans on the Bronx campus of New York University is William Graham Sumner, 1840-1910, sociologist and economist and second president of the American Sociological Society. The names of the nominees seconded by the senate of New York University will be included on the ballot submitted to the one hundred and fourteen members of the college of electors.

*United States Department of Agriculture.*—According to the last bulletin of the Bureau of Agriculture and Economics, there are now seven hundred and eight persons teaching courses in rural sociology in the United States.



*Boston University.*—Leonard Bloom, Kent State University, will offer courses during the summer session.

*Bucknell University.*—Samuel H. Jameson, University of Oregon, will give courses in modern social institutions and racial relations during the summer session.

*University of California.*—During the summer session Floyd N. House, University of Virginia, will offer courses in introductory sociology and contemporary sociological theory.

*Catholic University of America.*—The Reverend Paul H. Furfey has been appointed head of the department of sociology.

*Central Y.M.C.A. College (Chicago).*—Clifford R. Shaw and Jesse A. Jacobs, Illinois Institute for Juvenile Research, are offering a seminar in criminology during the current semester. Siegfried Marck, formerly of the University of Breslau, who has recently joined the faculty, is lecturing on the European backgrounds of sociology, methodology, and social institutions. Charles N. Elliott is teaching part time during the spring semester.

*Colgate University.*—Norman E. Himes has been appointed editor of the social science series published by Longmans, Green and Company.

*University of Colorado.*—Clyde W. Hart, University of Iowa, and Willard Waller, Columbia University, will offer courses during the summer quarter.

*Columbia University.*—Effective July 1, R. E. Chaddock has been appointed head of the department of social sciences. A. G. Truxal, Dartmouth College, and S. H. Prince, Dalhousie University, will give courses during the summer session.

*University of Connecticut.*—Harold Jacoby, College of the Pacific, will offer courses in principles of sociology and contemporary social problems during the summer session.

*Duke University.*—During the summer session Guy V. Price, Teachers College of Kansas City, will give courses in general sociology, child welfare, social pathology, and criminology, and Fred R. Yoder, State College of Washington, will teach general sociology and rural sociology.

*Kent State University.*—Roy E. Hyde, Southeastern Louisiana College, Harley Preston, Indiana University, and Joseph Roucek, Hofstra College, will be on the staff during the summer session. John F. Cuber has been promoted to the rank of associate professor.

*University of Kentucky.*—Robert N. Ford, University of Pittsburgh, is filling the vacancy, during the current semester, created by the resignation of M. G. Caldwell, who accepted a position with the Wisconsin Department of Public Welfare. Olive M. Stone, College of William and Mary, will offer a course in marriage and the family during the first term of the summer session.

*McGill University.*—Robert E. L. Faris has resigned to accept an appointment as associate professor of sociology at Bryn Mawr College.

*Michigan State College.*—E. R. Mowrer, Northwestern University, and Harriet Mowrer, will offer a course on marriage during the summer session.

*University of Minnesota.*—During the first term of the summer session, J. K. Folsom, Vassar College, will give courses in social interaction and the family.

*Morehouse College.*—Under the sponsorship of the department of sociology, W. R. Chivers, chairman, in co-operation with the Division of Negro Affairs of the National Youth Administration, a series of weekly forums beginning November 1 was held on the subject of "Southern Problems." The purpose of the series was to show the political, educational, social, and economic problems of the south from a particular standpoint of the southern Negro.

*New York University.*—Eight social science field laboratory fellowships are being offered by the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences for work to be done on the Pomo Indians of California during the summer of 1940. Communications should be addressed to B. W. Aginsky, Washington Square College, New York University.

*University of North Carolina.*—During the summer session J. Stewart Burgess, Temple University, will give courses in introductory sociology, and social progress and social values; Ray V. Sowers, Florida Southern College, will teach a course on the family; and B. O. Williams, Clemson College, will offer a course in population.

*Northwestern University.*—J. P. Lippincott Company has announced for early publication *Disorganization: Personal and Social* by Ernest R. Mowrer. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., has published in its "Borzoi Series" *The Economic Life of Primitive Peoples* by Melville J. Herskovits.

*University of Oregon.*—During the summer session Meyer Nimkoff, Bucknell University, will give courses in general sociology, marriage and the family, and social change.

*Pennsylvania State College.*—Duane V. Ramsey has been appointed assistant professor of sociology.

*Smith College.*—Kimball Young, Queens College, will give courses in culture and personality and in group psychology in the Summer School of Social Work.

*University of Southern California.*—Henry Pratt Fairchild, New York University, will offer courses on fundamentals of sociology and social progress and current trends during the summer session.

*Stanford University.*—During the summer quarter Howard Becker, University of Wisconsin, will give courses on "Social Thought from Lore to Science," and "Personality, Conduct, and Culture."

*University of Texas.*—Kingsley Davis, Pennsylvania State College, is scheduled to teach during the first six weeks of the summer session.

*University of Utah.*—Howard W. Odum, University of North Carolina, will teach courses in sociology and social work during the summer session. Henry H. Frost, Jr., University of California, has been appointed instructor in sociology.

*University of Virginia.*—W. J. Hayes, Vanderbilt University, will give courses in introductory sociology during the summer quarter.

*University of Washington.*—Arthur E. Wood, University of Michigan, will teach the sociology of religion and the family during the first term of the summer session.

*Wellesley College.*—"Building Democracy" is the theme of the Summer Institute for Social Progress to be held July 6-20, in which an effort will be made to define the interests of occupational classes and the means by

which they are seeking to release their aims. Further information may be obtained by writing Dorothy P. Hill, 22 Oakland Place, Buffalo, New York.

*University of West Virginia.*—During the summer session Charles M. Burrows, Simpson College, will give courses in race problems, crime and delinquency, and rural community organization..

*University of Wisconsin.*—Paul R. Farnsworth, Stanford University, has been teaching during the current year in place of Kimball Young, who has been on leave. Professor Farnsworth will give courses in social psychology, and personality and social adjustment, during the summer session. J. H. Mathews, chairman of the department of chemistry, will offer a course on the identification of criminals during the summer session. F. S. Crofts and Company have announced for publication this spring *Personality and Problems of Adjustment* by Kimball Young. The University of Wisconsin Press has published *Research Materials in the Social Sciences: An Annotated Guide for Graduate Students* by Louis Kaplan, and *Bibliographical Citation in the Social Sciences: A Handbook of Style* by Livia Appel.

#### PERSONAL

Houghton Mifflin Company is offering prizes of twenty-five hundred dollars each for accepted manuscripts on the subject "Life in America." Houghton Mifflin has also announced two literary fellowships for 1940—one for fiction and one for nonfiction—of fifteen hundred dollars each. The awards will be made "on the basis of promise rather than performance." Manuscripts should reach the company on or before September 15. Application forms for both types of award may be secured from Houghton Mifflin Company, 2 Park Street, Boston.

E. Franklin Frazier, Howard University, has received the Anisfield award for his recently published *The Negro Family in the United States*. Professor Frazier has also been awarded a fellowship by the Guggenheim Foundation to make a comparative study of the Negro family in the West Indies and Brazil.

## BOOK REVIEWS

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*Public Opinion.* By WILLIAM ALBIG. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1939. Pp. xiii+486. \$4.00.

This survey of social science aspects of symbolic phenomena corresponds to rather pressing needs arising out of the expanding pedagogic concern with this field as well as out of the rapid accumulation of specialized research results bearing on it. By the exhibition of a wide range of relevant data and of hypotheses of previous students (also, one should not omit reference to a competent selection of suggestive anecdotes) this volume supplements recent comprehensive treatises, such as Dr. Doob's on *Propaganda*, which concentrate on the construction of an apparatus of terms and generalizations of their own. If the richness of the content of Dr. Albigh's opus makes it an important contribution to the literature of its field, it cannot be said to have achieved the same degree of success with reference to the integration of the wealth of material presented. In any study of the vast scope of Dr. Albigh's the problem of a proper classification becomes important. Dr. Albigh uses a number of classificatory principles; but he does not care to make them sufficiently explicit, and he does not choose to "go through" with any one of them—without, however, indicating which spots in any given classification he prefers to leave "blank" (as to systematic treatment) and where the reader may find clues for such a treatment under other headings. Thus, for example, a classification of public opinion phenomena according to the social objects referred to is introduced (implicitly rather than explicitly) with chapter vi—"The Leader and Personal Symbolism." But the reviewer has not been able to find an equally focused discussion on "legends and myths" glorifying "ourselves," as distinct from our leader, and vilifying "them" as distinguished from "their" leaders. The problem of the relationship of the symbol patterns referring to individuals to those alluding to groups deserves, however, explicit mention. Or, to take another instance, the classification of public opinion phenomena according to causative factors is introduced by the presence of chapter ix, "The Geographic Distribution of Group Opinion," which deals mainly with "ecological" causative factors; but no systematic treatment is given to nonspatial aspects of, say, economic factors (nor does the Subject Index give a clue as to where refer-

ences in this direction may be found); and certain psychological determinants are treated in chapter iv on "Psychological Processes and Opinion" without establishing a close-enough rapprochement between the analysis of such "predispositional" factors and that of "environmental" factors as treated in the "geographic" chapter mentioned. Such examples could be multiplied. As Dr. Albig thus uses—as it is, of course, desirable—a plurality of classificatory principles, overlappings are bound to occur. This is evidently unobjectionable but seems to call for a rather pedantic system of cross-references in order not to lose sight of the structure of the field as a whole (particularly, but not exclusively, for pedagogic purposes). Dr. Albig, however—and these again are a few, but by no means all, instances available—treats the "red herring" technique, the technique of positive rather than negative appeals, and the technique of assertion rather than argument, in two widely separated chapters—chapter xiii on "Opinion Change" and chapter xviii on "The Art of Propaganda"—without saying a word about these recurrences. Nor does he make sufficiently explicit the relationships prevailing between the psychological mechanisms of "subjects" (sketched in chap. iv) and the propaganda devices (related in chap. xviii), the effectiveness of which is evidently predicated upon the existence of the aforementioned mechanisms.

If thus the classification devices employed as well as the interrelationships between generalizations established seem capable of improvement, a similar point can be made with reference to the relationships between generalizations, on the one hand, and "data," on the other. Obviously in the present stage of the social sciences we are not able to present all, or even a substantial proportion of the data available as particular instances of rather well-confirmed generalizations; but we can at least order them to questions for uniform relationships if not to answers. Dr. Albig, however, chooses to alternate between "generalizing" chapters and mainly "merely descriptive" chapters, such as those on "censorship" and the various "channels" (incidentally, the Egyptian "Wafd" is not a radio station as p. 358 seems to imply).

As far as the selection of data presented is concerned, the book is not free from the all too universal tendency of concentrating on organization, channels, and quantity at the expense of symbol contents. A representative instance of this may be found in the passages on totalitarian propaganda (pp. 298-301). The author states that "dictatorial propaganda . . . strives to align people with state programs. The methods used and the success achieved vary with the situation. . . . In this discussion we cannot attempt to summarize even one particular case." But the nomen-

clature of the divisions and subdivisions of Mr. Goebbels' ministry are presented *in extenso*.

Behind the dualism of generalizations and data stands Dr. Albig's assertion concerning the impossibility of a perfect system of general propositions on public opinion. Such a contention seems to be implied in his statement about propaganda that "there *can be* no hard-and-fast rules that may be experimentally verified about such procedures"<sup>1</sup> (p. 318), apparently because "the situation in which each issue occurs is . . . unique" (p. 311). Lack of space forbids us to attempt a refutation of this assertion which decides in an "aprioric" fashion what seems to the reviewer to be a question of "aposterioric" nature. Dr. Albig admits that recent generations of social scientists have been at least partially successful in the venture of generalizing about advertising. He must be aware that their early efforts were greeted with the same pessimistic prognoses which he now utters with reference to the embryonic science of propaganda.

N. C. LEITES

*University of Chicago*

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*The Degrees of Knowledge.* By JACQUES MARITAIN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938. Pp. xviii+475. \$6.00.

The reader who is more familiar with modern science and the scientific method than with the theology of the Catholic church, the Thomist metaphysics, and with religious mysticism will close this book more puzzled than instructed. Maritain is an orthodox Catholic, a Thomist philosopher, a poet, and a mystic; these several attributes color and obscure his pages. He gives us an abundance of assertions and a paucity of analysis and definitions, particularly of such terms as "knowledge," the play on which is the major theme of the book. Knowledge may refer to verified and ordered experience, recorded in books or transmitted in human tradition; it may refer to the fractions of this acquired in the lifetime of the individual; or it may refer to the direct conscious experiences of the individual, which are purely personal (e.g., I "know" that I had that dream, that headache, that euphoria; I "know" I saw those pink elephants). The accumulation and acquisition of knowledge in all these respects involve a normal brain and the laws of memory, except as to direct personal experiences like hallucinations. Knowledge may vary in degree of completeness, universality, and possible significance ("value"). But such matters should be settled by experimental analysis, and reason, not by prophecy and personal assertions.

<sup>1</sup> Italics mine.

The introductory chapter is an orthodox mystical sermon. Having informed us, in the Preface, that "man is not in a state of pure nature, but of a nature once fallen and redeemed," Maritain introduces three ascending categories of knowledge: (1) knowledge through senses (in collated form, science), (2) knowledge through reason (metaphysics), and (3) the highest form of knowledge, mystical experience, achieved by a few, through religion. Neither category appears to depend on or to flow naturally into the other. Thus, metaphysics deals with the "universal principles" and the "eternal verities," whatever they are, and does not even need to refer to modern science ("The phenomenological sciences have freed metaphysics from the necessity of explaining the stuff of sensible nature" [p. 19]). This highest, or mystical knowledge, is also spoken of as the highest wisdom and strangely enough, at times, as the antithesis to knowledge ("This highest knowledge presupposes the renunciation of knowledge"). As mystical experience constitutes the highest (most certain?) form of knowledge, many changes are wrought on this theme, that is, the method and the results of attaining to this state of knowledge, as witness the following:

There is no question of an intellectual elevation above the intelligible, of rising by metaphysics . . . to the abolition of natural intellection in a super-intelligibility of angelic ecstasies. . . . Here the soul finds pastures, and feeds upon its God. . . . Thus delivered from the sensible world and the intellectual, alike, the soul enters into the mysterious obscurity of holy ignorance, and renouncing all the gifts of science, loses itself in him who can neither be seen nor seized; . . . united to the unknown . . . by reason of its renouncement of all science; finally drawing from this absolute ignorance a comprehension which the understanding could never have won [pp. 16-18].

The main part of the volume (pp. 29-301) is taken up with a restatement of the Thomist philosophy and with a brief glance at modern science, especially mathematics and physics, from the comfortable heights of metaphysics. The author has little to say of modern geology and cosmology, and nothing about modern anthropology. He is somewhat less pontifical and mystical in these chapters, but religion and mysticism are appealed to here and there, and we are told that "metaphysics should be the regulative science, *par excellence*" (p. 51), and that "Rome is the capital of the world" (p. 21)—statements which make one question Maritain's understanding of the method and the spirit of modern science. After telling scientists that "Thomist philosophy rather than any other is in position to supply the sciences with the metaphysical framework, where they can follow out at ease the necessities of their own proper development" (p. 83), he informs them that the theory of evolution, applied to living beings as well as to the universe as a whole, "imposes on science



such exasperating metaphysical fetters." This is surely news to most modern men of science. But they should at least be grateful for the author's condescending tolerance of the toilers in science. They are essentially harmless and are concerned with the lowest order of knowledge or understanding ("lower order of scientific demiurgy" [p. 3]).

Not having read the original French the reviewer cannot state how much of the obscurity reflects on the translators. Four pages of errata, some of them serious, are listed, but there may be more of them. For example, the author speaks of the "psychico-chemical properties of the wood" in a table. Some of the phrases, such as "feeding on God," "a taste, a touch, a sweetness of God," etc., seem crude anthropomorphisms; reminding one of the dialogues in *Green Pastures* and of the sermons of Father Divine. I presume this is the poet speaking, but Jacques Maritain is known as a philosopher or metaphysician rather than as a poet. According to the publisher's blurb on the jacket, Maritain is today "supreme among the European philosophers," and this is his ideal metaphysician: "Metaphysics wishes purely to contemplate, to over-pass reason, and enter into pure intellection, aspires to the unity of a simple gaze" (p. 6). The "gaze" is probably metaphorical. Evidently the poet and the mystic are speaking. But, even so, the author's meaning will not be clear to some readers, and the unregenerate might be tempted to substitute "gas" for "gaze." Maritain, the mystic, has achieved in this book, to use the author's own diction, "an intellectual elevation above the intelligible, a rising by metaphysics . . . to the abolition of natural intellection."

A. J. CARLSON

*University of Chicago*

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*Business and Capitalism.* By N. S. B. GRAS. New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1939. Pp. xxii+408. \$3.50.

This is a book which is very difficult to describe at once briefly, accurately, and fairly. It is subtitled "An Introduction to Business History," but the first statement in the Preface (labeled "Introduction") reads: "*Insofar as* this volume deals with business history it is a *mere* introduction" (italics mine). It is clearly a discussion of "stages" in the historical development of the modern world, a genus of which Professor Gras has given an example before, but this one is different from his *Introduction to Economic History* in ways which again are not easy to describe. The first three of his former stages—collectional economy, cultural nomadic economy, and settled village economy—are lumped together and very briefly disposed of in chapter i, entitled "Pre-business Capitalism." This is now followed by other types of capitalism, instead

of town economy and metropolitan economy. The new types or stages are petty, mercantile (two chapters), industrial, financial, and national capitalism, respectively.

The aim seems to be to present a kind of combination of, or compromise between, a descriptive general view of economic evolution, involving the main conceptual types of economic organization, as they have been exemplified so far, including fascism, nazism, and the American New Deal (discussed in the final chapter), together with a social appraisal of the different forms or stages. A great deal of historical material, descriptive in a general sense and illustrative through use of concrete cases, is brought together and very interestingly presented. But, in the opinion of the present reviewer, the book is distinctly more successful as a descriptive survey than it is from the standpoint of analysis.

To the economic theorist the great change which has occurred in economic organization in historical times is the appearance of the "free enterprise" organization of production, characterized by the existence of enterprises or business units which hire the use of "productive services" from individual owners for a stipulated money price determined by competition in the market, initiate and direct production, and sell the product to individuals in another system of competitive markets. Any excess of return over cost is a "profit," in a meaning quite different from that of mercantile profit, and none of the other "distributive shares," about which center the burning economic problems of modern society, exist in a mercantile economy. The general outlines of enterprise organization appear with the advent of the putting-out system, and at the same general period in agriculture also, through the displacement of servile status and customary work and dues by the wage relationship. The freeing of the market for capital and land involved a longer struggle. Modern society finally became "capitalistic," however, as an indirect consequence of the industrial revolution, which in itself was a technological change.

The book under review contains no clear recognition of these facts. They are by no means indicated in the author's definition of business. This is vague and general, as it must be if it is to fit all business in the course of its history. There is no serious attempt at a definition of capital, particularly as a quantity, though it is referred to on every other page in quantitative terms. And the same lack of serious attempt at analytical definition is notable in connection with other main concepts necessary for a conceptual analysis of capitalistic enterprise and which frequently recur in the book.

FRANK H. KNIGHT

*University of Chicago*

*Social Control: Social Organization and Disorganization in Process.* By PAUL H. LANDIS. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1939. Pp. xxii+507. \$3.50.

*Fundamental Sociology.* By E. J. Ross. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1939. Pp. xiv+698. \$3.00.

Dr. Landis' book should serve its purpose well. It is an elementary text which deals primarily with the agencies of social conformity. If it fails to achieve an explicit theoretical articulation, if at times it suffers from an excess of common-sense materials and an insufficiency of rigorously sifted data, yet these imperfections are offset by many merits.

Social control is conceived as occurring both through associations definitely organized for regulatory purposes and through diffuse sociocultural forces. The elaboration of this point of view runs through brief summaries of the workings of various social institutions and more diffuse regulatory patterns. Adequate significance is attached to "social expectancy" as an incessant, if not always effective, force of control. In a fashion as unusual as it is commendable for texts in this field, Landis briefly reviews the historical development of the theoretical "problem of social order" (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau). Omission of the usually intruded chapters on protopsychology (e.g., Mendelism, racial characters, instinct inventories) testifies that the author has avoided the encyclopedic fallacy of treating all elements concretely involved in society as germane to sociological analysis.

This text seeks to integrate concepts on three distinct levels: the concepts of conditioned response, social interaction, and culture. The most effective part of the discussion deals with the ways in which the mechanisms of control are tied into the social structure and are integrated with the various status categories of social organization. In this connection Landis treats of the regulative effects of the cultural goals of age, sex, class, caste, and vocational categories. This discussion would be improved, however, by the addition of comparative cultural materials.

One of the less successful portions of this book is concerned with the means of social control. This chapter devolves into an inventory—an extensive catalogue, to be sure, but nevertheless a catalogue instead of a theoretically ordered classification—of modes of control which are on wholly different levels of complexity (e.g., socialization, regulatory symbols, sanctions). A second defect is found in the extensive quotation of students' accounts of mechanisms which operate as controls of their adolescent conduct. On the whole, the subjects' own views are accepted as

comprising valid sociological analyses. The result is simply an empirical classification of particularistic factors, rather than forces, of control.

Landis' book can be readily adapted for use in courses introductory to sociology as well as for courses in social control. It should prove to be a stimulating and teachable text.

Dr. Ross provides such an admirable summary of the postulates basic to her *Fundamental Sociology* that this reviewer cannot possibly improve upon it. These postulates, which either are "self-evident" or are "satisfactorily established by experts in other fields," guide the discussion of sociological principles through the first part of the book as well as the interpretation of social problems in the latter half.

The Catholic sociologist [viz., Dr. Ross] . . . does not regard sociology in the narrow positivistic sense, and in his work he presupposes the following, which he considers to be satisfactorily proved by philosophy, by historical events and documents, by revelation and in other ways:

1. That God exists, who is the Creator of all things, man included.
2. That Christ, the Son of God, established the Church to which He gave divine authority to guide men in matters related to their supernatural destiny.
3. That man has a spiritual soul which is immortal; hence he has an eternal destiny.
4. That man is endowed with a free will.
5. That man is not only subject to physical (necessary) laws, but also the moral law.
6. That man is a social being and has certain rights and duties which are common to all mankind.

ROBERT K. MERTON

*Tulane University*

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*Social Control in Its Sociological Aspects.* By L. L. BERNARD. New York: Macmillan Co., 1939. Pp. ix+711. \$4.00.

In so far as can be ascertained from his selection of illustrative and other quoted materials for inclusion in this volume, Professor Bernard is inclined to identify social control, first of all, as an art or technique—the art of manipulating conduct, sentiment, and opinion with reference to ends or values held by the manipulators. This impression is borne out by his remark in the opening chapter that "as a science in its own right [social control] may be looked upon as an administrative aspect, or as the administrative theory, of each general social science" (p. 3). This is a narrower connotation than Park and Burgess assigned to the term "social control" when they defined it as "mechanisms through which

social groups are enabled to act." Bernard has a chapter entitled "Social Control by Means of Custom and Law," but he makes no use of Spencer's account of ceremonial control, and even his treatment of custom seems to emphasize groups' conscious desire for social order as the sanction of custom rather than the objective fact that custom does tend to produce order in the absence of competing customs. This narrowing of the concept of social control may be desirable in the interests of sociological analysis and the discrimination of categories from one another; as a contribution to the grammar of the social sciences, however, this book leaves something to be desired.

In the author's Preface he "wishes particularly to emphasize the fact that he did not first make an outline of this work and then seek for cases to illustrate the outline. The book was constructed in a wholly inductive manner. Years of reading and analysis of cases, accompanied by an experimental classification and reclassification of these cases, finally resulted in the present form." This statement is easily believed; one gets the impression that the more theoretic and conceptual passages of this book, in the introductory chapters and elsewhere, have in the main been written to support the relatively concrete materials which comprise so large a part of its total bulk. The author seems to have been guided in collecting these materials by a very loose and elastic definition of his field of interest—an admirable research procedure, but one which, in this case, does not appear to have been followed by sufficient analysis and reflection to produce a very clear concept or theory of social control. The book remains little more than a collection of cases; the cases are, however, extremely interesting and thought-provoking.

FLOYD N. HOUSE

*University of Virginia*

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*The Natural History of Population.* By RAYMOND PEARL. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939. Pp. xii+416. \$3.50.

This work is the latest product of one of the world's most distinguished demographers. Here Dr. Pearl delves into the problem of human population from the biological rather than from the social viewpoint. Chapter i presents the biological background; chapters ii and iii deal with biological problems such as innate reproductive capacity, the length of the reproductive span, litter size, and comparison of potential with actual reproduction rates; and chapters iv and v are devoted to a presentation of the findings of a large-scale study of the extent of the use of contraceptive techniques. In chapter vi an effort is made to "bring the threads to-

gether" into a well-rounded conceptual framework. Two appendixes and thirty-three pages of bibliography complete the book.

This study may well be divided into three distinct parts. The first deals entirely with the biological processes involved in reproduction. Here Dr. Pearl minutely examines much data relating to the theoretical ultimate reproductive capacity and the varied and numerous obstacles which nature places in the way of such realization. Thus, in a sample of 199 couples which he studied he found that an average of 254 copulations were necessary for each pregnancy. So convinced is the author of the relatively great amount of sterility among human beings that he states, "The relative sterility of the human organism is truly the marvel rather than fertility" (p. 78).

The second part of *The Natural History of Population* is by far the best part. Here Dr. Pearl presents his analysis of about thirty thousand maternity cases, in which complete data relative to the reproductive life of the women were collected. After examining the data, Dr. Pearl concludes: "It is that if it were not for the effect of contraceptive efforts and the practice of criminal abortion, together with correlated habits as to postponement of marriage, there would apparently be little or no significant differential fertility as between economic, educational, or religious classes of urban American married couples" (p. 244).

Even this, however, is an understatement. Closer examination of the data presented here reveals that the writer has considered any pregnancy resulting to a woman who has employed contraception at any time during her life as a failure of the contraceptive technique. Thus any birth which is planned for is considered a failure of the contraceptive technique. Obviously, this is not necessarily the case since contraception when not employed cannot be credited with a failure. If the author had taken this into consideration, his conclusions quoted above would have been even more positive. In summary, this section has made a valid contribution to our knowledge of fertility. Students have long been convinced that birth control was the most important factor accounting for differential fertility but had relatively little evidence to prove it. Dr. Pearl has helped prove the case.

In the third part of this volume the author launches forth into a discussion of the various instincts which preordain the present American capitalistic order. Neither data nor logical reasoning are presented to substantiate this argument. "The instinct and habit of thrift are fundamental [in human beings]. . . . The roots of the institution of capitalism are biological in this important matter of thrift" (p. 279).

As to the physical makeup of this book, this reviewer is convinced

that the practice of placing all the footnotes at the end of the volume is not conducive to satisfactory readability.

A. J. JAFFE

*Bureau of the Census*

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*Leviathan and the People.* By R. M. MACIVER. Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1939. Pp. xi+182. \$2.00.

Professor MacIver has produced a book discussing the relative merits of democracy and dictatorship which is a model both in clearness and in method. It illustrates the sort of work which sociologists should be doing for the guidance of humanity in the present crisis.

The book is primarily three lectures, delivered at the Louisiana State University in 1939, followed by three chapters of "Commentary." The whole is a splendid example of what careful, scientific thinking can do to throw light upon world-wide situations.

Professor MacIver shows that the major conflict in the political world is not between communism and fascism but between dictatorial and democratic governments. He regards this conflict rightly as one between human values and so one within the human mind itself and not subject to objective quantitative measurements. Nevertheless, careful reasoning shows beyond a doubt the temporary and catastrophic nature of dictatorships. He tells us:

There are catastrophic conditions under which democracy cannot flourish or even endure. If under such conditions the whole world resorted to dictatorships, this phenomenon would offer no evidence for the permanence of that system. . . . Dictatorship arises to meet the immediate demands of a crisis or a series of crises; democracy is rooted in the heritage of experience and essays the longer task of adjusting the diverse demands of a complex civilization which must find unity within its differences and must reconcile its order with its liberties. The temporary character of dictatorship is revealed, as we shall see, in all its works, and not least in its proud claim to be eternal.

The author connects dictatorship with actual or threatened warfare. But, he points out, "warfare is so destructive that it can occur only at relatively long intervals. The years of peace must vastly outnumber the years of war, even under the worst conditions." Dictatorship is a sudden revulsion brought into being under conditions of great social tension. It is necessarily temporary. On the other hand, "democracy is the only principle that really seeks to solve the total problem of government." The closed-state principle is also necessarily temporary, both economically and culturally. The principle of democracy will outlive not only the present dictatorships but also all its historical embodiments.

Professor MacIver does not hesitate to consider the failures of existing democratic governments. His optimism is based upon a careful consideration of social and political principles rather than upon any existing or historical conditions. While the book was written before the present European war broke out, the author shows that he is fully aware of the weakness of present democratic governments in Europe, and the following quotation surely casts considerable light upon the causes of the present war:

The democracies defended their bad and undemocratic cause with a bad conscience, and therefore with weakness and vacillation. They blundered and bungled, bullied when it was wisdom to concede and conceded when it was wisdom to be strong. They have been shortsighted and thrown away golden opportunities. They refused to meet the reasonable demands of the distressed countries of Central Europe and thus they raised up against themselves new governments that were ready for extreme measures.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

*Duke University*

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*Society in Transition.* By HARRY ELMER BARNES. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939. Pp. xviii+999+xvii. \$3.75.

The whole content of this book is presented "as an exhibit of social and cultural transition, with each particular social problem considered as a special manifestation or outgrowth of the basic transformation now going on in society" (Preface). The omnipresent feature of the period is cultural lag—the lag, of course, being found in the fact that the mechanical and other aspects of our material civilization have outrun our ideologies, our institutions, and our programs of action.

The problems examined run the whole gamut of items found in recent treatments of social problems and social disorganization, including also some topics often ignored or toned down, such as a fearless and frank treatment of the sex problem and of corporate and group crime.

Each of the twenty subject-matter chapters constitutes a meaty summary of an extensive array of the recent literature in the particular field and presents in concise form whole blocks of facts and ideas, usually including a historical orientation and an interweaving of underlying social theory. In fact, the body of varied information is almost encyclopedic in quantity and scope. Many of the sources used are secondary and discursive in nature, however.

While the actual facts presented are scientifically acceptable, the work itself is not calmly scientific. It is intentionally a crusading and reformist piece of work, militantly "liberal" in its viewpoint and in the selection



and presentation of its materials, with indoctrination and an incitement to attack and construction along liberal lines as its primary objectives. In places the treatment borders on alarmism. According to the writer, utopia is within our reach; but failure to act decisively in the very near future means the chaos of barbarism. While the reviewer does not wish to underrate the seriousness of the present situation or to advocate an attitude of complacency, he is of the opinion that a considerable degree of cultural lag has been endemic throughout history and that debacles in the light of the innumerable social strains, have been relatively rare.

This is an extremely useful book for both laymen and college students. For laymen it will serve as a competent handbook; it will inform them and shake them up. It will do the same for students, but its length and the extensive coverage which it gives to the subjects treated is likely to discourage the reading of other works in the many fields presented. There will be the temptation for both instructor and students to make the course in which it is used a "one-book" affair. This, in the reviewer's opinion, partially defeats the purpose of any course.

J. O. HERTZLER

*University of Nebraska*

*Theory of Valuation.* JOHN DEWEY. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939. Pp. vii+67. \$1.00.

This is Monograph No. 4 of Volume II, as planned, of the *Foundations of the Unity of Science*, the two volumes being (as planned) the first two of twenty to compose the *Encyclopedia of Unified Science*.

According to Dewey's (pragmatic) views, a theory of valuation is the outline of a program of action (see title of Sec. VII) and presents the central practical problem in the unification of science (p. 66). Valuations, he explains, arise out of situations. They give rise to problems because they so often lead to undesirable results. Because of traditions, customs, institutions, and the activities of "special interests," men do not come to make those evaluations which it would be best for them to make. The problem set for the student of social phenomena is to find out by scientific investigation what conditions determine the character of men's valuations and how they operate. It is a problem, primarily, for psychology and culture anthropology, which are now in much the same state in which astronomy, physics, and chemistry were when they first emerged as genuinely experimental sciences. The result of a properly directed scientific study would be a method or technique for directing the formation of human desires and interests, i.e., for establishing such conditions that men will have values which are not unnecessarily limited in range or in pos-

sibility of realization. It seems to be assumed that everyone should and would agree on the scientific methods and results and the details of their application. Thus it is necessary firstly and mainly to get men to see that the elimination of conflict and frustration, and largely of limitation, is a fairly simple, or at least a concrete and definite, scientific problem. Then they will depart from the errors of apriorism, on one hand, and of skepticism as to the rational intellectual character of evaluation, on the other, and initiate the proper investigations, and mankind will be launched on the path to permanent and universal happiness.

FRANK H. KNIGHT

*University of Chicago*

*Soviet Housing Law.* By JOHN N. HAZARD. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939. Pp. iv+178. \$2.50.

It is not unreasonable to admit that; of the many changes which befell the masses in Russia after the establishment of the bolshevist regime, the most lasting impression in the outside world was left by Soviet nationalization of land, confiscation of larger buildings, and sequestration of empty dwellings. That these innovations, particularly from the standpoint of humanity's real need and right of having shelter, could have no other effect than confusion in the minds of those who traditionally associate their well-being with the free exercise of private property rights is not difficult to understand. Indeed, a variety of only too obvious questions can be readily set forth to witness this: What was the immediate effect of the bolshevist revolution on the housing problem? What are one's rights to occupy a dwelling in the U.S.S.R.? Must one pay rent there? What are the other duties of occupants? Can occupation be temporary and can the space be subleased? Can one exchange the dwelling space? When does the right to occupancy terminate? Can one resume possession? What happens in case of disputes or violation of housing discipline?

Because of the scarcity of information on the actual state of housing affairs in the Soviet Union, coupled with the often questionable reliability of the data available, this confusion has hardly diminished with the passing years. On the contrary, there is a temptation to say that it may have become even greater in view of the assertions that the Soviet constitution of 1936 is the most democratic and that the democracy under the dictatorial authority of the proletariat is the most liberal in existence.

Dr. Hazard's book is a welcome response supplying the needed information. Under corresponding chapters, and within a comparatively short space of only one hundred and twenty-six pages of text, he has given

to the reading world a well-written, clear, and impartial answer to all these queries. For the lawyers, who are told, among other things, that the Soviet housing law, which is "as opposed to the housing laws of the capitalist world as are the poles" (p. 151), must "center its attention upon evolving social needs rather than upon preservation of the *status quo*" (p. 125), he provides ample information in points of law. To the housing authorities, by describing the mechanics of the Soviet solution of the problem from the chaotic conditions of 1918 to the present-day results, he gives an instructive portrayal of an unprecedented experiment aiming at making "the most equitable use of what limited space there is by spreading the inconvenience of the crowded conditions over the entire population" (p. 125). Sociologists, political scientists, and students of Russian affairs will find in reading this book, respectively, new suggestions of the importance which the physical *Lebensraum* plays in fashioning society, new fields for the application of the principles of self-government, and new data on the achievements and shortcomings of everyday life in the U.S.S.R.

Twenty-five pages of appendixes, containing translated texts of the recent Soviet housing laws, a brief bibliography of the Russian materials proving the scarcity of the sources of information, and an adequate index, lend completeness to this useful addition to the literature on Soviet Russia.

T. A. TARACOUZIO

Harvard Law School

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*Black Workers and the New Unions.* By HORACE R. CAYTON and GEORGE S. MITCHELL. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1939. Pp. xviii+473. \$4.00.

The march of Negroes from rural areas in the South to industrial centers, both North and South, has brought a host of social and economic problems, among them the relationships between unions and colored workers. Much has happened since Spero and Harris published *The Black Worker*, and the present volume helps admirably to bring the story up to date.

The Negro entered northern industry primarily as a strikebreaker or else at a time of great labor shortage. With a rural background of low income and lack of organization, and with barriers of racial prejudice between unionized whites and Negroes, the latter made ideal strikebreakers. Only at such times could colored workers expect to obtain industrial jobs, be promoted to skilled work, or earn large pay. The educated Negroes to whom colored workers looked for leadership usually opposed unionism, because they were financially dependent upon wealthy

white employers or because they reflected typical middle-class prejudices. It is not surprising that most Negro workers developed greater loyalty to employers than to unions and a greater consciousness of race than of class.

Those unions, such as the mine workers, that have treated the Negro fairly have discovered that he, too, can make a staunch unionist. When the C.I.O. launched its campaign to organize mass-production industries, this earlier experience proved of great value. Negroes were attracted to the C.I.O. because it genuinely tried to organize them and to give them a fair share of offices and responsibilities. The A. F. of L. unions, on the other hand, had frequently barred Negroes or had shown no great interest in them.

In *Black Workers and the New Unions* Horace R. Cayton and George S. Mitchell have studied the relations of Negro steel workers to the industry and to unionism in great detail, with somewhat lesser attention to similar problems in meat-packing and railroad-car shops. They also studied unionism in the highly industrialized Birmingham district and analyzed the Negro community in the United States in its relations to the labor movement. The authors urge the formation of a united Negro trades to help unionize Negroes and to fight discrimination against them within the labor movement.

Of great value are hundreds of interviews with union officials and rank-and-file workers, from which the authors quote generously. These interviews give a firsthand picture of the psychology of Negro workers and shed light on the many complex problems involved in attempts to unionize them. It is somewhat unfortunate that the bulk of the field work was completed in early 1935, before the formation of the C.I.O.

JOEL SEIDMAN

*League for Industrial Democracy*

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*Marriage and the Family.* By RAY E. BABER. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1939. Pp. xii+656. \$4.00.

The aims of this college textbook are, in the author's words, twofold: "(1) to make a sociological analysis of the family which will contribute to an understanding of its origin, structure, and functions; (2) to select from what reliable data are available those factors that are likely to be of some practical help to young folk who are seeking guidance in the choice of a marriage partner and in the necessary adjustments of marriage and family life" (p. vii).

The author has been unusually successful in the fulfilment of these aims. In his presentation "marriage and family relationships are dealt

with in experiential form and sequence, with a minimum of sociological theorizing as such." While this method fails to produce a neat, concise, and intellectually satisfying system of thought, it is nonetheless distinctly sociological in its emphasis and point of view and seems best adapted not only to the author's purposes but to the present status of the subject.

The relegation of historical considerations to three short chapters will not be regarded as a serious omission by many students or teachers of courses on marriage and the family. No attempt is made to "bridge the wide gap between the ancient and modern family patterns," but the materials presented seem to provide an adequate basis for the author's subsequent treatment.

The chapters dealing with mate selection and courtship and the husband-wife relationship are well presented. Here, as in subsequent chapters, fresh materials are introduced, and some of the best and most recent (e.g., the studies by Terman and by Burgess and Cottrell) research data have been judiciously used.

The book is well organized and interestingly written throughout. It maintains a high level of "academic respectability" in spite of its frank catering to the concrete and practical interests of the student. It is believed that this volume will be recognized by student and teacher alike as a definite contribution to the growing list of texts in the field.

FREDERICK M. ZORBAUGH

*Oberlin College*

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*Local Community Fact Book, 1938.* Edited by LOUIS WIRTH and MARGARET FUREZ, with the aid of EDWARD L. BURCHARD. Chicago: Chicago Recreation Commission, 1939. Pp. 156. \$1.00.

*The Chicago Recreation Survey, 1937, Vol IV: Recreation by Community Areas in Chicago.* By ARTHUR J. TODD, in collaboration with WILLIAM F. BYRON and HOWARD L. VIEROW. Chicago: Chicago Recreation Commission, 1939. Pp. 165. \$1.00.

Knowledge of the community, which is basic to the effective work of any agency and to social planning, is here implemented by two excellent handbooks on Chicago. The reviewer knows of no similar compilations equal to these in amount of information and method of presentation.

The data in both volumes are organized on the basis of the seventy-five local communities into which Chicago has been divided. These community areas have been constructed by grouping contiguous census tracts on the basis of the following factors: (1) settlement, growth, and history;

(2) local trade area; (3) distribution of membership and attendance of local institutions; and (4) natural and artificial barriers. They probably come as close to being true natural or ecological areas as is possible of determination by this method; and certainly this is the most practicable procedure, since it permits the utilization of basic census data.

The *Local Community Fact Book* presents for each area (1) a descriptive page delineating the history of the locality, its boundaries, layout, points of interest, institutional facilities, and social and civic organizations, and (2) a statistical page containing a great deal of pertinent social data, an area plan, and an age-sex-nativity-and-color pyramid which is most useful in visualizing the distribution of the population at a glance. The presentation would be even more serviceable if locating a given area on the city map were facilitated by a more logical order of numbering the communities throughout the city and by the coupling of the number with the name of each local community as is done in the other volume.

The *Recreation Survey* volume, which completes the fact-finding project sponsored jointly by the Chicago Recreation Commission and Northwestern University, presents, for each local community, statistics on population and on the public, private, and commercial recreation facilities, and the following illustrated material: (1) a colored zoning map, (2) a map showing the location of recreation facilities and social agencies, (3) plot plans of schools, parks, and playgrounds, and (4) photographs of various recreation facilities. Though lacking pagination, the volume is indexed as to recreation facilities and agencies through the use of community area numbers.

MAURICE R. DAVIE

• *Yale University*

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*Next Steps in Consumer Education: Proceedings of a National Conference on Consumer Education Held at Stephens College, Columbia, Missouri, April 3, 4, and 5, 1939.* Columbia, Mo.: Institute of Consumer Education, 1939. Pp. 189.

*Does Distribution Cost Too Much?* The factual findings by PAUL W. STEWART and J. FREDERIC DEWHURST, with the assistance of LOUISE FIELD. The program by the COMMITTEE ON DISTRIBUTION OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1939. Pp. xvii+403. \$3.50.

*The Consumers' Cooperative as a Distributive Agency.* By ORIN E. BURLEY. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1939. Pp. xiv+338. \$3.00.

These three books relate to questions in which there is almost daily evidence of increased interest, namely what current economic trends mean

for people as consumers and what changes would be desirable from this point of view. Participants in the conference on consumer education, the proceedings of which are reported in the first volume, agreed upon the necessity of consumer education, and pioneer work was done in outlining the field and pointing out conflicts of interests and the necessary safeguards.

*Does Distribution Cost Too Much?* is the report of a special survey financed by the Twentieth Century Fund. The aim was to present "an accurate over-all picture and appraisal of the distribution system as a whole and a program for making it more efficient—all from the point of view of the general public." The reviewer is of the opinion that the value of the publication lies mainly in the program formulated in the concluding pages and the weight given to it by the names of the committee in charge of the investigation. It is questionable whether another over-all picture of the marketing system was needed. Probably no other aspect of our economic life has a more extensive literature in the form both of general books and of special monographs. Increasingly also the approach is from the point of view of the general public. Many aspects of the marketing system are in need of penetrating analysis and thoughtful appraisal, but this book does not push analysis and appraisal farther than other writers have done. The committee recommends establishment of an institute to explore "the broader and more important social implications of the kind of distributive system . . . we have." If this recommendation is carried out, the serious gap in marketing literature will be closed. If other recommendations for increasing consumer knowledge and decreasing market control for special benefit are carried out, some serious defects in our economic situation will be removed.

Professor Burley's study of consumers' co-operatives is by no means a duplication or summary of what literature already exists. As he says, there had been no general study of the distributive methods and policies of co-operatives. Other books deal with the philosophy of the movement and its history in general or with a specific development in other countries. This book, on the other hand, draws upon American experience and puts primary emphasis upon the methods by which consumers' co-operatives meet the organizational and operating problems common to all business enterprises as well as those inherent in their particular form. It is a book that should be studied by both theoretical and practical co-operators.

HAZEL KYRK

*University of Chicago*

*Health and Unemployment.* By LEONARD C. MARSH, A. GRANT FLEMING, and C. F. BLACKLER. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938. Pp. xxv+243. \$3.00.

This book is based on various kinds of data collected chiefly in Montreal by the Department of Public Health and Preventive Medicine of McGill University.

Part I is a discussion of the problem of the relation of environment to various phases of health and disease and measures of the relationship that can be used in a study of this kind. The section quotes the results of various sickness surveys that have presented data classified according to some index of economic status of the surveyed families.

Parts II, III, and IV report upon field studies done chiefly in Montreal by the university. Part II considers the results of physical examinations of 1,003 unemployed men classified into broad occupational groups, in comparison with the results of 1,007 physical examinations of persons employed in the textile, tobacco, flour, and electrical supply industries of Montreal.

Part III consists of the results of physical examinations and a study of the home and other environment of 270 boys of the ages fourteen to eighteen years who had left school but were not employed and many of whose families had experienced long unemployment.

Part IV is a report on a study of 591 families on unemployment relief and of the growth and physical defects of school children and infants classified according to economic status.

In each section a chapter is devoted to nutrition, and in the family section there is a chapter on minimum standard budgets. The final section on the provision of medical care traces briefly the history of medical relief in the different sections and provinces of Canada.

SELWYN D. COLLINS

Washington, D.C.

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*Japan in Transition.* By EMIL LEDERER and EMY LEDERER-SEIDLER. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938. Pp. xi+260. \$3.00.

This volume, a translation and revision of a work first published in Germany ten years ago, is based on two years' observations in Japan while one of the authors was a visiting professor at the Imperial University of Tokyo.

In the early chapters the writers show how the fundamental mores of Japan are little changed despite an acceptance of Western attire and



armaments, but in their discovery that Japan is Japanese they rather overstress the peculiarities of her culture. They later point out, on the other hand, that present-day Japan is very different from feudal Japan and that the country will probably change even more in the future—so much so that the Japan of tomorrow will have nothing in common with that of yesterday except a name.

The early part of the book, which deals with the geography, history, religion, and political system of Japan, is rather impressionistic, and cultural forces are frequently personalized: "In the Western development myth preceded religion, and again and again it has imperiled the intruder with the irrationalities which seep up from the secret depths of a mystic, fantasy-creating folk soul" (p. 12). "Taken as a whole it [the Tokugawa period] was an epoch which devoted itself to developing a culture form and realizing all the possibilities of refinement within it" (p. 64).

The later chapters on foreign policy and economic problems are more matter of fact. One of the good points made here and often overlooked by Western economists in estimating Japan's economic resources is the remarkable self-sufficiency of the farmer.

The book contains neither Bibliography nor Index.

JOHN F. EMBREE

*University of Hawaii*

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*South of Hitler.* By M. W. FODOR. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1939.

Pp. xvi+347. \$3.50.

The present imperial policies of the axis powers differ from those of England, France, and Holland, in that Germany and, to a lesser degree, Italy are faced with the problem of consolidating empires which are not in no man's lands and in empty continents but which are located in Europe, in countries that are part and parcel of Western civilization and of the existing balance of powers. It is these countries of the Balkans and of central Europe which the well-known foreign correspondent presents in this new and enlarged edition of his *Plot and Counterplot in Central Europe*.

The book contains an analysis of the foreign policies and domestic developments in those countries which are considered to be the next objectives of German economic or military expansion. Brief historical sketches serve to introduce the reader into the present position of nations and nationalities in those insecure parts of Europe. Diplomatic surveys

are interwoven with amusing anecdotes and firsthand inside stories about the "societies" and the governing parties and cliques of these countries. The book will be serviceable to the wider newspaper-reading public and the prospective tourist of southern and central Europe.

ERNEST MANHEIM

*University of Kansas City*

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*Norwegian Settlement in the United States.* By CARLTON C. QAULEY. Northfield, Minn.: Norwegian-American Historical Association, 1938. Pp. xii+285. \$3.00.

After a basic appraisal of "Migration Factors," the author follows the first Norwegian immigrants, who arrived in 1825, as they move westward, traces the spread of Norwegian frontier settlement into Wisconsin and Iowa, analyzes the advance into Minnesota, and then goes on to the country of Rølvaag's *Giants in the Earth*, South and North Dakota and beyond. He concludes with chapters on Michigan and on "islands" of settlement outside the main sweep of the advance. Historically, this is a valuable introduction to the whole story of the migration of the Norwegians to America. But we find here very little of the sociology which could have been extracted from the innumerable historical facts. For that reason the book is almost as complete as your local telephone directory, and, unfortunately, no more exciting.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

*New York University*

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*Crooked Personalities in Childhood and After.* By RAYMOND B. CATTELL. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1938. Pp. xii+215. \$2.00.

The author states that his aim has been "to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the current psychological methods of treatment of nervous and difficult children, and to do so in such a way as to bring out the underlying principles of psychotherapy." After an initial emphasis on the necessity of discovering and treating difficulties during childhood years, Dr. Cattell proceeds to a brief but clear statement of the main theories of Freud, Jung, and Adler, with an attempt at reconciling them. A very sketchy chapter, entitled "The Scientific Approach," then outlines present-day theories on instincts, intelligence, temperament, and conditioned reflexes. The remainder of the book is a discussion of child-guidance clinics, well illustrated with cases which are briefly analyzed according to the theories stated in the earlier chapters of the book.

Although the book is not intended for the professionally trained psychologist, some understanding of psychoanalysis and of psychology would be necessary, since a vast amount of material is treated with extreme brevity in the book.

RUTH SHONLE CAVAN

*Rockford, Illinois*

*Changing Aspects of Rural Relief.* By A. R. MANGUS. (Works Progress Administration, Division of Social Research, Research Mono. 14.) Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938. Pp. xxiii+238.

*Rural Families on Relief.* By CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN and NATHAN L. WHETTEN. (Works Progress Administration, Division of Social Research, Research Mono. 17.) Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938. Pp. xxiv+161.

These two monographs represent solid factual studies of the rural relief population of the United States. In 1935 the number of rural persons on relief numbered about eight and a half million, which was equivalent to 16 per cent of the rural population of 1930. During that year the relief surveys of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration were greatly expanded. From a sample of three hundred counties and eighty-three New England townships representing the major agricultural regions of the nation, cross-section data of the relief population as of February, June, and October were obtained. It is upon these data that the above monographs are based.

*Changing Aspects of Rural Relief* deals with the economic backgrounds of the rural relief situation, relief trends, and relief turnover, particularly during 1935, and the characteristics of the rural relief population. The reader will find here a careful analysis supported by abundant data. Fortunately, a critical evaluation of the data and the methods used is also presented. The entire last half of the monograph is devoted to statistical and methodological appendixes. The statistical development of the large sample used and the successful handling of it in co-operation with thirty-two state organizations provide an interesting event in the annals of practical co-operative research.

*Rural Families on Relief* deals with families rather than with individuals. The approach is statistical, but the authors have succeeded in presenting in an interesting as well as in a convincing manner the data bearing upon the type, size and composition, fertility, employability, and mobility of rural-relief families.

The reviewer regards these monographs as fundamental to an understanding of the rural-relief situation in the United States.

C. E. LIVELY

*University of Missouri*

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*Parent Education.* By EDITH A. DAVIS and ESTHER MCGINNIS. (Institute of Child Welfare Mono. 17.) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1939. Pp. 153. \$2.50.

The measure of the efficacy of parent education is the degree to which it is successful in bringing the opinions and attitudes of parents in line with the current views of the expert. This was the criterion employed by Dr. Davis in her study of the influence of parental instruction which is reported in Part I of this volume.

Ratings of the seriousness of specified behavior problems when occurring in boys and girls five, nine, and fifteen years of age were made by mothers before and after attendance at child-study groups. Differences in the two sets of ratings are taken as a measure of the opinion-changing influence of parent education. It is a surprising commentary on earlier rating studies that this should be the first of its kind which "... has adequately controlled the age and sex of the child considered and the cultural background of the rater."

Part II of this volume is an account by Dr. McGinnis of the history of organized parent education in Minnesota which dates from the founding of the Institute of Child Welfare at the University of Minnesota in 1925. The conclusions reached from an analysis of the systematic records kept by the institute over a six-year fact-finding period should prove valuable to persons concerned with the organizational or pedagogical problems of parent education.

PAUL WALLIN

*Chicago*

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*Practical Birth-Control Methods.* By NORMAN E. HIMES, with the medical collaboration of ABRAHAM STONE, M.D. New York: Modern Age Books, Inc., 1938. Pp. 254. \$0.95.

This volume, written with a minimum of technicality, provides an authoritative evaluation of all contraceptive devices now in use. Chapters on feminine hygiene, the problems of abortion, sterility, and sterilization, and a brief history of the birth-control movement add further to its usefulness. It concludes with a list of the medically directed birth-control

clinics in the United States and the addresses of companies manufacturing approved contraceptives.

Although this little handbook is ostensibly "for professional distribution," its utility, readability, and low cost should bring it to the attention of a much larger circle of readers.

PAUL WALLIN

*Chicago*

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*The Clinical Treatment of the Problem Child.* By CARL R. ROGERS. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1939. Pp. xiv+393. \$3.00.

This book, written for students and others who are working with unadjusted children, is a survey of methods of diagnosis and methods of treatment. Based upon a wide variety of published studies and reports as well as upon the author's own experience, it gives an excellent and detailed summary of procedures in use in child-guidance clinics in this country. Because it is a survey, it lacks definite focus and unity; its value will be in providing a background of information for the prospective clinician rather than in giving him the actual tools of a unified system of theory and practice.

Part I on methods of diagnosis is rather weak. Too much emphasis is placed upon tests and upon methods of diagraming factors in the child's situation; too little emphasis is given to a needed theory of personality that should lie back of any diagnosis. Part II on treatment through the use of foster homes and institutions is especially thoughtful and thorough. Part III upon the use of family, school, camps, and clubs in treating a child is rather sketchy. Part IV on treatment through interviews of various sorts gives a comprehensive survey of methods that have been developed in different clinics; this section will inform on types of interviews but will not make the reader of the book into an interviewer.

In spite of the shortcomings indicated, the book is exceedingly interesting and should be very useful to the group for which it is intended.

RUTH SHONLE CAVAN

*Rockford, Illinois*

# ABSTRACTS OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

The persons who have aided in the preparation of the material for this issue are: Hubert Bonner, John A. Clausen, Robert Dubin, Shotaro F. Miyamoto, Erich Rosenthal, Shirley A. Star, and Samuel M. Strong. The numerals and letters appearing after each abstract correspond to the items in the following scheme of classification:

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|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| I. THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY        | e) The State and Political Process   |
| a) Sociological Theory          | f) The School and Education          |
| b) History of Sociology         | g) Economic Institutions             |
| c) Methods of Research          | h) Voluntary Associations            |
| d) The Teaching of Sociology    | IV. POPULATION AND HUMAN ECOLOGY     |
| II. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY           | a) Demography                        |
| a) Human Nature and Personality | b) Ecology                           |
| b) Collective Behavior          | c) The Rural and the Urban Community |
| III. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION        | V. DISORGANIZATION                   |
| a) The Family                   | a) Personal Disorganization          |
| b) Ethnic and Racial Groups     | b) Social Disorganization            |
| c) Social Stratification        |                                      |
| d) The Church and Religion      |                                      |

284. Fünfzig Jahre deutscher Sozialversicherung: Rückblick und Ausblick [Fifty Years of German Social Insurance: Past and Future].—Fifty years after the announcement of the introduction of social insurance by Emperor Wilhelm I it seems appropriate to give an account of the result of this important social invention, which has become an international model for social insurance. Before the introduction of social insurance there were only voluntary aid associations for the poor and some private factory and guild insurance against sickness which took care of only the skilled workers. Both the individualistic trend toward decision by the groups immediately concerned and the socialistic trend toward radical change of the existing order lost in favor of the *sozial-ethische* movement, which advocated protection for the weaker part of the population by granting it as much individual freedom as possible. The introduction of a guaranteed and enforced social insurance led not only to larger security and bigger aid but, what is more important, to the *right* of public aid in cases of sickness, invalidism, and old age. By now (1931) two-thirds of the German population enjoys this right. War, unemployment, increased wages, increased cost of living, and demand for a more extended aid to the aged led to the increased burden of a suffering post-war economy. Although the cry for a reduction of insurance dues in an economic depression is understandable, the positive influence of social insurance on the whole population cannot be overemphasized. Whatever reform may take place, the system of social insurance must be upheld and cannot be separated from the state. The principle of insurance and of the single insurance of each risk should not be abolished. The only way to reduce the cost of social insurance is to maintain a simple and decentralized administration.—Friedrich Zahn, *Allgemeines statistisches Archiv*, XXII (1932), 1-17. (IIIc.) E. R.

285. Die internationale Kriminal Statistik in ihrer methodischen Entwicklung [The Systematic Development of International Crime Statistics].—Two organizations, the Institut international de statistique and the Commission internationale pénale et

pénitencier, are interested in the development of international crime statistics. Although more responsible scientists have stressed the fact that available data could not be compared and should not be used for an evaluation of culture in various countries, less responsible writers have made such comparisons with the result that they provoked a serious discussion as to whether international crime statistics are at all desirable or necessary. The main difficulty in this endeavor is the incomparability of the existing data and the difficulty of introducing an internationally recognized method of collecting data—a difficulty resting on differing definitions of crime in each country. The number of items collected in different countries varies from three to seventeen. An international comparison of juvenile delinquency is impossible because of differing definitions of majority. Some countries record only the number of sentences; others, the number of persons convicted; still others include the number of persons accused, though acquitted. The fact that the ratio of the number of convictions to the actual number of crimes varies from country to country, and within each country with the time, does not make a comparison easier. The attempt to explain the causes of crime by correlating the crime with economic and social conditions, occupations, etc., imposes new difficulties. The lag between the time at which the crime was committed and the conviction is another handicap. Only a positive interest and willing co-operation between the countries will improve the situation.—Ernst Roesner, *Allgemeines statistisches Archiv*, XXII (1932), 17-44. (Ic.) E. R.

286. Die statistische Erfassung der Begabungen und Leistungen auf den deutschen Schulen [The Statistical Evaluation of Abilities and Achievements in German Schools].—So far German statistics on education have been concerned only with data not relevant to the problem of whether the schools have actually fulfilled their function. The overcrowding of high schools and institutions of higher learning presents numerous reasons for attacking the following problems: (1) Do all capable students leave public school, or do only the economically poor remain? (2) Is the high school overcrowded with students whose ability to pay tuition is the only justification for attending it? (3) Have the achievements really decreased? (4) How do the different systems (*Gymnasium*, *Real-Gymnasium*, *Ober-Realschule*) compare in their achievements? The statistics of the annual high-school graduations which show how many graduated and how many left school with or without being graduated should be supplemented by information about the father's occupation and the normality of the student's age. The public schools should at least collect samples separated for rural and urban districts. A statistics of records is not impossible. If records are really not significant, as some believe, why are we giving grades? The records should be separated according to labor and business communities. Graduation examinations in high schools prior to enrolment in universities and examinations for enrolment in high schools should give more information of achievement.—Karl Keller, *Allgemeines statistisches Archiv*, XXII (1932), 45-60. (III f, Ic.) E. R.

287. Der Personalstand der öffentlichen Verwaltung im deutschen Reiche im Vergleich zu dem Frankreichs und Grossbritanniens [The Size of the Personnel of the Public Administration of Germany Compared with Those of France and Great Britain].—Although it is difficult to compare the size of the personnel of the three countries under consideration, a close inspection shows that, of all gainfully employed, 5 per cent in France, 6 per cent in Germany, and 6 per cent in Great Britain are civil servants. In Germany there were 1.3 million civil servants in 1928, of whom 19 per cent had the status of laborers, 14 per cent the status of *Angestellte* (white-collar workers not on tenure), and 67 per cent the status of *Beamte* (white-collar workers on tenure). To every hundred gainfully employed in Germany there are four civil servants. Most of the 1.3 million civil servants are in the so-called public service agencies, such as education, public welfare, traffic agencies, etc. In Germany 0.8 per cent, in France 0.75 per cent, and in England 1.1 per cent of all gainfully employed are teachers. Notable is the increase in Germany of the tax and customs administration to seventy thousand persons as against only thirty-five thousand before the war of 1914-18.—Karl Noa, *Allgemeines statistisches Archiv*, XXII (1932), 60-68. (III c.) E. R.

288. *La Conception chinoise du droit* [The Chinese Conception of Law].—As one moves toward the Orient the logical elements of Greco-Roman law, which more or less dominate life in the Occident, slowly disappear. The Chinese have given to law and the notion of justice only an inferior position. To them the "moral order" is above the "natural order." Legal sanctions are essentially penal in character, are very severe, and serve the purpose of intimidation. The power of the state and its delegate, the judge, has been progressively reduced as compared with the power of the leader of the clan, the guild, the head of the family, and the general administrator, each tracing his duties to his respective domain and ruling upon conflicts on the basis of local customs and usages. Law is intimately associated with the conception of a universal order of nature and with the idea of the effectiveness of an agreement between it and the social order. It leads to the recognition of a pattern of carefully defined relations whereby juridical rules enter into a system of classified natural objects. The concept of written law does not play an important part in Chinese mentality; what formalism resides in law is largely extra-legal. Chinese law is not differentiated from morals. Private law is reduced to a few unimportant texts which are maintained only because they are important in effecting public order. Inherent in the language and logic of the Chinese and in accordance with their moral principles is the notion that law is, above all, concerned with concrete cases and that responsibility is fixed on the basis of injury against the public order. The influence of the West on Chinese law is still only superficial and fragmentary.—Jean Escarra, *Archives de philosophie du droit et de sociologie juridique*, V (1935), 7-73. (Ia, IIIe.) H. B.

289. *Sociologie juridique et théorie processuelle du droit* [Legal Sociology and the Processual Theory of Law].—There are three schools of the nature of law: the positivistic, the idealistic, and the sociological. All three are in search of an exact definition of law and of an axiological definition of justice. A most satisfactory theory of law and one most in keeping with the demands of contemporary society can be found in legal sociology. Legal sociology requires, however, the use of a method different from that of naturalistic sociology. A critical study of the hypotheses of legal sociology will furnish the clue to this method. The method in turn will furnish the answer to the chief problems of legal sociology. The processual theory here advocated defines law as a social objectification that organizes the structure of other types of objectifications and makes possible the realization of as much justice and liberty as is possible in a given historical milieu. From the standpoint of this conception legal sociology is not a rigorous experimental science. Justice and liberty are inescapably axiological; and this definition of legal sociology is, in effect, an analysis of the development of the technique of law, by subordinating it not only to certain social necessities but also to logical, practical, and moral necessities.—Barna Horvath, *Archives de philosophie du droit et de sociologie juridique*, V (1935), 181-242. (Ia, IIIe.) H. B.

290. *Les Liens de vassalité et les immunités en Espagne* [The Bonds of Vassalage and Immunities in Spain].—The peculiar conditions created by the Mohammedan invasion prevented the full evolution of feudalism in Spain. Following the invasion, the social structure was organized on the basis of the small holdings of free men under a king kept powerful by the need for defense. Vassalage of nobles did not appear until the middle of the tenth century, and even then the bonds of vassalage were loose and easily broken by either party. In general, immunities consisted of exemption from certain services to the king and of forbidding functionaries of the king from entering the domain. Yet, even though they were powerful in their own domains, the lords were always bound to the king by solid ties. They never acquired the right to coin money and never exercised any real independence.—Luis de Valdeavellano, *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie*, XVI (1936), 91-96. (IIIg.) J. A. C.

291. *La Féodalité musulmane* [Mohammedan Feudalism].—The institution of feudalism, so characteristic of all the states of the Mohammedan world during the period from the eleventh to the nineteenth century, was not existent at the commencement of Islam and had no part at all in the Mohammedan conception of the state.



Land conquered from infidel peoples was given to members of the family of the Prophet and to military leaders. The holders of these grants turned over to the public treasury a tithe or rent, receiving in turn rent from small planters. They thus interposed themselves between the latter and the state. This economic evolution was accompanied by a breakdown of the political order, so that in time the governors of the provinces took over both political and financial administration and became independent sovereigns. Recompense for civil or military functions took the form of granting fiefs, and a military feudalism resulted. With the creation of a new army organized according to European principles, the feudal system was abolished in Turkey in 1839.—Paul Wittek, *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie*, XVI (1936), 97-101. (IIIg.) J. A. C.

**292. Problems in the Statistical Study of Juvenile Delinquency.**—This study, based on Cleveland data, seeks: (1) to check the generality of relationships suspected from intimate study of case histories and from impressions formed in personal contact with delinquents; (2) to uncover previously unsuspected relationships which may be worth further qualitative study; and (3) to develop and evaluate techniques for achieving the first two purposes. Since the number of cases is not large enough for extensive cross-classifying, partial correlation is used as a means of controlling factors. There are six series for the partial correlation analysis: male delinquency, homeownership, equivalent rental, dependency, unemployment, and native white of native parentage. The multiple correlation of delinquency with the five remaining variables is .84, but the multiple correlation of delinquency with homeownership and rental alone is .80. The partial correlation analysis gives the following results: (1) homeownership is very closely associated with juvenile delinquency; (2) nativity has little association when the other factors are held constant; (3) the "combined partial" correlation of rental, unemployment, and dependency, taken together as an index of economic status, and juvenile delinquency is .40. Of these three factors, dependency is associated with delinquency even when the other indices of economic status are held constant. For a more qualitative study, the census tracts of Cleveland are fitted into six categories, in which economic status and nativity are held relatively constant. Categories in which more than four tracts fall are selected for further analysis. From among those tracts which do not conform to the pattern of low in dependency and high in homeownership, low in delinquency are selected for detailed study in an effort to find other factors which might explain the nonconformity to the observed pattern. Nationality, the concept of interstitial area, size of family, and recidivism fail to explain the deviation. The number of families contributing delinquents seems consistently to be a small proportion of the total number of families in the tract. Owing to this fact, it becomes necessary to challenge the basic assumption of homogeneity within the census tract.—Henry D. Sheldon, Jr., *Metron*, XII, No. 1 (1934), 201-33. (Ic.) S. A. S.

**293. The Construction of Life-Tables by Correlation.**—A very serviceable life-table closely representative of the general population can be constructed on the basis of mortality statistics compiled for a sufficiently large group of that population. In this case the sample includes about sixteen million white lives representing the industrial policyholders of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. It is not necessary that the part of the population employed be an unbiased sample of the total, for this bias is fully compensated by the method proposed, which is based on the observed correlation and regression equation between the mortality rates in the sample as compared with the general population. The trend in the smaller group appears to reflect with accuracy the changes in the whole population. A method such as this makes possible the preparation of a life-table for the general population before the government statistics are published. A further advantage is that in intercensal years the information regarding the exposure among policyholders of a life insurance company is much more precise than in the general population.—L. I. Dublin, J. A. Lotka, and Mortimer Spiegelman, *Metron*, XII, No. 2 (1935), 121-27. (Ic.) S. A. S.

**294. Social Scientists and Public Affairs.**—Academic men are now increasingly drawn into public service, where they are under subtle inducement to harmonize their thinking with public policy, but this may impair their functions as academic thinkers

and research workers. Professors who undertake such public services should be vividly aware of their ambiguous status. Further, a group of scholars who resolutely avoid official connections, who make their work the attack upon fundamental problems of a social science, should exist. Workers on governmental programs acquire a progressive orientation to political expediency with a consequent deterioration of their technical thinking. If the pitfalls are avoided, however, active participation is valuable in increasing the insight of the scholars. The foregoing remarks predicate a political environment sufficiently stable and liberal to support free intellectual inquiry. It seems that intellectual freedom can thrive only where there is considerable freedom of political choice and economic enterprise. Under a liberal regime a scholar has relatively great intellectual freedom, but he may not use his freedom to advocate an authoritarian form of government, for he is then equally advocating the abolition of his status as a liberal scholar.—Paul T. Holman, *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, XXI (1937), 285-97. (Ic.) S. F. M.

295. **The Relation of Skill Politics to Class Politics and National Politics.**—A frame of reference that considers the significance of events in terms of the rise and fall of skill groups rather than in terms of the rise and fall of national states and social classes will provide a new perspective. Our definition of the skill groups includes workers who have some skills and those in professions. A commonwealth of skills has optimum conditions for the acquisition, exercise, and control of skills. About 1880 the United States was close to a skill commonwealth, but instability and monopoly were two tendencies inimical to its realization and preservation. Drastic economic fluctuations, leading to unemployment, limits opportunity for the exercise of skill; monopoly markets leading to dictatorial economic practices is a curtailment of skill control. World-political transformations may be intelligible as a movement toward skill commonwealths. In the Russian revolutionary pattern the effort toward equalization of income was in the general direction of a skill commonwealth, but the abolition of free competition and its replacement by the monopolization of legality in the hands of a single party were measures restricting skill control. Similar analyses may be made of the Fascist and Nazi movements. Common to all developments is a symbolic attack upon the limitation of skill control by private monopoly and the substitution of different degrees of public monopoly. It seems that political movements of this epoch are developing toward a common institutional form which we are calling the commonwealth of skill, and this will probably be achieved by many nations in many ways. To manipulate events toward the emergence of skill commonwealths, the appropriate measures are: (1) equalize income, (2) preserve general competition, (3) democratize technological monopolies, and (4) regularize production. Such a program involves a consideration of ways and means of gaining the requisite skills and has as well its propaganda, pressure, and inducement aspects.—Harold D. Lasswell, *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, XXI (1937), 298-311. (IIIc.) S. F. M.

296. **Educational Aspects of International Organization.**—Modern education does not effectively fit the school child for full and understanding participation in the life of his time primarily because systems of education are necessarily, at present, essentially national, and the men teaching within such a national "culture" unwittingly propagandize a limited point of view. In the training of the teacher, therefore, he should be made aware of the relation between his work and the national culture he has learned to accept and of the limits of his objectivity. An important advance would be made if every nation possessed its institute of education, such as the one in London, which is admittedly modeled after Teachers College at Columbia University, where the direct experience of national educational systems are made available to educators of other countries. An obvious correlate is an international institute that not only would function as a clearing-house of comparable national problems but would enable interchange of views among the world's ablest educators. A clearer definition of a philosophy of education would result, and the present lack of an organizing principle in educational institutions would be modified. The aim of education thus becomes the simultaneous development of ideal nationals and ideal world-citizens.—George H. Green, *New Commonwealth Quarterly*, II (1936), 65-74. (III f.) S. F. M.

297. Zur psychologischen Grundlegung des Friedens [The Psychological Basis of Peace].—The failure of collective security, as embodied by the League of Nations, has not been explained by political-historical or logical discussions but may be understood from a consideration of the psychological basis of peace. The idea of collective security begins with the conviction that the deepest yearning of people is for peace and order. However, the reality is that in people, especially in youths, there exists not only a desire for security but also an irrational instinct for struggle and change, for remolding life-conditions. We have seen where the rationalist's faith in the response of men to the idea of collective security has led. Yet the instinct of struggle is not to be confused with the instinct of war. Creative work has always the character of struggle, from which it is obvious that the instinct for struggle does not disappear in higher cultures but plays an ever greater role. The failure to get full expression in the spiritual realm, however, is the occasion for the steps toward war. Today increased freedom and higher standards of living have increased the vitality of people, and this, together with the growing unemployment and times of greater need, creates a stock of energy awaiting use. The outer observable unemployment is accompanied by an inner unperceivable unrest. This situation gives rise to unorganized masses without purpose or leadership only too easily swayed at the bidding of demagogues. It is this condition which leads to communism, fascism, and increased probability of war.—Hans Zbinden, *New Commonwealth Quarterly*, IV (1938), 177-88. (IIB, Vb.) S. F. M.

298. Circumcision [Circumcision].—The custom of circumcision dates back to six or eight thousand years ago. Sanchoniathian, in his *Théogonie phénicienne*, tells about Kronos, who sacrificed his sons and who practiced on himself this operation, forcing his countrymen to do likewise. The Phoenicians and the Egyptians received this practice from Kronos. Welch found a mummy of twenty centuries before our era with a circumcised phallus. According to George Montandon, circumcision appears to have been a characteristic of totemic culture in the early developments of the custom. It is practiced by Mohammedans, Jews, by all the dark peoples of Africa including its islands, by the Fellahs and Copts of Egypt, and by the Christians of Abyssinia. In North America the Dénés-Dindjés Indians of Athabasca-Mackenzie have preserved the custom which was a practice of the Aztecs and the inhabitants of Yucatan and Salvador. In Oceania almost all the people of the islands follow this custom. The Australians suspend hostilities at the time when the ritual takes place. The Mohammedans are among the very few peoples who practice it without ceremony.

Some people, like the Jews, circumcise their infants on the eighth day after birth; the Abyssinian Christians, on the twenty-fourth day; and the Arabs, at the age of thirteen. Among the ancient Egyptians circumcision was imposed only on the members of the warrior and sacerdotal castes. In central Arabia and in Egypt the man is circumcised the day after his marriage.

The Talmud specifies circumcision's hygienic importance. Philo of Alexandria first indicated the hygienic reasons for circumcision. Herodotus and Maimonides attributed prophylactic powers to it. Dr. Barras maintains that the absence of the foreskin is a guaranty against syphilis and other venereal diseases. This thesis is substantiated by statistics of the Metropolitan Hospital of the Jewish Quarter in London, and by Dr. Minor, of Moscow, giving the proportion of six cases of syphilis among uncircumcized to one case among circumcized individuals. Dr. Allaix believes that circumcision takes place mainly in the warmest climates and that its aim is to suppress the secondary erotic practices like masturbation and eliminate the dangers of hypersexual excitation which weakens the race. Blondel thinks that circumcision is an unjustifiable fanaticism. Dr. Tant points out that circumcision has never been for any people a practice of bodily cleanliness but that it always was a ritual act. [The second part of this symposium, a psychoanalytic interpretation, will be abstracted in the next issue of the *Journal*.—Ed.]—Symposium by Svalberg, Griaule, Leiris, Allendy, et al. *L'Hygiène mentale*, XXXVIII (1938), 72-96. (IIb.) S. M. S.

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